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1 
 
1 Introduction: the argument of this book 
 
The purpose of this work is to launch a discussion about the constitution of the native 
speaker’s linguistico competence in a philosophically, psychologically, sociologically, 
neuroscientifically, and linguistically plausible manner.
1
 At the same time it is intended to 
make a first contribution to this discussion. The principal goal is to show that the constitution 
of the syntax-semantics relationship is as much culturally determined as it is determined by 
natural factors. This means that if we want to know how sound waves produced by human 
articulation are assigned something we call “meaning”, we have to look at natural and cultural 
aspects of language users. While the theory I put forward is compatible with virtually all 
prevalent syntactic descriptive systems, it makes strong claims with respect to semantics. My 
central thesis regarding the relationship between syntax and semantics is that  
 
 linguistico utterances conventionally encode conceptual and non-conceptual contents 
of language users, whereby  
o conceptual contents ultimately originate in perception (in fact they simulate 
perceptions) and  
o non-conceptual contents originate in socioculturally conventionalized, 
internalized action and attribution habits enacted within the respective culture. 
As declarative knowledge, they are imposed on perceptually based conceptual 
contents which are fundamentally underspecified with respect to actional 
matters.
2
 
 
Languages, in particular their formal, i.e., syntactic sides, have developed strategies for 
regularly encoding these conceptual and non-conceptual contents. This is illustrated in Figure 
1.1 below, modeled on the semiotic triangle of Ogden & Richards (1965). 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Semiotic triangle 
                                                 
1
 As in the case of “biological“, the often used term “linguistic“ comprises two meanings, namley ‘concerning 
the science of language’ and ‘concerning language’. In order to properly distinguish both meanings, I will put a 
superscript “o” for ‘object language’ at the end of the word, wherever language is concerned. The superscript 
will be absent when the science of language is meant. I apologize for this notational inconvenience. 
2
 As done here, my central arguments, theses, and conclusions will be highlighted by means of boxes. 
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This work deals mainly with how the German language manages this but I will also indicate 
for which aspects of the theory cross-linguistic differences may be expected or not. 
Approaching the syntax-semantics relationship in this way, we must first ask why this 
relationship is problematic at all. 
 
 
1.1 Overview: the relationship between syntax and semantics 
 
Philosophers and linguists in the 20
th
 century have come to the conclusion that semantic 
relations as they have been describing them apparently do not stand in a one-to-one 
relationship with syntactic relations (cf. Butt 2006, Levin & Rappaport Hovav 2005, Kasper 
2008). This can be illustrated with the help of the following contexts, exhibiting the so-called 
unergative/unaccusative difference (1.1), an agent/patient shift (1.2), and the dative 
alternation (1.3): 
 
(1.1a)  A: Was macht denn Peter da? ‘What is Peter doing there?’ 
 B: Er tanzt. ‘He is dancing.’ 
 A: Das ist ein Krankenhaus. Hier wird nicht getanzt! 
  lit. ‘This is a hospital. Here is not danced (There is no dancing in here).’ 
 
(1.1b)  A: Was macht denn Peter da? ‘What is Peter doing there?’   
 B: Er zittert, weil er friert. ‘He is shivering because he is freezing.’ 
 ??A: Das ist eine Sauna. Hier wird nicht gefroren.3 
 lit. ‘This is a sauna. Here is not freezed (There is no freezing in here).’ 
 
(1.2a)  A: Was ist denn passiert? ‘What happened?’ 
  B: Ich habe die Vase zerbrochen. ‘I knocked over the vase.’ 
  A: Du Idiot! ‘You idiot!’ 
 
(1.2b)  A: Was ist denn passiert? ‘What happened?’ 
  B: Mir ist die Vase zerbrochen. ‘(It happened to me that) the vase broke.’ 
         
??A: Du Idiot! ‘You idiot!’ 
 
(1.3a)  A: Ich habe einen Brief nach Verona geschickt. ‘I sent a letter to Verona.’ 
  B: An wen denn? ‘To whom?’ 
  A: An Anna. ‘To Anna.’ 
 
(1.3b)  
#A: Ich habe Verona einen Brief geschickt. ‘I sent Verona a letter.’ 
  B: Wer ist denn Verona? ‘Who is Verona?’ 
  A: Verona ist eine Stadt in Italien, ich habe den Brief dorthin geschickt. 
                                                 
3
 Question marks in front of an example indicate that the utterance may be unacceptable/inappropriate to some 
speakers of German. Double question marks indicate that it may be unacceptable/inappropriate to most speakers. 
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  ‘Verona is a city in Italy. I sent the letter there.’  
 
In these and many other examples (apparently) similar syntactic structures (as in the (a) and 
(b) sentences) show divergent behavior with respect to certain operations. However, there are 
potential generalizations about the syntactic effects of semantic factors which can hardly be 
accidental. Pānini’s early observations of such generalizations in his Kāraka Theory (6th 
century BCE) could be mentioned here (cf. Butt 2006: 15ff.), or the rule for “unmarked” 
subject choice in terms of semantic deep cases stated by Fillmore (1968: 33, slightly 
modified). 
 
(1.4)  If there is an agent, it becomes the subject; otherwise, if there is an instrument, 
it becomes the subject; otherwise, the subject is the theme/patient. 
 
There is, then, an asymmetry between syntax and semantics that linguists have to deal with. 
While syntactic structures are relatively easy to observe in the form of actual utterances, 
semantic structures, i.e., conceptual and non-conceptual contents, are actually invisible, or 
opaque, to observation. That means, it is possible to describe certain syntactic regularities 
(e.g., dependency, valency), while this has been much harder in semantics so far. How can 
one approach the relationship between syntax and semantics? There are several strategies that 
have been pursued in the last centuries and decades.  
First, one could confine oneself to a descriptive framework (with few explanatory ambitions) 
and posit an integrated semantico-syntactic structure by imbuing syntax with semantic 
notions. This view could be characterized as that of classic Latin grammars. These grammars 
exploit the subject-predicate distinction from Plato’s Sophistes. However, such a view begs 
the question, since it presents the facts evident in the above examples without providing a 
solution to the problem. 
Second, one could grant syntax (in the form of a grammatical competence; cf. Chomsky 1980: 
224) an independent status, for reasons of method (cf. Chomsky 
2
2002: 101). But being able 
to generate the grammatical and only the grammatical sequences of syntactic units of a 
language seems to be insufficient. It seems that one must refer to semantic considerations to 
decide whether or not the odd examples above belong to the language in question. 
Third, one could segregate syntax and semantics and concede an independent status to both. 
Gaining insight into how “meaning” works would then allow the formulation of an interface 
structure between semantics and syntax. Philosophers and logicians as well as linguists have 
long hypothesized about the nature of an adequate semantic structure. Concentrating on 
linguistics here and focussing on the last fifty to sixty years, one can assert that this view is 
mostly accompanied by a specific theory about the human mind, assuming that it is organized 
in a (more or less massively) modular way. The modules are then connected via an interface 
(cf. Chomsky 1986: 68). According to different theories, the dependencies between syntax 
and semantics as well as the inherent organization of semantics also differ. While Jackendoff 
(e.g., 2007: 43) grants semantics a generative organization as well, Chomsky has always 
highlighted the primacy of syntax. With respect to the inherent organization of semantics one 
has to decide how much semantics may “enter” the interface: only the syntactically relevant 
structures or greater resources of “knowledge” (e.g., Bouchard 1995, Wunderlich 2000)? 
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The fourth view could be identified with that of Cognitive-Functional Linguistics (see section 
2.1.2). As Langacker (2008a: 5) formulates it in his “content requirement”,  
 
“[…] nothing beyond symbolic structures need be invoked for the proper characterization of 
complex expressions and the patterns they instantiate. More specifically: lexicon and grammar 
form a gradation consisting solely in assemblies of symbolic structures. An immediate 
consequence of this position is that all constructs validly posited for grammatical description […] 
must in some way be meaningful.” 
 
This is in some respects the direct opposite of the former view. Syntax and semantics are not 
cognitively separated in modules but equally constitute part of our conceptual structure. 
Linguistic
o
 structures are then pairings of semantic and phonological structures, both being 
present in our conceptual system. There are no syntactic units, then, which have no semantic, 
i.e., conceptual import. This means that syntax is constrained by semantic factors but is not 
completely determined by it (cf. Langacker 2008a: 6). And according to Dik, defending a 
rather functionalist view (
2
1997: 7f.), 
  
“pragmatics is seen as the all-encompassing framework within which semantics and syntax must 
be studied. Semantics is regarded as instrumental with respect to pragmatics, and syntax as 
instrumental with respect to semantics. In this view there is no room for something like an 
‘autonomous’ syntax.” 
 
Today, most theoretical linguists would presumably subscribe to the third view (but see the 
introduction to chapter 2). Several grammaticographic traditions could be subsumed under 
this view, among them Lexical Functional Grammar (LFG; Bresnan 2001), Head-Driven 
Phrase Structure Grammar (HPSG; Müller 
22008), Jackendoff’s Parallel Architecture 
(Jackendoff 1983, 1987a, 1990, 1997, 2002, 2007), Lexical Decomposition Grammar (LDG, 
Wunderlich 1997), and many linguists within the Generative tradition (e.g., Grimshaw 1990, 
Larson 1988, Hale & Keyser 2002). This view can be summarized by means of the following 
schematic: 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Modular view of the syntax-semantics interface 
 
The vertical arrows in Figure 1.2 indicate the bidirectional relations between semantics and 
syntax. This relation can roughly be illuminated by imagining a language producer and an 
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interpreter. The former has to encode semantic structures syntactically; the latter has to assign 
an interpretation to syntactic structures. The horizontal arrows indicate the theory-dependent 
variability of the width of the interface level, i.e., how many interface notions have to be 
assumed and of what sort they are (cf. Jackendoff 2002: 218ff.). Although cognitive-
functional theories, representing some variants of the fourth view, may not share this view on 
the organization of the mind and presumably would reject the term “interface”, they also 
attempt to bridge the gap between syntax and semantics (cf. Langacker 2008a, Croft 2001, 
2012, Goldberg 1995, 2006, Dik 
2
1997, Foley & van Valin 1984, van Valin 2005, van Valin 
& Diedrichsen 2006 (the latter three in the Role and Reference Grammar (RRG) framework). 
The interface shall thus account for the wide-ranging dissonances between semantics and 
syntax.
4
 Similar to these frameworks, one goal of my own proposal is to answer the following 
questions: 
 
 Is there a regular relationship between semantic contents and syntactic structures, and 
if so, what does it look like? 
 
Obviously, there is a wealth of theories dealing with the syntax-semantics relationship. Why 
should another one be proposed? The reason is twofold. The first concerns the descriptive 
means for prevalent semantic theories and its implications. The second concerns the 
explanatory depth and nature of a particular “interface” notion, namely that of thematic roles. 
I discuss them in the two following sections. 
 
 
1.2 Predicate-argument structures 
 
Not all of the theories subscribing to the third view above have an elaborated semantic 
structure. The research programme design of Chomskyan Linguistics (see section 2.3) makes 
semantics a secondary matter for it. Consequently, this linguistic tradition lacks a full-fledged 
theory of how knowledge is to be represented (apart from logic). Within cognitivist and 
functionalist linguistic theories, especially RRG, as well as in the parallel architecture 
approach by Jackendoff (1983 and sqq.) semantics play a more important role. Ray 
Jackendoff (1972 and sqq.), Leonard Talmy (2000), Ronald Langacker (1987 and sqq.), 
George Lakoff & Mark Johnson (1980, 1999, 2002), and nowadays those working on 
Construction Grammars (e.g., Fillmore 2006, Goldberg 1995, Arbib & Lee 2008, Croft 2001, 
2007, 2012) have long struggled with a conception of semantics as a conceptual semantics, 
conceiving of conceptual structure and conceptual mechanisms as at least partially 
determining factors for syntactic structures. These approaches agree in the rejection of what 
Jackendoff (2002: 107ff.) calls the “syntactocentrism” of Chomskyan Linguistics, i.e., the 
                                                 
4
 Theories defending the modular view employ different means of syntactic description. While many theories 
within Cognitive-Functional Linguistics use their own descriptive systems, most of the defendants of the third 
view use some variant of X-Bar syntax (at different stages of development) while differing as to the question of 
how many syntactic levels should be posited. These descriptive systems allow the formulation of structural 
relationships holding between syntactic elements, such as one or another variant of dependency, valency, and 
constituency (cf. Tesnière 1959, Zifonun 2003, van Langendock 2003 on dependency, Ágel 2000 on valency, 
Matthews 1981, 2007, Zwicky 1985, Chomsky 1981 on both dependency and constituency). 
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assumption that all non-syntactic representations are derivative of the syntactic representation. 
Semantic structure usually shares, however, many characteristics with the interface level. The 
latter, one could say, is conceived of as including all those notions that are both semantically 
and syntactically indispensable.  
 
And, perhaps surprisingly, despite all their differences, the metaphysical paradigms 
dominating Chomskyan Linguistics and Cognitive-Functional Linguistics with respect to the 
syntax-semantics relationship seem to promote predicate-argument structures as the primary 
means of description. 
 
Most of the theories employ some form of a descriptive system for the interface that is based 
on logical notions of the type given in (1.5a) and, applied to itself, in (1.5b): 
 
(1.5a) predicate (argument1, argument2, argument3) 
(1.5b) predicate (argument1, [(predicate (argument1, argument2, argument3)]) 
 
Whether promoted explicitly or not by their respective metaphysical paradigms, predicate-
argument structures are actually used as a means of describing relations between semantic 
units, and as a means to model the syntax-semantics interface, that is, the place where – in 
accordance with a computational model of the mind – some kind of semantic structure 
interfaces with some kind of syntactic structure, both of which are considered to be 
incommensurable with respect to their algebras. It is only at the interface that they are 
supposed to “communicate”.  
Since I will be dealing with what is traditionally called “(predicate-) argument structure”, a 
predicate can be identified with the semantic counterpart of a verb and the arguments in (1.5a) 
with the syntactic counterparts of complements. In (1.5b) the predicate in the square brackets 
constitutes an argument of the non-embedded predicate. It is the semantic counterpart of a 
verb, but functions semantically as an argument. Its counterpart is thus a verbal complement.  
The range of theories in which predicate-argument structures are employed is remarkable. For 
instance, Jackendoff (2007) has worked out a theory of conceptual structure which originates 
in his pioneering work in 1972. At that time, these structures were already designed to 
represent conceptual content, although Conceptual Semantics only began some time later. 
Jackendoff is in many respects a representative of prevailing views in theoretical linguistics. 
He (2007: 236, see also Culicover & Jackendoff 2005, Culicover 2009) uses the following 
means to represent the conceptual structure of the sentence Bill amazes me. 
 
(1.6) [Bill CAUSE [I BE [AMAZED (Bill)]]]  
 
This is clearly a variant of predicate-argument structures of the sort given in (1.5) in that there 
is some kind of base predicate of which variables are arguments. So Bill is one argument of 
CAUSE and the complex [I BE [AMAZED (Bill)]] is a second-level function as the second 
argument of CAUSE.  
The same is true of Goldberg’s (1995) constructions which also show clear-cut similarities to 
the descriptive means given in (1.5). In other words, Construction Grammar also makes 
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extensive use of “classical” predicate-argument structures, even though Construction 
Grammar rests on other assumptions about mental organization than Jackendoff’s parallel 
architecture account, in that it rejects a modularly organized computational mind, for instance. 
A Goldbergian construction is given in (1.7) below. 
 
 (1.7)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cognitive Grammar (e.g., Langacker 2008a) allows syntax no autonomy at all, as has been 
mentioned above. So, syntactic structures must somehow “derive” from conceptual structures 
in that they symbolize them. In order to make the correspondences between both structures as 
(theoretically) clear as possible and since syntactic structure is more transparent, it seems 
quite reasonable to assume conceptual structure to be homomorphic with it. This is expressed 
in the following quote. 
 
“What shows that ‘hit’ is the régissant, to which ‘Alfred’ and ‘Bernard’ are subordinated? […] 
What it means in conceptual and grammatical terms for a component to be the head is that it has 
the same profile as the composite structure. The composite structure usually inherits its profile 
from one of the components, which is thus called the profile determinant. ‘Hit’ is the profile 
determinant in ‘Alfred hits Bernard’, since the process it designates is also profiled by the 
expression as a whole. The verb is thus the head at this level of organization.” (Langacker 1994: 
75) 
 
In other words, the head in syntactic structure corresponds semantically/conceptually to the 
profile determinant of the structure, thus yielding parallel structures. In this context, 
parallel means that the dependency or head-complement relation is directed from predicate 
to argument in semantics and from verb to complement in syntax.
5
 
Within the Principles and Parameters approach (or Government and Binding, if one prefers; 
cf. Chomsky 1981), such a parallelism is maintained through the idea of θ-roles, which in 
turn implies some predicate of which the θ-role bearers are arguments. Ultimately, this 
results in a predicate-argument structure as the interface between syntax and semantics, as 
expressed in (1.8). The form of the so-called θ-grids is the appropriate example for the 
“fabrication” of the desired homomorphism between semantic, interface, and syntactic 
structures. The example is taken from Belletti and Rizzi (1988: 344). 
 
(1.8) piacere:  θ-grid [Experiencer, Theme] 
 
                                                 
5
 Although the Cognitive Grammar treatment of profiling and profile determination can be “translated” into 
predicate-argument structures, it must nevertheless be emphasized that it constitutes an original and 
independently motivated concept of semantic relations. 
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Further examples of the employment of predicate-argument structures would be LFG (cf. 
Bresnan & Kanerva 1989, Bresnan 2001, ch. 14), HPSG (cf. Müller 
2
2008), Grimshaw (1990) 
within the Principles and Parameters approach, Wunderlich (2000) within LDG, van Valin 
(2005) within RRG, Dik (
2
1997) within Functional Grammar, and Hale & Keyser (2002) 
within the Minimalist Program, among many others. What is obvious, however, is that 
theories of grammar and theories of linking belonging to different research programmes  and 
subscribing to different metaphysical paradigms (see part I on these terms) all make use of 
predicate-argument structures when describing semantic relations underlying syntactic 
structures in order to establish some parallelism between them. 
In the theories of the last decades many principles hypothesized to operate at the interface 
between semantics and syntax have been formulated, among them the Universal Alignment 
Hypothesis (Rosen 1984), the Uniformity of Theta Assignment Hypothesis (Baker 1988), the 
Projection Principle (Chomsky 1981: 29), the θ-criterion (Chomsky 1981: 36), RRG’s linking 
algorithm (van Valin 2005), or Tenny’s (1992) Aspectual Interface Hypothesis. These 
principles concern either causal and/or spatial or aspectual semantic relations and their 
morphosyntactic expression, and they shall serve the predictability of syntactic structures like 
those in (1.1) to (1.3) on the basis of the corresponding semantic structures and as frameworks 
for reading meaning off syntactic structures. Most of the theories make use of some variant of 
what are now widely known as “semantic” or “thematic” roles, an interface notion relating the 
semantic arguments like those in (1.5a) and (1.5b) above to verb-complement structures (cf. 
Gruber 1970 for the “invention” of thematic roles, Grimshaw 1990 on an important 
contribution to the development of thematic role theories, Dowty 1991, Primus 1999, van 
Valin 2005 on important attempts to generalize thematic roles, Kasper 2008, Levin & 
Rappaport-Hovav 2005 on overviews over prominent thematic role theories). Thematic roles 
are generalizations over the features of the argument(s) of a semantic predicate in order to 
capture regularities in the mapping between semantic and syntactic structures (cf. Kasper 
2008: 23). By means of thematic roles it should be possible to characterize the relationship 
between syntax and semantics as non-accidental. This is captured in Figure 1.3. Note that a 
theory about the how semantics and syntax are related non-accidentally needs semantic and 
syntactic notions which are systematically linked by the interface notions. One of the most 
useful syntactic notions in this respect has been case (cf. Malchukov & Spencer 2009 for an 
overview). 
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Figure 1.3: Modular view of the syntax-semantics linking by means of thematic roles 
(arg1-n: argument1-n; TR1-n: thematic role1-n; comp1-n: complement1-n) 
 
The problem of how to describe and explain the relationship between semantic and syntactic 
units has come to be known as the “linking problem” (cf. Carter 1988). Especially the theories 
grouped above as the third view have made huge efforts in this respect.  
In what follows I will trace the origins of predicate-argument structures and attempt to 
demonstrate that they are an unexplained means of characterizing both semantic structures 
and the structures which are supposed to reside in the syntax-semantics interface. Naturally, 
both are of paramount importance for a theory about the syntax-semantics relationship in that 
they are employed at two of the three proposed levels (according to Figure 1.3). But if my 
arguments against the use of predicate-argument structures in those semantic and linking 
theories which claim to be cognitively plausible are valid, then this would result in a 
desideratum regarding semantic and interface descriptions and would legitimate an alternative 
proposal of a linking theory, such as that proposed here. 
The scientific history of predicate-argument structures is revealing: In the years before 
Chomsky’s (1965) Aspects of a theory of syntax, maybe starting with Chomsky’s (1959) 
review of Skinner’s behavioristic theory of language, a (first generation) cognitivistic view of 
language emerged (see ten Hacken 2009: 103ff. on the earliest stages of Chomskyan 
Linguistics). Since Aspects, theorization in grammar must – at least to a large extent – be 
identified with the attempt to uncover mental/cognitive structures. One could call this 
paradigm change a first cognitive turn (cf. Lakoff & Johnson 1999: 75f.): The study of 
language is identified with how it is supposed to be mentally represented. This is true for 
many of the theories mentioned above: They try to adequately answer the question of why 
linguistic
o
 structures (i.e., syntactic structures) work the way they do. The answer is supposed 
to be found in the human cognitive system, irrespective of different assumptions about the 
degree of syntactic autonomy. Semantics must from this perspective be considered a cognitive 
enterprise, too. 
A completely different conception of semantics is that of formal semantics which explicitly 
grew out of formal logic (cf. Lewis 
2
1972, Montague and Schnelle 1972, Dowty 1979, 
Cresswell 1991, Heim and Kratzer 
2
1998). Proponents of this view do not primarily try to 
show how or to what degree syntax is motivated by the workings of cognition; they try rather 
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to give a semantic description of the syntactic structures they find. To this end, categorical 
grammars at least “specify the compositional relationship of meaning to syntax using the 
convenient notion of a homomorphism between two [syntactic and semantic – S.K.] 
algebras.“ (Dowty 1979: 14). This programme is more an exploration of the human ability to 
reason (logically) in relation to the linguistic
o
 structures which express this reasoning than of 
mental structures. Furthermore it is the attempt to rid us of the imperfections of “natural”6 
language for the sake of scientific progress (e.g. Schächter 1978). The ideas behind this 
programme can be traced back to the late 19
th
 century and Frege’s eminently influential 
formalization of linguistic
o
 structures through the establishment of predicate logic. With this 
he laid one cornerstone of later truth-functional logic (cf. Tugendhat 1978, Skirbekk (
2
1980). 
Frege (1879: III/IV; my translation, my emphasis)
7
 motivates this programme as follows: 
 
“Accordingly, we divide all truths that require justification into two kinds, those for which the 
proof can be carried out purely by means of logic and those for which it must be supported by facts 
of experience. […] Now, when I came to consider the question to which of these two kinds the 
judgments of arithmetic belong, I first had to ascertain how far one could proceed in arithmetic by 
inferences alone, with the sole support of those laws of thought that transcend all particulars. My 
initial step was to attempt to reduce the concept of ordering in a sequence to that of logical 
consequence, so as to proceed from there to the concept of number. To prevent anything intuitive 
(Anschauliches) from penetrating here unnoticed, I had to bend every effort to keep the chain of 
inferences free from gaps. In attempting to comply with this requirement in the strictest way 
possible I found t h e  i n a d e q u a c y  o f  l a n g u a g e  to be an obstacle; no matter how unwieldy 
the expressions I was ready to accept, I was less and less able, as the relations became more and 
more complex, to a t t a i n  t h e  p r e c i s i o n  that my purpose required.” 
 
Frege drew the conclusion that he had to formalize natural language in order to gain exactness 
of reasoning, i.e., to attain the precision his purpose required. His ultimate purpose was the 
finding of a scientific truth or at least to find a way of establishing a method to get there (cf. 
Frege 1879: III). He therefore took Plato’s classical subject-predicate distinction and modified 
it into a logical function. A function (e.g., “f ( ) = 2 · ( )3 + ( )”, cf. Frege 1962: 16) is an 
unsaturated expression and must be saturated by an argument expression which in turn is 
saturated per se. Together they form a whole (e.g., “f (4) = 2 · 43 + 4”). Translated into natural 
language this means that there are unsaturated elements (for our purposes: verbs) and 
saturated elements (for our purposes: complements). The result is the structure given in the 
form of predicate-argument structures, consisting of a relational expression R (the unsaturated 
element – a predicate) and some (ordered) saturating argument(s): R (x, y, z). The replacement 
of language structures with such a formal descriptive system was adopted by, e.g., 
                                                 
6
 The term “natural” stands in opposition to “artificial” here, not to “cultural”. Language as a means of 
communication in everyday praxis is a natural as well as a cultural phenomenon (see ch. 2, introduction) and 
both are opposed to “artificial”. I will use“natural” here, however, as a placeholder. 
7
 From the original: “Wir theilen danach alle Wahrheiten, die einer Begründung bedürfen, in zwei Arten, indem 
der Beweis bei den einen rein logisch vorgehen kann, bei den andern sich auf Erfahrungsthatsachen stützen 
muss. […] Indem ich mir nun die Frage vorlegte, zu welcher dieser beiden Arten die arithmetischen Urtheile 
gehörten, musste ich zunächst versuchen, wie weit man in der Arithmetik durch Schlüsse allein gelangen könnte, 
nur gestützt auf die Gesetze des Denkens, die über allen Besonderheiten erhaben sind. Der Gang war hierbei 
dieser, dass ich zuerst den Begriff der Anordnung in einer Reihe auf die logische Folge zurückzuführen suchte, 
um von hier aus zum Zahlbegriff fortzuschreiten. Damit sich hierbei nicht unbemerkt etwas Anschauliches 
eindrängen könnte, musste Alles auf die Lückenlosigkeit der Schlusskette ankommen. Indem ich diese 
Forderung auf das strengste zu erfüllen trachtete, fand ich ein Hindernis in der Unzulänglichkeit der Sprache, die 
bei aller entstehenden Schwerfälligkeit des Ausdrucks doch, je verwickelter die Beziehungen wurden, desto 
weniger die Genauigkeit erreichen ließ, welche mein Zweck verlangte.“ 
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Wittgenstein (2003), Carnap (
2
1968), and Schmidt (
2
1959). It is thus not accidental that Heim 
and Kratzer (
21998: 13) claim to execute the “Fregean Program” within their semantics for 
Generative Grammar.  
This is the crucial point: In Frege’s formalization of natural language expressions in logical 
terms we find the common ancestor of both of the descriptive systems mentioned above: that 
of the conceptions of semantics which grew out of formal logic and that of a cognitively 
oriented semantics. The structures in (1.6), (1.7), and (1.8) originate in Frege’s work and, as a 
means of formalizing natural language expressions, the underlying descriptive apparatus has 
“gained access” into natural language semantics.  
Talking about semantics is then highly ambiguous with respect to the following questions: 
What exactly do we want to describe? Is it logical relations and the relationships between our 
language systems and what happens in the external world or possible worlds (cf. Lyons 1991, 
Löbner 2003, ch. 4, 6, 10 for overviews), or is it cognitive structures and the roles they play 
with respect to the structures of our language systems (cf. Langacker 2008a, ch. 2 on a 
conceptual semantics)? Do we want to avoid the imperfection of natural language by 
formalizing it or do we want to explore the cognitive structures that may be responsible for 
this imperfection? Do we want to separate true from false sentences for the sake of scientific 
progress or do we explore cognitive structures for their own sake? These questions point to 
completely different research purposes and they culminate in the question of whether our 
descriptive means are tuned to the subject-matter of our theory. One could ask whether this 
labelling is important at all. Does it matter whether we use predicate-argument structures in 
the context of logic, formal semantics, or truth-functional semantics or in the context of a 
cognitive semantics? The answer must be affirmative, since the choice of descriptive means 
must be geared to the subject-matter and purposes of research. Apparently – and this is the 
reason for such extensive explanations – semantic researchers use the same means of 
description, while fundamentally differing in their scientific research goals.  
It is precisely at this point that I sense a problem in the historical development of descriptive 
means in linguistic
o
 semantics: The theories about the syntax-semantics relationship 
mentioned above claim to be cognitively plausible but at the same time make use of the 
instruments of logic originating in Frege’s conception of linguistico structures as functions. 
This choice not only seems to ignore the ontological orientation of the perspectives on 
semantics originating in classical logic (external/possible world ↔ linguistico structure) which 
are not compatible with that of a cognitively oriented semantics (concepts ↔ linguistico 
structure)
8
 (cf. Jackendoff 2002: 294ff., Lyons 1991), but it also imports other implications of 
the descriptive means as well, namely a dependency relation between predicates and 
                                                 
8
 Jackendoff (2002: 296) admits that “[i]n principle formal semantics is neutral about its metaphysics” which 
would mean about its ontological orientation, but Jackendoff (ibid.) states in the same breath that “on the whole 
‘language’ is taken to retain its common-sense status as something ‘out there in the world’”. David Lewis, a 
possible-world formal semanticist is explicit about this in that he distinguishes “first, the description of possible 
languages or grammars as abstract semantic systems whereby symbols are associated with aspects of the world; 
and second, the description of the psychological and sociological facts whereby a particular one of these abstract 
semantic systems is the one used by a person or population. Only confusion comes of mixing these two topics.” 
(
21972: 170). Lewis’ concern is with the former, and in the eyes of a cognitively oriented semanticist he 
“attempts to account for human reason without taking human beings into account at all. The assumption that the 
mind is a mirror of nature allows model-theoretic semanticists to bypass the mind altogether.” (Lakoff 1987: 
206).  
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arguments which is possibly modelled on that from verb to complement, although matters 
could be “mirror-inverted” here (Leiss 2003, see section 3.5 in the present work). This is 
clearly an empirical question, and empirical results thus determine how semantic structures 
should be described. This will be addressed in detail in sections 3.3 and 3.4. As a 
consequence, the branch of semantics dealing with cognitive structures has, from the 
beginnings of cognitively oriented linguistics until today, made use of a descriptive system 
that originates in another scientific discipline and that requires empirical validation. Taken 
together, predicate-argument structures have unexplained theoretical and methodological 
legitimation.  
The question of legitimation affects all those linking principles proposed so far in theoretical 
linguistics which conceive of syntax and semantics as exhibiting parallel structures, gained by 
employing predicate-argument structures. The use of predicate-argument structures facilitates 
the relating of semantic and syntactic elements in that the dependencies among semantic 
elements (argument dependent on predicate) are modelled as being parallel to the 
dependencies among syntactic elements (complement dependent on verb). The idea of a one-
to-one mapping between syntax and semantics is a consequence of the adaptation of the 
means of description from formal sciences, although they all claim to be part of cognitively 
significant theories.  
To sum up, it should be clear that there is a problem with a class of semantic theories claiming 
to be cognitively relevant; it concerns their means of description, which originates in a branch 
of science based on completely different research-programmatic (including ontological) 
premises, namely those of logic.
9
  
 
A theory of the syntax-semantics relationship not only requires a knowledge structure which 
is tuned to the underlying research programme and which is grounded both in perception and 
action but also one whose descriptive means must be motivated.  
 
It must not be in any way concealed or denied, however, that all the aforementioned theories 
and proposals mentioned above and using predicate-argument structures have brought us 
                                                 
9
 What about the concepts of valency and dependency? It is clear that my criticism towards them can only be 
valid if they are applied to semantics and at the same time are claimed to be cognitively relevant. Now, Tesnière 
(1959: 41 ; my translation), the father of the concept of dependency, states that “the structural [or syntactic – SK] 
and the semantic level are […] theoretically completely independent from each other.” But he also states (1959: 
40; my translation) that “on the structural level the linguistic expression of thought constitutes itself” and, more 
importantly, “between these two [levels – SK] there is no identity but parallelism.” (Tesnière 1959: 42; my 
translation). What is the scientific status of semantics, then? “The semantic level is external to the grammar, it 
belongs solely to psychology and to logic.” (Tesnière 1959: 40; my translation). The last quotation seems to 
indicate that psychology and logic are to be treated as one here, i.e., as indistinguishable. As a consequence, 
Tesnière attributes psychological significance to semantics. What is also remarkable is that elsewhere (cf. 
Tesnière 1959: 238) he uses Fregean terminology, when he says that a verb is “saturated” (saturé). Admittedly, I 
do not know whether this is purely accidental. But in sum, although syntax is conceived of as autonomous, it 
expresses “psychic” content. The locus of this content is conceived of as being structurally parallel to syntactic 
structure. Although Tesnière delegates research into semantic structure to psychology and logic, many of his 
successors in the field of valency theory have availed themselves of predicate-argument structures in order to 
describe such mental structures or processes (cf. Bondzio 1976, 1980, Heringer 1983, 1985, Jacobs 1994, 2003, 
the volume by Herbst & Götz-Votteler 2007, among many others). Whether implicitly or explicitly, they also 
rely on the parallelism thesis concerning predicate and argument on the one hand, and head and dependent on the 
other – an assumption which, as has been shown, is problematic. One could conclude from this that a semantic 
valency theory which is modelled parallel to predicate-argument structures is subject to the same problems. 
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extraordinarily rich insights into the syntax-semantics relationship and have led us far in 
explaining it (cf. Levin & Rappaport Hovav 2005 for an overview). From this discussion we 
can derive another question I will try to answer in the present work: 
 
 Are there alternative descriptive means for semantic contents as coded by verb-
complement structures? How must they be conceived, given that they have to be 
empirically plausible? 
 
As mentioned at the end of the previous section, the second factor that might legitimize a new 
proposal concerning the syntax-semantics relationship involves the explanatory depth and 
nature of thematic roles. 
 
 
1.3 The metaphysics of thematic roles 
 
The following fictional but true-to-life scenario will help to illustrate my point.  
 
 
(1.9) The three-year-old twins Jessica and Nicole are at dinner with their parents Sarah and 
Marc. Nicole reaches for the milk carton. She grips it only with her fingertips, causing it to 
fall down. It falls off the table and runs all over the floor. Jessica and her mother have kept 
track of what happened. 
 
(a)  Jessica: Nicole             hat                die          Milch runtergeworfen. 
  Nicole.3NOM have.3AUX the.ACC milk  down-throw.PTCP 
  ‘Nicole knocked over the milk.’ 
 
 Sarah: (hesitating, looking at the surprised causer) 
(b)  Nein, sie            ist            ihr           runtergefallen. 
  No    it.3NOM be.3AUX her.DAT down-fall.PTCP 
  ‘No, (it happened to her that) it fell down.’ 
 
 Jessica: … (not signalling misunderstanding) 
 
 
In this type of event with which every speaker of German is certainly familiar there is a single 
event (Nicole knocking over the milk) with two alternative verbalizations (Jessica’s and 
Sarah’s). However, these verbalizations are not paraphrases of each other but differ in 
“meaning”. Using classical terminology, while the (a) sentence makes Nicole the “agent” of 
the event, the (b) sentence makes her an “experiencer”. The milk is a “theme” in both 
sentences.  
Broadly speaking, linking theories have mainly employed two kinds of thematic roles, namely 
those concerning objects involved in spatio-temporal circumstances (e.g., source, goal, 
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location, theme, etc., cf. Gruber 1970, Jackendoff 1972 et sqq.) and those involved in causal, 
or action-related circumstances (e.g., agent, patient, instrument, etc.; cf. Fillmore 1968). Most 
thematic role theories make use of a mixed set of roles (e.g., LFG, Government and Binding 
theory, and Construction Grammar, among others). In proposals in which generalized 
thematic roles are used, these roles mostly encompass both spatial and actional role types 
(e.g., Dowty’s (1991), Primus’ (1999), and Ackerman & Moore’s (2001) proto-roles, and van 
Valin’s (1999) macroroles). Finally, there have been a number of proposals in which both 
kinds of roles were partitioned into a thematic (or spatial) and an action “tier”, thus making 
their different status explicit (e.g., Jackendoff 1987a, Culicover & Wilkins 1986, Grimshaw 
1990). 
Theories dealing with the linking problem must explain how particular thematic roles of the 
arguments in a semantic representation are linked to positions in syntactic representations. 
Scenario (1.9) illustrates that this is not enough. Linking theories must not only explain how 
language users assign particular “meanings” to utterances and construct utterances from 
particular “meanings”, they must also explain the criteria by which particular thematic role 
assignments come about, namely: 
 
(i) what criteria make Nicole an agent in (1.9a) but an experiencer in (1.9b) and  
(ii) what criteria let the milk remain a theme across both verbalizations?  
 
Note that (i) concerns all action-related thematic roles, while (ii) concerns spatio-temporal 
thematic roles. My claim is that answering (i) requires use of fundamentally different criteria 
than answering (ii). I will argue that (i) can only be answered by recourse to those non-
conceptual contents that originate in socioculturally conventionalized, internalized action and 
attribution habits enacted within a culture, and that (ii) can be answered by recourse to those 
conceptual contents that originate in perception. This is the reason why Jessica and Sarah in 
(1.9) perceive the same (exemplified by the theme) but make different attributions 
(exemplified by the agent vs. experiencer attribution). One crucial claim I will defend is that 
action-related notions like those underlying agentivity (roughly: intentions) are not 
perceivable and thus constitute a different kind of knowledge than perceptually based 
concepts. The latter are thus underspecified. This has huge consequences for a conception of 
semantics and the syntax-semantics relationship. These considerations can be condensed in 
the following questions: 
 
 What is the respective ontological status of spatio-temporal and action-related 
thematic roles, and what is their position in a linking theory? 
 
On the basis of the assumptions outlined above I will try to demonstrate how an adequate 
treatment of traditional linking phenomena like those in (1.1) to (1.3) and (1.9), among many 
others, is possible. 
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1.4 The structure of this book 
 
Part I presents my basic assumptions about the syntax-semantics relationship as a competence 
of language users and compares them with those of the two paradigms that presently account 
for most theoretical linguistic projects, studies, and publications. I refer to them as 
Chomskyan Linguistics and Cognitive-Functional Linguistics. As I will argue, both 
approaches reduce their subject matter in a way that impoverishes the linguistic
o
 competence 
in crucial respects that have to be taken into account. It will be claimed that the competence in 
question consists in the ability to successfully interact verbally by means of verb-complement 
structures, which implies the well-formedness and situational appropriateness of what is 
uttered. For instance, while both (1.9a) and (1.9b) are clearly well-formed, only (1.9b) seems 
to accord to actual conventions of attribution and is thus an appropriate utterance in this 
situation. Important aspects of this competence thus concern issues of use and supra-
individual matters, i.e., questions about whether actual utterances are appropriate with regard 
to the contents. I will show that the abovementioned approaches do not provide the means to 
accommodate this, creating the need for an alternative approach.  
While considering these two approaches (sections 2.1 and 2.3), an alternative proposal will be 
sketched in section 2.2, using the notion of “research programme”. The programme developed 
and the model embedded within it are outlined in the corresponding sections and are intended 
to rest on generally acceptable metaphysical assumptions. Thus, part I deals mainly with 
questions of the philosophy of science. Nevertheless, the model underlying the research 
programme gives structure to the procedure followed throughout the rest of the book, since it 
identifies the undertaking as multidisciplinary, following from the central roles of perception 
and action/attribution. This means that approaching the competence of relating form to 
content as characterized above requires looking into these sub-competences first, since the 
former draws upon the latter.  
Traditionally, different scientific disciplines deal with these sub-competences, the most 
important ones being cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience, linguistics, philosophy, 
sociology, and social psychology. The way in which these individual scientific disciplines talk 
about their subject-matters is quite heterogeneous with respect to their basic assumptions on a 
meta-theoretical, i.e., research-programmatic level. Part I therefore concludes with the 
formulation of an action-theoretic vocabulary and taxonomy (section 2.4). The notions 
developed there are grounded in those differentiations that are enacted in everyday life, i.e., 
they are lifeworld differentiations. How we differentiate things, features, events etc. in our 
everyday life in an intersubjectively traceable way is considered here to be the ineluctable 
instance for the validity of theoretical distinctions. Crucially, this vocabulary serves as the 
guideline for how to talk about the subject-matter of each of these disciplines. 
Part II and chapter 3 then deal with the sub-competences that have been identified as 
underlying linguistic
o
 competence. They concern the use of perception, 
identification/categorization, conceptualization, action, attribution, and the use of linguistic
o
 
symbols. Section 3.1 in part II deals with perception and thus with cognitive psychological 
matters. The significance of perception for the linguistic
o
 competence may be an indirect one 
in that perceptual mechanisms are sustained in conceptualization, but it cannot be 
underestimated for the same reasons. Figure 1.1 indicates the central place of conceptual 
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contents in the syntax-semantics relationship. In particular, two crucial properties of 
perception will be discussed: that it consists of a bottom-up part and a top-down part, and that 
the output of perception is underspecified in the sense that what we perceive is not 
informative with respect to actional, i.e., socially relevant matters. (This is what scenario (1.9) 
illustrates.) The sections on perception to some degree anticipate the characterization of 
conceptualization in section 3.2 because the latter will be reconstructed as simulated 
perception. The property of underspecification is thus sustained in conceptualization, too. 
Taking a conceptualist view of reference, this characterization of concepts becomes highly 
relevant: If utterances encode concepts and concepts are underspecified with respect to those 
matters that are most important for everyday interaction, one wonders how verbal interaction 
can (actually) be successful. Here is where action competence and attribution – matters of 
philosophy, sociology, and social psychology – come into play (the non-conceptual contents 
referred to above). I will show that natives speakers act and cognize according to particular 
socio-cognitive parameters, on the basis of which they make socially relevant attributions 
(just like Jessica and Sarah do in (1.9)). These in turn specify what was underspecified about 
concepts beforehand. (Nicole’s deed in (1.9) is underspecified with respect to matters of 
agentivity. Jessica’s and Sarah’s utterances encode the same perception, but differ in the 
encoding of attributions, thus compensating for the underspecification.) In other words, 
actional knowledge including attribution must complement concepts in order to count as the 
semantics underlying linguistic
o
 utterances. How this works is illustrated in a little case study 
involving German dialects that concludes these sections. 
Sections 3.3 and 3.4 develop a descriptive means for semantic contents not using predicate-
argument structures. I present the inherent structural organization of concepts and 
demonstrate how the spatial and temporal aspects of conceptualization can be systematically 
related to the syntactic structures underlying utterances, using the example of German. That 
means these sections deal with cognitive psychological matters but at the same time ask how 
these matters are systematically related to linguistic
o
 structures. In particular, I will argue that 
conceptualization is organized by means of trajector-landmark configurations which can quite 
regularly be related to parts of speech in syntactic constructions using the notion of 
diagrammatic iconicity. This will be illustrated by many examples. Questions of relativity and 
universality will also be discussed in this context. Given a diagrammatic mapping and 
conceptualization as simulated perception the utterance thus becomes something like an 
instruction to simulate a perception. (That is why (1.9a) and (b) encode the same 
conceptual/perceptual contents. The difference between them lies in the encoding of non-
conceptual contents: attributions). I will also discuss what role this motivated mapping plays 
in acquisition and what the consequences of violations of motivated mappings are, how they 
come about, and whether they derogate the interactive function of language or not. Because of 
the instruction rationale, I would like to give the name “Instruction Grammar” to the 
framework presented here. 
In part III, in which I turn to the core of the linking competence I try to demonstrate the 
advantages of the present theory of that competence over competing theories on a more 
concrete, i.e., phenomenon-oriented level. Even if my objections to Chomskyan and 
Cognitive-Functional Linguistics are considered serious and justified, they do not suffice to 
legitimate a new research programme at the level of philosophy of science alone, without 
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taking the explanatory power of those approaches into account at the level of theory. Even if 
the premises of a new research programme might be less problematic, the theories developed 
in accordance to it should not give up certain insights that are the result of the existing 
frameworks. Looking at the (incremental) interpretation and production of utterances, I will 
show how the conceptual and actional notions and devices developed in parts I and II supply 
producers and interpreters of utterances with the sub-competences to successfully interact 
verbally in a well-formed and situationally appropriate manner. Section 4.1 deals with the 
question of what the formal constituents of utterances/constructions contribute to the building 
of a concept from an utterance. In this context a theory of the German dative is presented, 
based on the theoretical notions developed throughout this work. Section 4.2 sketches the 
non-formal properties that reduce the remaining underspecification. In this context one of the 
most fundamental and important cognitive properties of language users is uncovered, namely 
their need to find the cause of any event they are cognizing about. I will then outline the 
consequences of this property for language production and comprehension. Section 4.3 lists 
the most important linking schemas for German on the basis of the most important 
constructions, i.e., motivated conceptualization-syntactic construction mappings, and then 
describes in a step-by-step manner how – from the utterance-as-instruction-for-
conceptualization perspective – such an instruction is obeyed, and how such an instruction is 
built up from the perception of an event, respectively. The latter will make use of the scenario 
in (1.9). The last section, 4.4, is dedicated to a discussion of some of the most famous, most 
widely discussed, and most puzzling linguistic
o
 phenomena which theoretical linguists 
traditionally deal with (like those in (1.1) to (1.3). In discussing the formal aspects of the 
linguistic
o
 competence, examples from German are used. 
For better or worse, setting up a research programme is associated with the reinterpretation 
and invention of theoretical terms. I have therefore put together a glossary at the end of the 
book. Additionally, appendix A shows how some central terms from traditional syntax-
semantics linking theories may be reconstructed using the present theory.  
The prominent role of perception in the theory proposed here and especially the role of the 
visual modality also finds its expression in the frequent use of illustrative figures. In 
particular, schematics of conceptual structures and of conceptualization-construction linking 
schemas will be of some importance. Although the symbolic conventions are separately listed, 
they will be developed throughout the chapters in conjunction with the theoretical notions 
they symbolize. The schematics used in this work are intended to be somehow iconic with 
respect to “real” events. This is due to the nature of perception and the close relationship 
between perception and conceptualization. I have also renounced any “syntax” of conceptual 
structure as is known from the work of Ray Jackendoff, for instance, because I claim 
conceptualization works modally, not by symbol manipulation. This makes a high degree of 
formalization difficult but I deem this unavoidable. But, one step at a time, let us begin with 
the research programme.  
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Part I: Research programme 
 
Introduction 
 
The topic of part I and its sub-parts is the programme underlying the proposal outlined in this 
book about the relationship between semantics and syntax.
10
 In particular, the background 
assumptions of the programme shall be presented and distinguished from alternative 
proposals. A programme without such prior, absolute assumptions seems, firstly, impossible 
and, secondly, ignores actual and previous research. The programme pursued here builds on a 
number of research results from a number of scientific disciplines. This is to a large degree 
due to the topic, since language and speech as objects of research extend to the fields of 
several disciplines. Any one of them makes proposals and contributes to the explanation of 
the phenomena in question. With respect to the history of science, it has often been ideas or 
complexes of ideas (like that of dialectic materialism) or technical achievements (like that of 
the digital computer) which have brought proposals and contributions of one or the other 
scientific discipline to the center of attention of the others and which have indicated new 
directions of research. Discipline-internally, i.e., in linguistics, such ideas or achievements are 
adopted under certain conditions and may, under further specific conditions, lead to paradigm 
changes (cf. Kuhn 
2
1970 on paradigms) or may bring about new research programmes (cf. ten 
Hacken 2009 on research programmes). Presumably, the last turnaround of this type took 
place within theoretical linguistics from the end of the 1950s to the beginning of the 1960s. It 
was at that time that linguistic structuralism of the post-Bloomfieldian type came into crisis 
(cf. ten Hacken 2009: 176ff.), when Chomsky (1959) sounded the death knell for linguistic 
behaviorism and when his alternative proposal required, as it developed, a representational 
theory of mind (cf. Horst 2005, Pinker 1994: 64–73) for which the works of Alan Turing (e.g., 
1950) on “thinking” and “learning” machines promised to provide the means. The assumption 
behind the novel syntactic analyses of Generative Grammar was one of a computational mind 
that manipulates formal symbols. 
Since about the end of the 1980s, however, a relatively coherent, identifiable research 
programme, known by its followers as either “Cognitive Linguistics” (cf. Janssen & Redeker 
1999: 1ff., Evans & Green 2006: 3) or “Cognitive-Functional Linguistics” (cf. Harder 1999b, 
Langacker 1999: 23, Tomasello 2000: 64, Nuyts 2005), has been developing. This research 
programme will here henceforth be referred to as “CFL.11 Adopting ten Hacken’s (2009) 
terminology, this programme seems incommensurable with respect to the concept of 
linguistics put forward by Chomskyan Linguistics (henceforth CL).
12
 Although a definitive 
program of CFL has not yet been formulated, its boundaries are relatively well determined 
(cf. the edited volumes, programmatic works and overviews by Janssen & Redeker 1999, 
                                                 
10
 The term “programme” is used here in a theory-neutral sense. The term “research programme” will be 
introduced in chapter 2.2. 
11
 Most importantly, one has to note that there was intensive work in this kind of linguistics prior to the 
establishment of a coherent research programme, or, one could say, there was a pre-paradigmatic phase. This 
period from the 1970s to the end of the 1980s can roughly be identified with the works of George Lakoff, 
Leonard Talmy and Ronald Langacker. 
12
 That is, their terminologies are founded on such different metaphysical assumptions that they can hardly be 
reconciled.  
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Evans & Green 2006, Evans & Pourcel 2009, Ungerer & Schmid 
2
2006, Croft & Cruse 2003, 
Geeraerts 2006a, Geeraerts & Cuyckens 2007a, Kövecses 2006, Kristiansen et al. 2006, 
Kristiansen & Dirven 2008, Dirven & Verspoor 1998, the Cognitive Linguistics Research 
monograph series, the journal Cognitive Linguistics
13
, among others). Not only the presence 
of textbooks in CFL (a sociological factor) but especially the manner in which scientific 
knowledge is passed on to upcoming Cognitive linguists points to the conclusion that it 
constitutes an identifiable research programme. Concerning the latter point, Cognitive 
linguists do not try – at least, usually do not try – to legitimate their programme by separating 
themselves from other programmes, but they suggest that there is already a readership that is 
interested in the topic for its own sake and thus do not need to be “converted” first. Today, 
two more or less isolated programmes in theoretical linguistics seem to coexist: Generative 
Grammar of the Chomskyan type (i.e., Government and Binding or Principles and Parameters 
theory and the Minimalist Program) and CFL.
14
 
When the subject matter of any scientific work overlaps with that of CL or CFL, then this 
work will have to deal with their programmes and their underlying assumptions and it has to 
take a stand relative to them. The present work, to anticipate the later chapters, shares some 
views with CFL but disagrees with it in some others, while it disagrees with CL more 
fundamentally. The following sections comprise a detailed outline of the programme pursued 
here and the discussion of its central assumptions.  
 Chapter 2 introduces the central sub-competences underlying the 
subject matter of this book: the linking competence. It outlines how 
the discussion of these sub-competences gives structure to the book. 
Section 2.1 introduces the notion of “research programme”; section 
2.2 presents a new research programme in the context of which the 
subject-matter is explored. This happens by contrasting it with the 
goals of CFL. The excursus to CL in section 2.3 demonstrates that it is 
not available as the starting point for my undertaking, either. Section 
2.4 introduces fundamental concepts associated with the research 
programme chosen.
15
 
 
 
2 Research programmes and the linking competence 
 
I deem that sociocultural praxis I am living in as well as that of any other human to be 
inconceivable without verbal interaction. By means of verbal action we organize and 
coordinate non-verbal action which is a constitutive part of such praxes (cf. Janich 2006, 
Gärdenfors 2002, Tomasello 2008, Everett 2013).
16
 In addition to their coordinating and 
organizing functions, verbal actions are themselves, as performatives, constitutive of our 
                                                 
13
 The CLR series and the journal “Cognitive Linguistics” are sponsored by the International Cognitive 
Linguistics Association (ICLA). See <http://www.cognitivelinguistics.org/index.shtml> for further information. 
14
 The dissension between Chomskyan Linguistics and Cognitive-Functional Linguistics still seem irreconcilable 
(e.g., Newmeyer 2003). 
15
 Paragraphs explicating the structure of upcoming chapters and integrating larger parts into the research 
programmatic context will be indented and marked with an arrow. 
16
 For a more detailed characterization of these terms see section 2.4. 
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living together (cf. Austin 1972). Anyone who wants or claims to be or to become a member 
of a sociocultural praxis must necessarily learn or acquire the language spoken in the 
particular culture. As famous exceptional cases indicate, a culture as reference point is even a 
necessary condition for the acquisition of a language (cf. Curtiss et al. 1974, Klann-Delius 
2
2008: 74ff.). Children like the famous girl Genie who were not raised in a human community 
do not acquire the competence to interact verbally until they have entered a community – even 
though in a different way from the “usual” (i.e., non-pathological or based on a missing 
linguistic
o
 socialization) course of events.
17
 It is a remarkable fact that we – as mature, 
autonomous subjects in a community – act verbally, i.e., we pursue purposes and manipulate 
the objective world around us by speaking, and due to the status of speaking as acting we 
could principally desist from acting verbally, while we cannot desist from acquiring the 
competence to speak, given the appropriate circumstances. Consequently, from the beginning 
a biotically
18
 rooted capacity appears to be another necessary condition for the acquisition of a 
language besides the already existing cultural praxis (cf. Bierwisch 2008: 324, Klix 2003, 
Tomasello 2008). Neither condition can easily be placed in the relation between phylo- and 
ontogenesis, even less so, if one factors the cultural aspects out of phylogenetic 
considerations, i.e., if one attempts to write a “natural history” of language.19 In any case the 
aforementioned conditions together contradict both radical “nature” and “nurture” proposals. 
In addition, this opposition seems to be nothing more than a hackneyed dichotomy today (cf., 
for instance, Johnson & Lakoff 2002).  
By “capacity” I mean the (condition for the) possibility of the development of a competence. 
Human beings like Genie indeed have the capacity to develop a linguistic
o
 competence, but 
the development has not been actualized in the conventional way. In the case that it becomes 
actualized, the linguistic
o
 competence is acquired. This – the actualization of the linguistico 
competence – is identical to the ability to interact successfully verbally within a 
communicative praxis. Success, as will be shown, thus comprises both grammaticality and 
appropriateness standards. 
In this context there appears to be an interesting asymmetry between language and other 
cognitive competences. Man, as a species, has the capacity to develop a linguistic
o
 
competence as well as to develop the competences of attending to something, employing 
visual imagery, memorizing something, solving problems etc. But while the development of 
the latter competences is independent from the presence of a community – Genie apparently 
has developed these competences –, the linguistico competence will not develop in a way that 
is comparable to the “usual” case. Thus, it cannot be actualized in a comparable way. This 
fact may lead one to the conclusion that language, because it is somehow special in this 
respect, should be viewed differently from other cognitive competences, and that linguistic
o
 
competence should be modelled differently and independently from other cognitive 
competences. But this viewpoint ignores the fact that the structures of language are to a high 
                                                 
17
 On the linguistic
o
 development of Genie cf. Curtiss et al. 1974, Pinker 1994, Sampson 2005. 
18
 While in speech about psychic and psychological, physical and physiological phenomena the difference 
between object-language and meta-language is sometimes respected, the speech about biological phenomena is 
an exception. Unfortunately, the meaning of „biological“ often comprises both ‘concerning the science of life 
forms’ and ‘concerning life forms’. Here, “biotic”, even if it sounds strange, is intended to mean the latter, while 
“biological” is used when the science of life forms is meant. 
19
 This is the case within the search for the origins of the language faculty within the Minimalist Program (cf. 
Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch 2002). 
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degree made possible by the working of other cognitive capacities and competences as well as 
by further biotic and cultural factors which pervade them (cf. Duranti 1988, 1997, 2004b, 
Foley 1997, Tomasello 1992, 1995, 2003, 2008, Tomasello & Farrar 1986, Tomasello, Kruger 
& Ratner 1993, Talmy 2000, Evans & Green 2006: 27ff., Palmer 2000, 2007, Ochs & 
Schieffelin 
2
1994, Everett 2013). 
As a consequence, the above-mentioned biotic capacity is, on the one hand, only a vague 
disguise of complex interdependences between different cognitive capacities and competences 
and, on the other hand, intermingled with cultural aspects in a complex and non-transparent 
way, where aspects of living together have a bearing on cognitive structures and operations. 
From the set of phylo- and ontogenetic, natural and cultural, social and individual, psychic 
and pragmatic conditions on the acquisition and the actualization of language(s) and speech, 
the following shall be emphasized as belonging to my basic assumptions: 
 
(B A1)
20
 the “possession” of conceptual contents (cf. the relevant literature on cognitive 
 psychology, e.g., Eysenck & Keane 
5
2005, Engelkamp & Zimmer 2005, Solso 2005, 
Sternberg 
4
2006). 
 This requires: 
 a) a perceptual apparatus for sensing and perceiving as well as structuring the 
 environment, i.e., functioning sense organs and in particular a visual apparatus 
 which in several respects structures language, 
 b) a “knowledge” structure constituting semantics which functions on the basis of 
perception and action, i.e., a conceptual structure in which “knowledge” is gained via 
perception and actional knowledge (i.e., from a sociocultural praxis) which 
complements it. How both conceptual and actional knowledge components are 
organized and combined constitutes the basis for the association of knowledge with 
structured signals; 
 
(B A2) the competence of intersubjectivity, i.e., the competence of seeking access to 
 conceptual contents (and thoughts) of others and of providing others access to one’s 
 own conceptual contents (and thoughts), respectively (cf. Schutz 1967 [= Schütz 
 
2
1981], ch. 3; Schütz & Luckmann 2003, ch. IIB, VA). 
 This requires: 
 a) the competence of joint attention (cf. Bühler 
2
1976: 27, 1982, Tomasello 1999: 
56–93, Tomasello 2008), through which a communication channel between 
interactants can be opened, which is indispensable for providing another person 
access to one’s own conceptual contents (and thoughts) which are per se private, and 
 for acquiring access to another’s conceptual contents (and thoughts), respectively, 
 b) a common ground, by which that is meant “what is ‘relevant’ to the social 
interaction, that is, what each participant sees as relevant and knows that the other 
sees as relevant as well – and knows that the other knows this as well […].” 
 (Tomasello 2008: 74ff.), 
 c) the need for cooperation which is the motivation for non-verbal interaction as well 
 as for the sharing of conceptual contents (and thoughts) (Tomasello 2008: 82ff., 
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 “(B An)” serves as abbreviation of “Basic assumption number n of the program pursued here”. 
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 Tomasello 2009); verbal interaction is in the normal case not independent of 
 purposes but serves the satisfaction of one’s needs and the realization of purposes, 
 respectively (cf. Janich 2001: chapter II, Janich 2006: 99f.); 
 
(B A3) the competence to use signs as means of purpose-rational action (cf. Tomasello 
2009). This requires: 
 a) the competence to match situationally-based percepts
21
 with concepts and to 
 designate the latter by means of syntactic structures, 
 b) the competence to designate concepts which are independent of the situational 
 context by means of syntactic structures, 
 c) the competence to segment signals and to classify the segments by associating 
conceptual contents with them, 
  
(B A4) action competence, comprising all conditions of action, action 
 understanding, and attribution (cf. Heider 1958). 
 Among these are: 
 a) autonomy to set purposes (cf. Janich 2001: 63), 
 b) rationality of means-end choice (cf. Janich 2001: 63), 
 c) the acquisition of an ascriptivistic action concept (cf. Janich 2006: 80ff.), 
 (d) control over one’s own actions, in part based on the perception and a “model” of 
 the environment (i.e., on basis of points (B A1) and (B A2) above; cf. Engelkamp & 
 Zimmer 2005: chapter 7, in part based on points (B A4a)-(c)).) 
 
None of these factors is sufficient for an explanation of linguistic
o
 competence. Furthermore, 
none of the competences mentioned is probably possible without presupposing one or more 
aspects of one or more of the others. But all of them are nevertheless necessary conditions. 
Moreover, few of them (even if the important ones) are necessary to acquire the other 
cognitive competences mentioned, namely those mentioned under (B A1). 
Apparently, the list above invites one to a discussion about which scientific disciplines should 
be responsible for the subject-matter. As an approximation, points (B A1) and (B A3) (and 
parts of (B A2)) lie in the traditional scope of psychology, cognitive or evolutionary, although 
philosophers might claim to contribute to point (B A1), sociologists to point (B A2), and 
semioticians to point (B A3). The topic becomes more complicated when one turns to points 
(B A2) and (B A4) (but cf. Quine 1951, 1969). While the cognitive aspects mentioned should 
lie in the scope of psychology, e.g. cognitive or evolutionary psychology, speaking about 
purposes and all the other concepts taken from a theory of action potentially poses a problem 
for natural sciences and a naturalized psychology. By naturalism I mean the metaphysical 
assumption underlying the research programme of a science or scientific discipline, according 
to which only laws of nature
22
 (Hartmann 1993, Hartmann 1998) are effective in their subject-
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 By “percept” I mean the result of the process of recognition (see section 3.1). 
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 Applying natural laws to some situation s1 such that another situation s2 can be predicted requires the 
subsistence of natural laws to the law of causality according to which the same causes have the same effects (cf. 
Hartmann 1993: 81). 
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matters.
23
 It is an outcome of the rise of the natural sciences since the nineteenth century that 
the natural sciences have made even human action their subject-matter. If, in addition, they 
accept the principle of sufficient reason
24
 and if purposes, intentions, decisions etc., i.e., 
matters of human action, are taken to be “real” in the sense of being somehow physically 
manifested, then they must be subjected to necessary physical causation. The following shall 
be the guideline of my overall considerations: The results of those cognitive sciences and 
neurosciences which make human action their subject-matter will be taken into account to the 
degree to which these scientific disciplines remain able to claim validity for their own results, 
depending on their presumptions (cf. Janich 2003). These claims are possible as long as these 
disciplines respect the relevance of action-theoretic notions and the distinction between object 
and observer. The assumption of a strict naturalism, i.e., conception of all human 
“movements”25 as being subjected to the laws of nature and the denegation of the possibility 
of action (as opposed to mere behavior), deprives us of the possibility to claim validity for our 
own theory and research results because we could not have done otherwise than to formulate 
them. As Janich (2001: 56; my translation) puts it,  
 
“[t]he main argument against the programme of naturalizing human action, i.e., of making it the 
exclusive subject-matter of natural scientific explanation is that it is logically incompatible with 
itself. One would actually have to see such behavioristic, or naturalistic, research not as a purpose 
of the scientists pursuing this program but one would have to explain it causally. This explanation 
is absurd, if only it is so complex that no one has ever attempted to put it into practice. But even if 
it were possible to do so, the crucial feature of any scientific explanation would fall victim to it: 
the differentiation between valid and invalid, between true and false explanations. Because, if 
insights were only products of functions of organisms which are described by natural scientific 
methods, then the same would be true for errors, mistakes, misapprehensions etc., too. That means 
natural scientific descriptions and explanations of the functioning of the human organism do not 
supply a differentiation between true and false results. On the contrary, they must claim this ability 
of differentiation from the beginning. In fact (and reasonably), natural scientists do not waive 
claims of validity for their results. The program of naturalizing human action is therefore as a 
matter of principle doomed to fail.” 
 
The subject of science, that is, a person of whatever profession engaging in the exploration the 
cognitive powers of homo sapiens, explores him-/herself as object of his/her research. 
Whatever his/her claims towards his/her object are, they are therefore claims concerning him-
/herself (cf. Janich 2006: 393ff.). As Hartmann (1998: 4) puts it (generalizing considerably), 
the naturalist asserts that any event, including human action, is a “natural” event, i.e., it is 
describable and explainable by theories of natural sciences in terms of natural laws. Any 
existing theory on the topic is thus an alternative to one’s own theory with (or without) equal 
claims for validity, since all those theories are necessary ones in the sense of laws of nature. 
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 These complications may result from ideas of the human species which are mostly implicit and seldom explicit 
in naturalistic theories. Keupp (2001: 37; my translation) states with respect to psychology that “[a]ll 
psychological theories and statements are based on ideas of the human species though they are seldom made an 
issue and reflected upon. When in today’s psychological jargon notions like “storage” or “information 
processing system” are used, then the human mind is conceptualized by means of a computer metaphor. The use 
of metaphors can be illuminating [erkenntnisfördernd] but the metaphor must not be treated like “the object” 
itself. Otherwise it becomes a myth.  Metaphors are tentative approximations to a field that is yet unexplored but 
one must be aware of this tentativeness.” 
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 “Every event has a cause.” (Hartmann 1993: 81f.; my translation). 
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 See section 2.4 and the event taxonomy proposed there. It suffices to say here that movement applies to any 
instance of vegetative or somatic behavior or action of living beings. 
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An external observer with a “God’s eye view” on what happens in the world is not possible, 
since the observer/theoretician is always part of the world he/she describes and as such he/she 
and his/her theory are subject-matters of themselves (cf. Gergen 1973, Pepitone 1981 on 
arguments against a naturalized psychology). In this work, a rather sceptical position shall be 
taken with respect to the principle that every event has a cause, since this is neither an a priori 
truth nor a natural scientific statement (cf. Hartmann 1993: 82ff.). Because of this the starting 
point of my considerations is a functioning communicative, sociocultural praxis in which 
everyone is simply forced to overtake responsibility for what he/she is made responsible for 
by other members of this praxis, just as if there were no alternative other than to presuppose 
the possibility of freedom of choice, setting of purposes, claims for validity etc. (cf. Janich 
2000, 2006, 2009, 2010, Sturma 2006, and section 2.4 of the present work). This is neither the 
denial that mental states and processes are accompanied by neuronal states and processes nor 
the denial of there being natural laws. It is a sceptical position towards the universal validity 
of the principle of sufficient reason which is in the first instance not a law of nature but (only) 
a methodological norm due to specific goals of research (cf. Hartmann 1993, 1996).
26
 
With that, the upper boundaries of the subject-matter of natural scientific methods are set for 
the theory of the semantics-syntax relationship presented in this work. A purely biological or 
evolutionary or, in brief, naturalistic explanation for the phenomenon of language and acting 
through language shall therefore not be attempted. The position of Chomsky (e.g., 1980: 
106ff.) is explicitly a naturalistic one and is therefore not available as an approach to the 
subject-matter in question. It is remarkable in this context that, as in CL, the naturalistic 
stance comes along with a gradual reduction of its subject-matter which, in the case of the 
narrow language faculty (FLN) (cf. Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch 2002), today encompasses little 
more than recursion which is, additionally, from an evolutionary perspective considered to be 
only secondarily a matter of language, since it is an exaptation, not an adaptation, and 
therefore might have developed for purposes other than communication (cf. ten Hacken 2009: 
114ff., 258ff. for an overview of evolutionary questions concerning FLN). Chomskyan-style 
theory of grammar thus excludes pragmatic competence and praxis-based performance at the 
level of the individual (cf. Chomsky 1980: 224 on grammatical competence vs. pragmatic 
competence; Chomksy 1965: ch. I, 1 on competence vs. performance), and the non-
genetically determined, non-evolutionary based aspects of the faculty of language at the level 
of species from its subject-matter, for methodological reasons (cf. Chomsky 1980: 38). 
In sum, the subject-matter of this work – the semantics-syntax relationship and its relation to 
the individual’s competence of verbal interaction – shall not be accounted for in a natural 
scientific approach, but in one that starts from within a functioning communicative praxis and 
that nevertheless includes insights from natural and cognitive sciences as well as from the 
humanities (in particular philosophy). 
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 Criticizing the naturalistic programme from a slightly different perspective, Keupp (2001: 39; my translation) 
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Coming back to conditions (B A1) to (B A4) above, which were conceived of as conditions 
for the development of a linguistic
o
 competence, one has to shift the perspective to make them 
the starting point for an investigation in the semantics-syntax relationship as manifest in the 
language user. Although these four conditions have been introduced as concerning the 
development of a linguistic
o
 competence, in what follows the focus will lie on the reflexes of 
the functioning of these competences in the functioning of language as it is used. In other 
words, the list above is derived from the factors that show up in the functioning of linguistic
o
 
structures and the structures underlying them, especially in what is known in theoretical 
linguistics as “argument-structure” and its verbal realization. 
  
As a consequence, the necessary parts of a theory of the syntax-semantics relationship can be 
listed. Drawing from numerous proposals from numerous scientific disciplines and sub-
disciplines, a consistent account of the topic requires  
 
 an account of perception and conceptualization (sections 3.1 and 3.2), 
 an internalized action theory (attribution) concerning actional knowledge that is 
imposed onto conceptual knowledge (section 3.2), 
 an account of how we understand others and know their interests and goals on the 
basis of acquired social and conceptual competences (section 3.2), 
 an account of linguistico utterances, in particular how they are build up, how they 
relate to what we perceive, conceptualize, and know about matters in the world and 
other persons (sections 3.2.3 to 3.4), 
 a discussion of the classical problems of the syntax-semantics relationship from the 
perspective of the present proposal (part III). 
 
Together, these constitute the foundations of Instruction Grammar. How the name is 
motivated will be shown in Part II. 
 
 
2.1 Research programmes 
 
2.1.1 On research programmes in general 
In order to integrate the considerations above into a consistent framework it is necessary to 
create a level of abstraction at which this becomes possible. The notion of “research 
programme” is intended to provide this level.  
The term “research programme” is taken from the work of ten Hacken (2009) in which he 
outlines the research programme of “Chomskyan linguistics”. The notion is derived from that 
of “paradigm” established by Kuhn (21970).27 One of the most important features of 
paradigms is their dependence on scientific communities. “Scientific communities can and 
should be isolated without prior recourse to paradigms; the latter can then be discovered by 
scrutinizing the behavior of a given community’s members.” (Kuhn 21970: 176). Sociological 
                                                 
27
 The term as used here in the sense of ten Hacken is not identical with Lakatos’ (1998) concept of “research 
programme”. 
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factors are necessary for Kuhn’s framework, since paradigms are defined as what a given 
community shares. They are thus existentially dependent on several agreements among 
members of a community. Such a characterization of paradigms allows Kuhn to investigate 
developments in the history of science, especially revolutions, i.e., the replacement of a 
paradigm by another one due to a crisis in the former (cf. Kuhn 
2
1970: 92ff.). In Kuhn’s 
account, then, paradigms depend on intellectual as well as social/sociological properties. 
In the present work, I am not primarily interested in the course of science in general, changes 
of paradigms or sociological matters concerning scientific communities but in the intellectual 
properties of what could potentially be a paradigm. Kuhn provides an answer to the question 
of what has to happen to make certain intellectual considerations to become a paradigm. The 
answer lies in sociological factors. I concentrate on the intellectual considerations alone and 
can only claim that it be generally acceptable to researchers within linguistics and in related 
fields. What is needed, then, is some equivalent to a paradigm which works independently of 
sociological factors. This is what ten Hacken (2009: 18) provides with his concept of research 
programmes. 
 
A research programme is constituted by a “model” consisting of a set of assumptions which 
are able to set the “empirical cycle” in motion and to circumvent its inherent problems (cf. ten 
Hacken 2009: 6–19). The empirical cycle is the mechanism that makes scientific insights 
possible.  
 
The necessary components to set it “in motion” are “observable facts”, “observations”, 
“empirical laws”, and “theories”. Each of these notions will be characterized in turn. The 
“setting in motion” of the empirical cycle can be described as follows: Someone (e.g., 
Eratosthenes) makes specific observations (e.g. about heavenly bodies), which are extracts of 
what is generally observable. He notices that there is something systematic, recurrent or 
pattern-like within the phenomena he observes (an observed, heavenly body x is always at 
point p in space at daytime t). On the basis of the analysis of his own observations, 
Eratosthenes formulates an empirical law. Empirical laws are “close” to observations. For 
instance, the characterization of the orbit on which the body moves along would count as an 
empirical law. These laws mediate between observations and theories which are more abstract 
than empirical laws (e.g., a formulation, verbal or other, which gives an explanation of the 
planetary system and the movements of their parts along orbits). A theory allows further 
predictions of other empirical laws and other observable facts. At the same time, these 
observable facts test the theory’s validity and may lead to a situation in which the 
incorporation of new data into the theory improves this theory, let’s say theory1, by 
modification in the sense that it, as theory2, now explains a greater range of data 
(observations). This process is potentially infinite, i.e., the “movement upwards” from theory1 
to theoryn has no logical end. In this sense, the empirical cycle is rather a spiral (ten Hacken 
2009: 9).  
Simple as it might seem, the idea of scientific progress based on the empirical cycle poses 
severe difficulties. According to ten Hacken (2009: 11) they can be put in the following way:  
 
“a. Which of the many possible observations are worth recording as data? 
27 
 
b. Which aspects of the selected data should be taken as a basis for a generalisation? 
c. When is a theory deep enough to be considered explanatory?” 
 
Why do these points pose difficulties? In the case of (a) the problem lies in the fact that 
observations are not mere subsets of observable facts and thus have a different status. A tree 
standing in front of the institute I’m sitting in might count as observable fact, but what I 
actually observe is dependent on my vantage point. I do not observe the entire tree because I 
can never see the entire tree. Thus, what I observe is limited. Furthermore, I add information 
that is not contained in the stimulus, i.e., in what I see. Actually, there are bushes in front of 
the tree, but I “know” that behind the bushes there is “more” tree than I see. Thus, any act of 
perceiving involves acts of interpretation and what we observe is not simply given in a unique 
way (cf. Moskowitz 2005: 22, Solso 2005: 104ff. for a cognitive-psychological explanation of 
this phenomenon from two different perspectives). 
The second problem, (b), is that it is possible to draw an infinite number of generalizations 
from a definite number of observed data, such that the generalizations are compatible with the 
data.
28
 Each of these generalizations might serve as the basis for predictions of further data 
and they will certainly predict slightly or completely different data not yet observed. When 
these data are (made) available, then some of the generalizations can be discarded, as they 
have been proven to make wrong predictions but the number of possible generalizations will 
never reach a number that could be coped with. What is required here is a criterion for 
choosing those generalizations among the possible ones which are “sensible generalisations” 
(ten Hacken 2009: 13).  
Problem (c) concerns the “depth” of explanations and the question of when they are deep 
enough to count as explanations. The seemingly simple answer to this question is “Never!”, 
because any explanation forces one to ask new questions. In the end, this might be a question 
of when a scientist is satisfied by the explanation given. Thales might have been satisfied by 
the depth of his explanation of the rich olive harvest he predicted because it allowed him to 
prove that a philosopher could easily get rich if he only wanted. Why today’s astronomers or 
astro-physicians are in no way satisfied by the insights they have brought about is a question 
that only they can answer by recourse to their purposes.  
The ostensible simplicity of the empirical cycle thus suffers from threefold indeterminacy. In 
other words, without additional considerations the empirical cycle alone does not suffice for 
making scientific progress possible. This is where the research programme becomes relevant, 
as it is the set of assumptions that circumvents the problems of the empirical cycle while 
warranting its functioning. That means a “set of assumptions, tacit or implicit” (ten Hacken 
2009: 18) must be made independently of the way the empirical cycle works in order to be 
able to cope with its above-mentioned deficits. 
Among the six assumptions gathered by ten Hacken (2009: 35), two play a special role, since 
they constitute the “model” underlying the research programme. (1) This is firstly “absolute 
assumptions as a basis for explanations” (ibid.). They correspond roughly to what Kuhn 
(
2
1970: 184) calls “metaphysical paradigms”. He characterizes them as “shared 
commitments” to certain “beliefs” which “supply the group with preferred or permissible 
analogies and metaphors. By doing so they help to determine what will be accepted as an 
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explanation and as a puzzle-solution.” The exclusion of sociological factors in research 
programmes leads to the replacement of “shared” by “generally acceptable” and of “will be 
accepted” by “could in principle be accepted”. Thus absolute assumptions lose their 
normative character. Instead of this they should be seen as generally acceptable. Absolute 
assumptions have the character of definitions or axioms and are more or less “immune to 
further questions” (ten Hacken 2009: 35). That does not mean that they are “true” but that 
they are the starting point for research. An example for such an absolute assumption, in the 
form of a preferred metaphor, is the mind-as-a-digital-computer metaphor on which much of 
the cognitive psychological research of the last fifty years is based (cf. Solso 2005: 23f.). 
Absolute assumptions shall also include what Kuhn (
2
1970: 182ff.) calls “symbolic 
generalizations” by which he means “those expressions, deployed without question or dissent 
by group members […].” (Ibid.: 182). This would account for, e.g., syntactic categories like 
N, V, P, A and the formula by which they can be combined into larger units. 
(2) The second factor that is constitutive of the model underlying a research programme is 
“[c]riteria for selecting relevant data” (ten Hacken 2009: 35). These criteria should be 
provided by the determination of what is the subject-matter of one’s theory. If I am interested 
in an ideal speaker-hearer’s grammatical competence, his/her performance data are clearly not 
immediately relevant. Grammaticality judgments seem to be more relevant. In other words, 
the model as constituted by absolute assumptions and criteria for selecting relevant data 
should clarify what language is and what aspects of it should be explained (cf. ten Hacken 
2009: 36). As this characterization shows, the two factors are closely related in that absolute 
assumptions in part determine what relevant data are. The model as a whole, then, should 
provide an answer to question (a) above. 
Besides these two factors, certain heuristics have to be developed which must be compatible 
with the former. These heuristics should enable (3) “the collection of interesting data”, (4) the 
formulation of useful, i.e., sensible generalizations on the basis of observations, (5) “finding 
plausible explanations for generalizations” (ten Hacken 2009: 35). (6) Finally, criteria have to 
be formulated on the basis of which different concurring theories based on (1) to (3) can be 
evaluated.
29
  
When looking at the heuristics (3) to (5) employed, one has to look at other research traditions 
and make use of their insights. For instance, once I have singled out a phenomenon that is 
worth investigating, this tells me what might be relevant data but not how I can access them. 
However, I know that the segmentation and classification of utterances allows me to access 
interesting data. Thus, the requirement formulated in (3) above can be resolved by recourse to 
generally acceptable “problem-solutions” (Kuhn 21970: 187). Requirements (4) and (5) can 
only be answered by reference to absolute assumptions, i.e., by reference to the goals of 
research, i.e., by pointing to the plausibility of certain generalizations and explanations at the 
expense of others with respect to what is investigated for what purposes. 
Concerning the evaluation criteria (6), depth of explanation could be measured and be used as 
an evaluation criterion for concurring theories. When theory A is able to explain phenomenon 
x in terms of its “How?” (e.g., when Thales can explain that we have a sun eclipse when one 
heavenly body takes the position between our own one and the sun), and when theory B is 
able to explain the “Why?” of the phenomenon (e.g., when Kepler can explain that one 
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heavenly body takes a position between earth and sun because of the movement of earth and 
moon along orbits around the sun), then theory B has gained greater depth of explanation. 
Together with the amount of data that is captured by a theory, depth of explanation can serve 
as evaluation criterion for the “value” of theories. As the example illustrates, amount of data 
and the depth of explanation cannot be separated properly but seem to coincide to a certain 
degree. A further evaluation criterion of theories with the same coverage of data and the same 
depth of explanation is simplicity (cf. Curd & Cover 1998: 211f.). The theory requiring less 
“complexity” would then be preferable. It is difficult, however, to explicate criteria of 
simplicity. Crucially, concurrent theories can only be evaluated when they serve similar 
purposes, i.e., “value” is dependent on the question of what the theory is for.  
 
 
2.1.2 The need for a new research programme 
Before outlining the details of the research programme put forward in this work one has to 
consider the question of whether such a research programme is desirable, at all. In the 
introduction to this chapter the inception and current existence of an identifiable, relatively 
coherent research programme called Cognitive-Functional Linguistics has been mentioned. 
The present work shares some of its assumptions. So why should one need another research 
programme? The answer lies firstly in the fact that CFL is, or has, not yet a definitive research 
programme. CFL is an identifiable linguistic approach, but it still lacks a full-fledged research 
programme in the sense outlined. Why this is so is the topic of the present section. The second 
part of the answer consists of the assumptions that I do not share with CFL. 
The fact that CFL lacks a full-fledged research programme and that one shall be presented 
here does not mean that fulfilling such a gigantic task is intended here. However, as will be 
shown, once the skeleton of a research programme is acceptable in its general form, it is open 
to application to any phenomenon that might be interesting. The nature and scope of the 
subject-matter of the present work requires, in my view, a multi-facetted account, extending 
to several sub-disciplines of linguistics and other sciences. This requires the setting up of a 
research programme. In other words, the programme proposed here might serve as a model 
(in neutral terms) which can be “filled out” in various ways in order to be a guideline for 
future research. Once the assumptions (necessary for constituting a research programme) are 
formulated and fixed in a model (in the research programmatic sense), the concrete subject-
matter to be investigated, be it verb-complement structures, speech-acts, morphological 
matters etc., can freely be chosen. 
Cognitive linguists are aware of the fact that they do not (yet) possess a unique research 
programme. This is more or less explicitly stated in several “programmatic” works. Consider 
the following quotation. 
 
“Cognitive Linguistics, when considered in the light of this metaphor, takes the form of an 
archipelago rather than an island. It is not one clearly delimited large territory, but rather a 
conglomerate of more or less extensive, more or less active centers of linguistic research that are 
closely knit together by a shared perspective, but that are not (yet) brought together under the 
common rule of a well-defined theory.” (Geeraerts 2006b: 2) 
 
One can paraphrase this statement in terms of the research programmatic notions introduced 
in section 2.1.1 above. The “shared perspective” corresponds to elements of “absolute 
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assumptions” which actually constitute an important, but by itself non-sufficient, part of a 
research programme. This shared perspective exists and is explicated in many works, e.g., in 
the one from which the above citation stems. They contain all those assumptions which 
determine the boundaries of the programme and what its main subject-matter is. The citation 
also says that those Cognitive linguists sharing a perspective on what they are doing do not 
work “under the common rule of a well-defined theory”, that is to say “under a research 
programme”. A research programme would be defined as being constituted by a model of 
how to handle the empirical cycle such that this programme is generally acceptable and 
actually generally accepted by those doing Cognitive-Functional Linguistics. It would 
comprise all the assumptions implicit or explicit in all the “centers of linguistic research” 
presently comprising the Cognitive-Functional Linguistics “enterprise” (Langacker 1999). 
Furthermore, one can read the above passage as establishing a contrast between “shared 
perspective” and “well-defined theory”. In other words, some shared absolute assumptions are 
not sufficient to constitute a full-fledged research programme. It follows that the word “yet” 
in the penultimate line expresses the desirability of such a research programme. The need for 
a research programme for Cognitive-Functional Linguistics is obvious. 
This is not, however, an answer to the question of why such a skeletal research programme 
should be outlined in the present work on the linking competence. This must be justified 
separately.  
The need for a research programme will be justified by means of a comparison of these 
requirements with the absolute assumptions so far explicated within Cognitive-Functional 
Linguistics. There is general agreement within CFL that language is “an instrument for 
organizing, processing, and conveying information” (cit. in Geeraerts 2006b: 3). This might 
serve as the starting point for further questions. What is obvious, however, is the primacy of 
“meaning” in this statement and therefore in Cognitive-Functional Linguistics as a whole (cf. 
Geeraerts & Cuyckens 2007b: 5). “Information” serves as a non-technical paraphrase in this 
statement. 
First, one could ask what sort of “information” this is, how it is organized and how it is 
acquired. In Cognitive-Functional Linguistics, the information conveyed by means of verbal 
communication is of a conceptual kind, i.e., conceptual contents in speakers’ minds 
(Langacker 2008a: 27). One could summarize this in the following statement:
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(CFL A1) “Semantic structure is conceptual structure.” (Evans & Green 2006: 157). 
 
“This principle asserts that language refers to concepts in the mind of the speaker rather than 
to objects in the external world.” (Ibid.). Those concepts that are associated with a 
phonological form (and are thus part of the language) are only a subpart of all concepts in the 
individual’s mind. Single, isolated concepts are necessarily underspecified. Consider the 
adjective safe and the concept SAFE to which it refers. One has only a vague concept about 
how it should be characterized. The word can occur in multiple contexts: 
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 In what follows, “CFL An” stands for “absolute assumption number n within Cognitive-Functional 
Linguistics” in the research programmatic sense (see chapter 2.2.1). “C” stands for corollaries of these 
assumptions. 
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(2.1) The child is safe. 
(2.2) The place is safe. 
(2.3) The pistol is safe. 
 
The word safe “means”31 different things in these contexts. It gets its specific meaning only in 
the contexts provided by (2.1) to (2.3). It follows that the phonological form /safe/ alone does 
not carry all the conceptual information that is potentially present in the concept SAFE. The 
phonological form provides only a “prompt” (Evans & Green 2006: 162) for the construction 
of meaning in context. This leads to a corollary of (CFL A1): 
 
(C1 of CFL A1) “Meaning construction is conceptualization.” (Ibid.). 
 
One consequence of (C1) which becomes obvious in the above examples is that meanings are 
dynamic and flexible (cf. Geeraerts 2006b: 4, Gärdenfors 1995). Another consequence of this 
corollary, according to which concepts are underspecified in isolation and serve as prompts 
only, is that “understanding” a word involves more than just retrieving its content in the sense 
of that prompt, but that it activates “vast repositories of knowledge” (Evans & Green 2006: 
160). The word knuckle can only be understood, i.e., one can know what it means only if one 
is able to conceptualize it relative to the concept of FINGER (cf. Langacker 2000: 7). 
This is captured in corollary 2: 
 
(C2 of CFL A1) “Meaning representation is encyclopaedic.” (Evans & Green 2006: 
160). 
 
The opposite view of the encyclopaedic nature of linguistic
o
 meaning is the so-called 
dictionary-view, according to which meanings are packages with clear boundaries, i.e., 
definite descriptions. 
The relation between concepts and the external world is a very complex one. For now it 
should suffice to say that “[m]eaning is not just an objective reflection of the outside world, it 
is a way of shaping that world.” (Geeraerts 2006: 4). Whether I say that x resembles y or that y 
resembles x is presumably not due to an objective difference between two situations described 
but to a difference in how a situation is construed from the point of view of the speaker. This 
is captured in corollary 3: 
 
(C3 of CFL A1) “Linguistic meaning is perspectival.” (Geeraerts 2006: 4). 
 
If the vantage point of the speaker in conceptualizing states, processes, or activities, and in 
verbalizing them is of primary importance and shows in linguistic
o
 structures, then one would 
assume that conceptualization is closely connected to our perceptual apparatus. This is 
expressed in the fourth corollary: 
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 The problem of “meaning” will be mentioned in the introduction to part III. Until then, I presuppose a 
common-sense notion of “meaning”. 
32 
 
(C4 of CFL A1) Meanings are (at least partly) perceptually grounded (cf. Gärdenfors 
1999: 21). 
 
This assertion holds that there is a tight relationship between perception and conception, i.e., 
between how we perceive the world around us and how our “knowledge” in the form of 
conceptual structure is organized. The perceptual grounding of our conceptual system is likely 
to answer the question of how the latter is acquired. Furthermore, it leads to another, more 
fundamental assumption within Cognitive-Functional Linguistics. It is implicit in the 
assumption (CFL A1) as well as in its corollaries. It holds that our conceptual system has the 
form it has because we have the bodies we have (cf. Rohrer 2007). The body-dependence of 
our conceptual system becomes obvious when one looks, for instance, at the realm of color. 
Our experience of colors depends on which biotic equipment we have as humans. Organisms 
with other equipment will have color experiences different from ours: 
 
(C5 of CFL A1) Meanings are embodied (cf. Evans & Green 2006: 45). 
 
“The idea that experience is embodied entails that we have a species-specific view of the 
world due to the unique nature of our physical bodies. In other words, our construal of reality 
is likely to be mediated in large measure by the nature of our bodies.” (Ibid.).  
Implicit in (CFL A1) and especially its first corollary are the mechanisms by which concepts 
are organized, put together and combined to larger units. (C2) to (C5) give a hint as to the 
nature of these mechanisms. To Cognitive-Functionalists, the most important of these are 
figure/ground organization (Talmy 2000, I, 5), conceptual metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 
1999), metonymy (Kövecses & Radden 1998), polysemy (Dunbar 2001), idealized cognitive 
models/frames/cognitive domains (Lakoff 1987, Fillmore 2006, Langacker 2008a: 44ff.), 
categorization (Rosch 1999, Tuggy 2007), “windowing” of attention (Talmy 2000, I, 4), and 
mental spaces and conceptual blending (Fauconnier & Turner 1994, 1998, 2002, Fauconnier 
2009). 
(CFL A1) and its corollaries concern the semantic part of language. Widening the scope 
toward the question of how and on what basis meanings are considered to be conveyed leads 
to further assumptions. To put it differently: What is the nature of the instrument by means of 
which information is conveyed? Asking this question implies a more inclusive view than that 
on meaning. It comprises not only the semantic side of language but also the formal one. The 
formal side of linguistic
o
 structures is traditionally sub-divided into phonology, morphology, 
and syntax. Cognitive-Functional Linguistics respects this sub-division for practical reasons 
but rejects it as a statement concerning the cognitive status of these levels. Instead of 
separating these levels on notional grounds, it is generally assumed that the formal sub-
systems share fundamental organizational features and thus cannot be conceived of as 
autonomous structures. This is captured in the so-called “Generalization Commitment”: 
 
(CFL A2) Different aspects of language are organized by common structural 
principles (cf. Evans & Green 2006: 28ff.). 
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The idea behind the Generalization Commitment is that phonology, morphology, syntax (and, 
in fact, even semantics and, at least in part, pragmatics) might each involve different units 
with different properties and different relations among each other, but that they all respect the 
features of human categorization and other cognitive mechanisms like those mentioned above. 
Because human categorization concerns not only semantics but also “formal” notions of 
language, it is not a subpart of (CFL A1) but of (CFL A2) which includes semantic aspects as 
well.  
The Generalization Commitment is closely related to another one, the “Cognitive 
Commitment” (Evans & Green 2006: 40ff.). While the former asserts that linguistico 
structures on different levels share organizational principles, the latter asserts that these 
structures “should reflect what is known about human cognition from other disciplines, 
particularly the other cognitive sciences […]” (ibid.).  
 
(CFL A3) Language and its structural organization reflect general cognitive 
principles (cf. Evans & Green 2006: 41). 
 
The Cognitive Commitment thus provides a partial explanation for what is claimed by the 
Generalization Commitment. If language, i.e., semantics, pragmatics and grammar, is all 
about cognition and if its levels share organizational structures, then this is unlikely to be 
accidental. According to the Cognitive Commitment, this is due to the assumption that all 
levels of linguistic
o
 organization draw from the same resources, namely general cognition and 
the mechanisms it is constituted by. It follows from this that “language is not an autonomous 
cognitive faculty” (Croft & Cruse 2003).  
What counts for language as a whole, counts for grammar, too. If our “knowledge” is to a 
large degree grounded in perception (as (C4 of CFL A1) claims), and if our “knowledge” 
structure manifests itself in any level of language structure (as (CFL A2) and (CFL A3) 
claim), it follows that grammar is also experientially based in the end, that means it is based 
on the encountering and performing of actual linguistic
o
 material. In other words, “la langue” 
is grounded in “parole” (cf. Geeraerts 2006: 6; Saussure 1916: 25/30).  
 
(CFL A4) Language as a whole and grammar in particular are experientially 
grounded and usage-based (cf. Geeraerts 2006: 5f.). 
 
Admittedly, there is actually no agreement among Cognitive linguists as to the degree to 
which the workings of syntax are independent of general cognition (cf. Harder 1999a for a 
proposal of “partial autonomy”; Jackendoff (2002: 270), though not being a Cognitive 
linguist, proposes the term “semi-autonomous” (see also Jackendoff 1993)). 
The assumptions above comprise a substrate of what linguists engaging in CFL share. In 
developing more specific theories like Construction Grammar, Cognitive Grammar, 
conceptual blending theory and others, researchers might make additional assumptions or 
mold those above in a variety of ways. Differences within CFL are possible in numerous 
ways: How are concepts precisely conceived of (cf. Geeraerts 1999)? What form do they take 
(cf. Margolis 2006)? What is embodiment precisely (cf. Rohrer 2007)? How do symbols get 
to “mean” something (cf. Harnad 1990, 2010)? What are the units making up the syntactic 
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component of language (cf. Evans & Green 2006, part III)? To which degree is syntax self-
contained (cf. Harder 1999a)? Are there frames, cognitive domains and idealized cognitive 
models or can they be reduced to a single concept (cf. Cienki 2007)? Notwithstanding 
disagreements like these, the above assumptions are the core of what constitutes Cognitive-
Functional Linguistics as opposed to “cognitive linguistics”, i.e., all research traditions within 
linguistics as a discipline which conceive of language as a cognitive phenomenon including 
Chomskyan Linguistics (cf. Geeraerts & Cuyckens 2007b: 4). In sum, the Cognitive-
Functional Linguistics enterprise can be described as the attempt to see how far one can get 
when describing language as a competence drawing from the properties of general cognition. 
This includes the exploration of how these properties are reflected in grammar. 
How can assumptions (CFL A1) to (CFL A4) be related to my own assumptions (B A1) to (B 
A4) outlined in the introduction to chapter 2? 
The accentuation of meaning in CFL is reflected in its basic assumptions. Especially (CFL 
A1: semantics/meaning as conceptualization) and its corollaries document this. Anticipating 
my argument, I will argue that there is more to meaning than conceptualization. That means 
that (CFL A1) will be rejected but its corollaries will be accepted if adjusted. In particular, I 
subscribe to the assumptions that meaning construction crucially involves conceptualization 
(C1 of CFL A1: meaning construction is conceptualization) but is not identical with it, that 
conceptualization (as partially constituting the meaning of utterances) draws from 
encyclopaedic knowledge (C2 of CFL A1: meaning representation is encyclopaedic), that 
conceptualization (but not meaning) is perspectival (C3 of CFL A1: meaning is perspectival) 
because it is grounded in perception (C4 of CFL A1: perceptually grounded meanings), and 
that conceptualization (but not meaning) is embodied in the sense that how and what we 
perceive and conceptualize crucially depends on the make-up of our bodies and our perceptual 
apparatus (C5 of CFL A1: embodied meanings). The assumed gap between meaning and 
conceptualization that leads to the rejection of (CFL A1) will be shown to originate in the 
roles of perception and conceptualization on the one hand (B A1), and action (B A4) on the 
other hand. 
My own assumptions obviously do not list equivalents to the Generalization and the 
Cognitive Commitments in (CFL A2) and (CFL A3), respectively. This is due to my 
reservation toward the reduction of language phenomena to individual cognitive structures 
which is closely related to the separation of meaning and conceptualization. The 
Generalization Commitment asserts that all levels of language work by the same cognitive 
principles. It has been stated, however, in the introduction to chapter 2 that language is not 
only a cognitive phenomenon but also a social one, i.e., one that transcends individual 
matters, while cognition sticks to individuals. In other words, there might be some principles 
at work in language that are the result of the peculiarities of per se supra-individual 
sociocultural interactions and the origins of which are “not within the head” (Deacon 1997: 
452).
32
 It is these matters that are captured in (B A4: action competence). However, children 
learn how to put languages to use, so they must have mastered these principles, if there are 
                                                 
32
 As Deacon (1997: 452) puts it more elaborately: “If symbols ultimately derive their representational power, 
not from the individual, but from a particular society at a particular time, then a person’s symbolic experience of 
consciousness is to some extent society-dependent – it is borrowed. Its origin is not within the head. It is not 
implicit in the sum of our concrete experiences.” See also Vygotsky’s (1962) work on egocentric versus social 
speech.  
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any. The question is, then, what kind of “knowledge” is involved in this mastery, and whether 
it conforms to the “cognitive principles” alluded to in the Generalization commitment. These 
principles comprise, for instance, categorization and conceptual metaphor (Evans & Green 
2006: 28ff.). If my reservations are justified, it must be possible to show that there are 
principles at work at levels of language which do not conform to these principles of 
categorization (cf. Rosch 1999) or conceptual metaphor (cf. Lakoff & Johnson 1980). This is 
precisely what I will try to show in later sections (expecially 3.2). I doubt that one can 
understand language as an information conveying instrument by viewing it as a phenomenon 
of the individual cognition alone.  
These considerations also concern (CFL A4: language/grammar are experientially 
grounded/usage-based), i.e., the role of language as a whole and of grammar in particular. In 
the formulation chosen for (CFL A4), however, there is lack of balance in relation to the other 
assumptions. All the assumptions from (CFL A1: semantics/meaning as conceptualization) to 
the first half of (CFL A4: experientially grounded language/grammar) highlight the cognitive 
aspects of language. But the listing of “usage” seems a bit strange in this context, since it 
touches on sociocultural praxis and this goes beyond the individual’s mind. One could argue 
that usage in the sense of actual utterances could be reduced to some specific form of 
perceptual input (e.g., frequency), the latter shaping our concepts of grammatical structures. 
In this sense, usage can be reduced to the first part of (CFL A4), namely experience. It would 
thus constitute the sort of experience shaping our grammatical concepts, this being the reason 
why it is mentioned separately by Geeraerts. But taken seriously, usage is always embedded 
in a sociocultural praxis and we do not know to what extent matters of this praxis which are 
not part of the individual mind shape the structure of language more or less independently of 
the workings of the individual’s cognition. This latter consideration is in line with what has 
been said about the indispensability of a sociocultural praxis for language acquisition. The 
socioculturally bound sense of “usage-based” thus agrees with my assumptions. The other, 
reductionist sense does not: Usage is reduced to a sort of experience as substantiating 
grammatical knowledge (cf. the articles in Barlow & Kemmer 2000, Bybee & Hopper 2001, 
Tomasello 2003, Bybee 2006, Bybee 2010, for usage-based approaches to knowledge of 
language). Maybe a closer look on what forms of learning are involved here will be revealing. 
Is it mere exposure to grammatical forms, taking the form of classical conditioning (cf. 
Pavlov 1928, 2010), correlated with the priming of certain synaptic connections which is 
involved in “usage” as the basis of langue? Or are other forms of learning involved here too, 
for instance observational learning and learning by doing within actual interactions which is 
always accompanied by an instance giving feedback about the utterances produced (e.g., the 
mother)? This will also be alluded to in later sections. 
A closer look at (CFL A1) to (CFL A4) reveals the high degree to which “meaning” is made 
dependent on the individual’s cognition in Cognitive-Functional Linguistics. All of these 
assumptions are permeated by the focussing on the individual’s cognition. There is no 
assumption that would be valid for a plurality of individuals while being invalid for only one 
of them. Should meaning be restricted to the individual’s (mostly the speaker’s) mind? As (C3 
of CFL A1: meaning is perspectival) demonstrates, this is clearly the position of Cognitive-
Functional Linguistics: The meaning of an utterance is identified with how the speaker 
construes what he/she wants to utter (cf. Geeraerts 2006b: 4). It follows that the hearer 
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“understands” the utterance when he/she grasps the result of the speaker’s construal of what 
he/she wanted to utter.  
The considerations about the question of how dependent or independent language and its 
structure are from the individual’s mind or from “supra-individual” matters reveal a puzzle: 
Cognitive-Functional Linguistics has long been blind to the social and, as the absolute 
assumptions (taken as the least common denominator in Cognitive-Functional Linguistics) 
illustrate, there is actually no means by which the gap between the focus on cognition and the 
obvious relevance of supra-individual matters could be bridged. However, Cognitive linguists 
know about this desideratum. As Geeraerts & Cuyckens (2007b: 15) put it, 
 
“Cognitive Linguistics, by its very ‘cognitive’ nature, has a tendency to look at language from a 
psychological point of view, that is, language as (part of) the organization of knowledge in the 
individual mind. However, a number of researchers […] emphasize that the experientialist nature 
of Cognitive Linguistics does not only refer to material factors (taking a notion like ‘embodiment’ 
in a physical and psychological sense) but that the cultural environment and the socially interactive 
nature of language should be recognized as primary elements of a cognitive approach.”  
 
Eight years before Geeraerts and Cuyckens, Langacker had already emphasized the need to 
take “the dynamics of discourse and social interaction” (Langacker 2000: 376) into account.33 
I would suggest that the social factor has largely remained a desideratum because of the 
possible consequences for a cognitive semantics that would come about when cognitive 
semanticians realigned themselves toward a sociologically compatible view on meaning that 
goes beyond the individual mind. It shall not be concealed that there has been work in 
cognitive sociolinguistics more recently (cf. Kristiansen & Dirven 2008, Croft 2009, among 
others) but they seem to avoid touching on the question of meaning. The gap between the 
individual’s cognition and the relevance of sociocultural factors and the central question of 
meaning that hovers above them might be a powder keg for the unity of Cognitive-Functional 
Linguistics and its semantic sub-part in particular (see also Bernárdez 2005 on this gap). The 
mentioned gap concerns nearly all of the basic assumptions of CFL and there is the danger 
that CFL and sociological considerations could remain incompatible. The desideratum would 
also remain then, and sociolinguistics would be left independent of Cognitive-Functional 
Linguistics. The way out of this situation would be the constitution of a well-defined research 
programme bringing together both sides which ought to be generally acceptable both for 
Cognitive linguists (and semanticians) and for those researchers working in the socially and 
culturally oriented fields.  
This affects especially the Cognitive Commitment (CFL A3). Language and its structure 
would then reflect not only general cognitive principles but also principles originating in 
sociocultural interaction (I try to show this especially in sections 3.2.4 and 4.4). In the same 
vein, linguistic
o
 structures should reflect what is known about cognition from the other 
cognitive sciences and what is known about (verbal) interaction from the social sciences as 
well.  
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 See also Sinha & Jensen de López 2002 who make an attempt to reconcile the biotic and the sociocultural 
origins of conceptual development, thereby building on a Vygotskyan framework (Vygotsky 1962). However, to 
anticipate what is yet to come, even this attempt remains a form of scientism, thus eliding questions of validity of 
scientific statements. Scientism pertains to the belief that any significant problem could be solved by natural 
scientific methods. In other words, every inquiry falls under the subject-matter of the natural sciences. However, 
scientific methods do not provide criteria by which one could distinguish true from false. See also section 2.4. 
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The assumptions in (B A3: intersubjectivity) and (B A4: action competence) are mainly a 
consequence of what has been said about the realignment of a cognitive semantics and its 
supplanting with sociocultural, or actional, considerations. Because of its concentration on 
what happens in the individual’s mind, one would expect questions of sociocultural praxes 
and interaction to be rather rare in Cognitive-Functional Linguistics. And this actually seems 
to be the case. In all the textbooks and handbooks listed in the introduction to chapter 2 these 
matters are hardly ever mentioned. An exception is Langacker (1999). He identifies two 
primary functions of language, the “semiological” and the “interactive” functions, the latter 
including communication (Langacker 1999: 14). While he notes that both functions, 
symbolizing conceptualizations by means of sounds and gestures, and discourse with 
interlocutors, cannot be understood independently of each other, he remains in the realm of 
the individual’s mind when he states that  
 
“[i]nteraction is critically dependent on the embodied minds that engage in it, and cannot be 
properly understood or described without a detailed characterization of the conceptions they 
entertain, including their conceptions of the interaction itself and of the interlocutor’s 
conceptions.” (Langacker 1999: 14f.) 
 
In Langacker (2008a: 30), he justifies focussing on the individual’s mind in methodological 
terms: Questions concerning the social aspect of meaning “cannot be fully answered unless 
the knowledge of individual speakers is taken into account.”34 In the same vein, Langacker 
(2008a: 7f.) states that “cognitive linguistics stands out by emphasizing the semiological 
function of language. It fully acknowledges the grounding of language in social interaction, 
but insists that even its interactive function is critically dependent on conceptualization.” It 
seems to me that Langacker does not factor in here that there is no unmediated access to 
conceptualization other than via the results of interactions, i.e., via the ineluctable, already 
existing interactive praxis which even provides the criteria for what conceptualization can 
accomplish or not.
35
 Section 2.4 and 3.1.1 will show how such methodological problems can 
possibly be avoided. The task then is to re-align assumptions (CFL A1) to (CFL A4), as is 
attempted by (B A1) to (B A4) in order to take into account matters of interaction, 
intersubjectivity, communication, and semiotics.  
One word on the proceeding throughout this section: The basic assumptions of Cognitive-
Functional Linguistics and the ones presented here have been outlined in a very brief fashion. 
Since I share some though not all of the former, I have refrained from giving a detailed 
description of the leading psychological, philosophical, grammatical, and semantic ideas 
                                                 
34
 Interestingly, Jackendoff’s (1990, 1997, 2002, 2007) “conceptual semantics” takes a similar “intra-individual” 
position. Jackendoff (2002: 280f.) argues that any “contextualist” approach to meaning can in the end be reduced 
to the question of what “is present in people’s f-minds when they grasp a meaning.”  
35
 These comments also concern Knott (2012). Knott’s subject-matter is quite similar to my own (actually, he 
explores the relationship between “sensorimotor cognition and natural language syntax”), but he locates it in a 
hybrid of a Cognitive-Linguistic (conceptual part) and Chomskyan Linguistic framework (cognitive architecture, 
syntax). His work is remarkably comprehensive and deep, but crucially it lacks a discussion regarding 
philosophy of science in which the compatibility of the CFL and CL programmes needs to be addressed, because 
they seem to be incommensurable when it comes to the metaphysical assumptions mentioned in section 2.1.1. (as 
well as in 2.1.2 and 2.4). As a consequence, it neither addresses one of my central concerns, namely the 
metaphysics of thematic roles and the cultural, i.e., sociocultural grounding of most of our cognitive and 
linguistic
o
 activities.  
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underlying it. This will be caught up in the context of the development of the research 
programme. 
 
 
 
2.2 A new research programme 
 
2.2.1 The subject-matter of the programme 
Bearing in mind the components of the empirical cycle and the model constituting a research 
programme, we now turn to filling in the blanks. 
 
Subject-matter of the present programme is one aspect of the competence of an individual to 
successfully interact verbally, namely his/her ability to encode and decode concepts of 
potential and actual states, processes, and activities by means of utterances containing verb-
complement structures.  
 
The structures in question are often called “argument structures” or “predicate-argument 
structures” (e.g., Grimshaw 1990, Bresnan 2001, Goldberg 1995) which is insofar 
problematic as the subject-matter comprises syntactic structures, while both labels mentioned 
clearly contain semantic notions. For reasons of methodical carefulness one should not 
intermingle formal and semantic notions (cf. Kasper 2011). On the other hand the term “verb-
complement structure” seems to be occupied by the research programme of Chomskyan 
Linguistics (cf. Chomsky 
22002 on “verbs” and “complements”) and carries with it all the 
assumptions behind it. The term is, however, also used by linguists who are rather 
programmatically unbiased and of a descriptive provenience as opposed to the explanatory 
claims of CL. Therefore it will be adopted here, but explicitly in the latter sense (cf. Eisenberg 
1999, Storrer 1992). For now, complements are defined as those elements in a sentence which 
stand in a syntactic valency relationship with the verb, including traditional “subjects”, 
“direct” and “indirect objects” as well as many prepositional phrases.  
More specifically, I will explore how interactants conceive of objects (in a broad sense) and 
states, processes, and activities in which objects are involved under certain communicative 
circumstances.
36
 These notions are the central units in conceptual structure which in turn is 
part of semantics within the semantics-syntax relationship (the other being actional 
knowledge). The question is then how specific conceptual structures are encoded and decoded 
by means of syntactic structures. Keeping in mind that semantic structures as well as syntactic 
structures belong to our “knowledge” structure and should therefore likewise be conceptual in 
nature, the conceptual structures must stricto sensu be distinguished from syntactic-
conceptual structures. The latter will simply be called syntactic structures but it should be kept 
in mind that they have some psychological relevance. The primary focus does not lie here on 
possible syntactic structures and “operations”, i.e., on the question of how syntactic elements 
combine to constitute the grammatical and only the grammatical sequences that are part of a 
                                                 
36
 See sections 2.4 and 3.4 for definitions of the event structural notions employed here. 
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particular language which is the externalization of the competence of the members of a 
homogenous speech community (cf. Chomsky 1965).  
 
Instead of this, the question is rather how far one gets when attempting to explain syntactic(-
conceptual) structures, i.e., verb-complement structures, on the basis of the workings of 
conceptual structures, i.e., from conceptualizations involving concepts of objects, states, 
processes, activities, and fundamental instruments of conceptual organization on the one 
hand, and on the basis of matters of actional knowledge (especially attribution), all this 
embedded in contexts of action and interactive communication (as suggested, for instance, by 
Tomasello 2008: 333).  
 
What are the semantic counterparts of relational elements, e.g., verbs and prepositions, and 
non-relational ones, e.g., nouns? How shall we conceive of their combination during 
conceptualization? What regularities are there in the way specific (complex) concepts are 
encoded linguistically
o
? What are the means and instruments by which they are encoded? 
How can we account for these regularities? What is the role of actional knowledge in linking? 
These are the issues which shall be discussed in the chapter on linking and the preparatory 
chapters on action, conceptual structures, and syntactic structure (see chapters 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 
and 4). They clearly touch on many questions about the relationship between syntax and 
semantics, e.g., the question of the degree to which syntactic structures work autonomously. 
Such issues will also be discussed in the preparatory chapters (3.3). 
 
 
2.2.2 The “individual” level in the model 
We need a theory of the syntax-semantics relationship that is socioculturally and 
cognitively/perceptually grounded (cf. Tomasello 2008, esp. section 6.2.1 on foundational 
work in this direction). People actually use language, i.e., they know what to utter under 
which circumstances in order to interact successfully verbally. They obviously have a 
competence about how to link formal and semantic aspects of language. The linguist’s task, 
then, is to formulate a theory of the syntax-semantics relationship that describes the 
competence of individuals to relate forms and contents in a situationally appropriate manner. 
This is captured in the first sub-part of the model constituting the proposed research 
programme. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: “Individual” level of the model 
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Figure 2.1 depicts one stage in the spiralling of the empirical cycle, namely the stage of the 
first theory. On the left side, the oval encloses the phenomenon to be described. This is what 
has been identified as the subject-matter of the programme further above in this section, here 
abbreviated as “linking competence”. This linking competence is part of the “world/mind”. 
As a cognitive competence it is primarily “part of the mind” (but see sec. 2.4 on mental 
termini), as manifested in actual communicative interactions it is part of the material world. 
How far world and mind coincide is not a question discussed here (see, for instance, 
Beckermann 
3
2008, Hartmann 1998: esp. 257ff., for such discussions from completely 
different perspectives). It shall suffice here to say that there is something to be described and 
explained, be it two aspects of the same phenomenon. On the right side the rectangle encloses 
the linguist’s “theory”. This theory aims at describing the phenomenon just identified in the 
world/mind. Although the rectangle is included in the theory domain it shall be emphasized 
that any theory once formulated is also part of the world. Anything claimed valid by the 
theory with respect to its subject-matter applies to itself, then, insofar as the theory itself – as 
an assembly of linguistic
o
 expressions – contains something that overlaps with its 
phenomenon range.  
While “world/mind” and “theory” divide the parts of the model on the vertical there is also a 
domain on the horizontal which includes both the theoretical and the phenomenal units, 
namely the “individual” level. This level designates the scope of both the theory and the 
phenomenon component. It should be taken not too literally, however. The term “individual” 
stands in a twofold field of tension. On the one hand there is a biologically based distinction 
between “individual” and “species”. This would be the distinction to be made within a 
research programme that could be termed (or which would term itself) “naturalistic”. Such a 
programme considers human beings to be solely natural objects and thus objects of natural 
sciences. I would allege that most if not all of the theories mentioned above, as defendants of 
the third view of the syntax-semantics interface, could be subsumed under such a view, since 
many of them are working on components of the research programme of Chomskyan 
Linguistics. In the model proposed here, the individual level does in fact concern the 
individual in its biological sense, but not exclusively. It has been argued above that the human 
competence in question draws from two sources, biotic and sociocultural. Consequently, a 
theory that deals only with the biotic endowment of a human individual misses half of what is 
actually relevant. That is to say, there is on the other hand a sense of “individual” according to 
which it stands in opposition to “community”.37 In this pairing, “individual” loses most of its 
biological implications and enters another tension which has sociological (e.g. Abels 
3
2007) 
and/or action-theoretic implications (e.g., Habermas 1981 on sociological and action-theoretic 
grounds, Hartmann 1996 and Janich 2001 on action-theoretic grounds; cf Miebach 
2
2006 for 
an overview). In sum, the fact that the individual is doubly bound prescribes the theoretician 
to explore his/her subject-matter from two perspectives at once, couching it in a single theory 
(see sec. 2.4 on the difficulty of choosing the adequate descriptive means for such a task). 
                                                 
37
 This “opposition” should not be conceived of as a dichotomy of isolated domains. This would only obstruct 
one’s view on the intricate mutual dependencies among individual and community (cf. Daniel 52006: 390ff.). 
The opposition should be open enough to allow for the individual to represent part of what constitutes the 
community. At the same time, the community is to some degree determined by the performance of each of its 
members.  
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With respect to ten Hacken’s (2009) concept of scientific progress, a theory and its subject-
matter alone do not constitute an empirical cycle. The theory is not the lowermost stage in the 
cycle’s spiralling. In the beginning there must be observable facts and observations of an 
observer. 
 
 
2.2.3 Observable facts, observations, and heuristics for collecting interesting data 
As to observable facts, principally any verbal expression in interactive contexts is available 
which contains the structures in question or, more precisely, which can be analyzed as 
containing these structures. The observations (i.e., data) thus comprise abstract descriptions of 
a subset of the observable facts as well as variables of the interaction.  
The concrete linguistic
o
 structures in question are of a quite simple nature. The situations on 
which their analysis shall be based are therefore construable as possible successful 
communicative acts. However, corpus-based analyses are in principle desirable (cf. Geeraerts 
& Cuyckens 2007b: 16ff.) in order to be (at least partially) independent of subjective 
intuitions. An example of a possible successful interaction would be the construed 
communication situation of the following type. 
 
Face-to-face communication between A and B who both know Peter and Mary. 
(2.12)  A: Peter             hat                Maria         einen   Brief geschickt. 
  Peter.3NOM have.3AUX Mary.DAT a.ACC letter send.PTCP 
  ‘Peter sent Mary a letter.’ 
  B: Ich          weiß. 
  I.1NOM know.1 
  ‘I know.’ 
  A: … (does not signal misunderstanding) 
 
The example in (2.12) is so simple that this type of communicative exchange (e.g. when 
substituting the names) probably happens several times a day. The example provides data. 
One could describe the possible observations – depending on the identification of the main 
topic – as two verb-complement structures, whereat hat geschickt in one case and weiß in the 
other case are the verbs and Peter, Maria, and einen Brief as well as Ich are the respective 
complements. The reduced variables of the interaction, or “interactional variables” are given 
as superscript above the verbal expressions. In this case this is a “Face-to-face communication 
between A and B who both know Peter and Mary”. These variables contain situational, 
contextual and individual factors (see sections 3.2.1.4 to 3.2.4). But what is interesting about 
these structures and variables and how might they serve a theory of the syntax-semantics 
interface? Or, to put it differently, what are the interesting data to be drawn from such 
observable facts? 
The first question to ask is why the complements have the form they actually have. Why does 
Peter take nominative case morphologically, Maria dative case and Brief ‘letter’ accusative 
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case?
38
 Why do other patterns of case assignment result in ungrammatical structures, e.g., 
when Peter and Maria take dative case and Brief takes accusative case, resulting in (2.13). 
 
(2.13) *(Dem)       Peter hat              (der)          Maria den           Brief geschickt?
39
  
 The.3DAT Peter have.3AUX the.3DAT Maria the.3ACC letter send.PTCP 
 
What governs case assignment in general? Second, why can Brief not change cases with 
Maria, yielding (2.14).  
 
(2.14) 
#
Peter hat (die) Maria einem Brief geschickt?
40
  
 
Most speakers of German would concede that this utterance is grammatically well-formed but 
odd in some other respect. How can this oddity be described and explained? 
Third, what is the difference between the “badness” of the former and the latter sentence? 
Seemingly, the latter sentence shows nothing different than another pattern of case assignment 
which led to ungrammaticality in the former case. Nevertheless, it can be described as well-
formed. 
Fourth, making a cloze out of A’s utterance in (2.12) by deleting the participle geschickt 
‘sent’ yields an interesting effect. One can predict which (kind of) verb can occur in the gap 
on the basis of the presence of a nominative, a dative and an accusative complement. The 
prediction may be vague but one could think of something like a verb which describes some 
schematic transfer or prevented transfer. This makes the insertion of numerous verbs possible 
which all share this semantic feature. Few or no other verbs could be inserted into this 
structure.
41
 Where does this effect come from? Why do we not find it in the case of B’s 
utterance? When deleting weiß ‘know’ (and abstracting the context) one cannot predict any 
similarly unique semantic feature as in the former case. One could insert as different verbs as 
sterben ‘die’, träumen ‘dream’, verschwinden ‘disappear’, or transpirieren ‘transpire’.  
People familiar with Chomskyan-style Generative Grammar can easily answer the first three 
questions. First, A’s utterance in (2.12) has the form it has because of the grammatical 
competence of A. The alternative coding of the complements are ruled out as ungrammatical 
on the basis of an ideal speaker-hearer’s grammaticality judgment (cf. Chomsky 1965: 3ff.). 
Second, Brief cannot change cases with Maria for reasons of language use only. The 
grammatical competence of a speaker-hearer would presumably judge this sentence well-
formed (i.e., grammatical). The Generative grammarian would assess that it is only 
inappropriately “put to use” and thus a matter of performance, not grammatical competence 
(cf. Chomsky 1965: 10ff.). Third, grammaticality and pragmatic “deviation” mark the 
dividing line between the oddness of the sentences in question.  
                                                 
38
 Cf. Dürscheid 1999, Blake 
2
2001, and Croft 2001 on diagnostics with respect to the case category. 
39
 Ungrammatical utterances will by marked with an asterisk.  
40
 Unacceptable utterances will be marked with an octothorpe. It should be kept in mind that in a usage-based 
approach non-well-formed (ungrammatical) utterances and inappropriate (unacceptable) utterances can 
sometimes not be sharply distinguished. 
41
 It is difficult to assess the status of verbs like beschmieren ‘bedaub’, zerreißen ‘tear apart’ or nennen ‘call’ (in 
the sense of call x an y) with respect to the concept of “transfer”. Questions like these will be discussed 
throughout this book. 
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Unfortunately, one must rely on judgments of speakers in collecting the relevant data. These 
judgments shall reflect the underlying competence(s) of the speaker, even when one works 
with a corpus: The linguist could in principle pick communicative situations containing verb-
complement structures for analysis but one cannot reliably reconstruct whether an interaction 
has failed or succeeded, or, if it has clearly failed, what the relevant factors have been. The 
competence to interact successfully verbally by means of verb-complement structures is the 
subject-matter of the programme. Thus, it comprises aspects of both grammatical competence 
and “pragmatic competence” (Chomsky 1980: 224), since communication might fail because 
of both ungrammaticality and the pragmatic “inappropriateness” of one’s utterances (among 
other, channel- or code-related matters). That means the data are made up of those (verb-
complement) structures which can be judged grammatical and “appropriate” in relation to the 
communicative situation in question. These concepts cannot, however, simply be borrowed 
from the Generative Grammar framework without further ado. They must be adjusted to and 
made compatible with the present research programme. Both Chomskyan concepts rest on the 
theses of the autonomy of syntax and on the innateness of grammatical competence which are 
challenged by Cognitive-Functional Linguistics (without having led to any agreement, 
however). One has to answer the question, then, where agreement among speakers about the 
grammaticality of sentences comes from, if not from an innate and/or encapsulated syntactic 
module. Part of the answer lies in the assumptions about the organization of our conceptual 
system, including the relationship between syntactic structures and conceptual structures (see 
sections 3.3 and 3.4). At this point it shall suffice to point out that grammatical knowledge is 
not incompatible with the assumption of a non-autonomous syntactic structure, and that such 
agreement among users of a language is due to their similar histories of confrontations with 
usage-events which allow them to extract schematic syntactic patterns from actual usage-
events (cf. Tomasello 2003, Clark 2003).  
In CFL, as has been mentioned, there is no agreement on the status of the syntactic 
component in a grammar and it is not surprising that one hardly finds a characterization of 
well-formedness or grammaticality in the respective literature. (This might in part be due to 
the fact that this is a theory-dependent notion. There is no definition of grammaticality 
without a corresponding theory of grammar; cf. Ágel 2000: 175). A simple characterization 
should contain the following assumptions: Grammatical knowledge, i.e., knowledge about 
which actual syntactic structures are possible (grammatical) or impossible (ungrammatical) is 
gained via usage-events, thus shaping our syntactic-conceptual knowledge. This knowledge is 
furthermore constituted by the abstraction of syntactic structures from actual utterances, the 
former becoming entrenched with every further encounter of the same structure. The 
evaluation of new structures rests upon the success or failure of the matching of entrenched 
structures or combinations of them (cf. Kemmer & Barlow 2000, Langacker 2000, ch. 4, 
2
2002: ch. 10) throughout identification.
42
 As Kemmer and Barlow (2000: xiii) put it, 
 
“[…] the speaker’s linguistic system is fundamentally grounded in ‘usage events’: instances of 
speaker’s producing and understanding language. ‘Grounded in’ means that linguistic 
representations are tightly linked to usage events […].” 
                                                 
42
 By entrenchment I mean the routinization and automatization of certain cognitive movement schemas, 
accompanied by the potentiation of the corresponding neuronal pathways. See section 2.4 and chapter 3 on the 
learning-theoretic, neuroscientific, and action-theoretic terms. 
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Grammatical knowledge is insofar “fundamentally grounded”, as usage-events are 
“experience from which the system itself is initially abstracted” (Kemmer & Barlow 2000: 
ix).  
A usage-based account of grammatical knowledge might serve then to propose an alternative 
characterization of well-formedness, one which is not based on the central assumptions of 
Chomskyan Linguistics. Such an alternative must again be complemented by sociocultural 
aspects as highlighted above.  
 
Then, competence to make grammaticality judgments is the ability of a member of a speech-
community to decide whether the syntactic structure underlying a particular utterance is well-
formed or ill-formed on the basis of (frequent) prior experiences with utterances which 
successively have led to entrenched, schematized syntactic-conceptual structures against 
which the syntactic structures of actual utterances can be evaluated by means of identification 
as being instances or non-instances of the former.  
 
Since speech is action and action constitutes praxes, speech-communities are constituted by 
sociocultural praxes. This in turn means that usage-events, i.e., actual utterances in 
communicative situations, should in part be shaped by sociocultural, i.e., action-theoretic 
factors. Thus, agreements among speakers concerning grammaticality can only in part be 
explained by recourse to their conceptual systems because our access to them is mediated by 
usage, i.e., actual verbal interactions. If verbal action is only one form of action among others, 
and action is what we are made responsible for, the manner in which we act is regulated by 
norms of our community. In other words, although what becomes entrenched in our 
conceptual systems are the frequent inputs of certain syntactic structures, these structures are 
not “raw” but already “filtered” (by means of feedback, examples and counter-examples) 
through norms of action. This leads to grammaticality as a social convention (cf. also 
Tomasello’s (2008, section 6.3.3) well justified normative characterization of 
grammaticality).  
The central weakness of usage-based models of grammatical competence (and with it the 
competence to judge grammaticality) is that they do not specify the endpoint or goal of the 
development which they are claiming takes place, and most importantly, who determines 
what the criteria are for it to have arrived (cf. Berger & Luckmann 
20
2004: 53). There are 
obviously three possibilities. First, this endpoint (the “possession” of a competence for which 
judgment performance is an indicator) is natural, evolutionarily driven, or it is – secondly – 
cultural, determined by people, or, thirdly, both. The acquisition of interactive communicative 
competence (as present in the usage and understanding of utterances containing verb-
complement structures) to become a member of an existing sociocultural praxis is a 
development with an endpoint that is specified “by the praxis itself”. There is no observer 
possible to decide whether someone has or has not the linguistic
o
 competence in question, 
unless he/she is at the same time participating in the praxis the competence is part of. So, the 
community members decide whether one has the competences in question. It is probably not 
by chance that in naturalistic theories the development of grammatical competence ends with 
something like a mature speaker’s ability to produce and understand situationally adequate 
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utterances. I doubt that this is by chance, since these endpoints, as I would suggest, mark the 
stage in which one fulfils the requirements for being a “full” member of speech community as 
part of sociocultural praxis. From this perspective, the development of grammatical 
knowledge and any other sort of “knowledge” cannot plausibly be described as being a 
natural process (alone), since nature does not provide the criteria necessary to make such a 
decision. The stages that have to be gone through as well as its endpoint strongly appear to be 
culturally determined (cf. Sinha & Jensen de López 2002, building on Vygotsky 1962, 
veering to such view). In the present account, the prior, implicit, and unjustified determination 
of the goal of development is avoided. Instead of this, the subject-matter of the programme 
marks this goal – becoming a competent member of a speech community. Naturally, nothing 
develops without there being something to develop, i.e., the individual’s biotic endowment. 
And it should also be clear that the development of a competence is definitely restricted to the 
possibilities provided by our bodies (cf. Tomasello 2008 on a naturally based “cognitive 
infrastructure”; cf. Janich 2000: 78ff. on the problem of the goals of development, especially 
in evolutionary psychology and radical constructivism). 
Anyway, a comprehensive theory of grammaticality is not the purpose of this programme. In 
sum, the capacity to have grammatical intuitions is (and will be shown to be) compatible with 
a non-modular conception of syntax. Obviously, we come with this capacity. Most examples 
in this work are of such a simple nature that they are “easy to judge”.  
Besides grammaticality, “pragmatic competence” plays a major role with respect to our 
subject-matter. Consider (2.14) above. The fact that someone cannot send a letter Mary 
(where a letter is the recipient of the moving Mary) is mostly explained not by grammatical 
ill-formedness but by performance factors. In fact, communicative appropriateness is more 
difficult to characterize than grammaticality, since within CL, the scope of performance is not 
as precisely defined as that of competence. Another difficulty lies in the fact that one cannot 
simply adopt the performance notion from CL, since its distinction between grammatical 
competence and pragmatic competence relies on the autonomy
43
 of the former, thus allowing 
for a strict demarcation between both. Furthermore, the definition of pragmatic competence 
presupposes the adoption of grammatical competence and the primacy of syntax over 
pragmatics, at least. According to Gumperz (1972: 205),  
 
“linguistic competence [i.e., grammatical competence – SK] covers the speaker’s ability to 
produce grammatically correct sentences, communicative competence describes his ability to 
select from the totality of grammatically correct expressions available to him, forms which 
appropriately reflect the social norms governing behavior in specific encounters.” 
 
Questioning the autonomy and primacy of syntax/grammar then means giving up the 
possibility of this sharp distinction. According to Chomsky, (1980: 224) grammatical 
competence is all about form and its relation to meaning, while pragmatic competence 
concerns “knowledge of conditions and manner of appropriate use, in conformity with various 
purposes.” This is fully compatible with the dependency relation between grammatical and 
pragmatic competence put forward by Gumperz.  
                                                 
43
 In this context, autonomy of grammatical competence can be characterized such that knowledge about the 
formal properties of languages cannot be derived from, or explained by recourse to, some other type of 
knowledge. 
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The gap between grammatical competence and pragmatic competence has not yet been closed 
by Cognitive Sociolinguistics within CFL. In fact, it is hardly a topic at all (cf. Kristiansen & 
Dirven 2008). Again, as with the syntax-semantics interface, not conceding grammar an 
autonomous status seems to complicate theoretical matters. However, this is the price on has 
to pay for the “recontextualization” (Geeraerts & Cuyckens 2007b: 11) of linguistico 
competence as opposed to its “decontextualization” (ibid.: 10) by Chomskyan Linguistics. A 
solution might be possible and usage-based models together with the notion of 
“communicative competence” provide the means. What will follows now might be worn out, 
but it is very important at this point. In a critical assessment of the Chomskyan dichotomy 
between competence and performance from a sociolinguistic perspective, Hymes (1972) 
severely criticizes Chomsky’s “decontextualizing” program in which he deprives “the keeper” 
of interactive communicative competence, i.e., the individual capable of speaking, of its social 
competences (cf. Hymes 1972: 272). Instead, he claims “that the competency of users of 
language entails abilities and judgments relative to, and interdependent with, sociocultural 
features […].” (Hymes 1972: 277). The linguist has not only to account for the child’s 
acquisition of grammatical competence but also of the competence to judge utterances 
appropriate or inappropriate. “A model of language must design it with a face toward 
communicative conduct and social life.” (Hymes 1972: 278). These considerations led Hymes 
(1972: 279) to the proposal of a “communicative competence”, among which grammatical 
competence is only one besides others, including knowledge of appropriateness etc. (see also 
Rickheit, Strohner & Vorwerg. 2008, Rickheit & Strohner 2008).  
 
“Within the developmental matrix in which knowledge of the sentences of a language is acquired, 
children also acquire knowledge of a set of ways in which sentences are used. From a finite 
experience of speech acts and their interdependence with sociocultural features, they develop a 
general theory of the speaking appropriate in their community, which they employ, like other 
forms of tacit cultural knowledge (competence) in conducting and interpreting social life […].” 
(Hymes 1972: 279) 
 
Among the questions that arise with respect to such a communicative competence are those of 
grammatical competence and what Chomsky terms pragmatic competence. The latter can now 
be characterized in accordance with Hymes and tuned to the subject-matter of the present 
work.  
 
Then, pragmatic competence concerns the ability of a member of a speech-community to 
decide whether a certain utterance’s semantic content44 is appropriate or inappropriate in 
relation to a given communicative situation and to the action theory
45
 the members of a 
speech-community have internalized on the basis of (frequent) prior experiences with actions 
and utterances which successively have led to entrenched actional knowledge, against which 
actual utterances can be evaluated (by means of identification) as being instances or non-
instances of appropriate action. 
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 Anticipating what is yet to come, this should be understood here as the conceptual and attributional contents 
that the interlocutor associates with the syntactic structure in question. On conceptual and attributional contents 
see section 3.2. 
45
 On actional knowledge cf. section 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. 
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Such a characterization of pragmatic competence is fully compatible with a usage-based 
account of language because it proposes considering the development of grammatical 
knowledge and pragmatic knowledge to be co-extensive. They are interdependent as well, 
since in our everyday praxis there is no grammatical competence possible, or, at least, 
observable without pragmatic competence and the other way around, maybe except for very 
specific pathological cases. Successfully interacting by means of verbal communication is 
identical with being grammatically and pragmatically competent. 
Consider an example which could illustrate this interdependency. It repeats (1.9) from section 
1.3 and shows why it is problematic to attribute the syntax-semantics relationship and actional 
(pragmatic) considerations to different cognitive modules. 
 
 
(2.15) The three-year-old twins Jessica and Nicole are at dinner with their parents Sarah and 
Marc. Nicole reaches for the milk carton. She grips it only with her fingertips, causing it to 
fall down. It falls off the table and runs all over the floor. Jessica and her mother have kept 
track of what happened. 
 
(a)  Jessica: Nicole             hat                die          Milch runtergeworfen. 
  Nicole.3NOM have.3AUX the.ACC milk  down-throw.PTCP 
  ‘Nicole knocked over the milk.’ 
 
 Sarah: (hesitating, looking at the surprised causer) 
(b)  Nein, sie            ist            ihr           runtergefallen. 
  No    it.3NOM be.3AUX her.DAT down-fall.PTCP 
  ‘No, (it happened to her that) it fell down.’ 
 
 Jessica: … (not signalling misunderstanding) 
 
 
Speakers of German know these situations well and the linguistic
o
 structures which 
accompany them. Speaking pre-theoretically, they are about whether one should be blamed 
for what one has caused or not. As will be argued in the section on action theory (sec. 3.2.1.4 
to 3.2.4), the mother’s judgment of the girl’s utterance as inappropriate in (2.15) is due to a 
learned and internalized actional “knowledge”. Such judgments are constrained by many 
factors which are in part culture-specific and which must be learned by children growing up in 
this culture. The example shows that sociocultural factors, i.e., factors of pragmatic 
competence, directly enter grammatical structure, as indicated by the different patterns of case 
assignment and coding of the verb. That means “knowledge” about how to construct 
grammatical sentences and “knowledge” about how to put them to use cannot be properly 
separated (cf. Hymes 1972: 279, Wardhaugh 
5
2006: 250f.). If this is true, then linguistic
o
 
structure and the socio-culturally constrained structure of interaction are not isolated domains, 
but clearly bear upon each other (see also Ariel 2008 on this topic). (The fourth question 
presented above concerning some schematic transfer meaning in (2.12) shall not be pursued 
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here. It is about the possibility of constructions (cf. Goldberg 1995), and this will be discussed 
in section 4 in some detail).  
In sum, actual or (properly construed) verbal expressions within interactions constitute 
observable facts. The actual observations, i.e., the data, are constituted by a subset of the 
possible observations, i.e., by interactional variables and parts of speech analyzed by the 
linguist as containing grammatical and appropriate verb-complement structures. 
Grammaticality and appropriateness can also be judged via elicited responses.  
Obviously, there is one step missing in the identification of interesting data as a basis of 
theoretical modelling. How do we “extract” data as a basis of explanation from the observable 
facts? Consider the interactional variables first by means of example (2.15) above. 
Interactional variables are provided by features, properties, and dispositions of the 
participating individuals, the framing situation
46
 in which the interaction takes place, and by 
the wider context in which the interaction takes place. For instance, the interactional variables 
overtly present in (2.15) above are constituted by several observational facts, among them the 
information that there are three-year-old twins, what their names are, that the framing 
situation is “dinner” and so on. More important information (where the degree of importance 
is clarified in the context of sections 3.2.1.4 to 3.2.4) is supplied by the fact that one girl 
seems to be immediately willing to make her sister responsible for what she has caused, 
namely the milk’s falling down, while presumably nothing has indicated intentionality in this 
event as it is observable. Here, the interactional variable can (to anticipate what is yet to 
come) be identified with some factors ranging between the individuals involved and the 
context of the event. It is specifically the relationship between the mother and the causer on 
the one hand and the sister and the causer on the other hand. What determines the assessment 
of the state, process, or activity by the participants is not only what they see, but also their 
personal (individual) dispositions and the state-, process-, and activity-independent 
relationship to the other participants (context) (cf. Moskowitz 2005: chapters 6, 7, 8 on 
influences on the assessment of situations). In short, then, it depends on how they identify or 
conceptualize the states, processes, and activities. 
How do we “extract” verb-complement structures from utterances in actual interactions? It 
has been demonstrated above (section 1.1) that the form-content mapping in language is not 
straightforward. This is the reason that the formal properties of sentences can or should be 
described without recourse to their contents. On the other hand, the realm of meaning can or 
should also be described in separation from formal matters. This is, however, not a statement 
as to the “self-containedness” of each structure in an ontological sense, but it is justified 
exclusively methodically. This procedure of separating the levels serves the single purpose of 
describing their respective workings. After that the nature the form-content relationship can 
be characterized and explained. This makes it possible to find out whether, to what degree and 
which semantic and pragmatic factors motivate syntactic structures. The widely known 
method for analysing utterances into formally characterized smaller units is the distributional 
method (cf. Saussure 1916, Bloomfield 1926, Trubetzkoy 1939, Harris 1946, Croft 2001). 
The distributional method yields formal constituents of different size, including those from 
phonemes to sentences. I will not catch up here on everything already accomplished in the 
                                                 
46
 The situation is constituted by the participating individuals and their environments for the time duration of the 
interaction. For the notion of environment see section 2.4. 
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past but will presuppose that the application of the distributional method to the utterances in 
question demonstrates that determiners, nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs, and prepositions 
show different distributional patterns. Two things are important with respect to the syntactic 
structures in question (like those underlying (2.12) and (2.15)). First, one type of morpheme is 
of great importance, namely that indicating case. The function of case will be discussed in 
section 4.1.6. However, case morphology has been demonstrated in the examples above to be 
of great importance with respect to grammaticality and appropriateness. Second, example 
(2.12) above constitutes an utterance, i.e., some part of the world, or of “parole”, to borrow 
Saussure’s (1916) terminology. As phones, morphs and other constituents of an utterance 
once segmented have corresponding units in “langue”, namely phonemes, morphemes, etc., so 
must the utterance itself also have some corresponding formal unit. As Croft (2001: 11) points 
out, “syntactic categories are defined by the occurrence or nonoccurrence of their members in 
different types of utterances. Utterance types […] are defined in structural terms [i.e., in 
accordance with the distributional method – SK]. We will call utterance types constructions.” 
Since we are talking about formal aspects of language here, I will also call the unit of 
“langue” corresponding to the formal aspect of an utterance a “syntactic construction” or 
simply “construction”. Consequently, (2.12) consists of the morphological langue units 
{Peter},{ha-}
47
,{-t},{Maria},{ein-},{-en},{Brief},{ge-},{-schick-}, and {-t}
48
 and has an 
underlying syntactic construction of the type NPnom-V-NPdat-NPacc (ignoring tense here). (The 
question whether constructions have some semantic import is the topic of section 3.3 and part 
III). The tendency or need to overtly case-mark proper nouns often interplays with the degree 
to which word-order is free (but see section 4.1.6.1). Presumably, in languages exhibiting 
global subject-object ambiguities in structures like (2.12) Peter hat Maria einen Brief 
geschickt determiners are used to make the identification of “who does what to whom” 
possible. As Rabanus (2008: 260) puts it, “speakers of German use morphological markers 
because they facilitate or even make possible the identification of the syntactic structure and 
with it the semantic-pragmatic interpretation of the utterance” (my translation). Consequently, 
word order is another central formal mechanism constituting syntactic structure. For now, this 
topic will not be pursued further here (but see sections 4.1 and 4.2).
49
 
 
 
                                                 
47
 It should be noted that this is a simplification and that matters with suppletives are more intricate than 
indicated here. 
48
 Where is case in {Peter} and {Maria}, given that it is such an important notion? In Generative Grammar they 
would be assigned structural case. I will assume here that there are indeed zero-allomorphs ({-Ø}) indicating 
nominative and dative for {Peter} and {Maria}. Are there reasons to assume something like this? In most spoken 
varieties of German, proper names are actually case-marked by determiners, as I have done in (2.13) for 
convenience of understanding. Besides that, proper names were case-marked by bound grammatical morphemes 
in older forms of German. This pattern can also be found today in varieties of Switzerland (cf. Bucheli-Berger 
2006, Schmidt 
9
2004: 224). 
49
 Actually, what is up to discussion here is a gap between “langue” and “parole”. In the example, there is 
nothing in parole corresponding to the case category in the language system. However, the strict Saussurian 
dichotomy between “langue” and “parole” is rejected here because the gap can presumably be bridged by a 
usage-based account to language. This would mean that frequent prior experiences with similar syntactic 
constructions in which morphological cases are overtly realized have led to the entrenchment of the case concept 
and that this concept could be activated also in cases of perceiving these construction without overt case-
marking. A connectionist usage-based account of German gender-marking has produced promising results (cf. 
MacWhinney 2000).  
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2.2.4 Implementing the data level 
In section 2.2.1 the relation between the subject-matter of the programme (abbreviated: 
linking competence) and the theory of the syntax-semantics interface has been outlined. They 
are both related to the individual’s grammatical and pragmatic competences. The theory and 
its subject-matter must, however, be based on data and observable facts, respectively. With 
the considerations of the previous section in mind the data level can now be implemented in 
the model by positioning it under the individual level, in accordance with the metaphorical 
spiralling of the empirical cycle from the bottom upwards. The revised model of the 
programme is given in Figure 2.2. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: “Data” and “individual” levels of the model (revised) 
 
On the left hand, the oval containing “verbal interaction” designates the interactants’ 
communicative performance as part of the real world. Verbal interaction is here the 
abbreviation of what has been identified as observable facts in the previous section, i.e., actual 
or (properly construed) verbal expressions within interactions. Naturally, they contain 
instances of grammatical and/or appropriate as well as ungrammatical and/or inappropriate 
utterances. The girl’s utterance in (2.15) is judged inappropriate by its mother within the 
communicative exchange. On the right hand, the rectangle containing “syntactic structure and 
interactional variables” designates neither raw observable facts nor an entire theory but rather 
“edited” data or some form of “transcription” of a subset of the observable facts in accordance 
with assumptions about how to collect interesting data. These assumptions comprise what has 
to be added to the mere components of the empirical cycle in order to set up a research 
programme. Such assumptions (termed “heuristics for the collection of interesting data” and 
criteria for selecting relevant data” in section 2.1.1) come from outside the empirical cycle 
itself and are imposed by the linguist exploring certain phenomena to certain ends. In other 
words, the theory part of the data level describes the world part of the data level in a specific 
way. The descriptions providing “syntactic structures” are supplied by the distributional 
method. The descriptive means providing interactional variables are more difficult to gain and 
to restrict. The problem is that a description of interactional variables is an interpretation of 
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the interaction itself, and this is ultimately the subject-object problem which we have been 
facing for centuries. It is virtually impossible to describe a situation neutrally without 
imposing causal relations on the situation by describing it. A possible explanation of the 
causal factors in a situation is then obscured by the description’s being permeated by 
subjective judgments from the outset. Even perceiving (and imagining) a situation similar to 
the one described in (2.15) above includes setting up causal relations between components of 
what is perceived (or imagined). Even though this means relocating the problem, it seems 
feasible to use such descriptions. The text in (2.15) obviously attempts not to impose causal 
relations on sub-events or -situations, on the relationship between happenings and their verbal 
annotations. It does not address how the participants perceive and assess the situation, except 
for their linguistic
o
 utterances. That means much is left open for inferences of the reader (or 
observer, given the event is visually perceived). In addition, construals or descriptions of such 
contextual information accompanying utterances shall be compatible with results from 
sociology and socio-cognitive psychology about which factors govern the assessment of 
situations (see sections 3.2.1.4 to 3.2.4). This should account for the simultaneous 
overspecification (what is imposed on the situation) and underspecification (information 
missing in the description) of the description. 
How is the data level related to the individual level? On the left side, there is an arrow 
connecting “linking competence” and “verbal interaction”. It indicates that in every actual 
verbal interaction containing the structures in question the linking competence is realized, 
actualized, instantiated, or enacted. On the other hand, the linking competence is existentially 
dependent on actualized verbal interactions, since usage and experience in actual 
communicative exchanges are considered to underlie its development. But while the latter is 
described on the data level, linking competence is described on the individual level. On the 
right-hand side in the rectangles, there are extracted data on the data level and a theory of the 
syntax-semantics interface. They are interrelated in the sense that the theory must explain the 
data while the data test the predictions and explanations of the theory in that new data must be 
tested against those predictions and explanations of the theory made on the basis of previous 
data. Now, the empirical cycle can be recognized in the model. Its spiralling up is constituted 
by the twofold relationship between the data testing the theory and the theory explaining the 
data. The theory must be modified if new data provoke theory1, formulated on the basis of 
data set A, to be adjusted to a new data set B, resulting in an improved theory2 that also 
captures the data from B (cf. section 2.1.1). The different shading of the elements of the two 
levels indicates that it is the individual level that constitutes the narrow subject-matter of the 
present programme. 
In section 2.1.1 six aspects have been listed which must complement the empirical cycle. Two 
of them have already been incorporated: what relevant data are (2) and how they are collected 
(3). Some absolute assumptions (1) have also been presented. At this point two further 
questions arise: What shall count as useful generalizations over the collected data (4) and 
which explanations for these generalizations are plausible (5)? 
As for (4), in order to answer the question of which generalizations about the data are 
useful/sensible, one has to refer to the four components of the model identified so far and to 
empirical laws which are part of the empirical cycle but which do not directly show up in the 
model, although part of it can be thought of as being implicit in the “test/explains”-connection 
52 
 
between the two theoretical components. Obviously, empirical laws are the form in which 
generalizations are stated (similar to the astronomer who states something like “always at time 
t planet x is at point p”). It has been mentioned that empirical laws mediate between 
observations (here: syntactic structure and interactional variables) and theories (that about the 
syntax-semantics interface) and that they are “closer” to observations than theories are. Given 
a finite set of data similar to those in (2.15), what sensible generalizations can be made in 
consideration of the fact that they are logically infinite? Bearing in mind the notions of 
grammatical competence and pragmatic competence developed in the previous section as well 
as what has been identified as relevant data, the only useful generalizations to be made would 
have the following form: “An utterance u of the form f is possible, iff situation variables v1, 
v2, vn are given.” Applied to the example in (2.15) (as a placeholder for any similar example) 
this would roughly yield something like the following: “The utterance Nicole hat die Milch 
runtergeworfen with the underlying form [NPnom-AUX-NPacc-Vptcp] is possible, iff the speaker 
has certain (cognitive) dispositions, the causer has certain (cognitive) dispositions, certain 
situational factors are given, and certain contextual factors are given.” Whether an utterance is 
“possible” or not depends on the judgments of grammatically and pragmatically competent 
members of the speech-community. Such judgments can, for instance, be elicited via 
standardized questionnaires.
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 As a consequence, any generalization that accords to the 
linking competence is useful and serves as a basis for explanation. This leads to the other 
question, namely which explanations for the generalizations are plausible (5). At first glance, 
this question seems trivial. By looking at the model in Figure 2.2 it becomes obvious that it is 
the theory of the syntax-semantics interface which delivers the explanations for 
generalizations and the explanation is plausible when it describes the linking competence 
properly. The so-called indeterminacy problem lies in the fact that one can construe an infinite 
number of theories from a finite set of generalizations, similar to the fact that one can draw an 
infinite number of generalizations from a finite set of data unless there are criteria for 
choosing sensible generalizations. As a result, one needs a criterion to construe the “correct” 
theory from the available generalizations. The question about plausible explanations is thus 
intimately related to the question of how to evaluate concurring theories (6). Among the 
notions developed so far – those present in the model, those which are part of the empirical 
cycle, the heuristics and additional assumptions for resolving the cycle’s problems – there is 
nothing that could provide this criterion. What we know is the following: The “best” theory 
should account for the fact that (i) the linking competence can be acquired, (ii) it is 
instantiated/actualized/used/enacted in every interactive communication, (iii) it is based on 
cognitive factors, (iv) it is based on sociocultural factors, (v) it is grounded in perception (vi) 
and interaction. In other words, the model in its present form cannot be complete yet. 
 
 
2.2.5 Excursus: converging evidence 
Presumably from the 1950s on, linguistics has more and more been cross-linked to 
neighbouring scientific disciplines. Although Bloomfieldian and post-Bloomfieldian 
linguistics were indebted to behavioristic psychology, the coming about of a (first) “cognitive 
                                                 
50
 This is actually done within a project with the title “Syntax Hessischer Dialekte (SyHD)” funded by the 
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG). See section 3.2.4 and <www.syhd.info>. 
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turn” in the 1950s has led to new fields in linguistic research (cf. ten Hacken, 2009 on the 
terms “Bloomfieldian” and “post-Bloomfieldian; cf. Lakoff & Johnson 1999 on first-
generation cognitive science). Especially Chomsky’s so-called mentalism caused theoretical 
linguistics to reorient itself, since Chomsky (1968) declared linguistics to be a part of 
cognitive psychology, dealing with grammatical competence alone. The simultaneous 
development of digital computers gave rise the idea of a computational theory of mind as the 
leading paradigm in psychology and thus in theoretical linguistics (cf. Pinker 1994). However, 
as time went by, Chomsky’s naturalistic programme more and more focussed on the 
biological (i.e., genetic) aspects of this competence. Nevertheless, one result of the 
“Chomskyan revolution” was the coming about of psycholinguistics as a sub-discipline of 
linguistics, but mainly for those interested in the production and comprehension performance 
of speakers (cf. Bresnan 1982). Another line of development that one could term 
“anthropological” complemented the cognitive turn in linguistics and explored language from 
an anthropological, ethnological perspective (cf. Basso 1970). This development is closely 
related to sociolinguistics as established by Labov (1972). Yet another line comes from 
philosophy and a “pragmatic turn”. The name associated with this influence on linguistics is 
Austin (1972). Also throughout the 1970s, some linguists claimed a broader applicability of 
psychological considerations to linguistic questions than the Chomskyan framework allowed. 
This focussing on psychological questions beyond those of a computational theory of mind 
were motivated by important findings of Eleanor Rosch (Rosch 1999, Rosch & Mervis 1975) 
on the one hand and Brent Berlin and Paul Kay (1969) on the other hand with respect to 
human categorization. To be brief, throughout the second half of the 20
th
 century, linguistics 
has been “hyphenated”, making the interdisciplinary boundaries of linguistics fuzzier. This 
process has given birth to psycholinguistics, neurolinguistics, biolinguistics, evolutionary 
linguistics, clinical linguistics, sociolinguistics, anthropological linguistics, cultural 
linguistics, computational linguistics, and many more. Linguistic theorization has become 
more complicated, since it can not ignore the results of any relevant sub-discipline of 
hyphenated linguistics.  
Respecting this development, Cognitive-Functional Linguistics has methodologically 
committed itself to what its members call “converging evidence” (Lakoff & Johnson 1999: 
79/80, Langacker 1999: 26, Evans & Green 2006: 17. See also Sinha 2007: 1269, Harder 
2007: 1247ff.). Langacker (ibid.) states that  
 
“[p]erhaps the most fundamental methodological principle I follow is to look for converging 
evidence from multiple sources. This is especially important considering the diversity of the 
cognitive-functional enterprise. An essential source of guidance and empirical support for work in 
any one area is its broad compatibility, and hopefully its convergence in specific details, with the 
findings of others.”  
 
What qualifies as findings of others then? With respect to the Cognitive Commitment (Evans 
& Green 2006: 40ff.) language should reflect what is known from other cognitive sciences, 
i.e. philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence, and neuroscience. This statement has 
already been criticized above (section 2.1.2). In order to make the idea of converging 
evidence compatible with the present research programme, it has to be reformulated in 
accordance with the basic assumptions put forward here and with the mode of operation of the 
model. Then, converging evidence is provided by those findings of other scientific disciplines 
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or sub-disciplines (a) which can contribute significant input to a theory of the syntax-
semantics interface, (b) which converge with generalizations suggested by the data in 
question, and (c) by those findings of other disciplines the fundamental assumptions of which 
are not incompatible with those of the research programme pursued here. The fundamental 
assumptions mentioned in (c) are the basic assumptions underlying the research programme. 
Calling back to mind the four postulates from the introduction to chapter 2 (B A1) to (B A4) 
concerning the question of what the relevant parts of the programme are, and the claim that 
the linking competence is “doubly grounded” in – to put it roughly – perception and action, 
we can characterize those disciplines that will hopefully contribute to a explanatory theory 
(excluded are linguistic sub-disciplines): the branches of cognitive psychology and 
neurosciences dealing with perception and conceptualization, the branch of social psychology 
dealing with social cognition, the branches of sociology and social psychology dealing with 
intersubjectivity and attribution, and the branches of philosophy dealing with action. Due the 
double-grounding of the linking competence, this list also contains non-cognitive scientific 
disciplines, in contrast to what the Cognitive Commitment suggests. 
 
 
2.2.6 Multidisciplinarity  
The excursus on converging evidence has been inserted here because its wider implications 
shall contribute to the solution of the indeterminacy problem raised in section 2.2.2. This 
problem becomes even more serious when looking at different communities. The individual 
level in the model is conceived of as embracing two “oppositions”, that between individual 
and community on the one hand and that between individual and species on the other hand. 
However, the individual level applies only to an individual in a specific speech-community. It 
should be clear, however, that any individual that stands in a relationship to a community 
acquires what has been termed “linking competence” independently of the language spoken in 
its respective speech-community (except for pathological cases). As a consequence, there are 
as many “correct” theories of this competence as there are speech-communities. So, one must 
find criteria to choose every “correct” theory from the possible theories in a way which allows 
for a formulation about what languages have in common. 
A good theory aiming at an adequate description and/or explanation of its subject-matter must 
be plausible in the sense that is in accordance with the double grounding of language (cf. 
Tomasello 2008, Everett 2013). Since languages must be learned by children, and children 
must – based on usage – rely on their general cognitive abilities as well as on their interactive 
environment, a theory of the linking competence must be plausible with respect to all the 
above-mentioned disciplines.  
 
In other words, the best theory of the linking competence is one in accordance with the 
findings of the scientific disciplines identified as being related to its subject-matter. 
  
This claim might seem trivial, but it is not. Consider the solution of the indeterminacy 
problem of another research programme, that of CL (cf. ten Hacken 2009: 73ff.; see also 
section 2.3). First, grammatical competence has been singled out as its subject-matter. Due to 
some absolute assumptions underlying the programme, the mode of operation of the part of 
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the mind corresponding to this competence does not resemble any other cognitive function, 
i.e., it is autonomous and self-contained. The indeterminacy problem – what is the correct 
theory of this competence – can then only be answered by reference to something that is 
compatible with an autonomous competence. Indeed, Chomsky uses the “learnability” of 
language as criterion, i.e., the theory must be open enough to allow any child to acquire its 
proper I-language and at the same time it must be restrictive enough to allow for the 
acquisition of the possible and only the possible I-languages. This tension is set up by means 
of the language faculty of which the grammatical competence of the individual is only an 
instantiation. The theory describing the language faculty is Universal Grammar. The 
indeterminacy problem is thus considered to be resolved by the tension captured “between” 
UG and the theory of grammatical competence. The critical notions in how the balance 
between openness and restrictiveness is created are those of the poverty of the stimulus and 
the innate (= present at birth) language acquisition device (LAD). Stricto sensu, the innate 
LAD represents the criteria of the correct grammar. From what has been said so far it follows 
that neither this sort of nativism nor a cognitively encapsulated grammatical competence 
employed in CL are available in the present programme.
51
 What can be learned, however, is 
that indeterminacy must be resolved in part by reference to learnability. The species-specific, 
genetically based language faculty with which the innate grammatical competence of the 
individual “interplays” can be paralleled to the situation here: There is the competence in 
question which is doubly grounded. The simultaneous openness and restrictiveness of this 
competence can only be a result of its being related to aspects of general cognition available 
to the child and the way interactions are carried out within human communities as a frame of 
reference in which children develop.  
 
 
2.2.7 Species, community, and sciences 
In order to be able to deal with the indeterminacy problem we have to add one more level to 
the model. Its final version is given as Figure 2.3. 
 
                                                 
51
 Even the assumption of a partially autonomous grammar does not necessarily force one to adopt a nativist 
stance. In principle, it is conceivable – if there are autonomous aspects about grammar, actually – that these 
aspects come in company with the usage-based development of grammatical and pragmatic competence drawing 
on multiple sources of general cognition. 
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Figure 2.3: “Data”, “individual”, and “species/community” levels 
of the model (final version) 
 
The core of the indeterminacy problem is that the theory of the syntax-semantics interface 
must be open enough to allow for any occurring form of the linking competence and 
restrictive enough to rule out non-occuring forms of the linking competence. Since this 
competence broadly draws from two sources, general cognition based on perception and 
conceptualization, and socioculturally-based interaction, the actual character, or constitution, 
of both perception, conception, and action restricts what is possible and impossible for the 
linking competence. In order to make restrictions operative the intended theory, one has to 
have access to perception, conception, and action, as well as to their descriptions. This lies far 
outside the scope even of hyphenated linguistics but it seems to be a necessary step towards 
the “recontextualization” of linguistico competence. 
At best, then, all notions, mechanisms, “knowledge” structures etc. employed in the linking 
theory should be interdependently motivated. For this to be possible, the linguist has to widen 
his/her scope toward the scientific disciplines listed above which potentially provide 
converging evidence with respect to the linguist’s topic. He/she has to look there for evidence 
for theoretical claims. Looking at Figure 2.3 above, the topmost level should be conceived of 
as the level of multidisciplinarity and converging evidence. On the right-hand side, i.e., the 
theoretical side, “theories of competences and interaction” designates any theory from 
whatever scientific discipline the subject-matter of which is some general or specific 
cognitive competence potentially contributing to the cognitive grounding of language or the 
modes, manners, governing factors, and so on of interindividual interaction, potentially 
contributing to the sociocultural grounding of language. On the left-hand side there is 
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consequently any phenomenon in the world reflecting instances of actualized cognitive or 
interactional competences and interactions themselves.  
The level in the model on which these matters are located is the “species/community” level. 
In section 2.2.1 the individual has been conceived of as being naturally and culturally bound. 
The distinction between nature and culture has been explicated by reference to the 
individual’s “opposition” both to the species and to the community. But is this distinction 
necessary? Is it not possible to reduce culture/community to the species, i.e., to nature? 
Should it not be possible to “naturalize” culture as well, including all forms of human 
competences and accomplishments (cf. Quine 1951, 1969)? According to Hartmann (1998: 3; 
my translation) 
 
“naturalism is in error because of its attempt to put itself in an absolute observer perspective – 
divorced from any participant perspective. […] This becomes most obvious in the ‘naturalization 
of epistemology’ programme: epistemology and the philosophy of science shall be transformed 
into natural scientific theories which ought to explain the attainment of our knowledge – and 
therefore also knowledge formulated by natural scientific theories themselves – in terms of 
causality.”   
 
This does not mean that there are no empirical findings possible concerning the attainment of 
knowledge. But according to Hartmann (1998: 4, my translation) 
 
“[w]hat such theories as a matter of principle cannot accomplish is to provide criteria for 
knowledge itself, i.e., criteria for differentiating true from false. Rather, such criteria, for assessing 
the validity of scientific theories, are required beforehand. Criteria of validity cannot be 
determined by empirical theories because they are normative. […] Criteria of validity as criteria 
for one’s claim for validity […] can only be justified internally, in the context of the perspective of 
joint participation in a speech and communication community.” 
 
Taking the observer’s perspective on one’s own communication community is possible as 
long as one’s involvement in this community as a participant is respected. 
In a similar vein, the distinction between community and species should be conceived of as 
one of aspects. While the natural sciences investigate homo sapiens as a natural object, the 
social sciences investigate him/her as a purpose-rational political being. Culture is a factor 
because humans act together purpose-rationally. Animals do not (cf. Tomasello 2008). From a 
juridical and moral perspective, they are not (made) “responsible” for the effects of their 
behavior. Finally, they do not carry out scientific investigations and do not claim validity for 
their assertive speech acts (cf. Janich 2010).  
The species/community level in Figure 2.3 is thus compressed. It comprises many different 
scientific disciplines – natural sciences and humanitites – with different subject-matters and 
must be conceived of as expandable to the sides where each scientific discipline unfolds its 
own research programme built around its subject-matter. This is schematically captured in 
Figure 2.4. 
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Figure 2.4: Multidisciplinarity and converging evidence 
 
The shading of Figure 2.4 is of no particular importance except that of the subject-matter of 
the respective research programmes. Their color corresponds to that in the model developed 
here. Any scientific discipline or sub-discipline works in accordance to a specific research 
programme. This is constituted by a model which sets the empirical cycle in motion. As far as 
important aspects of the research programmes are compatible with one another, as far as their 
subject-matters are overlapping, and as far as their results provide converging evidence, this 
restricts the range of possible theories in any one of the research programmes considerably. 
The triple-dot punctuation marks to the left and to the right indicate that research programmes 
from other disciplines can be added. In this Figure psychology and sociology have been 
chosen as examples in order to illustrate how converging evidence with respect to the doubly 
grounded linking competence could be gathered. Psychology contributes to its cognitive 
grounding, sociology to its sociocultural grounding. In parts II and III of this work, several 
sub-competences of the linking competence are identified and characterized. These sub-
competences are subject-matters of different scientific disciplines like the aforementioned 
psychology and sociology. For each section dealing with these sub-competences I will 
therefore give a partial research-programmatic model in the style of Figure 2.3 in order to 
indicate the notions to be developed and to make possible the reader’s orientation in my 
argumentation.  
 
 
2.3 Excursus: a brief sketch of “Chomskyan Linguistics” 
 
It might be helpful at this point to see how the programme behind Chomskyan Linguistics fits 
into the concept of research programme developed by ten Hacken (2009). The first reason for 
this is that “Chomskyan Linguistics” is actually the topic of ten Hacken’s work. The second 
reason is that it provides a level (in fact, a meta-metatheoretical one) on which models can be 
compared. The model underlying Chomskyan Linguistics is given in Figure 2.5. 
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Figure 2.5: Model underlying the research programme of Chomskyan  
Linguistics (modified adaption from ten Hacken 2009: 120; (c) Equinox Publishing Ltd 2007) 
 
As in the case of my own model, the ovals on the left side correspond to things in the real 
world and are therefore observable facts or (presumably) facts that can (presumably) be 
observed in some future time, as far as they have a material basis. On the right side rectangles 
stand for theories (and observations, respectively) which describe things in the world. 
On the “individual” level (which is solely biologically characterized) a “grammar” is a theory 
which describes the speaker’s “competence” as a fact in the world. At the same time the 
grammar (from now on unambiguously understood as a theoretical construct) explains the 
data on the lowest level. The data in turn test the predictions of the grammar. Grammar 
corresponds to theory1 in the description of the empirical cycle in section 2.1.1 above, relative 
to “universal grammar” (again, a theoretical construct) which constitutes theory2. That means, 
with respect to the empircial cycle universal grammar covers a greater range of observable 
facts in the world, since competence (as a matter of the individual and described by grammar) 
is “only” an instantiation or a derivate of the more inclusive, genetically anchored language 
faculty which is described by universal grammar. Furthermore, universal grammar has a 
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greater explanatory depth, since it is (considered to be) able to answer the “why?” of 
competence, while grammar is only able to answer its “how?”. The testing function of 
grammar with respect to universal grammar lies in the fact that universal grammar must be 
compatible with all existing and possible instantiations of competence, i.e., with all existing 
and possible “I-languages”.52 According to ten Hacken (2009: 106ff.), the topmost level of the 
model constitutes the last step throughout the succession of theories within CL, i.e., the one 
from Principles and Parameters (Chomsky & Lasnik 1993) to the Minimalist Program 
(Chomsky 1995). The programmatic character of the latter becomes apparent in the fact that 
the “why?” of the language faculty is not presently in the scope of the “General Theory” (ten 
Hacken 2009: 120) which is a concept of the future.  
What are the absolute assumptions underlying the model and setting the empirical cycle in 
motion? Subject-matter of CL is the generative capacity of a mature speaker, i.e., some form 
of knowledge or “competence” (cf. Chomksy 1965: 3ff.). Competence is not only independent 
of particular languages and ultimately located in the human brain but also separated from 
actual performance, i.e., some form of acting, which is “only” the externalization of 
something internalized. This (methodically motivated) separation is accompanied by another 
one, that of grammaticality and acceptability. The former is attributed to competence and the 
latter to performance (cf. Chomsky 1965: 11). From another perspective, competence, taken 
as “grammatical competence”, should be distinguished from “pragmatic competence”. 
 
“For purposes of inquiry and exposition, we may proceed to distinguish ‘grammatical competence’ 
from ‘pragmatic competence’, restricting the first to the knowledge of form and meaning and the 
second to knowledge of conditions and manner of appropriate use, in conformity with various 
purposes.” (Chomsky 1980: 224) 
 
With this, the subject-matter has been reduced not only to some form of knowledge located in 
the brain but also by its pragmatic components. From a third perspective, competence, as “I-
language”, i.e., that part of the mind which constitutes linguistico knowledge, is contrasted to 
“E-language”, i.e., the aspects of language that are considered to be independent of matters of 
mind and brain (cf. Chomsky 1986: 20ff.).  
Thus, repeatedly separating the subject-matter of the programme allows one to single out the 
aspects required to set the empirical cycle in motion. The available data, i.e., the sort of data 
that are relevant for the research programme, are restricted to grammaticality judgments of 
native speakers of a language, due to the focussing on (grammatical) competence/I-language. 
Grammaticality judgments are the only “access points” to competence (cf. Chomsky 1986: 
36ff.). Grammaticality judgments, i.e., a rather poorly designed type of experiment utilizing 
introspection, supplies rich data of high relevance, insofar as they provide evidence for 
competence (cf. ten Hacken 2009: 56). Hence, the observable facts in the model shown in 
Figure 2.5 correspond to all those verbal expressions (whether they are drawn from corpora or 
construed) about which grammaticality judgments can be made. The latter constitute the 
observations, then, i.e., the data. A grammar is a theory of the competence of the individual 
on the basis of such data. This theory is descriptively adequate, if it describes competence 
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 This is true not only for interpersonal variation in I-language but also for the states language learners go 
through as initial, intermediate and final states of I-language. Every one of these states is describable as an I-
language (cf. ten Hacken 2009: 84). Every I-language in turn corresponds (logically) to a grammar (cf. Chomsky 
2
2002: 64). 
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correctly (cf. Chomsky 1965: 30ff.). It seems important in this context, to see what Chomsky 
means by asserting that competence is “real”. Ten Hacken’s exegesis of several expressions 
of Chomsky has demonstrated that not every aspect of a mental operation “transforming” one 
structural description to another is considered mentally and physically real by Chomsky. In 
other words, only structural descriptions themselves are “real”, i.e., located in the brain, while 
derivations are artefacts in the sense of descriptive means of the theoretician (cf. ten Hacken 
2009: 68–70, mainly on the basis of Chomsky 1965: 9). 
Up to this point, the most important absolute assumptions have been clarified as well as the 
way in which data can be gathered and which observable facts are relevant with regard to 
these assumptions. The next problem of the empirical cycle is the question as to which 
generalizations one should make on the basis of the data, because the latter suffer from 
indeterminacy such that they allow an indefinite number of generalizations (cf. ten Hacken 
2009: 73ff.). This means that there can also be an infinite of grammars for these data. 
Chomsky (1962: 550) claims that the theory should be “insightful” and “true”. This does not 
only mean that is has to be able to specify the “correct” generalizations but also that one must 
be able to evaluate concurring theories in order to determine the one that is “true”. “True” 
should be understood here relative to the degree to which the theory captures the mental or 
neuronal reality of the explanandum (cf. Chomksy 1986: 249f.). 
Chomsky tackles the problem of indeterminacy by drawing an analogy between the linguist’s 
task of finding the correct grammar and the child’s task of developing the right I-language. 
The linguist operates on the basis of his/her data, the child on the basis of its primary 
linguistic input (cf. Chomsky 1965: 4). The child’s task is, however, in a sense more difficult, 
since its data are considered to be deficient.
53
 Chomsky concludes from this that the child has 
a genetic predisposition (i.e., the language faculty on the species level) that, when confronted 
with experiential data, i.e., primary linguistic input, leads to the development of I-language in 
the mature speaker (i.e., competence on the individual level; cf. Chomsky 1980: 134ff.). This 
is the language acquisition device (cf. Chomsky 1965: 47ff.). The problem of indeterminacy, 
i.e., indeterminacy of the child’s primary linguistico data in the sense of the “poverty of the 
stimulus” is resolved by means of a criterion of learnability (of any possible I-language) 
coupled with a genetic predisposition for competence (restrictive enough to allow for only the 
possible I-languages; cf. ten Hacken 2009, sec. 2.4.1). The description of universals on the 
basis of which the child aquires a language (together with the data) is the subject-matter of 
universal grammar (i.e., the theory of the linguist). The search for universals is thus restricted 
to those which are part of the species-specific language faculty. 
From the fact that the language faculty is species-specific, whereas competence is individually 
realized, it follows that there are many I-languages which are all “instantiations” of the 
language faculty. Furthermore, it follows from this that there are as many grammars possible 
as there are I-languages but that there will only be one universal grammar that has to explain 
each of these grammars. If universal grammar provides the identification of a descriptive 
adequate grammar which is the correct one among all possible grammars, then it is 
explanatorily adequate (cf. Chomsky 1965: 30ff.). It is now possible to associate the levels of 
adequacy in Chomskyan linguistics with the levels of the model. On the data level we find 
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 The primary linguistic
o
 data contain ungrammaical expressions, they are limited with respect to the 
constructions that are possible and rare, and the child has to rely on positive evidence (e.g., Sampson 2005). 
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observational adequacy, on the individual level we find descriptive adequacy and on the 
species level explanatory adequacy – as related to competence, in fact (cf. ten Hacken 2009: 
89). The data supply the “what?” of competence, the grammar supplies the “how?” and UG 
answers its “why”?  
The leading questions on the basis of which the model was set up were those concerning the 
nature of the knowledge of language and how it is acquired. They were answered – in brief – 
by recourse to an individual competence and a species-specific language faculty. In 
connection with the development of the Minimalist Program the leading questions were 
supplemented by two further ones, those of the physical basis of the language faculty and its 
evolution (cf. ten Hacken 2009: 109ff.). These questions as part of the programme were 
already in place in the 1960s (cf. Chomsky 1965: 59), but seriously dealing with them was far 
out of reach at that time (and maybe today, as well). Concerning the physical, i.e., neuronal 
basis of language, it will hopefully be possible one day to reduce all sciences engaged in 
investigating the same phenomenon – let’s say competence – to one single discipline, a 
General Theory (cit. in ten Hacken 2009: 112). That means, a situation could be brought 
about in which “physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, and linguistics describe different 
aspects of the same world” (ten Hacken 2009: 120) such that their results can be related to 
each other. With respect to the model there is hope that the way in which the language faculty 
is realized in the brain will supply data for the investigation of the nature of the language 
faculty (FL). But here one faces the problem of indeterminacy again. How are the (potential) 
data to be interpreted? What constraints are there with respect to “sensible” generalizations? 
The idea is that such criteria could be found in the study of the evolution of language. The 
“narrow” FL (meanwhile defined as recursion only; cf. Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch 2002: 
1573) is assumed not to have evolved gradually but developed saltationally, i.e., by a sudden 
mutation, and the crucial involvement of recursion in language is a case of alienating its 
original purpose, whatever this might have been. It was not communication, however, which 
is rather a side-effect of the presence of recursion in homo sapiens (cf. Hauser, Chomsky & 
Fitch 2002: 1571). The uppermost level thus asks for the “how?” and “why?” of FL. At the 
same time it is an interface between all those research programmes in other disciplines – those 
mentioned above – which pursue similar goals, thus approximating the General Theory. 
 
 
2.4 An action-theoretic vocabulary grounded in lifeworld differentiations 
 
 In the previous sections I have outlined a research programme and its 
organization, i.e., the relationships among its constitutive parts (in the 
horizontal dimension of the model: levels, in the vertical dimension of 
the model: domains). The linking competence lies at its heart. It is 
clear from the multidisciplinary programme that a proposal of a theory 
of the linking competence will include much talk about cognitive and 
actional matters, bringing together results from several scientific 
disciplines. Therefore, this section will serve to construe a 
terminological basis on the basis of which to talk about these 
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heterogenous results. This will conclude the research-programmatic 
part I.  
 
The present account of cognition and action will attempt a bottom-up approach as regards the 
embedment of the talk of both kinds of activities in everyday praxis. This is not to declare 
flawed all research results with respect to cognition and action but to approach them from the 
perspective of lifeworld differentiations (cf. Schütz & Luckmann 2003: 29ff.). As has been 
outlined in section 2.2.7, research programmes are limited in their ability to establish criteria 
for the validity of theories. The philosophy of science must establish them as norms. Research 
programmes, as the one outlined above, are then not self-contained constructs but depend on 
their embedding in our everyday praxis the constitution of which provides the criteria in 
question.  
 
The argument of the following sections is thus as follows: According to the research 
programme pursued here, theories (and therefore theoreticians/observers) are part of what 
they describe (world/mind). The terminological tools theoreticians use to describe their 
subject-matters must therefore be based on those differentiations which are grounded in 
everyday praxis and which are therefore intersubjectively accessible and acceptable (cf. Ryle 
1990, von Wright 1974, 1977, Janich 2001, 2006, Schütz & Luckmann 2003). The 
differentiations grounded in everyday praxis can be stated in terms of an action-theoretic 
taxonomy (cf. Hartmann 1996, 1998).  
The theory of the linking competence proposed here will utilize this taxonomy, thus enabling 
the traceability of its theoretical notions. In particular, decisions about the possession or non-
possession of competences rest on differentiations made by groups of individuals constituting 
sociocultural praxes. In what follows, the action-theoretic terminology will be developed. 
The mind is not an object like tables, cars, or brains are. However, the list (B A1) to (B A4) in 
section 2.1 does contain mostly cognitive competences (as well as the physical competence 
for physical action), namely perceiving, knowing, attending, sharing knowledge, planning, 
imagining, and thinking. These competences are preconditions of the linking competence, 
another partially cognitive competence. If the mind is not an object, what is it? It is not the 
purpose of this book to deal primarily with this problem, as it is perhaps the most disputed 
one in the history of philosophy and – nowadays – natural sciences (cf. Beckermann 32008, 
e.g., Haggard 2001, Hallett 2007, “Manifest”54). Instead of this, I shall propose a new way to 
talk about such psychological notions from the perspective of our everyday needs and from 
the perspective of an already functioning communicative praxis which is the ineluctable 
reference for any differentiation. As Luckmann (1992: 1; my translation; see also 
Schütz/Luckmann 2003: 29) puts it,  
 
“[t]hose sciences aiming at interpreting and explaining human action must start with a description 
of the reality of everyday life which we take as granted. It is the reality in which the human being 
participates repeatedly, this participation being inescapable and continuous.”  
 
                                                 
54
 In this manifesto, eleven leading neuroscientists announce that neuroscience will soon be able to explain and 
predict psychical processes. They identify the freedom of will – traditionally one of the great philosophical 
topics – as one of the great questions of neuroscience. 
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We can term this reality which is the ineluctable instance for all of our judgments “lifeworld” 
(cf. Schütz & Luckmann 2003, chapter 1). Because even the theoretician has nothing besides 
language to talk about his/her phenomena and results, it is plausible even to ground one’s 
scientific language in ordinary language so that descriptions of phenomena and results do not 
lose contact to the instance that is able to judge it valid or invalid. The way of talking about 
perceiving, knowing, imagining etc. is the result of our everyday interplay with our 
environment and interaction with each other, which allows for intersubjective accessibility. 
This allows us to refer technical notions of psychology to differentiations acquired in 
everyday experience in our lifeworlds as they are present in ordinary language use (cf. 
Hartmann 1998: 8ff., Hartmann & Lange 2000, Janich 2006: 391ff.). Applied to the model 
underlying the proposed research programme (Figure 2.3) for which it has been claimed that 
theories are also part of the world, this means that the terminology construed applies to both 
the theory and world/mind dimensions at the same time, thus neutralizing the observer’s and 
practitioner’s points of view in the sense that any observer is necessarily at the same time a 
practitioner.  
I use the term “interplay” here to differentiate it from “interaction” which shall be reserved for 
what is usually called “intentional action” towards each other and which is opposed to mere 
“behavior” (see below). Interaction requires two agents, i.e., some symmetry between its 
participants. Interaction is then always a form of acting together, of co-operation. Many action 
schemas can only be actualized in the form of acting together, e.g., selling and talking. In 
contrast, “interplay” shall designate any affection of the sense-organs of the individual 
through the environment and any behavior or action of the individual toward its actually non-
agentive environment.
55
 By “environment” everything is meant which can affect the 
individual’s sense-organs or can be affected by the individual’s behavior or action. Because 
these “affections” are also involved in human interactions, our potential interactants are also 
parts of the environment. The differentiation of interplay and interaction is a descriptive one, 
one of aspects of the same “thing”, namely an individual’s relation to its environment.  
The taxonomy of notions proposed in this section is then a result of the successful 
differentiations we make in our everyday engagement with our interactants and our 
environment in that we enact these differentiations. What follows is a reconstruction of 
psychological notions in accordance with the subject-matter of the programme presented, 
namely a doubly grounded linking competence.  
In the course of our encounters with others and with our environments we learn to distinguish 
objects from states, processes, and activities in which objects occur. The latter can together be 
labelled circumstances.
56
 In states some aspect or status of an object, or a relation between 
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 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the noun “interplay” means ‘mutual operation of two things or 
agents in influencing each other's action or character’. Accordingly, the intransitive verb “to interplay” means ‘to 
exert mutual influence’. 
56
 Thus, “circumstance” is a cover term for any conceivable form of appearance of an object. The following 
taxonomy is a modification and in certain parts elaboration of Hartmann’s (1998) work in which he attempts a 
methodological reconstruction of important psychological notions in the context of his proposal of a “proto-
psychology” (cf. also Hartmann 1993, 1996, 2006). He makes use of ordinary language in this attempt (see also 
Ryle 1990 [1949]) in order to relocate the theoretical notions employed in psychology in our everyday praxis. 
This shall prevent the scientific discipline psychology from the hypostatization of their theoretical constructs 
(see also Foley 1937), i.e., for a psychology which does not keep track of the everyday praxis in its 
characterization of its subject-matter there is danger of “hypostatizing” its theoretical constructs. One example of 
such a hypostatization might be the “computational mind”. Once invented as a heuristic for the exploration of 
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two or more objects remains constant through a period of time. A state would be constituted 
by a car standing in front of a house or a lamp hanging from the ceiling. If some aspect, 
status, or a relation between objects changes in time, for instance, the car’s being removed 
from in front of the house by a flood or the lamp swinging because of ventilation, this is a 
process. In our everyday praxis we can also easily distinguish between states and processes on 
the one hand and activities on the other hand, where the latter term shall apply here to animate 
beings and the former to inanimate beings. Activity finds its expression in movement, 
whereas I reserve the term motion for the embodiment of processes. Examples of activities 
would be the laughter of someone, a dog’s whining, or Alex’ rolling himself down a hill. 
States, processes, and activities can further be characterized according to two parameters. This 
is firstly their complexity, i.e., the number of their respective sub-parts. States do not have 
sub-parts because no changes occur in states. Processes may consist of only one part or may 
have two or more sub-parts, as in the event of a ball rolling from the living-room through the 
vestibule into the kitchen (for details on the defining characteristics of sub-parts see section 
3.4). Activities work similarly. States, processes, and activities can secondly be characterized 
with respect to the number of objects that are involved in them, i.e., whether they are 
monadic, dyadic, triadic etc. (adicity). The taxonomic distinctions so far are captured in 
Figure 2.6.  
 
 
Figure 2.6: Types of circumstances and their characteristics 
 
Table 2.1 illustrates the role of the complexity and adicity parameters.  
 
 
Table 2.1: Complexity and adicity of states, processes, and activities 
 
We can now reconstruct the usage of the terms “situation”, “event”, and “relation”. A 
situation is a state of any adicity (see Table 2.2).   
                                                                                                                                                        
cognitive skills, it was increasingly taken literally until the mind was indeed considered a computer (cf. also 
Lakoff & Johnson 1999, chapter 12).  
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Table 2.2: Situation 
 
An event is a process or activity of any adicity in which “something happens”, i.e., where 
complexity > 1 (see Table 2.3). 
 
 
Table 2.3: Event 
 
Finally, a relation is given when adicity > 1, where complexity is irrelevant. This is given in 
Table 2.4. 
 
 
Table 2.4: Relation 
 
Another distinction we acquire through everyday praxis is that between behavior and action. 
These are the two types of activity (or movement).
57
 The distinction between these two is of 
great importance. Behavior can be described as those movements which can perfectly be 
explained in terms of biology, physiology and other natural sciences, since these discinplines 
are, or claim to be, able to causally explain the occurrence of behavior in terms of natural laws 
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 In most psychological works, the term “behavior” subsumes both what is here called “behavior” and “action” 
(e.g., Engelkamp & Zimmer 2006).  
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(i.e. laws about activity patterns of the type: Every time something of kind A happens, B 
occurs afterwards). These causal explanations in terms of natural laws cannot be applied to 
acts, since they can be desisted from, i.e., their occurrence can not be captured by such laws. 
In fact, natural laws for the occurrence of action do not exist (Hartmann 1993, 1998). 
Examples of behavior would be breathing, the heartbeat or yawning. Examples of action are 
writing a letter, buttering bread, running, singing, and eating.  
Any state, process, or activity that is not an act of ours but involves us “happens to” us. These 
“happenings” include, e.g., our own behavior, the behavior and especially the acts of others. 
Acts can be successful or they can fail. Due to the success or failure of our own acts we may 
incur happenings even with respect to our own acts: A failed attempt to open a tin “happens 
to” us. All instances of successful accomplishment of a particular act, e.g., opening the 
window, making coffee, washing dishes, can be schematized, resulting in action schemas (see 
also Cooper & Shallice 2000, 2006). An action schema is actualized when a particular result 
of an action occurs, i.e., the bringing about of a circumstance as the result of an act. When I 
have made coffee successfully, i.e., there is coffee after my acting, then I have actualized the 
action schema of making coffee, since the resulting state of there being coffee is the condition 
for the foregoing action to be an instance of the schema “making coffee”. Most actualizations 
of action schemas are for the greater part associated not only with particular resulting 
circumstances but also with further outcomes. A further outcome of my making coffee could 
be a messy kitchen. It is, however, not necessarily but contingently tied to the action schema 
“making coffee” and its (necessary) result of there being coffee.  
In the course of our lives and our everyday experience we gain encyclopaedic knowledge 
about the outcomes of our actions. We use this knowledge to fulfil our needs. When I turn on 
the light, the action schema “turning on the light” is actualized iff the light is on. My need is, 
however, to get something out of the room in which it is dark, and a further outcome of the 
actualization of the action schema “turning on light” is that it is bright in the room after I have 
turned on the light to find what I am looking for. Therefore, we use our knowledge about the 
further outcomes of our acts for the sake of bringing about particular circumstances. These are 
called purposes. Purposes are either goals, i.e., states, processes, or activities which have to be 
brought about, or interests, i.e., states, processes, or activities which shall be maintained or 
avoided. Outcomes of acts that are not purposed are called side-effects. If a purpose is 
achieved, the act has been effective; if not, it has been ineffective. Most purposes can be 
identified with further outcomes of action. But there are also cases in which a purpose 
coincides with the (necessary) result of an action, e.g., if someone writes poems to write 
poems. These acts are acts with an end in themselves. Some aspects of action are captured in 
Figure 2.7. 
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Figure 2.7: Aspects of the relationship between action schemas and purposes  
(peii: purpose consists in actualizing an action schema (as) as an act with an end in itself) 
 
Many action schemas are actualized by actualizing other action schemas, as1, as2, asn first 
(think of making coffee, for example; cf. Jackendoff 2007: 123ff., Cooper & Shallice 2000 on 
accounts of the making coffee-schema using hierarchies). Then, as is mediated by as1, …, to 
asn. The latter are known as ancillary action schemas. Acts that do not support others are basic 
acts. The defining criterion for a basic act is how it is learned: It cannot be learned by the 
step-by-step acquisition of partial action schemas but only as a whole (e.g. washing one’s 
hands consists of different steps learned independently of one another, while clenching one’s 
fist is a unified whole, in that one need not learn to bend each limb separately). 
Those action schemas that are usually effective with respect to a particular purpose p when 
they are achieved are means to p.  
In order to put into effect a particular purpose it might be necessary to put into effect other 
purposes first. I call the former the superior purpose p and the latter subordinate purposes p1, 
…, pn, where subordinate purpose p1 might be subordinate to a “higher” purpose p but at the 
same time be the superior purpose in relation to a yet “lower” purpose, p2. When several 
actions must be executed in a strict order to put into effect a highest purpose p, this is called 
an action chain (cf. Cooper & Shallice 2000 for a similar account). This is schematically 
depicted in Figure 2.8 below:  
 
 
Figure 2.8: Action chain 
(Figure 2.8 can be read as follows: Someone has a purpose (p), i.e., wants a 
state/process/activity to come about. He/she therefore conceptualizes this 
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STATE/PROCESS/ACTIVITY and the means to put it into effect in terms of action schemas 
(aa1-n). He/she actualizes the corresponding ancillary action schemas in sequence (aa1-n), 
whereby he/she brings about several states/processes/activities which are results and 
outcomes of ancillary acts (p1-n) (see Figure 2.7). They must match the conceptualized 
intermediary states/processes/activities (RESULT & OUTCOME1-n). (A feedback mechanism 
(not depicted) provides that unexpected or undesired results and outcomes lead to a 
modification of the means to get to purposes p1-n or p, respectively.) If the final 
state/process/activity is brought about, purpose p is put into effect.)
58
 
 
When a purpose is put into effect by concerted (successive or simultaneous) action of several 
persons, this is referred to as the interdependence of acts. Schematized and person-invariant 
interdependences of action are praxes. Praxes are then dependent on co-operation which has 
been characterized above as the constitutive feature of interaction. Any form of verbal 
communication is then constituted by concerted action and cannot occur in the absence of less 
than two agents. With these action-theoretic clarifications (made on meta-theoretical grounds 
here) one can catch up on the talk about a praxis being one precondition for our verbal 
interactive competence as claimed in section 2.1. Taken together, all forms of action comprise 
a culture, as these things are passed on from generation to generation within a community (cf. 
Tomasello 1999, 2008).  
There are many events especially relevant for living beings insofar as they serve or hinder 
their survival. Living beings tend to act or behave in regular ways toward such events. If this 
is the case, one can talk about a movement (or activity) schema. This schematization of 
movement, and, as has been introduced above, of actions, can also be extended to motions (or 
processes), behaviors, and even to situations, events, and relations. There are then, relation 
schemas, event schemas, situation schemas, movement schemas, motion schemas, action 
schemas, and behavior schemas.  
Reaction schemas are one type of behavior schemas. They can regularly be caused by certain 
situations which are stimuli and the corresponding objects in these situations are stimulus 
objects. Reaction schemas contributing to the survival of a living being or species are need-
satisfying. The summation of circumstances in which a living being might find itself is its 
environment (i.e., where interplay and interaction take place). It might be necessary for a 
living being to face novel circumstances. Insofar as it learns new life-sustaining reaction 
schemas for them, it adapts to its environment. The distinctions made so far are summarized 
in Figure 2.9 below. 
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 By way of exception, the notions “concept” and “conceptualization” must be forstalled here. They are 
discussed in extenso in sections 3.1 and 3.2. 
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Figure 2.9: Thing-circumstance taxonomy (inspired by Hartmann 1998: 64) 
 
Most differentiations have been introduced here in terms of physical processes and activities, 
although it is obvious that this is insufficient with respect to our subject-matter, i.e., some 
form of (largely) cognitive competence drawing from other cognitive competences. Even if 
any cognitive activity has a neuronal correlate, talking about cognitive activities in terms of 
neurophysiological terminology will not be auspicious. So we need a cognitive psychological 
terminology in order to talk about something which is different from neuronal matters in 
aspect. The proposal given here is to ground our talking about cognitive activities in terms of 
the above taxonomy (Figure 2.9) as drawn from our actual experiences of our interplay and 
interaction with our environment. The taxonomy in Figure 2.9 can then be applied to physical 
circumstances as well as to cognitive ones. 
First, it shall be clarified what competences are (see also section 2.1). Naturally, competences 
are not objects but properties that become significant only with respect to something 
“enacted” or “executed”. Now, one masters an action schema if its actualization is regularly 
successful. One who masters an action schema has then the competence to actualize it. It was 
mentioned above that the actualization of action schemas can either succeed or fail. If the 
actualization of an action schema is successful, its result is an accomplishment. If it fails, the 
result of the act is a misaccomplishment. The talk about competence applies to both physical 
and cognitive activities. How can one tell physical and cognitive states and activities apart? 
With respect to action schemas, opening a door is naturally a physical action schema, while 
solving equations “in one’s head” is a cognitive action schema. “If one wants to know 
whether a particular action schema is a cognitive action schema, one has to test whether it can 
be internalized in the sense that the corresponding result of the action can principally be 
realized “internally” – without being mediated by the usual physical action schemas.” 
(Hartmann 1998: 77; my translation). For instance, one can solve an equation “in one’s head” 
or on paper or both. In principle, this can be accomplished without a physical action schema 
(writing), so it is a cognitive action schema. In contrast, I have never heard of someone who 
seriously claims to be able to open a (real) door “in his/her head”, so it is a physical action 
schema. Where a successful internal and a successful external actualization of an action 
schema (constituting the same accomplishment) leads to the same result, it is feasible with 
respect to “action schemas which can be internalized to allocate also the accomplishments 
made through physical mediation, the physically mediated actualizations themselves as well 
as the corresponding competences in general to the cognitive competences.” (Hartmann 1998: 
77; my translation). In other words, when solving an equation on the paper, this is a cognitive 
action schema because it can be internalized. At the same time it is physically mediated. 
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Solving it “in one’s head” and on paper leads to the same result – the successful solution of 
the equation, which is at the same time an accomplishment. Now the accomplishment made 
through physical mediation, i.e., the solution on paper, and the physically mediated 
actualizations, i.e., the process of solving the equation on paper, and all the physical 
competences that are necessary to solve an equation are also cognitive competences. It 
follows from this that we cannot characterize talking (as interacting verbally) as a cognitive 
action schema. Talking, as concerted action, cannot be internalized and is necessarily 
physically mediated. Reasoning which I take to be an individual, simulated verbal activity is, 
on the other hand, a cognitive action schema.
59
 
Cognitive activities are not exclusively instances of action, of course (cf. the “cognitive 
unconscious” of Lakoff & Johnson 1999: 9ff. as one facet of the “embodiment” concept in 
Cognitive-Functional Linguistics; Jackendoff 2007: 77ff.), i.e., they can often not be desisted 
from, since we are not aware of them. They are cognitive happenings, then, in the sense that 
they simply “befall” us: Sometimes things, persons, events, and things that we should have 
done etc. “come to our minds” or we see things that are not there. These are clearly instances 
of states and activities that happen to us without our having purposed them.  
Unlike acts, what happens to us cannot be differentiated into physical, cognitive and mixed 
happenings. The reason is that emotions also happen to us, i.e., they cannot be desisted from. 
We can only attempt to influence our emotions by acting, e.g., by trying to ignore the insults 
of someone in order to not become angry. The occurrence or non-occurrence of anger is then 
a further outcome of our attempt and in itself not an instance of action.  
What happens to us cognitively can also be purposed. This seems inconsistent with what has 
been said before, because purposefulness is restricted to action. But cognitive happenings can 
occur as results of acts which are purposeful per definitionem. This yields cognitive 
accomplishments. Imagine you misplaced a book. You can actively (as an act) try to recollect 
the last moments in which you still had the book. From there you might reconstruct this time 
span and it might finally “come to your mind” where you put the book. This strategy 
(recollecting) does not guarantee success but the cognitive happening (you recollect the 
book’s place) is a cognitive accomplishment in this situation. 
Furthermore, the above clarifications allow one to reconstruct the term “cognition”. In 
Cognitive Psychology the term is used rather broadly, encompassing mostly attention, 
perception, identification, knowledge, memory, learning, problem solving, thinking, and 
sometimes even speaking and acting (cf. Sternberg 
4
2006, Solso 2005, Engelkamp & Zimmer 
2005, Anderson 
5
2000, Eysenck & Keane 
52005). In addition, “cognition” mostly comprises 
cognitive activities as well as their results. In accordance with the above terminology we can 
state:  
 
“Cognitive acts, cognitive happenings, cognitive accomplishments as well as the results of non-
purposed cognitive happenings [are] called cognitions – cognitive acts and happenings in the sense 
of cognitive events, cognitive accomplishments and non-purposed results of cognitive happenings 
in the sense of results of cognitive events.” (Hartmann 1998: 80; my translation) 
 
                                                 
59
 For a more detailed characterization of “thinking” see Hartmann (1998: 164ff.). 
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What is “the mind”, then? According to the programme pursued here it is a terminus of 
reflection, i.e., a term that is used to make assertions about cognitions in opposition to 
assertions about physical states and activites, and their results. Unfortunately, although it is a 
terminus of reflection, i.e., only a manner of speaking about some cognitive states and 
activities and results of them, the term suggests that there is such an object: “the mind”. This 
reification easily leads to a type of category mistake, yielding literal scientific statements as 
“the mind knows…” (cf. Ryle 1990 [1949]: 17, 161, Hartmann 2006). Such a manner of 
speaking is the result of speaking about cognitions person-invariantly, i.e., in general. The 
same is true for the notion of “culture”. Cultures are not objects, so talking about living “in” a 
particular culture, or about “having a culture of…” might be misleading without further 
clarification. The above construal of a terminology that is situated in the here and now of 
people perceiving and acting together allows characterizing culture as nothing more than 
those praxes (and their resultant artefacts) which are enacted here and now and which have 
been passed on from the past and will be passed on to the future. And insofar as a culture is 
constituted by praxes and praxes are constituted by individuals that act “we-intentionally” 
toward common goals, praxes and cultures are inherently social. As a result, talking about 
“sociocultural praxis” is highly redundant. Nevertheless, I will go on using this phrase, since 
it fits common usage and adds nothing inadequate. 
 
 
2.5 Summary of part I 
 
In chapter 1 and part I I have proposed a research programme within which a theory of the 
syntax-semantics relationship will be developed. The research programme gets its 
legitimation through the fact that the prevalent research programmatic frameworks, 
Chomskyan Linguistics and Cognitive-Functional Linguistics, have reduced their subject-
matters by performance, use, and by actional matters that go beyond individual cognition, 
respectively. The subject-matter of the present programme has been identified as the linking 
competence, i.e., using verb-complement structures in a well-formed and appropriate manner 
to code semantic contents. The data to be used are linguistic
o
 data embedded in verbal 
interactions including interactional variables. In the context of semantic description it has 
been demonstrated that predicate-argument structures are a theoretically problematic 
descriptive means. From the perspective of research programmes, they are borrowed from a 
different context, namely truth-oriented philosophy.  
Among the basic assumptions of the proposed programme are those that concern several sub-
competences of the linking competence, i.e., perception, conceptualization, intersubjectivity, 
action competence, and the competence of sign-use, i.e. associating syntactic structures and 
semantic contents. The most important aspect of the linking competence is thus that it is 
grounded both in perception, i.e., natural sub-competences, and in action, i.e., cultural sub-
competences. The way in which these sub-competences enter and shape the linking 
competence and thus linguistic
o
 forms makes it necessary to go beyond the boundaries of 
linguistics and to look at what cognitive psychology, neurosciences, sociology, and social 
psychology can contribute to the linking competence. The research results from these 
disciplines together with linguistic
o
 evidence restrict – by converging evidence – what is 
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possible and what is not regarding the linking competence. The actual, observable, and 
successful verbal interactions enacted in speech communities constitute the standard of what 
is to be explained.  
The talk about mostly cognitive competences was finally embedded within an action-theoretic 
vocabulary based on intersubjectively acceptable lifeworld differentiations. This is too part of 
the research programme and its conception allows to treat the theoretician as the object of 
his/her own theory.  
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Part II: Grounding the linking competence in sub-competences 
 
Introduction 
 
The following chapters serve to explicate the assumptions (B A1) to (B A4) from section 2.1 
in detail. I will show how each of these (sub-)competences contributes to our competence to 
interact successfully verbally.
60
 In particular, their contribution to the performances of Sarah 
and Jessica in the below scenario repeated from earlier sections will be outlined.  
 
 
(II.1) The three-year-old twins Jessica and Nicole are at dinner with their parents Sarah and 
Marc. Nicole reaches for the milk carton. She grips it only with her fingertips, causing it to 
fall down. It falls off the table and runs all over the floor. Jessica and her mother have kept 
track of what happened. 
 
(a)  Jessica: Nicole             hat                die          Milch runtergeworfen. 
  Nicole.3NOM have.3AUX the.ACC milk  down-throw.PTCP 
  ‘Nicole knocked over the milk.’ 
 
 Sarah: (hesitating, looking at the surprised causer) 
(b)  Nein, sie            ist            ihr           runtergefallen. 
  No    it.3NOM be.3AUX her.DAT down-fall.PTCP 
  ‘No, (it happened to her that) it fell down.’ 
 
 Jessica: … (not signalling misunderstanding) 
 
 
The first sub-competence presented is perception. The matters discussed in the respective 
sections are cognitive psychological ones. In the context of the research programme and its 
underlying model they can be located at the species/community level where different 
scientific disciplines – here: cognitive psychology – contribute to an adequate characterization 
of the linking competence at the individual level.  
 In particular, I will split perception into a bottom-up part (sensation; 
section 3.1) and a top-down part (identification; section 3.2), and I 
will characterize conceptualization as simulated perception. The idea 
is that neither of them sufficiently provides Jessica and Sarah the 
information necessary to make their utterances in a well-formed and 
situationally appropriate manner (sections 3.2.1). Rather, perceptual 
and/or conceptual data must be complemented by actional, or 
attributional, knowledge. These matters are traditionally discussed in 
philosophy (action theory), sociology, and social psychology 
                                                 
60
 Perception, conception, action, etc. are “sub-“competences only relative to the linking competence. 
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(attribution). The matters discussed in the respective sections can thus 
be located at the species/community level, too. Together with the 
cognitive psychological considerations they converge in the most 
important sub-competences that are central to the linking competence 
at the individual level. In sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 I discuss how 
actional, or attributional, knowledge relates to perception, how it is 
acquired, and what the regularities of its practical application are. 
Section 3.2.3 concludes with an empirical study considered to reflect 
the mechanisms in attribution that lead to Sarah’s and Jessica’s 
differential action. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 deal with how 
conceptualization is related to the syntactic structures underlying 
utterances, first from a spatial-conceptual and then from a temporal-
conceptual perspective. 
 
 
3 Perception, conceptualization, and action  
 
The central assumptions to be developed in sections 3.1 and 3.2 are that perception can be 
shown to be the primary condition for conceptualization. In particular, conceptualization can 
be characterized as simulated perception. Both are underspecified with respect to socially 
highly relevant types of information. Section 3.2 thus proceeds with a characterization of the 
actor/cognizer, i.e., the one perceiving, conceptualizing, and acting (by speaking). It will be 
shown that his/her physical and cognitive constitution together with what will be called the 
underspecification of percepts and concepts bears central significance with respect to how the 
linking competence must be conceived. This discussion of the actor/cognizer leads to his/her 
action competence the main component of which will be demonstrated to be attribution. The 
latter is supposed to make up for this underspecification.  
 
 
3.1 Perception 
 
 The sub-competences of the linking competence that are developed in 
section 3.1 are given in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1: Sensation, recognition, and identification as sub-competences of the linking 
competence that are developed throughout section 3.1 
 
 
3.1.1 Grounding the talk about perception in practical differentiations 
 
Perceiving is all about making differences in the objects and states, processes, and activities 
we encounter, we are involved in, or in which we engage. We differentiate by acting or 
behaving differently toward or with respect to different objects and circumstances. Thus, 
differences do not solely exist by nature but especially in dependence on someone who 
differentiates.  
 
There are probably numerous life forms that differentiate between the “same” objects and 
circumstances in different ways from each other (cf. Bruce, Green & Georgeson 
4
2003). That 
means life forms differ in their competences of differentiation and their differentiation 
accomplishments. We find here one more of the several meanings of “embodiment” as 
employed in CFL (see (C5 of CFL A1: embodied meanings) above; cf. Rohrer 2007 for an 
overview on meanings of “embodiment” employed in CFL). Embodiment in the present 
context means that the world in which we live, act and perceive is not simply given to us 
objectively but in a way that is restricted by the way in which human beings are able to live in 
it, act in it, and perceive it. What we perceive does not simply reflect the world as it is but 
what our biotic makeup makes possible for us to perceive. Only if we are able to differentiate 
blue from green objects, there “are” blue and green objects “in” the world for us.  
Impairment of our sense organs or their neuronal pathways leads to decreased differentiation 
competences (for instance, in visual apperceptive agnosia, cf. Grossman, Galetta & 
D’Esposito 1997). Someone whose differentiation competence is impaired cannot actualize a 
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specific somatic movement schema by which he/she makes a difference.
61
 In other words, 
he/she does not perceive a difference.
62
 It is the failure in actualizing certain movement 
schemas which directs our attention to perception and its functioning. As a consequence, we 
can only be sure about what we and others perceive when people make differences by doing, 
i.e., by actualizing certain somatic movement schemas. Where one cannot differentiate, one 
does not perceive. Depending on the part of the body which is involved in making differences 
(which can be detected if the body part in question is impaired), we can identify different 
modalities of perception. We will concentrate here mainly on visual perception because of its 
overwhelming significance for linguistic
o
 competence (cf. Miller & Johnson-Laird 1976, 
Jackendoff 1983 et sqq., Lakoff & Johnson 1999, Langacker 1987 et sqq., Talmy 2000, Zlatev 
2007, Evans & Chilton 2010).
63
 It is important in this context that only those differences that 
have been perceived can also be communicated in a traceable manner, by description or other 
means. This does not mean that we can describe anything we perceive, since there are 
perceptions possible that have not been noticed by the perceiver (they are below a threshold 
and thus perceived “without awareness”; Merikle et al. 2001) but that have biased some of 
his/her actions or decisions. Nor does it mean that we cannot talk about perceptions we do not 
have, in the sense of ascribing them to someone. 
Because perceptions come along as being constituted by somatic movement schemas, they 
occur as acts or behavior. It is easy to see why perceptions cannot be exclusively acts. Often 
enough perceptions simply happen to us, for instance, when we hear a scream or catch a 
glimpse of a falling star. Nevertheless, we can influence such happenings by blocking our ears 
or looking away from something. On the other hand, famous examples like the Necker cube 
(Figure 3.2) and the Rubin face (Figure 3.3) show that perceptions can also be acts. With a 
little practice it is easy to switch between the two possible percepts, i.e., the two recognizable 
forms. 
 
 
  
                                                 
61
 The somatic nervous system is part of the peripheral nervous system and underlies (controlled) body 
movement by skeletal muscles as well as sensory experience. In contrast, the vegetative (or autonomic) nervous 
system also belongs to the peripheral nervous system and underlies movement of internal organs. So, both 
somatic and vegetative movements can be subsumed under activities. 
62
 Note that “making a difference” is identical with “actualizing a somatic reaction schema” here.  
63
 Because this will be topic of later sections, the following comment shall suffice for now: the works of 
Langacker (e.g., 2008a) and Talmy (2000, I, ch. 3, ch. 5) have shown to what high degree grammatical structures 
respect spatial configurations, especially with regard to figure/ground configurations. Evans & Green (2006: 
532) point out that Talmy’s grammatical subsystem of conceptual structure depends on visual perception. 
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Figure 3.2: Necker cube  
(cf. Inui et al. 2000: 146, Necker 1832)  
 
 
Figure 3.3: Rubin face  
(cf. Davis, Schiffman & Greist-Bousquet 
1990: 307,  Rubin 1921) 
 
Since perceptions can be internalized (or are exclusively internal) they are cognitive 
movement schemas, i.e. cognitive acts or cognitive behavior. Perception as action and 
perception as behavior can again be related to perceptual accomplishments and perceptual 
competence. When a perception happens to us (e.g., finding something) as an outcome of a 
perceptual act (looking for something with uncertain success), the perception is an 
accomplishment and we can talk about perceptual competence for both cognitive acts and 
cognitive behavior (as an outcome of action).  
If perceptions can be successful, they can also fail. What are the criteria for successful or 
failed perceptions? The percept’s correspondence to reality is not an option here, since it 
summons the god’s eye view insofar as one needs immediate access to reality – access not 
mediated by perception. This is impossible. But if perception is all about making differences 
by means of actualizing certain somatic movement schemas, it is easy to see what makes 
perceptions adequate or inadequate, namely their suitability with respect to the actualization 
of certain movement schemas. If I want to read a book and actualizing the corresponding 
action schema fails because it is too dark to read then my perception has failed. This would be 
a case of my failure to perceive that it is too dark. Besides this, it might be the case that we 
“perceive” something that is not there – illusions or hallucinations (cf. Crane 2005, Huemer 
2007 on discussion). Such an illusion occurs when looking at the Müller-Lyer illusion (Figure 
3.4).  
 
 
Figure 3.4: Müller-Lyer illusion 
(e.g. Hartmann 1998: 111) 
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In this Figure, one “perceives” the upper horizontal line to be longer than the lower one, 
although both lines can be proved to have the same length. This poses a difficulty: We cannot 
simply say that someone perceiving a difference in length here has a failed perception because 
there is no such difference, even if individuals might (and actually seem to) be naïve realists 
and insist that the lines have indeed different lengths. If perceptions occur as results of 
making differences by actualizing somatic movement schemas, and if someone makes such a 
difference in the case of the lines above, then one should be justified in talking about 
perceiving different lengths. What is crucial here is that subjects do not exist in isolation but 
within praxes which are among other things constituted by interdependences of acts. It is in 
principle possible then to recognize illusions. Treating two different objects as being identical 
might be unproblematic with respect to many purposes but if it leads to a problem (a certain 
movement schema cannot be actualized because the two objects perceived as being identical 
“behave” differently throughout the actualization), then another solution is necessary. Within 
praxes, such solutions consist in the construction of artefacts which are instrumental with 
respect to the actualization of movement schemas. In particular, it is the additional criteria of 
differentiating (here: by constructing measurement devices) by which humans transcend 
subjective differentiations and make differentiations available which are intersubjectively 
accessible and acceptable. Of course, those additional criteria must be justified with respect to 
the needs and subjective experiences of the actants within praxes, i.e., the differentiations 
made within a community must be traceable for its members. It must be noticed, however, 
that this leaves room for undetected illusions.  
 
In sum, “illusions and perceptions can be confused because a differentiation between illusion 
and perception is made possible not until and only relative to a criterion of intersubjective 
accessibility and additional criteria explicitly agreed upon.” (Hartmann 1998: 117).  
 
Only the communicable divergence between subjectively and intersubjectively construed 
reality allows one to talk about what different perceptions “feel like” (cf. Ryle 1990 [1949]), 
since it is only this divergence which makes a distinction between “what is” and “what seems 
to be” necessary. The assertion that the feeling associated with perceiving the lower line being 
shorter than the upper one is only meaningful and necessary when it is intersubjectively 
sharable that they are in fact not identical in length.  
 
 
3.1.2 Assumptions concerning the significance of perception for the linking competence 
In this section some subordinate assumptions to (B A1) are presented concerning those 
aspects of perception that are considered to be significant for what I am attempting to explain 
– the linking competence. They shall serve as an outline of the argumentation in the 
subsequent sections in which each of the assumptions is discussed.  
 
  Perception must be divided into sensation and identification/categorization (cf. 
Sternberg 
4
2006, ch. 4, Engelkamp & Zimmer 2005, ch. 1, 2, Eysenck & Keane 
5
2005, ch. 2, 3, Ward 2006, ch. 6, Bruce, Green & Georgeson 
4
2003, Marr 1982). 
Sensation comprises the processes from the affection of our sense organs by light 
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waves to the recognition of a stimulus. Identification is the process by which the 
recognized stimulus is identified as instance of something known.  
  Sensed states, processes, and activities are inherently indeterminate, or 
underspecified, with respect to certain relations holding between its participant 
objects (especially when it comes to matters like causation, purposefulness, or 
psychic states) (cf. Hastorf & Cantril 1954).  
  Verbal expressions of perceived events impose relations on these events (holding 
between the participant objects). These relations are not (necessarily) present in the 
stimulus event (or could have been identified differently). The relations expressed in 
such verbal expressions cannot originate in the stimulus alone (apart from the trivial 
fact that perceiving/identifying/speaking requires a cognizer/speaker). 
 
 
3.1.3 Sensation 
Because it is failures in perception which provide the most useful insights in how perception 
works (cf. Ward 2006: 79), I shall make use of cases in which impairments decrease people’s 
differentiation performances (cf. Behrmann & Nishimura 2010 for an overview on types and 
subtypes of agnosia
64
). I claimed above that that there are two main processes involved in 
perception, namely sensation and identification. Sensation can be subsumed under what is 
usually called bottom-up processes. This means that in sensation there are no (or hardly any) 
processes involved drawing from previously gained knowledge or conceptual contents. On the 
other hand, identification involves top-down processes in which what is sensed and 
recognized is “matched” to something known, i.e., to something that is present in long-term 
memory. Is there evidence for such a claim? It would be justified to talk of two different 
processes, if one could at best show that sensation and identification can be doubly 
dissociated.
65
  
We know of many cases in which sensation is impaired. For instance, Goodale and Milner 
(2004) report on a woman whom they call DF. She suffered a gas accident and afterwards was 
no longer able to “see” the shapes of objects, i.e., their edges and outlines. What she could see 
was features of the surfaces of those objects, e.g., colors, textures, and grain. (This points to 
another dissociation within sensation.) From this we see that someone who is not able to 
detect the boundaries of objects will not be able to identify them as instances of something 
known beforehand. However, DF had completely intact identification abilities in other 
modalities. Even if she could not visually identify objects, giving her an apple for haptic 
perception did not result in any problems concerning the sensation of its shape and edges and 
the identification of the object as an apple. In other words, identification abilities were fully 
intact. Furthermore, although DF was not able to adequately draw copies of pictures of simple 
objects (because she did not detect their shapes), she performed very well in drawing pictures 
of the same objects when asked to draw them from her memory (even if she did not detect the 
edges of her own drawings). Thus, cases like DF’s (among others, cf. Behrmann & Nishimura 
                                                 
64
 “Agnosia” literally means ‘state of not knowing’. “Knowing” should not be taken too literally here. Actually, 
there is a variety of processes involved in impairments the results of which are called agnosias, not all of which 
can be associated with “knowledge”. This should become obvious throughout the discussion. 
65
 That means that one would have to show that one patient is impaired in sensation while his identification 
performance is spared, while another patient shows the reverse pattern (cf. Ward 2006: 82). 
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2010: 206f.) which are called “apperceptive agnosia” with the subtype “visual form agnosia” 
point to an impairment which affects only bottom-up processes of perception.
66
  
Cases in which sensation is intact while identification is impaired (called associative agnosia) 
are also well known, showing an even greater variety in subtypes (cf. Behrmann & Nishimura 
2010: 207ff.). McCarthy and Warrington (1986) report on a patient whom they call FRA. He 
awoke one morning and noticed that he was not able to read the newspaper any more. 
Psychological tests showed that he “saw” things “correctly”, i.e., he recognized the form of 
objects, but was not able to identify them as instances of objects he knew. For instance, he 
was not able to judge whether a and A were the same letter and he performed poorly on word-
picture matching tasks (requiring retrieving a word for the sensed stimulus from long-term 
memory). Other cases of failed identification due to associative agnosia show that the agnosia 
can be restricted to certain categories, e.g., animals and tools, living or non-living things 
(which points to dissociation within associative agnosia; cf. Hillis & Caramazza 1991). 
Successful sensation will be termed here “recognition”, its result a “percept”. The criterion of 
successful recognition is the ability of the perceiver to inform others about the features of 
objects (which does not imply identification of the object as an instance of something known). 
Importantly, not everything which hits the retina will be recognized. What is recognized is 
therefore convergent on what is actually sensed. 
 
Although I have presented single cases here, the two forms of agnosia are well-known clinical 
pictures and clearly demonstrate that sensation and identification are separate processes. 
  
Before we can gain a more global picture of perceptual mechanisms, a sketch of the overall 
processes involved in perception seems to be instrumental here (for the following cf. Bruce, 
Green & Georgeson 
4
2003, Engelkamp & Zimmer 2006, Ward 2006). Readers already 
familiar with sensation might skip here to section 3.1.3.6. 
 
 
3.1.3.1 The eye 
Sensation is possible among other things because electromagnetic energy reflected from 
objects in certain wavelengths stimulates different kinds of cells making up our retina (cf. 
Bruce, Green & Georgeson 
4
2003: 4ff.). Waves of light cross our pupils and lenses and build 
something like upside-down images on the retinas due to the optics of the lenses. The point 
where waves of light affect the retina at a zero degree angle is the fovea. This region shows 
the highest number of cone cells, cone cells and rod cells being the two types of 
photoreceptors in the retina (in fact, the retina consists of several layers of cells). Cone cells 
are sensitive to different wavelengths of light (contributing to colors) and are mainly involved 
in seeing acutely, while rod cells are sensitive mainly to differences in light intensity and they 
are involved in black-and white seeing, mainly during night time. The number of cone cells 
decreases strongly in relation to the angle degrees toward the periphery, away from the fovea. 
The periphery is important for the detection of motion/movement. The point on the retina 
where the optic nerve leaves the eye (near under the fovea) is the blind spot because there are 
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 Cf. Humphreys & Riddoch (2007). Their argument implies that the distinction between apperceptive and 
associative agnosia might be too simplistic. However, it does not directly bear upon the distinction I argue for. 
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no photoreceptors at all. It is not the case that we do not see anything at the blind spot, as one 
might think, because contents of the retinal image are “filled in” at this point (cf. 
Ramachandran 1992). For visual acuity we have to focus our sight on a stimulus so that the 
lens accommodates to the stimulus.  
The cells in the retina can be characterized in terms of lateral inhibition. This means that a 
given cell’s firing rate might be inhibited by neighbouring cells. So, somewhat simplified, 
neurons do not only transmit electric signals, they also modulate them in terms of excitation 
or inhibition. Lateral inhibition is especially important in detecting edges and perceiving 
contrast between surfaces with different light intensities. The effects of lateral inhibition can 
be characterized in terms of receptive fields. Receptive fields respond to differences in light 
rather than to light as such (cf. Barlow 1953). The mechanisms in receptive fields are one 
important precondition for our seeing points and figures.  
A particular cell type in the retina, ganglion cells, can be shown to be specified with respect to 
the movement/motion of stimuli or to details of stimuli, depending on whether they fire 
transiently (transient-response cells) or show sustained firing (sustained response cells). The 
former are distributed all over the retina and can be identified with rods, while the latter can 
be found particularly around the fovea and are excited by cones. The two types of ganglion 
cells belong to the magnocellular (or M-) system and to the parvocellular (or P-) system, 
respectively. Most importantly, receptive fields of the kind found in the retina can also be 
found in the neuronal pathways leading to the brain where later processing of visual stimuli 
takes place.  
 
Thus, the spatial relationship between stimuli that are projected to the retina are retained for 
further processing in the primary visual cortex (see below).  
 
 
3.1.3.2 The lateral geniculate nucleus and the primary visual cortex 
The optic nerves of both eyes meet at the optic chiasm. From there the activations stemming 
from the left visual fields (rightmost on the retinas) are transmitted to the left hemisphere, 
while those from the right visual fields (leftmost on the retinas) are transmitted to the right 
hemisphere. Several pathways lead away from the eye to several parts of the brain. For our 
purposes, namely describing important aspects of object perception, the one leading from the 
optic chiasm to the primary visual cortex (or V1) is especially interesting. A smaller part of 
optic nerves leads to the superior colliculus which is involved in the movement of the eyes 
and locating objects in space. The geniculostriate pathway, leaving the eye, passes the lateral 
geniculate nucleus (LGN) on its way to V1. As has been mentioned above, M-layers are 
involved in detecting motion/movement, and P-layers in details of stimuli. Damage to either 
M- or P-layers leads to failures in detecting motion/movement or color, texture, and grain of 
stimuli, respectively (cf. Schiller, Logothetis & Charles 1990). Interestingly, those neurons 
that are adjacent in the LGN also have adjacent receptive fields on the retina. That means that 
the spatial relations between receptive fields on the retina correspond to the spatial 
relationship of neurons in the LGN. Retinotopic relations are then preserved in the LGN, 
since the cells in the retina and the LGN share a similar topological organization.  
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The nerve fibres from the LGN lead (predominantly) to the primary visual cortex which is far 
more complex than the former. In V1 one can find different types of receptive fields, 
corresponding to simple, complex and hypercomplex cortical cells (cf. Hubel & Wiesel 1962). 
All these cells are sensitive not only to the positions of receptive fields on the retina but, what 
is equally important, to their orientation. The cells seem to be organized in columns, each 
being sensitive to a specific degree of orientation (with a tolerance of about 20 degrees) of the 
stimulus (cf. Hubel & Wiesel 1974, Hubel et al. 1978). Furthermore, the cells in V1 are not 
only organized relative to the positions of the receptive fields on the retina and to their 
orientations, but also relative to the eye they react to. These cells are also organized in 
columns. Columns responsible for the same retinal region and the same orientation are then 
twofold between left and right eye. The different cell types mentioned above react to stimuli 
of increasing complexity, making possible the detection of points of light, the orientation and 
direction of moving stimuli, specific lengths of stimuli, edges, and bars. In sum, the more 
complex the stimuli, the more sensitive the reaction of these cortical cells.  
 
In addition, the cells in V1 are again retinotopically organized with respect to the retina and 
the LGN, and the different neuronal substrates of M- and P-cells are also preserved.  
 
The geniculostriate pathway is sketched in Figure 3.5. 
 
 
Figure 3.5: The geniculostriate pathway 
LGN: lateral geniculate nucleus; V1: primary visual (striate) cortex 
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How can the output of V1 be characterized phenomenally? Roughly, the results of the 
processes described so far can be described in terms of a bundle of disintegrated features: 
There is something. Something is colored, something has a shape, i.e., it has edges of a 
specific length or is a bar of a specific length, something has a specific orientation, something 
moves from there to there. There might be several “somethings” which later turn out to be a 
single object (e.g., a book flipped open by moving only one half of it).  
 
 
3.1.3.3 The integration of basic visual features 
Sensation from the retina up to V1 does not constitute the entire process of sensation. For 
sensing objects in the way someone with associative agnosia senses objects, one mainly has to 
account for the integration of parts into wholes, i.e., singling out objects of specific forms and 
segregating them from other objects of specific forms. In these processes the same forms of 
knowledge are employed as in cases of occlusion. These forms of knowledge are known as 
gestalt laws of perception (cf. Wertheimer 1922, 1923, Palmer 2002, Bruce, Green & 
Georgeson 
4
2003: 123ff., Peterson 2001: 177ff. for an overview). However, their status is 
somewhat unclear because there seem to be top-down processes involved within the P-cellular 
system (from the extrastriate cortex (V2) which is involved in attention; cf. Qiu & von der 
Heydt 2005; and possibly even from prestriate cortex areas (V4), (V3), and mediotemporal 
cortex (V5); cf. Grossman 1993), while gestalts might possibly remain in the realm of 
sensation. Gestalt laws are instrumental in grouping stimuli into parts and wholes, i.e., in 
making possible sensation of discriminable objects. I will first present these gestalt laws and 
their contribution to object perception and then present an argument for their being part of 
sensation, not identification.  
 
(i)  The law of proximity states that elements are more likely to belong together if 
 they are close together. Figure 3.6 (i) shows that the vertically aligned spots 
 tend to be grouped together because they are closer to each other than in the 
 horizontal dimension. 
(ii) The law of similarity states that those elements are more likely to belong 
 together which share similar shapes. Figure 3.6 (ii) shows that those elements 
 aligned vertically tend to be grouped together, although the distance of one 
 element to another is identical in the horizontal and vertical dimensions. 
(iii) The law of continuation states that elements devoid of abrupt changes are 
likely to belong together. Figure 3.6 (iii) shows that we tend to perceive two 
diagonally aligned lines, instead of the following forms: ˂, ˃, ˄, ˅. 
(iv) The law of closure states that elements yielding a closed shape when “filled in” 
are more likely to belong together. Figure 3.6 (iv) shows that we tend to perceive 
an rectangle here, although there are gaps in it.  
(v) The law of common fate (not depicted) states that those elements that move 
together also belong together. This was illustrated by the light point experiments 
executed by Johansson (1973). He attached light spots to the limbs of a moving 
person. In darkness, the moving (walking, running, dancing) light points were 
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perceived as someone’s walking, running, and dancing, respectively. For 
sensation this means that they were perceived as a single object. 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Gestalt laws  
(i) Law of proximity, (ii) law of similarity,  
(iii) law of good continuation, (iv) law of closure 
 
It should now be clear that these gestalt laws contribute to the grouping together of the 
stationary or moving shapes, colors, edges, bars which are the result of the processes in the 
geniculostriate pathway. The processes of grouping together already occur outside V1 in the 
prestriate cortex (V2 as part of the extrastriate cortex). Proximate and similar “objects” 
without abrupt changes which are “closed” are grouped together, as are “objects” moving 
together. One clue in depth perception
67
 is that a partially occluded object should be behind 
another object. The law of closure seems to be involved in this. In Figure 3.7 it could be that 
the lines in Figure 3.5 (iv) are simply partially occluded by two bars. However, the perceptual 
mechanism of closure makes it possible to perceive a rectangle. 
 
Figure 3.7: Law of closure and depth perception 
                                                 
67
 Actually, we face the problem that the retina is two-dimensional, while we move in a three-dimensional world. 
There are a number of cues for depth perception, i.e., for detecting which positions two sensed objects take in 
relation to each other and in relation to the viewer. The three most important cues are motion parallax, stereopsis, 
and the texture gradient. As to motion parallax, everyone is familiar with the phenomenon of objects nearer to 
the viewer appearing to move faster than those farther away when the viewer turns his/her head. This allows the 
viewer to determine the positions of stimuli relative to him/-herself. Stereopsis is vision with two eyes. The 
retinal images on our eyes are not identical but disparate when we perceive stimuli. A given stimulus projects 
onto many non-corresponding points on each of the two retinas, one laid over the other. This leads either to 
seeing something double if the points on the retinas exhibit too great disparity or to depth perception. Effects of 
the texture gradient can be illustrated by imagining standing in front of a field of sunflowers. The flowers in 
front of the viewer seem to be less densely arranged than those at the opposite side of the field. This change in 
the texture of the “surface” of the field leads to depth perception. Besides these cues, it is necessary for a 
perceiver to calculate how far the stimulus is from the perceiver using the visual angle at which light reflected 
from a stimulus hits the retina as well as the size of the retinal image. He/she also must “know” that something 
partially occluded by another object is behind this object. One question is where this “knowledge” comes from. 
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Taken together, the gestalt laws provide what is known as figure/ground segregation of the 
stimuli within the visual field in that they (1) help to “build” a figure as a whole from the 
basic visual features and they (2) help to determine the spatial relationship of a figure in 
reference to a ground, i.e., to determine how the figure relates spatially to what else is there in 
the visual field.  
 
The gestalt laws thus provide the reconstruction of three-dimensional spatial relations from 
the two-dimensional retinal image. For this we need to “know” which edges belong to which 
object (i.e., the entirety of the object). Consider Figure 3.7 above again. There are many 
boundaries between the three objects. To determine their relative positions it is crucial to 
know which object “owns” which boundary, i.e., which object is occluded by which other 
object. This is accomplished either by bottom-up, top-down or both processes (cf. Qiu, 
Sugihara & von der Heydt 2007). In other words, detecting the relationships among objects in 
3D space can be accomplished even in the absence of attention but can also be modulated by 
attentively focussing something (as a top-down process) in the visual field (as has been 
illustrated in section 3.1.1 by means of the Rubin face and the Necker cube).  
 
A “good” figure is – in accordance with the gestalt laws – an integration of visual features 
which  
 
(i)  are proximate to each other,  
(ii)  are similar to each other,  
(iii)  constitute continuous lines, 
(iv)  exhibit closure, 
(v)  and move together.  
 
The segregation of a figure from a ground is made possible by 
 
(vi)  the smallness of a figure relative to a ground, 
(vii)  the movement/motion of a figure relative to a ground. 
 
For an illustration of (vi), imagine visiting a museum in which paintings are exhibited: We 
cannot single out a painting (as a potential figure) from its background (a wall in the museum) 
when we stand so close to it that it occupies our entire visual field. The painting is apt to be 
perceived as a figure only in relation to the position of the viewer relative to it. For an 
illustration of (vii) imagine perceiving (and monitoring) a car (figure) crossing a bridge 
(ground). The car consists of basic visual features moving together with well continuing lines 
and closed form. It moves relative to a stationary ground against which it is singled out. 
However, the ground need not be stationary and the figure need not move necessarily. 
Imagine perceiving (and focussing on) someone standing on the platform of a train station 
while a train is passing behind him. This would be an example of a stationary figure relative 
to a moving ground. In this case, however, the smallness of the figure in relation to the ground 
is given. Grounds may also have features that make them apt to be perceived as a figure, e.g., 
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person A (the figure) standing in front of another person B (the ground)) and may therefore 
also be object-like. If the perceiver goes around persons A and B such that B stands before A 
then, it is possible to perceive person B as the figure and person A as the ground. However, 
grounds are mostly locations like gardens, forests, countries etc. which lack object features 
and under most circumstances are not able to be perceived as figures in sensation. 
 
As an intermediate summary, the results of the processes from the retina via LGN and V1 to 
V2 consist in the detection of several features of stimuli, their shape (including edges and 
bars), and their orientation.
68
 Perceived contrast (by means of very early processes of lateral 
inhibition and later processes of determining border-“ownership”) and depth (by means of 
stereopsis, motion parallax and texture gradient) help us to group these basic features together 
in order to discriminate objects. Gestalt laws of perception further facilitate the separation of 
objects from one another and the determination of what is fore- and background. 
Figure/ground segregation may be influenced by top-down attentional processes, but does not 
need to be. 
 
Many features of objects are imposed on them by the perceiver, i.e., they are not necessarily 
“present” in the stimulus. We “infer” that there is a rectangle behind the bars in Figure 3.7, 
although there need not be one. Such inferences include top-down processes which are 
nevertheless different from those in identification (as part of perception in addition to 
sensation). For instance, Humphreys and his colleagues (see Ward 2006: 115ff.) report on a 
patient who obviously lacks the ability to group visual features together in accordance with 
the gestalt laws: Their patient was able to discriminate the lengths, positions and orientations 
of objects but was not able to identify them as instances of something known. Experiments 
showed that he could not integrate parts into wholes although his sensation was intact, so that 
he could describe what he “saw”. On the other hand, he was able to draw copies of objects, to 
draw pictures from memory and to identify objects by other modalities. In other words, he 
suffered a special form of apperceptive agnosia, namely integrative agnosia (Riddoch et al. 
1987). Apperceptive agnosia affects sensation and only affects identification because of its 
effect on sensation (as in the case of DF). In conclusion, from the perspective of sensation and 
identification, the processes outlined so far belong to the former. 
As we have seen, there are different kinds of cells reacting to different stimulus features. 
Gestalt laws help to single out figures from the visual fields (result: There is something) and 
to perceive them as specific forms (result: This something has this and this feature). The 
processes involved in integrating visual features into those complete forms which can be 
thought of as being the output of sensation are – apart from the importance of the gestalt laws 
– largely unknown (cf. Bruce, Green & Georgeson 42003: 57ff.,  Engelkamp & Zimmer 2006: 
101ff.). This is why less physiological information was provided in the passages dealing with 
gestalt perception, i.e., those following V1 in the process of perception.  
 
                                                 
68
 Importantly and in accordance with the explanation in section 3.1.1, features are the result of differentiating. 
Stating that we perceive different things because there are differences in the world (cf. Rosch 1999) is thus a 
methodical error, because differences cannot be introduced without introducing someone making differences (cf. 
Hartmann 1998: 82). 
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We know, however, that in the prestriate cortex (V2) there are retinotopic structures similar to 
those in LGN and V1.  
 
 
3.1.3.4 Two visual pathways 
The processes occurring in the geniculostriate pathway are so complex that portraying a 
comprehensible diagram of them requires considerable simplification. Matters become even 
more complicated when it comes to V2 and the processes beyond it. For convenience of 
comprehension, the most important pathways of visual perception we know about are 
schematically depicted in Figure 3.8.  
 
 
Figure 3.8: Two visual pathways  
V1: primary visual (striate) cortex; V2, V3, V4: extrastriate cortex;  
V5: mediotemporal cortex; IT: inferotemporal cortex 
 
As Figure 3.8 indicates there are two different pathways leading from V2 two other cortical 
areas involved in perception which in turn lead to non-visual cortical areas (cf. Ungerleider & 
Mishkin 1982). However, the origins of the two pathways can be traced back in part to V1 
(Bruce, Green & Georgeson 
42003: 58f.). The “dorsal” pathway runs from V2 via V3 and V5 
to non-visual cortical areas in the parietal lobe. The “ventral” pathway leads to the non-visual 
temporal lobe via V4 and inferotemporal areas (IT). Functionally, the dorsal pathway seems 
to be involved in the localization of objects in space and is therefore often called “where” 
pathway. The ventral pathway seems to be functional in the recognition of objects (not to be 
confused with identification. An object is recognized if it can be described to someone. For 
this it is not necessary for someone to identify it as an instance of something; cf. Bruce, Green 
& Georgeson 
4
2003: 62ff. for experimental evidence for the different functions of the 
pathways). Ungerleider and Mishkin therefore call it the “what” pathway. Experiments in 
apes have shown that damage to or the absence of the parietal lobe (destination of the “where” 
path) leads to the apes’ inability to locate an object in relation to another object. Damage to or 
the absence of the temporal lobe (destination of the “what” path) results in their inability to 
discriminate different objects (cf. Mishkin, Ungerleider & Macko 1983). Remember that a 
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similar clinical picture was also reported in Goodale and Milner’s study of DF. With respect 
to humans we have seen that different cell types are sensitive to different types of stimuli. For 
V5 (part of the “where” path) it has been shown that great majority of its neurons are sensitive 
not only to the location but also to the direction of movement/motion of stimuli, while this is 
true only for a few neurons in V4 (part of the “what” path). At the same time, a high number 
of V4 neurons are sensitive to color. This is not the case for any neurons in V5 (cf. 
Engelkamp & Zimmer 2006: 65, but see Bruce, Green & Georgeson 
4
2003: 59f.). In addition, 
V4 seems to be involved in detecting the position and curvature of contours in more complex 
shapes – part of what is required for recognizing objects.  
The case of the dorsal and ventral streams is not as simple as it seems, however. Goodale and 
Milner (2004) ascribe both functions (locating objects and their movements relative to one 
another versus recognition of their form and details), to the ventral stream alone. In addition 
they break down the “where” functions (what Ungerleider and Mishkin ascribe to the dorsal 
pathway) into two separate processes. One of them is dedicated to the perception of objects in 
relation to one another. This is called allocentric space. Crucially, gaining an “object-
centered” reference frame goes beyond the actual perceptual situation and includes top-down 
processes which have to be acquired in addition to a viewer-centered reference frame (cf. 
Bremner, Bryant & Mareschal 2006, for further evidence see Butterworth & Jarrett 1991). 
Allocentric space will therefore be discussed in the next section. The other one is dedicated to 
perceiving the relation of objects to the perceiver. It is thus called egocentric space.  
 
In Goodale & Milner’s view, the ventral stream is involved in form and detail recognition and 
in conceptualizing spatial relations in allocentric space. In contrast, the dorsal path is 
considered to be involved in perceiving (and behaving/acting from within) egocentric space. 
 
It adds an important facet to the considerations of Ungerleider and Mishkin, that we do not 
merely perceive but that perception is crucial for the actualization of behavior and action 
schemas towards the environment. The dorsal pathway makes it possible for humans to 
behave and act successfully towards the objects in the environment in that it provides 
information about the perceiver’s position relative to the objects around him. Thus, the dorsal 
pathway does not only provide the “where” of perception space but also the “how” of action 
in egocentric space. Is there evidence for such claims? Indeed, the story of DF above was only 
half of the truth. As has been mentioned, DF suffered an apperceptive agnosia, more precisely 
a visual form agnosia. Because form is associated with the ventral stream, one would assume 
that it was damaged. This was indeed the case. Thus it follows that, if Goodale & Milner’s 
theory is right, DF should not be able to perceive the location of objects in allocentric space 
but should have no or few problems in actualizing movement schemas towards objects in her 
environment. This seems strange because not being able to locate something seems to imply 
the inability to behave or act successfully toward objects. However, DF showed exactly this 
pattern. In perception, she could not recognize (chance level) the angle of a slot and whether 
some specifically oriented card could be put into it (cf. Goodale & Milner 2004: 19ff.). In 
contrast, when she was asked to put the card into the slot she performed well, i.e., nearly as 
accurately as the control group. Further evidence comes from the finding that locating stimuli 
in egocentric and allocentric space can be doubly dissociated. This is the reverse pattern of 
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that found in DF and is called optic ataxia. It concerns the inability to actualize movement 
schemas towards objects on the basis of visual perception. Patients of optic ataxia with 
damage to regions in the posterior parietal cortex should be able to recognize objects perfectly 
while not being able to act toward them successfully. This is indeed a well-known impairment 
(cf. Perenin & Vighetto 1988).  
Here, at the end of the dorsal pathway where perception and action have their “functional 
meeting-point” is one of the endpoints of sensation. It is not the case, however, that category-
specific identification (top-down processes) due to a sociocultural praxis is necessary for 
actualizing some movement schema towards objects in one’s environment. This is an 
important point: Someone who has never heard of or made experiences with a hammer need 
not know that a specific object is a hammer in order to act toward or with it. Furthermore, 
he/she does not even need to know that a hammer is used for hammering to be able to act with 
it in a way that is similar to hammering. This will be discussed further down in the context of 
affordances (see section 3.2.1.2). It shall suffice to say here that it is the form of this object 
which “affords to” the perceiver certain movement schemas that can be actualized toward it 
independently of the knowledge of the purpose for which it has been constructed, i.e., 
independently of the socioculturally determined functional knowledge necessary to identify it 
as a hammer. In contrast to a simple object like a hammer, recognizing the form of a staple 
gun does not suffice to “infer” from its form that one can staple together sheets of paper with 
it, i.e., the purpose for which it has been constructed. In order to “know” this one has to 
identify the staple gun as a staple gun and to get access to its function from memory. 
 
 
3.1.3.5 Motion/movement perception 
Since the emphasis has been laid on object perception so far, motion/movement perception 
shall be discussed briefly. It has been mentioned above that different systems in perception 
are involved in object (feature) perception and movement/motion detection. The rough 
correspondences are given in Table 3.1 below which complements Figure 3.8 above. 
 
 
Table 3.1: Neurophysic components in object and motion perception 
 
A discussion of motion/movement perception thus addresses the components in the lowermost 
line of Table 3.1, or, in terms of Figure 3.8, the dorsal pathway. Damage to V5 which is part 
of the dorsal pathway may lead to the inability to perceive motion. Patients of so-called 
akinetopsia perceive “series of still frames” (Ward 2006: 112). That means their object 
perception mechanisms may be preserved while motion detection fails (e.g., Schenk & Zihl 
91 
 
1997a, 1997b), thus pointing to a dissociation. In psychology motion/movement is often 
treated as change of position over time (cf. Bruce, Green & Georgeson 
4
2003: 210). Most 
importantly, it must be added that it is the change of position of something which is 
recognized by a perceiver. Movement/motion is always directed, i.e., for a perceiver the 
position of something (a figure) changes in time relative to some background which is either 
stationary or changing its position through time differently from the former. What are the 
mechanisms involved in detecting position changes over time in some specific direction? 
Similar to different types of cells (simple, complex, hypercomplex) involved in detecting 
different features of objects, there seem to be direction-sensitive cells in the M-cellular system 
in V1, and detectors for more complex forms (“manners”) of motion/movement (radial, 
circular, etc.) in V5 and neighbouring areas (cf. Anstis, Verstragen & Mather et al. 1998). It 
has been proposed that similar to the mechanisms involved in detecting bars and edges the 
receptive fields of these cells combine to allow movement/motion detection (cf. Adelson & 
Bergen 1985).  
I have talked so far about “movement/motion perception”. The reason for this is that there is 
evidence for a dissociation between movement and motion perception, and discussion about 
the question whether what distinguishes movement (above characterized as the expression of 
animate activity) from motion (expression of inanimate processes) involves top-down 
processes or can be “found in” the percept. There are reports on patients who are not able to 
detect motion, i.e., moving inanimate objects. At the same time they are able to identify 
moving dots (like those in the experiments of Johansson 1973) as so-called “biological 
movement”, i.e., in our terms, movement of animate, in this case human, beings (e.g., Vaina 
et al. 2002). However, the respective literature does not differentiate between motion and 
movement in a way comparable to the one proposed here. Thus, the opposite of their term 
“biological movement” would be “non-biological movement”, which, according to the view 
taken here, is a contradiction, since movement is the term for animate activity by definition. 
From here onwards I will use “movement” for “biological movement” and “motion” for “non-
biological movement”, in accordance to the thing-circumstance taxonomy. Perception of 
movement (as opposed to motion) seems to be neuronally substantiated in regions near V5 
which is involved in motion detection. No or few parts of V5 itself seem to be involved in 
movement perception (Grossman et al. 2000), however.
69
 How is this possible?  
 
I would purport that movement perception is the result of an identification process involving 
top-down processes including non-conceptual knowledge (besides attentional and gestalt 
related processes), while this is not necessarily the case for motion detection (cf. Servos et al. 
2002, Blake & Shiffrar 2007: 53f.).  
 
In other words, motion can be recognized without identification. It is “contained” in the 
percept. Movement, on the other hand, must be identified as a special instance of something 
moving via top-down processes. What distinguishes both is thus not part of the percept. The 
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 It must be mentioned that in experiments with light points the involvement of neurophysical correlates of 
gestalt laws (here, the law of closure, in that light points are “closed” to an integrated object) should not be 
underestimated and that the reported results need not be ascribed to movement alone. Furthermore, “biological 
motion” and “inanimate motion” can hardly be experimentally separated due to the inherent variability of 
animate movement and inanimate motion, respectively. 
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main difficulty here lies in the definitional boundaries of the cognitive psychological term 
“biological movement” because, if taken seriously, the question of what it is that distinguishes 
“biological movement” from “non-biological movement” provokes a debate similar in 
complexity to that about the question of what agentivity is and where it ends. In the 
pioneering studies by Johansson (1973) “biological movement” applies to “combinations of 
several pendulum-like motions of the extremities relative to a joint”, whereby the “geometric 
structures of body motion patterns in man and higher animals […] are determined by the 
construction of their skeletons.” (Johansson 1973: 201). In other words, movements which 
lack such pendulum-likeness do not count as “biological movement” – clearly an 
unsatisfactory characterization if one thinks of the many dancing styles there are which do not 
include this feature, or of stumbling, for instance. Will they count as “non-biological 
movement”? I am not in the position to solve this problem but I would like to propose to align 
the “biological” vs. “non-biological motion” distinction with the distinction between motion, 
movement, action, and behavior in accordance with the thing-circumstance taxonomy from 
section 2.4. The idea is, then, that “biological motion” in the cognitive psychological 
terminology would apply to movement which constitutes a possible instance of action, 
whereas “non-biological motion” would apply to motion which does not constitute a possible 
instance of action (on the definition of action and action understanding see sec. 3.2.2). 
 
 
3.1.3.6 The embodied nature of the percept 
In sum, the processes from the affection of the retina by light waves reflected from stimuli in 
the visual field, and the subsequent processes in the LGN, in V1, and in the dorsal and ventral 
pathways leading to the temporal and parietal lobes provide object recognition and the 
recognition of objects moving in the visual field. Along these paths, different types of cells 
react to different kinds of stimuli, resulting firstly in the integration of features and parts into 
whole forms that constitute integrated, constant objects (ventral pathway), and secondly in the 
recognition of the direction in which something moves and its velocity. Together with depth 
perception and the organization of egocentric space the result of sensation is thus something 
like an image of the stimuli in the visual field.
70
  
This image is, however, not identical to what might “really” be there because 
 
(a) our perceptual apparatus (especially the gestalt laws and the Mach bands
71
) 
adds, fills in, or imposes some things which are not present in the stimuli and 
which might not be recognizable by other life-forms,  
                                                 
70
 One should note that these features are features thanks to our differentiation performance in everyday praxis 
which determines what features actually are. It is these differentiations which provide the psychologist the 
criteria for classifying neurophysical responses to stimuli as feature-sensitive (see sect. 3.1.1). 
71
 This can be demonstrated with contrast. This term designates both the physical contrast (to be measured by 
measurement devices) and the perceived differences in light intensity on a given surface. They often do not 
coincide. Ernst Mach investigated that perceived contrast deviates from physical contrast. In particular, the 
differences in the light intensity of two neighbouring surfaces with sharp edges and different homogenous 
greyshade values are perceived at their edge as boosting the contrast. The brighter shade of grey is perceived to 
be even brighter on the edge to the darker shade of grey (“Mach bands”). This phenomenon can be explained by 
the mechanisms of lateral inhibition outlined earlier (cf. Ratliff & Hartline 1959). 
93 
 
(b) we always and necessarily have a viewer-centered perspective on the stimuli, 
i.e., we see less than there might be and we see something different from 
someone else attending to the “same” stimuli from a different vantage point,  
(c) our photoreceptor cells in the retina are only sensitive to a specific and small 
bandwidth of wavelengths, so that we see differently from other life-forms,  
(d) we recognize less than there might be in the stimuli and on the retina because 
the nerve impulses are regulated many-to-few, so for instance in the LGN and 
during other stages of processing. Often, we visually focus on what we attend to, 
which leads to a less detailed processing of that to which we do not attend, 
although it might take place in our visual fields. 
 
What we recognize is thus not an accurate “copy” of what is in the visual field but rather a 
structural model (e.g., Engelkamp & Zimmer 2006: 108ff.) of the environment in the visual 
field which is determined by the biotic equipment of the perceiver, the stimulus features and 
the circumstances under which this takes place. By “structural model” I mean the fact that in 
the percept certain structural configurations of the projection on the retina are preserved. The 
“building” of a structural model (i.e., a percept in our sense) is what patient FRA (reported on 
above) was able to accomplish in visual perceptual tasks and what DF failed to accomplish. In 
the points above we encounter the basis of two meanings of “embodiment” as employed in 
Cognitive-Functional Linguistics (cf. Rohrer 2007). Consider the second point first: Given the 
assumption that the way in which we conceptualize matters depends on the way we perceive 
matters (cf. Lakoff & Johnson 1980; see section 3.2.1), coupled with the viewer-dependence 
of our perceptual encountering of the world (i.e., we cannot gain an absolute, objective 
perspective on it), this means that we always and necessarily have a specific vantage point in 
any conceivable circumstance in which we are engaged as perceiving, conceptualizing or 
acting beings (cf. Langacker 2000, ch. 7, 
2
2002, ch. 12). We recognize stimuli (and to a large 
degree conceptualize objects and circumstances) as they are located in relation to us as 
viewers. In other words, they are located in egocentric space. The other three points concern a 
neurophysically “deeper” level, namely the evolutionary development of our nervous system 
which has led to the mechanisms underlying the Mach bands, the sensitivity of our 
photoreceptor cells to particular wavelengths, and the convergent “mappings” throughout the 
stages of processing. They are bound to human bodies only. One should understand 
“embodiment” in this sense. These human body-specific properties, as demonstrated in 
sensation, also show up in higher cognitive activities, since conceptualization will be shown 
to be identifiable as simulated perception. One important result of this section is that what we 
recognize is not a mirror of the external world. 
 
 
3.1.4 Determinants in identification (I) 
Now, the question arises what sensation does and does not provide for someone’s verbal 
interaction. In order to interact verbally in the way illustrated in (II.1) in the introduction to 
part II (in which Nicole drops the milk carton and her sister Jessica says to their mother 
Nicole hat die Milch runtergeworfen), the girl Jessica has to recognize all objects in her visual 
field, including her mother she will be talking to, her sister, the milk carton, and the table she 
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will be talking about, etc. She also has to recognize all the objects moving in her visual field, 
especially her sister moving her arm toward and against the carton, the carton moving beyond 
the edge of the table, and the carton moving to the ground.  
 
This sounds trivial, but note what, among other things, is not included in Jessica’s percept of 
that event:  
 
 Knowledge about how objects “behave” physically, especially in contact with other 
objects. For instance, the weight of the milk carton and the power of the girl are not 
present in the percept. They must be inferred later, as an instance of identification 
(and with this, attribution; Kelley 1973). That is, they must be known beforehand. 
Generally, it is the features of objects which restrict the range of states, processes and 
activities in which something can stand (cf. Kasper 2011). Many features of objects 
are not present in the percept. Being able to make adequate statements about what is 
perceived requires accessing vast repositories of prior knowledge, i.e., top-down 
processes. 
 Causes in general, i.e., the exact relationship between objects/circumstances and 
other objects/circumstances in the scene (cf. Hume 1894; 1960, I; White 1989, 
2009b, Cheng 1997, Schlottmann 2001: 111). A cause, or causation, is not a 
particular object/circumstance bringing about another object/circumstance but rather 
a way of talking about invariants in temporally segregated co-occurrences of 
discernible objects/circumstances. “What has caused what” is mostly imposed on the 
scene by the perceivers as instances of identification and only seldom sensed 
directly. 
 The wider context of the scene. Has there been something in the near past (quarrel 
with the sister or mother) which could have tempted Jessica to do this or that, i.e., are 
there factors which make Jessica’s imposition of some causal relationships on the 
stimuli in her visual field more plausible than others? Are there factors of the 
situation biasing the perceiver to impose particular causal relations on the scene but 
not others? If yes, they are not part of the percepts but part of actional knowledge due 
to the context (cf. Moskowitz 2005: 24ff.). 
 The purposes (goals, interests) of the persons in the scene. Although putting purposes 
into effect consists in bringing about, maintaining, or avoiding particular 
circumstances which can be recognized, it is not part of the percept whether the 
coming about of a particular state, process, or activity was purposed or not. Rather, 
in the situation in question the presence or absence of purposefulness is ascribed by 
the speakers on the basis of identification and attribution processes. 
 Stable dispositions of the persons in the scene versus factors of the situation. It need 
not be obvious (observable) that someone has some disposition making him/her more 
probable to cause misaccomplishments (e.g., illness, clumsiness etc.). Knowledge 
about such dispositions or about factors of the actual situation may alter the 
probability of certain attributions (which includes identification beforehand) (cf. 
Kunda 
5
2002: 295ff.). 
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 The question whether the event in question constitutes an accomplishment or a 
misaccomplishment. 
 
It turns out, then, that what we recognize is not only constrained by perspective-boundedness 
and the neurophysical processes and neuroanatomical makeup of the visual apparatus but that 
our percepts are largely underspecified with respect to the causal relations holding between 
the objects in our visual field and with respect to action-theoretic considerations, i.e., context, 
purposes, and dispositions. In other words, in making utterances in response to perceived 
states, processes, and activities (like the one by Jessica) we impose the respective 
specifications onto these states, processes and activities (cf. Jonas, Stroebe & Hewstone 
5
2007: 120). In uttering Nicole hat die Milch runtergeworfen Jessica makes judgments 
involving all the above specifications with respect to which the percept is underspecified, 
namely the physical behavior of objects (it was Nicole’s activity which sufficed to make the 
milk carton move and fall), causal relations (it was only because of Nicole’s activity that the 
milk carton moved), contextual factors (Jessica might have been biased to impose certain 
relations on the sensed event in favour of others), action-theoretic considerations (Jessica 
makes her sister the subject of the utterance, chooses an agentive verb and a corresponding 
auxiliary, thus imposing a structure on the event which suggests that Nicole acted 
purposefully, leaving open the possibility of blaming here), personal or situational factors (in 
making Nicole the causer of the event Jessica suggests that it was the disposition of her sister 
and not factors in the situation which made her drop the milk. This provides the opportunity to 
blame her. In contrast, situations cannot be blamed). Were the relevant parameters of the 
above factors set differently, different specifications might probably have been imposed on 
the percept and a different verbalization would have been the result. This would be given, for 
instance, for the mother’s contribution in (II.1) (Nein, sie ist ihr runtergefallen. ‘No, (it 
happened to her that) it fell down.’).  
The crucial point about all this is that Jessica need not even be aware of or know about what 
she imposed on what she perceived. She rather acts and behaves as if there was only one way 
to grasp the perceived event and that she did so adequately. Therefore, she implicitly holds the 
view that what she saw was in no way underspecified but that the percept included all the 
information necessary to make her judgment as expressed in (II.1). This view, according to 
which everything that is necessary for making judgments about something perceived is (in) 
the percept itself, will be termed naïve realism here. According to social psychologists we are 
naïve realists most of the time.
72
 As Moskowitz (2005: 22) puts it,  
 
“[t]his term captures the idea that when trying to make sense of the world, we begin with the 
perception of the people and objects that enter our visual field. Both objects and people have 
features that are independent of us. They existed prior to coming into our life space and will 
continue to exist once they have departed. This enduring character of the people and things we 
observe gives rise to the belief that our experience of things is one of an objective reality opening 
itself up to us.” 
                                                 
72
 It is possible, however, to learn to be aware of at least some of the factors which bias our judgmental 
processes. One problem is that this sort of awareness is cognitively very effortful. Another problem is that 
presumably a non-manageable number of (top-down) cognitive activities are either automatized (in case of 
behavior) or routinized (in case of action) such that they are impossible or difficult to control, respectively (cf. 
Moskowitz 2005, ch. 12). 
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Importantly, every utterance makes some judgment, be it that something happened here in 
What happened here? or what happened in Nicole hat die Milch runtergeworfen. Being naïve 
realists means that we are not aware of the degree to which those judgments we make about 
states, processes, and activities by making utterances about them are constructive, i.e., they 
indeed depend partially on what we perceive but also significantly on what is imposed on our 
percepts by us in a top-down manner. One aim of this book is to shed light on the connection 
between particular linguistic
o
 forms and judgmental processes and activities. 
 
To sum up, between recognition and utterance numerous identification, conceptualization, and 
attribution activities have to take place. The way we single out objects and their features from 
the visual field and recognize their direction of motion is only the raw material on the basis of 
which these extensive top-down activities take place.  
 
It is not until these activities take place that stimuli gain some significance for the perceiver 
(as parts of their plans, threats, desired objects etc.). To recapitulate, the factors underlying the 
linking competence are being explored here. As the model underlying the proposed research 
programme suggests (especially the “data” level, see sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4), studying parts 
of speech alone does not suffice to explain them. What needs to be taken into consideration is 
also interactional variables which have been identified as involving individual factors, 
contextual factors, and factors concerning the circumstances under which a verbal interaction 
takes place. They are important determining factors with regard to how states, processes, and 
activities are assessed, or judged, by speakers, and ignoring them means depriving people’s 
linking competence of its constitutive parts, namely perceptual and interactional competences. 
We can now equate the interactional variables in the research programmatic model mentioned 
in chapter 2 with the factors above, i.e., those with respect to which the percept is 
underspecified, and the specification of which requires extensive top-down processes. In other 
words, understanding the linking competence, i.e., how people relate form and semantic 
contents “by” or “in” interacting verbally, can only be expediently accomplished by taking 
into account the cognitive activities underlying the content side of the linguistic
o
 sign – which 
is the reason for discussing perception and action here. 
Before we next turn to identification (as one aspect of top-down conceptual processes) one of 
the factors shall be characterized which bias it, i.e., which contribute to the way in which 
something recognized is identified. This factor is salience, a property of the stimulus. Because 
salience is close to bottom-up processes, it is discussed in this section. The other biases which 
rather involve the influence of existing knowledge on identification (and conceptualization) 
are presented in the sections on conceptualization (3.2 and subsequent). 
 
 
3.1.4.1 Salience and the power of the stimulus 
 
I will characterize “salience” here as those features of objects in the visual field, either stable 
or momentary, which are rendered more prominent in relation to a perceiver than other 
features and which therefore are more likely to be attended to by the perceiver. 
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By “features” I mean those recognized throughout sensation, e.g., colors, shapes, forms, sizes, 
orientations, and (manners of) motion. Salience is therefore a function of both the stimuli and 
the perceiver. Without a perceiver, the term “salience” is meaningless. By “prominence” I 
mean the effect of features on the perceiver’s attention. If a stimulus is prominent enough, the 
perceiver will most likely attend to it. There seems to be a high correlation between salience 
and eye fixation and eye fixation and attention (Parkhurst, Law & Niebur 2002). That means 
we tend to direct our visual focus (foveal seeing) to salient stimuli because they grab our 
attention and force us to identify them. Thus, the most prominent features are those which are 
most “attention-grabbing” (Moskowitz 2005: 52).  
The cause of why we attend to salient features is presumably that they trigger reactions which 
may be life-sustaining (cf. Duckworth et al. 2002). For instance, eluding a stone – as a reflex 
– flying in our direction, thereby entering our visual field and threatening our well-being is 
stimulus-driven in terms of salience (see section 3.2.1.1 on stimulus- and purpose-driven 
identification). Purpose-driven action under these circumstances (which includes extensive 
top-down processes, e.g., action planning) would be too slow. But not only avoidance 
reactions can be stimulus-driven, as it seems, but also approach reactions (cf. ibid.).  
Another question is what makes stimuli salient, i.e., more prominent or attention-grabbing. 
Firstly, what is salient depends on the anatomical and neurophysical makeup of the perceiver 
(due to embodiment). For an organism only able to see black and white something green in a 
blue environment will presumably not be as salient as it is to us. Secondly, the features 
making stimuli salient seem to be closely related to the features which make a stimulus a good 
figure (cf. Parkhurst, Law & Niebur 2002). It is “intense, changing, complex, novel, and unit-
forming stimuli” (McArthur 1981: 202) which grab our attention. It is important to note that 
something is a good figure only if it exhibits these features relative to a ground which does 
not have the same features. Only under these conditions do intense (relative to less intense; 
law of similarity), moving (relative to stationary; law of common fate), complex (relative to 
simple; laws of good continuation, proximity, and closure), and unit-forming (all gestalt laws) 
stimuli “pop out” from the environment. “Novel” stimuli stand out from this list in one 
respect. Novelty has a temporal aspect which the other features lack. When repeatedly 
presenting a specific stimulus to a person (where the response to the stimulus is habituated) 
and then presenting him/her a novel stimulus (one which differs in features from the former) 
where he/she expects continuation of the former stimulus, causes him/her to attend (to be 
measured, for instance, by fixation time) to the novel stimulus (e.g., Zink et al. 2003, Cohen, 
Gelber & Lazar 1971 with infants). In a sense, we find here a figure/ground segregation 
extending to the temporal domain, where the frequently presented (or: familiar) stimulus 
constitutes the ground against which the novel (unfamiliar) stimulus is identified (see also 
McArthur & Ginsburg 1981).  
An especially important feature making stimuli salient seems to be unexpectedness which 
bears some relation to novelty. Because of the embedment of human perception in everyday 
routines and action dependences, this will be discussed in the section on the power of the 
perceiver dealing with pertinence (cf. section 3.2.1.1). 
Naturally, salience, i.e., the featural prominence of stimuli relative to a perceiver, does not 
dispel any of the underspecifications mentioned in the previous section. How could it, given 
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the fact that salience is part of the percept and that it is the percept which is underspecified? 
Instead, salient stimuli affect identification in another sense: Because of the importance of 
salient stimuli to us, i.e., their potential value/threat, they force us to identify them. As such, 
what is salient is most likely to be processed further. Thus, during the judgment of a state, 
process, or activity we take stimuli in consideration that were salient in perception, and only 
salient stimuli are then accessed to impose causal relations on a percept. In other words, the 
salient features in the percept determine the range of potential causes and effects to be 
imposed on a process or activity. The perceiver seeks causes for changes, or 
motion/movement, in the stimuli available to him/her (cf. Moskowitz 2005: 57f.). Stimuli not 
attended to and therefore not necessarily identified could then be excluded from the 
perceiver’s causal judgments with regard to what he/she has recognized.73 It is not impossible, 
however, that another perceiver’s perspective on the same processes/activities provides 
him/her information leading to his/her attributing different causal relations (e.g., Taylor & 
Fiske 1975). Once more it is different senses of “embodiment” which account for the 
subjective nature of causal attributions; firstly, in the sense of the perspectival bondage of the 
perceiver who recognizes and identifies not all facets of a state, process, or activity, and 
secondly the properties of his/her perceptual apparatus which constrain what he/she is 
generally able to perceive. 
 
 
3.2 Identification and conceptualization: actional notions and their grounding 
 
 In the following sections I will show that identification, or 
categorization, is the process by which the recognized stimulus is 
identified as an instance of something known. This is accomplished by 
matching the percept with a memorized concept. The criterion for a 
successful identification of something as something is that it can be 
shared with others as something. Identification will be shown to be 
either stimulus-driven or purpose-driven. 
 
                                                 
73
 If a perceiver comes to the conclusion that an event in his/her visual field must have been caused by something 
not present in the visual field, then he/she must seek for the cause in his/her environment or infer the cause on 
the basis of his knowledge about what can cause what. For instance, we all know that a snowball entering our 
visual field and hitting us has a cause, most probably a human one, although it might not be present in our visual 
field. 
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Figure 3.9: Identification/categorization and conceptualization as sub-competences of the 
linking competences that are developed throughout section 3.2.1 
 
Furthermore, the idea will be developed that conceptualization is 
simulated perception. In particular, one can distinguish identification, 
which is the step in perception following the recognition of a stimulus, 
from conceptualization which emphasizes the embedment of 
conceptual processes in practical concerns, i.e., action. This is 
indicated in the partial model given in Figure 3.9. 
 
What we identify and how we identify/categorize stimuli depends on properties of the stimuli, 
properties of the perceiver, and properties of the situation (cf. Bruner 1957, Moskowitz 2005: 
24ff.). The same is true for conceptualization except for the absence of stimuli (due to the 
nature of a simulation).  
 
 
3.2.1 Identification in perception and conceptualization for action 
In order to successfully identify, or categorize, a recognized object, we must be able to inform 
others about what it is an instance of. We may do this by giving its name or by illustrating 
what its function is by acting towards it, or by other means. In any case we have to use 
memorized information to identify something as something (cf. Engelkamp & Zimmer 2006: 
108).
74
 Patient FRA (reported on above) fails in the task of informing others about what the 
objects are he recognizes. He is therefore not able to identify visually recognized objects as is 
                                                 
74
 I consider “to identify sth. as sth. already known” to be a paraphrase of “to categorize sth.”. In the following 
they are used nearly synonymously, whereby “categorize” renders the result more prominent than “identify” 
which puts emphasis on the activity.  
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generally the case in associative agnosia. Many psychologists dealing with identification 
describe this activity as the “matching” of the percept which is the result of sensation with 
another structural model which is stored in long-term memory (e.g., Rosch 1999, Smith & 
Medin 1981). It is difficult to assess the status of “matching” and “structural model” in long-
term memory with respect to lifeworld differentiations. Both terms need to be grounded to be 
intersubjectively accessible. Now, only in cases where this “matching” fails does it become a 
matter for us in everyday praxis. If nothing is wrong with our perceptual abilities, these 
matching activities are not accessible to us, i.e., they occur without our being aware of them. 
It will again be those cases in which certain movement schemas cannot be actualized that give 
us clues as to how to conceive of these activities. We have distinguished sensation and 
identification by means of illustrating how they can be (doubly) dissociated as observable in 
patients’ failures to actualize specific movement schemas.  
 
Accomplished matching can then be described as the step linking the accomplished 
recognition of an object (its form can be described to someone) and the accomplishment of 
the identification of an object (its being-an-instance-of something can be communicated). 
 
From here I will call those structural models considered to be present in long-term memory 
concepts. The activities the results of which are (mostly complex) concepts will be called 
conceptualizations. Conceptualization will be used as a theoretical term here. It is to be 
distinguished from our everyday use of “conceive of sth.” which will be used here in a theory-
neutral way. Now, how can concepts be characterized in relation to percepts?  
On the physical level, it is naturally neuronal activity which instantiates sensation (as we have 
seen) as well as identification. Throughout the foregoing section it has been shown that during 
the processing stages in sensation there is preservation of retinotopic relations, even in later 
stages. Percepts thus can be conceived of as “quasi-pictorial” in that they preserve (formally 
transduced) features of stimuli as they hit the retina. In some famous experiments in which 
participants should, on the basis of some visually presented target items, judge whether some 
visually presented stimuli (skews, reversals or mirror-images of the target item) were 
instances of the target item types or not, Shepard and Metzler (1971: 701) have shown that 
“[t]he time required to recognize that two perspective drawings portray objects of the same 
three-dimensional shape is found to be […] a linearly increasing function of the angular 
difference in the portrayed orientations of the two objects […].” They concluded that their 
participants must have “mentally rotated” their percepts in order to be able to identify them as 
instances or non-instances of the target items. Most interestingly, Muthukumaraswamy, 
Johnson & Hamm (2003) found that participants’ brain activities during such rotation tasks 
increased in those parietal regions of the brain which are also involved in defining the 
egocentric “where” and “how” of the stimuli in sensation. It seems even possible that a 
rotation task is a simulation of a rotation act executed with the hands (cf. Vingerhoets et al. 
2002). In a task designed to modify “what” features of the stimuli – their size – temporal 
regions showed increased activity (see also Alivisatos & Petrides 1996).  
Importantly, behavioral data like those of Shepard and Metzler do not only point to mental 
rotation of recognized objects (in working memory) but also to that of concepts, i.e., structural 
models retrieved from long-term memory and being independent of the actual presence of 
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stimuli. That means participants can “evoke” (or recall) concepts of objects not present in the 
perceptual field and manipulate their spatial (rotate them) or inherent features (e.g., Farah 
1989, Kosslyn & Thompson 2003, Kosslyn, Ganis & Thompson 2001, Borst & Kosslyn 2008, 
Ganis, Thompson & Kosslyn 2004). In addition, the neuronal substrates of this “visual 
imagery” in the absence of stimuli (thus involving top-down processes) “reach down” to V1 
and extend to those cortical regions which have been shown to exhibit retinotopic mappings 
(cf. Kosslyn et al. 1993). A consequence of this would be that people suffering cortical 
blindness from accidents should under certain circumstances preserve their ability for visual 
imagery, i.e., evoking quasi-images in the absence of the corresponding stimuli. If concepts in 
the sense used here, i.e., image-like structural models in long-term memory, are dependent on 
foregoing visual perceptual experiences (in contrast to being inborn), such patients should be 
able to “draw” from past visual perceptual experience in order to imagine specific objects and 
to describe them. This is exactly what Goldenberg, Müllbacher & Nowak (1995) found in her 
patient – a dissociation between mentally modifying a recognized object on the basis of 
having perceived it (as in the experiments of Shepard and Metzler) and mentally modifying a 
memorized concept independently of perception. That this is possible only under certain 
circumstances follows from the fact that mentally modifying percepts and concepts draws 
from neuronal substrates which do not entirely overlap, such that both abilities might but need 
not be damaged due to deterioration of the respective cortical regions (cf. Bartolomeo 2002). 
Similar to visual imagery, retrieving knowledge relating to tactile, gustatory, and auditory 
experiences (in the absence of the respective stimuli) activates the same cortical regions that 
are also active when actually processing the respective stimuli in the respective modalities (cf. 
Goldberg, Perfetti & Schneider 2006). 
 
We can now draw the line between concepts and percepts more properly by stating that 
conceptualization is simulated perception (cf. Hartmann 1998: 146ff., Barsalou 1999, 
Johnson-Laird 1980).
75
  
 
As the aforementioned experimental results indicate, this simulation even reaches down to the 
neuronal level (cf. Damasio 1989). In addition, in mental rotation tasks those regions of the 
brain (premotor cortex) may be active which would be necessary to actually perform the 
rotation of the objects (cf. Vingerhoets et al. 2000). Furthermore, (without putting forward a 
too bold interpretation,) there seems to be a type of neurons (“mirror neurons”) in the human 
premotor cortex firing when one observes someone performing a purposeful act and when one 
performs this act himself (cf. Gallese & Goldman 1998, Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004, Fabbri-
Destro & Rizzolatti 2008). Similarly, Hauk, Johnsrude & Pulvermüller (2004) found that 
reading action words activate regions which are also active during actually performing these 
actions. For instance, Schnitzler and colleagues (1997) also found activity in the primary 
motor cortex during so-called “motor imagery”, i.e., imagining performing specific 
movements.  
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 This characterization seems to be valid for the other modalities, too (Barsalou et al. 2003, Barsalou 2005a: 
406ff. reporting on the respective studies). 
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Therefore, the above definition of conceptualization shall be extended by stating that 
conceptualization can also be simulated activity. 
 
The definition has several implications. First, simulating a movement schema is not identical 
to actualizing this movement schema. Thus, perceiving and acting are not identical to 
conceptualizing. What conceptualization misses are clearly the stimuli involved in perception 
and action, respectively. Indeed, brain regions underlying conceptualization and perception do 
not entirely overlap but perception involves brain activities beyond those also active during 
conceptualization (cf. Martin 2007: 31ff.). Strictly speaking, “mental imagery”, “mental 
rotation”, “quasi-images” and the like are misleading in this respect. It is always something 
which is rotated, something which is depicted, and someone who actualizes a movement 
schema.  
Second, the simulation is methodically as well as ontogenetically “later” than what is 
simulated. Visual perceptual experiences are a necessary precondition for being able to 
conceptualize something in terms of visual imagery. This can be shown with the help of 
people suffering congenital blindness. These exhibit “visual” imagery only to the degree to 
which their contents are acquirable through cross-modal perception, especially haptic 
perception (cf. Arditi, Holtzman & Kosslyn 1988, Lederman & Klatzky 2009).
76
 We find here 
one of the origins of the idea of Cognitive-Functional Linguistics (C4 of CFL A1) that 
“meanings are (at least in part) perceptually grounded” where the meaning of “meaning” 
relates to conceptual contents plus the modes of conceptualization (“construal”; cf. Langacker 
2008a: 43). Thus, for CFL which identifies conceptualization with meaning, the fact that 
conceptualization is dependent on perception means that meaning depends (indirectly) on 
perception. 
Third, an eminently important aspect of conceptualization is creativity. That means 
conceptualization can be uncoupled from actual perceptual/actional experiences. We have 
seen in the section on sensation that different neuronal substrates are involved in the 
processing of different features of stimuli and that retinotopic relations are preserved in the 
course of processing.  
 
In cases of conceptualization (which is per se stimulus-independent) we are able to 
conceptualize counterfactual states, processes, or activities we have never visually 
experienced before but which are nevertheless made of the constituents of prior visual 
perceptual experiences (cf. Fauconnier & Turner 1994, 1998, 2002).  
 
According to Hartmann (1998: 163; my translation), “being able to conceptualize serves the 
purpose of achieving the advantageous effects of specific perceptions on our action, behavior, 
and condition, if these perceptions cannot yet, not presently, or not at all be achieved.”  
The presentation of conceptualization as simulation (or “re-enactment”) shall be concluded 
with a statement of Barsalou (2005a). According to him, perceiving things (i.e., “bottom-up 
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 It is an open question as to how to determine the degree to which other modalities might compensate for the 
absence of visual perception with respect to their ability of “visual” imagery (cf. Bértolo 2005, Mandler 2010: 
26). 
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sensory stimulation”) is accompanied/constituted by activity of the neurons sensitive to 
specific features of these things (i.e., “conjunctive neurons”; see also above). These  
 
“conjunctive neurons can later reactivate the pattern in the absence of bottom-up sensory 
stimulation. While remembering a perceived object, for example, conjunctive neurons reenact the 
sensorimotor states that were active while encoding it. Similarly, when representing a concept, 
conjunctive neurons reenact the sensorimotor states characteristic of its instances. A given 
reenactment is never complete, and biases may enter into its reactivation, but at least some 
semblance of the original state is partially activated.“ (Barsalou 2005a: 399) 
 
We will later return to the consequences of the incompleteness and biases in what Barsalou 
calls re-enactment. For now, we can turn to the question of how matching between percepts 
and concepts should be conceived of. One fundamental problem in the identification of 
recognized objects is that a recognized stimulus must be comparable to the concept in long-
term memory (cf. Barsalou 1999, Barsalou et al. 2003). In other words, to identify a 
recognized object o as an instance of an already known concept O they must be somehow 
similar. We know this difficulty from our everyday experiences. What we perceive has been 
shown to be always viewer-dependent, i.e., we perceive objects always from our vantage 
point and from no other (i.e., our “ego-center” differs from those of others). However, we are 
mostly able to identify objects as belonging to a particular category albeit our perspective on 
it might be disadvantageous, for instance when seeing a dog directly from above (cf. 
Engelkamp & Zimmer 2006: 103ff.). We might be able to identify it as belonging to the 
category DOG, but we might fail stating to which breed it belongs. For this to accomplish it 
might be necessary to see it from another perspective, one that provides more information (cf. 
Solso 2005: 106ff.). As several experiments have shown, there might be something like a 
canonical perspective which is most informative for a perceiver with respect to an 
identification task, since it provides most information about the features of the object in 
question, given the perceiver’s omnipresent perspective limitations (e.g., Blanz, Tarr & 
Bülthoff 1999). A concept which potentially matches a percept must be similar to it or be 
made similar to it. In neuronal terms, the percept and the concept must share a subset of 
neurons (cf. Barsalou 1999). Now, concepts might be present in long-term memory 
(presumably not exclusively) in terms of canonical perspectives. Imagine we approach the 
dog we have previously perceived from above from left behind. Although this might not yet 
be the canonical perspective we might nevertheless be able to identify it as a Golden 
Retriever. Therefore we must have been able to match our percept of the dog with our concept 
of DOG (or even of GOLDEN RETRIEVER) in which we view it from the canonical perspective. 
Let us assume that the canonical perspective is one from a 45 degree angle above, to the left 
and in front of the dog, so that we grasp about three quarters of the object (cf. Palmer, Rosch 
& Chase 1981). Then the structural model and the concept do not yet fit because they actually 
exhibit different features (i.e., the neuronal activity underlying the percept does not 
sufficiently overlap with those neuronal patterns underlying the concept DOG/GOLDEN 
RETRIEVER). In other words, the canonical perspective alone does not supply the means by 
which the matching could be accomplished. Now imagine standing in front of a Golden 
Retriever which stands on a turning platform turning it slowly around in 360 degrees. What 
we do in this imagination task is to rotate this dog conceptually, perhaps along its principal 
axis (cf. Marr & Nishihara 1978, Marr 1982: 302ff.) the finding of which seems a necessary 
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condition for mental rotation. If the axis is not found because of deterioration of regions of the 
parietal cortex, mental rotation fails (cf. Harris, Harris & Caine 2001). It seems plausible to 
assume that in the course of mental rotation different feature assemblies of an object (concept) 
are “highlighted” in sequence, accompanied by activity of the respective feature-sensitive 
neurons. Now, both canonical perspectives and mental rotation seem to be involved in 
identifying a recognized object as an instance of something known, i.e., in matching a percept 
with a concept (cf. Tarr & Pinker 1989). It is at least possible that our concept of a Golden 
Retriever consists of multiple perspectives on it combined with our ability to mentally rotate it 
around a specific axis (cf. Lawson 1999).
77
 Any perspective on the object, or any position of 
the object, is constituted by a single pattern of neuronal activity, then. However, in a non-
perceptual task, when we have to retrieve the concept of an object from memory, we are 
likely to imagine it from the canonical perspective (cf. Palmer, Rosch & Chase 1981). It is 
difficult to decide whether it is the percept that is rotated to a canonical perspective in a visual 
perceptual experience (this might be possible by means of its formal integrity caused by 
filling-in mechanisms of gestalt laws) or whether it is the concept. For the former to occur it is 
necessary to go beyond a viewer-dependent perspective on the object and to gain an object-
centred perspective on it (“view normalization”).78 For the latter to occur it is necessary to 
have rich former experiences with instances of the category (say DOG) to acquire multiple 
conceptual perspectives on it and to be able to rotate it. Discussion about this matter is still 
going on (cf. Peissig & Tarr 2007, Bruce, Green & Georgeson 
4
2003: 287ff.). I will assume 
here that it is mainly concepts which are rotated in matching percepts and concepts, the 
success of which depends on the richness of former experiences of instances of the category. 
You might have accomplished such a conceptual rotation in participating in the task above 
with the Golden Retriever on the turning platform. Your success in this task should depend on 
your former experiences with Golden Retrievers. If you have never seen an exemplar will 
presumably either have replaced it by another exemplar of the category DOG or RETRIEVER 
with which you are more familiar. One who has already encountered Golden Retrievers – 
though not often enough to be able to visualize it from multiple perspectives – will succeed 
less well in rotating it conceptually. Taken together, identification should be faster, if the 
percept matches a category with the instances of which the perceiver is familiar due to rich 
prior experience with them (cf. Boer 1991), so that multiple perspectives are available to 
him/her and changing the perspective requires less time. This view of conceptualization could 
be termed “usage-based” because its functioning crucially depends on frequent perception of 
similar exemplars which has lead to entrenched concepts.
79
 Rich, entrenched concepts (i.e., 
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 Criticism of the “multiple perspectives” view has aimed at the implausibly high number of stored 
“representations” necessary for a single concept (e.g., Peterson 2001: 187). This may not necessarily be so, if 
one assumed that both percepts and concepts can be rotated to the degrees to which the viewer-dependent 
sensation and the previous experiences with the concept in question allow, respectively, and that “matching” can 
be accomplished by approximating percepts and concepts to compatible perspectives by rotating both.  
78
 The terms “object-centred” or “viewer-independent” appear highly problematic to me. Both potentially imply 
that an objective perspective is possible. This is of course not the case. Rather, what is meant is a perspective that 
is independent from the present position of the viewer but nevertheless simulates a position of a viewer. Gaining 
an “object-centred” perspective includes then the ability to take a different perspective on something than the 
present one.  
79 
This does not preclude the possibility that also percepts can be rotated, since good performance in mental 
rotation tasks is also possible in patients with associative agnosia. Presumably, such performance involves 
extensive use of gestalt laws of perception by means of completing the recognized (but necessarily incomplete 
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they consist of multiple perspectives and are easily activated) allow matching them with 
percepts, in that the neuronal activities underlying both increasingly overlap by rotating the 
concept into a position in which it is featurally sufficiently similar to the percept (see 
Langacker 2000: 93ff. on entrenchment). 
In this section, the basic mechanisms of identification/categorization have been presented 
irrespective of the remaining biases involved. The next step is therefore to discuss the bias 
originating in the perceiver. 
 
 
3.2.1.1 Determinants in identification (II): pertinence and the power of the perceiver 
I have characterized identification/categorization and conceptualization in the last section. 
Identification involves the matching of a percept with a concept, whereas conceptualization is 
simulated perception in the absence of the respective stimuli. We now turn to the questions of 
how identification and conceptualization can be classified with respect to the thing-
circumstance taxonomy and which of all stimuli present in the visual field are identified. 
Concerning the former question, identification comes along as either action or behavior. 
Trivially, we will not encounter counterfactual states, processes, or activities in perception 
(illusions excluded; see above). Thus, a creative aspect of identification does not play a 
significant role here. It is extremely difficult to determine whether there is some connection 
between identification and behavior on the one hand, and conceptualization and action on the 
other. The difficulty lies in the fact that our knowledge about which of all recognized stimuli 
in the visual field are also identified, and under what contextual, situational, and dispositional 
conditions, rests on experimental data, if anything. The designs of these experiments rest on 
instructions to participants which prescribe them a purpose. The means to put this purpose 
into effect are also prescribed (certain acts or sequences of acts). In the following, I will 
attempt to show why this is crucial. In our everyday interplay with our environment we are 
mostly not instructed by others and it seems problematic to treat natural situations similar to 
lab situations with respect to the question of how identification processes should be conceived 
of in either. In our everyday interplay and interaction with our environment we act purpose-
rationally towards reaching goals and safeguarding interests. To put into effect our superior 
purposes we mostly have to actualize numerous (ancillary) action schemas first and to put 
their numerous subordinate purposes into effect prior to them. Let us say such an action chain 
was constituted by my goal to have a coffee. I have to get out of my chair, leave my desk, 
walk into the kitchen of my institute, prepare the coffee machine, get my cup, and so on. 
Before actualizing the first action schema of the whole sequence I already expect (and 
mentally visualize) to encounter several objects and to be engaged or involved in several 
circumstances throughout the entire sequence. In other words, identification as part of 
perception is prospective (cf. Bertenthal 1996: 438ff.) in this case:  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
because of perspective-dependence) forms in working memory (cf. Cohen et al. 1996: 97) because retrieving 
concepts from long-term memory for completion is not available. 
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What is to be identified is already primed by my conceptualization of the action chain. My 
purposes determine the objects to attend to because they are pertinent with respect to realizing 
these purposes (cf. Schütz/Luckmann 2003: 286ff.).
80
  
 
I have to attend to all the objects which are instrumental in getting coffee and I have to act 
toward them in the way they are constructed to be acted towards, and therefore I have to know 
their functions. In other words, many but in no way all objects I interplay with in the action 
chain of making coffee must not only be recognized, they must also be identified. My 
purposes determine what to attend to and therefore what to identify. Stimuli irrelevant to the 
putting into effect of my purposes need not be attended to and might remain unidentified 
because they are neither salient nor pertinent, while still being sensed (or even recognized) 
because they are in my visual field (for instance, the flowerpot on the windowsill, the doors to 
the other offices, etc.). However, getting the coffee need not be that easy. It could be that 
several unexpected objects come into my visual field occasionally: a colleague leaving her 
office space, a door slammed, a spigot leaking, etc. These “objects” are salient in that they are 
moving through the visual field when I do not expect them because I have not conceptualized 
them as part of my plans, so they redirect my attention from my current (subordinate) goal 
towards them and hinder the actualization of my next (ancillary) action schema. Because of 
this they might become pertinent to me, since they pose a problem for me, so they force me to 
identify them. They have to be identified for me to be able to plan my next acts, and because 
action planning requires top-down conceptualization of what I am to do. Such unexpected 
encounters happen to us and because they are unexpected but nevertheless important, the 
involved objects are not only recognized but also identified, because it might turn out that 
they provoke some action of ours.  
 
Identification of recognized objects then turns out to be dependent on the contingencies of 
everyday circumstances and comes along as either purpose-driven or stimulus-driven. These 
are the two attentional systems proposed by Corbetta and Shulman (2002), based on 
neurophysiological evidence.
81
 Then, identification comes along either as accomplishment 
resulting from action (pertinence) or as happening, maybe interfering with present purposes 
(salience).
82
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 Schütz/Luckmann use the term “relevance” which I have substituted for “pertinence” here because of the 
manifold occupation of the term “relevance” in theories of mind. 
81
 In patients of unilateral neglect (which ignore visual stimuli on the opposite side to the damaged hemisphere) 
there is a tendency for preserved attention to “goal-driven” stimuli (the term of Corbetta and Shulman), while 
attention to unexpected stimuli in the neglected visual field fails which points to dissociation (cf. Corbetta & 
Shulman 2002: 213).  
82
 This does not mean that salient stimuli necessarily interfere with present purposes. I take the position that the 
“default” case in everyday praxis is a person pursuing goals and interests. Only if the non-default case is given – 
one’s mind running idle, for example – then salient stimuli might force us to identify them while they do not 
interfere with present purposes in such situations.  
The identification activities which are anticipated because they are part of action plans correspond closely to 
what Zacks et al. (2007) call “perceptual predictions”. The view presented here of how people segment and 
identify what is going on around them shares many (though not all) assumptions with the “event segmentation 
theory” proposed by Zacks & Tversky (2001) and Zacks et al. (2007) (see also Zacks & Swallow 2007 for a brief 
presentation of their main ideas). In section 3.4 of the present work the topic is discussed with respect to the 
temporal organization of states, activities, and processes, and its consequences for the linking problem. 
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In the former case the stimuli to be identified are pertinent, as determined by our (previously 
conceptualized) goals and interests; in the latter case, we are forced to identify unexpected 
stimuli on the basis of their salience in our visual fields, independent of or interfering with 
top-down processes relating to purpose-driven action chains. 
We have seen that there are several stages in perception in which – from a neurological 
perspective – many-to-few mappings take place. It is often argued that these mappings are due 
to capacity limitations with respect to what we are capable to identify (e.g., Engelkamp & 
Zimmer 2006: 59f.). This seems to be a feasible assumption, given the neurophysiological 
evidence, but it might turn out to be only half of the truth. Lab experiments have long 
concentrated on exploring either perception or action, so that experiments in visual perception 
were “decontextualized” from those practical contexts in which perception takes place in 
everyday life (see also Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings 2005: 157 on this point). This harbours 
the risk of obstructing the close interrelation of perception and action, or better: perception for 
action. The above view of either purpose-driven or stimulus-driven identification thus 
provides an alternative perspective on selective identification (without excluding the 
“convergence” perspective), in that the question of which of all recognized stimuli are 
identified is answered in relation to the pertinence of these stimuli for action (cf. Glenberg 
1997 and the comprehensive review sections in Hommel et al. 2001). As we have seen, an act 
includes the relation of an action schema to a purpose, as a means to put this purpose into 
effect (see Figure 2.7 in section 2.4). Purposes are either goals or interests. In order to bring 
about certain circumstances (goals) we must have concepts of them which might be many, if 
several ancillary action schemas have to be actualized in order to put the superior purpose into 
effect. We also need to have concepts for the results and (purposed) further outcomes 
(circumstances) of these intermediate action schemas. In actualizing all these action schemas 
in sequence, we expect to encounter all the component parts (stimuli) of the intermediate 
states, processes, or activities, since they are present as concepts. (One could say, we 
conceptually prime the identification of the stimuli to come; cf. Glenberg 1997: 8.) These 
stimuli will therefore be identified as necessary constituents of the conceptualized action 
chain which serves as means to put the superior purpose into effect (e.g., having coffee).  
If we encounter stimuli not expected, interfering with our present purposes, and hindering our 
action we must also identify them. What we do in this circumstance is to modify the means by 
which we put our present purposes into effect, i.e., by modifying the intermediate concepts of 
results and further outcomes of the intermediate states, processes, or activities. In particular, 
we might “insert” subordinate purposes into the concept of the whole action chain due to the 
unexpected changes in our environment in the visual field. This would be the case, for 
instance, if a colleague’s occurrence in my visual field interferes with my goal of making 
coffee. If she wants to talk to me and if we have to solve a practical problem, I have to modify 
my (complex) concept of the action chain leading to my having a coffee such that I must put 
into effect the new subordinate purpose first (solving the problem) while not “losing touch” 
with the goal of having coffee (which in fact could happen, due to memory limitations). These 
considerations are captured in Figure 3.10 which will be commented in turn. 
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Figure 3.10: Purpose-driven and stimulus-driven identification 
(Figure 3.10 can be read as follows (lower panel): Someone has a purpose (p), i.e., wants a 
state/process/activity (s/p/a) to come about. He/she therefore conceptualizes this 
state/process/activity (STATE/PROCESS/ACTIVITY S/P/A) and the means to put it into effect 
(RESULT & OUTCOME1-n). He/she actualizes the corresponding ancillary action schemas in 
sequence (aa1-n), whereby he/she brings about several states/processes/activities (s1-n) which 
correspond to subordinate purposes (p1-n), respectively. The states/processes/activities (s1-n) 
brought about must match the corresponding concepts (RESULT & OUTCOME1-n). These 
conceptualized states/processes/activities (s1-n) consist of those pertinent stimuli expected to 
be encountered in actualizing the corresponding ancillary action schemas. Between aa2 and 
aa3 something unexpected happens, i.e., something salient comes into the visual field and 
must be identified (upper panel: stimulus-driven) because it hinders the realization of p. This 
leads to the conceptualization of a subordinate purpose p’ which must be put into effect by 
means of similar mechanisms as in the purpose-driven action chain. The concept 
corresponding to p’ takes the form of STATE/PROCESS/ACTIVITY S/P/A’. When p’ is put into 
effect, i.e., when s’ is brought about as the outcome of the last ancillary act, the actor can 
continue in the action chain serving the realization of superior purpose p. If s is brought 
about and matches S/P/A, purpose p is put into effect.
83
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 The action chain constituting the pursuit of purpose p need not necessarily interfere with the action chain 
constituting the pursuit of the subordinate purpose p’, namely if actualizing the respective action schemas do not 
exclude each other. Thus, if the chain of acts of my making a coffee is not incompatible with the chain of acts of 
discussing a problem with my colleague, then they can potentially be actualized simultaneously. (My colleague 
would have to follow me into the kitchen while discussing with me, and I would have to talk while making 
coffee.) This would then simply be a case of a routinized action schema (making coffee) which need not be 
actualized with great attentional effort, therefore allowing for executing some less-routinized action schema 
simultaneously. A simple example of action schemas necessarily excluding each other would be that of jumping 
and walking, an example of action schemas excluding each other empirically would be that of breathing and 
swallowing (at least with respect to the average adult) (cf. Hartmann 1998: 123f.). 
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Such a view of the interrelation between action and identification in perception is at odds with 
views holding that we are only and always reacting (which is behavior, action-theoretically) 
to stimuli we come in contact with (cf. Hommel, Müsseler & Aschersleben 2001 who also 
emphasize the strong action-perception connection). As Zacks et al. (2007: 173f.) put it, 
“[p]erceptual predictions are valuable because they allow an organism to anticipate the future 
and to plan appropriate actions rather than reacting to incoming stimuli”. Rather, we 
dynamically conceptualize purposes and the means to put them into effect based on the 
question of whether stimuli we encounter fit our purposes (pertinence) or trigger their 
modification or the modification of the means to get there (due to salience).  
Conceptualization can presumably be routinized to a high degree, depending on the task 
difficulty which means that it can be executed without attention (cf. Barsalou 1999: 583, 
2005a: 398ff.).
84
 For instance, conceptualizing where to play the ball next in soccer match 
while monitoring one’s own movements and those of the opponents is no problem for 
routinized soccer players, whereas it is more difficult to conceptualize the way from the town-
hall to the train station under the same circumstances. It turns out then that looking at 
identification without taking into account its embedment in complex action dependences leads 
eventually to an oversimplification of matters. Emphasizing the priority of perception for 
action over perception as (mere) identification is identical with emphasizing the importance of 
the dorsal visual stream for action in relation to the role of the ventral stream in stimulus 
identification. The embedment of perception in action and action planning provides an 
explanation for DF’s performance in everyday life which is characterized by pursuing 
purposes, choosing means to get there and actualizing action schemas. Goodale and Milner 
(2004: 19ff., 117ff.) report on her astonishing performance in tasks in everyday activities 
(making tea, for instance), given the serious damage to her temporal lobe resulting in a visual 
form agnosia. In other words, identification does not work, but action-oriented 
conceptualization works well in DF. This is due to the intact processing in her dorsal pathway 
which provides perception for action for which perceiving egocentric space is necessary.  
What is the significance of pertinence for the discussion of the scenario in (II.1) where Nicole 
knocked over the milk? There are two ways in which pertinence compensates for some 
aspects of the underspecification of what Sarah and Jessica have perceived in that scenario. 
The crucial point is that Sarah’s and Jessica’s identification performance is purpose-driven in 
a double sense. Firstly, identification is always biased by someone’s own purposes so that the 
respective outcomes of identification may be partially predetermined by something 
completely independent of the observable stimuli. Thus, being biased by their respective 
prejudices and attitudes towards Nicole, Sarah and Jessica may identify what they see in 
different ways. Secondly, judging events in the way exemplified in scenario (II.1) involves 
attributing pertinences to others. Sarah and Jessica will assume that the milk had some 
pertinence for Nicole, i.e., for her action planning. The question that remains open for now is 
whether Nicole’s actual deed (knocking over the milk) is identified as the successful 
                                                 
84
 Routinization is a form of learning (also called automatization (e.g., Norman & Shallice 1984) and 
proceduralization (Anderson 1982)). It is the process at the end of which an action schema need no more be 
actualized with attentional effort. An indicator of when this is the case is that another action schema can be 
actualized simultaneously with the routine action schema, e.g., talking to someone while driving a car. 
Routinization takes place when an action schema is persistently practiced (cf. Hartmann 1998). 
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actualization of some planned action schema (allowing praise or reprimand) or whether such 
an actualization failed (disallowing praise or reprimand).  
 These are already matters of action and attribution going beyond 
perception and conceptualization in the narrow sense. They will be 
further pursed in 3.2.1.4. The last perceptual/conceptual aspects of 
underspecification to be discussed are causal knowledge and 
knowledge about how objects and bodies behave physically. I will 
show that top-down processes make up much of the 
underspecification of percepts. 
 
 
3.2.1.2 Features, affordances, relations, and the power of frequency 
As humans engaging in a sociocultural praxis and interplaying with our environments within 
our lifeworld, we need to know about the features of (types of) objects which are relevant to 
put our purposes into effect. Furthermore, we need to know how – depending on the features 
they exhibit – different (types of) things move (see thing-circumstance taxonomy) in different 
(types of) states, processes, and activities, either to fulfil our needs by acting towards them, or 
to avoid threat to ourselves. We have to know that it is fluid substances we can drink, that we 
can pour drinkable fluids into cups and that we can lift cups to drink out of them. We also 
have to know that a balloon falling on our head does not endanger our well-being, while a 
falling anvil does. Most, if not all of our activities depend on our knowledge about how we 
can interplay with the objects in our environment and interact with people around us. Such 
knowledge is not only important to adapt well to one’s environment and to be able to pursue 
one’s goals in it but also for verbal interaction, since it is our knowledge about which 
circumstances are possible for some object, i.e., in which states, processes, and activities 
something can occur, which is also crucial for making appropriate utterances (think of 
colorless green ideas sleep furiously). With respect to syntactic (-conceptual) structures it is 
certain constructions in which certain types of states, processes, and activities are coded (cf. 
Goldberg 1995). We therefore have to know which construction is associated with which type 
of circumstance and under which setting of the interactional variables. For this, a state, 
process, or activity must be appropriately conceptualized on the basis of the (multi-modal) 
percept and prior knowledge, and its appropriateness or non-appropriateness shows up in the 
appropriateness of the construction by which it is coded in the circumstance in which it is 
uttered. (How the state, process, or activity is conceptualized by a person is opaque to his/her 
interactors until he/she has made it intersubjectively accessible by coding it in a conventional 
way by means of an utterance.) 
In the sections on sensation we have seen that features of objects are only partially present in 
percepts, depending on the modality or modalities involved. What is not present in the visual 
percept of a milk carton is, for instance, its weight or the force required to move it in a 
specific way (and to specific ends, if present), or whether it is capable of motion or 
movement. But this is exactly the information needed by Jessica in (II.1) to make causal 
attributions. Because her utterance is a judgment of the described event including physical 
reasoning (relating to invisible object features and causal relations) and attributions (involving 
more abstract concepts like purposes, contexts, dispositions) we have to ask first for the 
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origins of her physical knowledge concerning what (kinds of) objects exhibit what (kinds of) 
features and can stand in what (kinds of) states, processes and activities. For such judgments 
to make, she has to rely on rich prior knowledge which provides her the means to go beyond 
what she has actually perceived with her utterance. 
 
I will assume here that this knowledge is insofar grounded in perception in that concepts are 
memorized modally, not amodally in terms of a syntax of meaningless symbols (cf. Barsalou 
1999, Pulvermüller 1999: 261ff., James & Gauthier 2003, Hauk, Johnsrude & Pulvermüller 
2004, Pecher & Zwaan 2005).  
 
This is already implied by the characterization of conceptualization as simulated perception 
above. However, not all of what affects our sense organs will result in having a concept of it. 
We form concepts only of those forms, shapes, colors, motions, movements etc. (i.e., the 
results of recognition), the differentiation of which is pragmatically required in the sense that 
it makes our interplay and interaction with our environment possible. As such, any concept, as 
part of long-term memory, originates in the salience or pertinence of things and their features 
in perception. The top-down conceptualization of something thus relies on those featural 
aspects which were salient/pertinent in perceiving an instance of it (cf. Glenberg 1997: 4) and 
which forces the perceiver to selectively attend to it (cf. Barsalou 1999: 583f.). Therefore, 
conceptualization is also neuronally based only on those features which were salient/pertinent 
during perception, i.e., there is neuronal activity due to salient/pertinent features, not due to all 
the features of an object (cf. ibid.). A concept is neuronally instantiated by the “re-enaction” 
of a state of a subset of neurons which are also active in perception. This is at odds with the 
classical view of concepts according to which the  
 
“conceptual system is a detached database. As categories are encountered in the world, their 
invariant properties are extracted and stored in descriptions, much like an encyclopaedia. The 
result is a database of generalised categorical knowledge that is relatively detached from the goals 
of specific agents.” (Barsalou 2003: 536) 
 
Instead of this, we have a concept of some feature because the corresponding 
tactile/visual/olfactory, etc. experiences we have had with some objects exhibiting this feature 
were salient/pertinent for us. Perceiving the feature is (always) accompanied by neuronal 
activity of the respective feature detectors in the respective modalities. If a feature becomes 
pertinent to us although it is absent, so that we have to conceptualize it, we are able to “re-
enact” (Damasio 1989, Barsalou 2003) the corresponding perception.85  
 
This simulation is accompanied/constituted by the partial activation of those neuronal 
assemblies which are also active in actual perception.  
 
We thus conceptually single out object features by means of sensory(motor) experiences in 
our different modalities (cf. Martin 2007, Hauk, Johnsrude & Pulvermüller 2004) because 
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 I will use the term “simulation” here for this operation on the conceptual level and I will use the term “re-
enactment” for this operation on the neural level. Simulation on the conceptual level corresponds to “re-
enactment” on the neuronal level, then. 
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they facilitate purpose-rational action in our environment. There might be innumerable 
potential features humans actually do not differentiate because they are irrelevant and non-
salient for them. It is, however, not possible without contradiction to make any assertion about 
them, since this would presuppose our having concepts of them.  
Features of things vary in the degree of pertinence they have for us in different circumstances. 
When cutting is necessary, the sharpness of a knife’s edge is more pertinent than its color. It is 
presumably in contexts of cutting that we learn that edges can be sharp. And it is certainly 
mostly knives in the presence of which something is cut. So, cutting is experientially bound to 
sharpness and sharpness to knives. As Mervis and Rosch (1975) have shown, there is a high 
correlation between the co-occurrence of specific features and the membership of the 
respective things in a category.
86
 In other words, often (but not always, depending on the 
category) instances of a category share features. Knives are sharp, longish, and have edges. 
Birds have feathers and beaks. Cars have motors and four wheels etc. The perception of such 
things is accompanied/constituted by the firing of those neurons sensitive to the 
salient/pertinent features the things exhibit. Now it is obviously the case that the same objects 
are mostly involved in similar types of states, processes and activities, respectively, and play 
similar roles in them, respectively. For instance, books usually stand or lie somewhere, or are 
read, held, or carried, but seldom eaten, cut through, or cooked. Glasses are lifted, washed, 
poured with fluids etc., but they are rolled, thrown, or laid somewhere rather seldom. Such 
objects are important for us because few features of them (relative to all identifiable ones) are 
pertinent for us relative to present purposes. It is therefore mostly the same features of the 
same objects which are pertinent for us. Although there is an indefinite number of features a 
particular thing might exhibit, there are only few features of a particular thing (e.g., the 
sharpness of a knife) we actually identify in everyday circumstances. Identifying some 
features at the expense of others correlates with a specific pattern of neuronal activation 
instead of others related to other features. Analogously, categorizing or conceptualizing some 
object is probably accompanied by attention to those features which are also most frequently 
perceived.  The neural co-activation of these features will be associated with this particular 
distribution of attention. In the long run, neuronal activation propagates most easily along 
familiar paths due to long-term potentiation. This is an „increase in the long-term 
responsiveness of a postsynaptic neuron in response to stimulation of a presynaptic neuron.“ 
(Ward 2006: 187; on how electrical currents are transmitted in the nervous system see Ward 
2006, ch. 2).
87
 I have already introduced the notion of potentiation on the conceptual level as 
“entrenchment”. 
According to these considerations, tools are not tools by nature, but by purpose, experience, 
and practice. Although a knife “is not” a screwdriver, it might be used as one, thus 
“becoming” a screwdriver. Imagine you have a problem with your notebook and need to open 
the bottom side. A screwdriver would open it, but you do not have one. There is, however, a 
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 Note, that there is an important difference in the assumptions of Mervis & Rosch about categories and those 
put forward here, in that Mervis & Rosch (e.g., 1981) assume categories to exist a priori, whereas I assume that 
categories exist because we make differences, whereby making differences is methodically “earlier” than its 
results, i.e., differences.  
87
 Potentiation in the nervous system is in part made possible by neuronal plasticity and might be a source of 
cultural relativity. This is possible, roughly speaking, because things exhibit an indefinite number of features, so 
it could be dependent on cultural praxes which features of which things are pertinent (cf. Turner 2002). 
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knife lying on the desk. Identifying the knife in perception would, under normal 
circumstances, be accompanied by the co-activation (due to potentiation) of the most usual 
(i.e., frequent) features (e.g., longish, sharp etc.) necessary for action (cutting, buttering) 
relative to the current state of the perceiver (cf. Glenberg 1997). In the present circumstance, 
however, your purpose is to open the notebook for which you need something “functioning 
as” a screwdriver, so you attend to a feature of the knife usually less pertinent, namely the 
shape and form of its tip. If it is sufficiently similar to that of a screwdriver, you can utilize 
the knife to open the notebook.  
Depending on our purposes we attend to specific features of things but not to others. 
Frequency and recency of experience shape the activation patterns associated with particular 
stimuli in the long and short term, respectively (cf. Tulving & Schacter 1990 on recency 
effects, or “priming”).  
 
Most importantly, those features identified (in perception) or conceptualized (for action) by 
means of selective attention determine and restrict the states/processes/activities the objects in 
question can be conceptualized to stand in.
88
 Conceptualizing a knife and attending to its tip is 
not the appropriate means to conceptually prepare a cutting event but (rather) a screw-driving 
event. Conceptualizing a knife and focussing on the edge and its sharpness does not suffice 
for planning a screw-driving event but (rather) a cutting event. Depending on our purposes we 
identify/conceptualize objects actually exhibiting different features. It is these features which 
indicate and restrict the state, process, or activity in which the object may stand. The 
circumstance possibilities an object indicates on the basis of the identified or conceptualized 
features will be called affordances here (cf. Gibson 1979, Michaels & Carello 1981, Tucker & 
Ellis 1998, Grèzes & Decety 2002, Symes, Ellis & Tucker 2007, Buccino et al. 2009).  
 
Things afford states, processes and activities only in dependence on their physical features as 
identified by a perceiver (they afford something to someone iff there is someone), on the 
physical makeup of the perceiver (a knife does not afford screw-driving to a donkey – 
“embodiment”), and on the present state of the perceiver (a cookie does not afford grasping to 
someone attending to the TV).  
Due to our frequent and recent experiences, knives primarily afford cutting or buttering bread, 
containers usually afford putting things into them or putting them onto things, stones afford 
throwing, etc. Many affordances depend on such experiences and on prior knowledge of 
object functions. Many objects in our environments which have relatively fixed functions are 
artefacts, i.e., they were constructed in order to fulfil particular functions (knives, glasses, 
cookies, staple guns). As such, they have rather fixed roles in specific circumstances in that 
they repeatedly play the same roles in the same types of circumstances. Other things are not 
artefacts and do not have such fixed functions for humans (stones, trunks of trees, fir cones). 
                                                 
88
 Implicated here is my argument according to which the notion of traditional “selectional restrictions” (cf. 
Fodor & Katz 1964) which are imposed on “arguments” by “predicates” is flawed in that it states the wrong 
dependency direction: It is not relations which put selectional restrictions on objects, but it is objects whose 
features restrict the range of the relations they can stand in (cf. Kasper 2011). Related insights are entering 
prevalent theories of grammar and linking only very slowly. Groundbreaking in this respect is Pustejovsky 
(1995: 10) who states that “the diversity of complement types that a verb or other category may take is in large 
part also determined by the semantics of the complements themselves.”  
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Occasionally, and depending on the featural complexity of the respective objects, an 
important difference between the former and the latter is therefore that in order to act purpose-
rationally and functionally “appropriately” toward a staple-gun we have to know its function 
beforehand, while we need not have prior knowledge to infer from the shape of a stone that it 
qualifies for (affords) being thrown through the window of our fractious neighbour’s house. 
Semantic knowledge is often but not always required in finding object affordances. Suffering 
semantic dementia
89
 might lead to our failure in identifying a staple gun to be the right kind of 
thing to staple sheets of paper, while it need not hinder us in inferring from the shape of a 
shopping cart that it can be pushed by clasping the handle bar. In other words, one can 
distinguish between bottom-up and top-down affordances. In the former case, an object might 
afford states, processes, or activities to a perceiver/conceptualizer with his/her present 
purposes solely on the basis of its recognizable features without the involvement of semantic 
memory (cf. Craighero et al. 1996, Hodges, Spatt & Patterson 1999, Hodges et al. 2000). In 
the latter case, affordances of objects depend (besides the present purposes of the 
perceiver/conceptualizer) on prior knowledge (i.e., entrenched knowledge through long-term 
potentiation) about their functions which are not necessarily perceivable (cf. Tyler et al. 2003, 
Martin 2007). It is, however, possible to infer from the perceivable features of a staple gun 
alone that I can hit someone with it, if this was my goal. I might even infer from a multimodal 
analysis of a knife that it can be used for cutting, given the respective purposes. For this, I 
need not have an entirely intact semantic memory. The distinction between these two types of 
affordances is of importance because it grants patients of semantic dementia preserved means-
end rationality on the basis of bottom-up affordances. That means, as illustrated in Figure 
3.10, they can conceptualize and actualize action chains involving objects in order to put 
superior purposes into effect, if the task is sufficiently simple (cf. Hodges, Spatt & Patterson 
1999).  
Bottom-up affordances need not even depend on intentions to act. Craighero et al. (1996) 
have shown that neuronal activation patterns point to the fact that objects afford “action” to 
observers even in the absence of their intention to act. Strictly speaking, this is not action but 
behavior then, namely spontaneous behavior or a reaction. Interestingly, however, these 
bottom-up affordances depend on the body position of the perceiver relative to the object in 
question (cf. Tucker & Ellis 1998). According to Tucker and Ellis, the presence of bottom-up 
object affordances depends on whether the object is in the right position for actualizing 
movement schemas toward it, e.g., for grasping it, relative to the perceiver’s position. If it is 
not, e.g., because it is inadequately oriented, it does not afford movement toward it, indicated 
by lack of the respective neuronal activation patterns. “Being in the right position” can thus be 
defined relative to egocentric space within reach, and this points to an association between 
egocentric space (“some object is directly in front of me”), proprioception (“what can I 
manipulate given the length, agility, and position of my limbs”) and bottom-up affordances. 
In fact, this is the connection Norman (2002) has tried to establish. Strictly speaking, he has 
tried to unify the concepts of affordances and the dorsal stream (underlying egocentric space). 
Presumably, the bottom-up affordances of an object in egocentric space and within reach 
(which afford behavior schemas towards it; see above) may concur with top-down 
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 Progressive loss of knowledge about the meaning of words, the functions or significance of objects due to 
deterioration of brain regions which could not be clearly identified, yet (cf. Ward 2006: 73). 
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affordances of the same object in this circumstance, namely in the case when one plans an 
action toward this object (thereby actualizing one of its many possible affordances) which is 
not identical with what it bottom-up-affords: It could be that the cake lying in front of me on 
the table bottom-up-affords (my reaction or spontaneous behavior of) grasping it and putting 
it into my mouth, while at the same time it might be my altruistic intention to push it across 
the table to offer it to my colleague. 
Naturally, not anything perceived or conceptualized is perceived or conceptualized as being 
within actual reach, and therefore it does not exhibit bottom-up affordances as a function of 
its position relative to the perceiver/conceptualizer in egocentric space. I would argue, 
therefore, that things out of reach for a conceptualizer (i.e., concepts as simulated perceptions) 
may nevertheless top-down-afford states, processes, and activities in which they may stand, 
namely either as simulated activity toward these objects (involving a viewer-centred reference 
frame) or as simulated perception of a relation between objects (involving an object-centred 
reference frame).
90
 This can be accomplished thanks to the features to which the 
conceptualizer attends and which restrict the range of states, processes, and activities in which 
the thing(s) in question might stand.  
Because the present work deals mainly with conceptualization underlying verbal interaction 
for which intact conceptualization performance is required, the term “affordance” will be used 
here for top-down affordances, since concepts are what underlies linguistic
o
 sign-use. If 
reference to bottom-up affordances will be necessary, it will be explicitly mentioned. The 
three types of affordances I have introduced are depicted in Figure 3.11 below. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.11: Bottom-up and top-down affordances 
(V: viewer; C: conceptualizer; o1-n: objects; dashed lines: visual or conceptual, i.e., simulated 
visual, field) 
 
Figure 3.11 shows that there are three types of affordances: First, there are bottom-up 
affordances affording a reaction (or spontaneous behavior) of the viewer V towards object o. 
This is case (a). O is construed here in relation to V, i.e., within his/her visual field and within 
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 I take Young (2006) to be compatible with this view. In his article, the author extends the proposal of Norman 
(2002) in such a way that not all affordances are neuronally situated in the dorsal stream but also in the ventral 
stream which serves allocentric space (allocentric “where”) and object features (“what”; see section 3.1.3.4 and 
Figure 3.7). This fits well with my proposal according to which it is the features of objects (ventral stream) 
which restrict the range of relations (i.e., what they afford) of objects. 
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egocentric space (viewer-centred reference frame). This type of affordance does not include 
retrieving knowledge from memory, because the object in question affords some circumstance 
by means of its most salient recognizable features alone (see section 3.1.4.1 on salience).  
Now, type (a) affordances might concur with type (b) affordances. This latter type exhibits 
nearly the same setting, but the object’s affordances are part of purposeful action. One could 
say that in (b) V/C (who is both a viewer and a conceptualizer) “exploits” some though not all 
affordances of o. He/she does this by conceptualizing an act (or action chain) toward o, 
thereby “calling upon” those pertinent features of o which condition o’s involvement in this 
kind of action. At the same time other features of o which are irrelevant for V/C’s purposes 
are discarded. A circumstance where (a) and (b) concur about which affordances are 
actualized would be constituted by a mismatch between those affordances based on the most 
salient features (= (a)) and those based on features pertinent to V/C (= (b)).  
Case (c) depicts how affordances work in the absence of stimuli. The conceptualizer simulates 
a viewing perspective on o1, but o1 is not construed in relation to C but to other o’s, i.e., the 
objects in the simulated visual field are construed in relation to each other, i.e., within an 
allocentric space and an object-centred reference frame. Those features of o1-n which allow 
them to afford certain states, processes, and activities in which they may stand are those 
pertinent features retrieved from memory in the course of simulating the perceptual 
experience underlying the concept of o1-n 
Summing up, objects afford states, processes, and activities in which they may stand to a 
perceiver/conceptualizer, whereby particular features of objects are singled out by means of 
paying attention to them (but not to others) on the basis of salience or pertinence, so that the 
range of circumstances in which the objects may stand is restricted by salient or pertinent 
features. Observing that different features of (kinds of) objects are involved in different (kinds 
of) states, processes, and activities, and constituting such differences through one’s own acts 
and instances of behavior leads to the conceptual dissection of features which different (kinds 
of) objects exhibit. This last aspect also fits in the greater picture of gaining knowledge by 
means of observational learning and learning by doing:
91
 The fact that people’s actions toward 
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 Observational learning can be characterized as follows: If an organism perceives that the actualization of a 
behavior schema by another organism in some circumstance is reinforced and if this perception leads to an 
increase in the association strength between the behavior schema and the circumstance in the perceiving 
organism, then the behavior schema has been conditioned to the circumstance with respect to the perceiving 
organism (cf. Bandura 1965, Kawai 1965 for a possible example of observational learning in monkeys).  
Observational learning is – at least with respect to observed action schemas – necessarily incomplete without the 
subsequent actualization of the action schema by the observer. Someone who watches a basketball player 
shooting nine of ten free-throws into the basket will not learn to actualize the correspondent action schema by 
observation alone. The observed movement schemas of the basketball player are underspecified in the sense that 
the observer simply does not experience by him-/herself how the player controls his muscles and gauges his 
effort. The observer will have to learn to score in basketball by performing the throwing by him-/herself, since 
the “model” provides only partial information about what is necessary to score. We can term this learning by 
doing: Observing action facilitates performing the same action. However, observing action of others and 
actualizing action schemas by oneself seem to inform each other (cf. Bertenthal 1996: 436ff.). Feedback from 
one’s own act allows one to very accurately predict afterwards (on the basis of perceptual information) whether 
others will succeed in engaging in the same task. In contrast, having no feedback from one’s own performance 
and judging only on the basis of leads to lower accuracy in judgment (Franchak, van der Zalm & Adolph 2010, 
Wagman et al. 2008, Thornton & Knoblich 2006). On the other hand, having perceived another person 
actualizing a certain action schema allows one to recognize the relevant, rather global, movement schemas 
necessary to adequately actualize this action schema. In this case, observing another’s action facilitates one’s 
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objects follow sociocultural norms (think of the functions of artefacts, for instance, which are 
mostly obeyed in action) leaves room for the possibility that some of these norms override, or 
thwart, those acts which would otherwise be more “natural” on the basis of the merely 
physical abilities of the actor relative to the object.
92
 In this way, the acquisition of object 
affordances involves sociocultural constraints from the very beginning.
93
 One could go even 
further, remembering that whole cultures are constituted by praxes, and conclude that cultures 
are co-constituted by what objects (top-down-)afford to their members (cf. Sinha 2009 for a 
related idea).
94
 
We have discussed three biases in identification so far, namely salience (a property of the 
stimulus relative to the perceiver), pertinence (an attitude of the perceiver relative to the 
stimulus) and frequency (which relates to affordances; a property resulting from the interplay 
of properties of the stimulus and the perceiver). As will be shown in the following section, the 
way we grasp the crucial concept of causation depends on several of these factors. 
 
 
3.2.1.3 Causality as the enhancement of constant conjunctions and stimulus generalization 
Our everyday interplay and interaction with our environments teaches us that not everything 
that happens depends solely on the features (identified to be) inherent to single objects. An 
apple affords peeling to us, and an apple can actually be peeled, but whether the apple 
actually gets peeled does not depend on the apple alone. Its being “peelable” is only one 
necessary condition of its actually being peeled. Another condition is the presence of an 
object which affords the actualization of a motion/movement schema the result of which is a 
“peeled” apple, i.e., a “peeler”. In such instances we can say that the peeler has “caused” the 
peelable thing to be peeled, simply because we believe that without the presence and 
engagement of the peeler the peelable thing would not have been peeled.  
Above, in the outline of those aspects with respect to which the percept is underspecified, I 
have characterized “cause” as a terminus of reflection, a manner of speaking with respect to 
invariances in the co-occurrence of objects or circumstances. This is yet a vague 
characterization of causation but it is due to the broad applicability of the term in everyday 
usage. Being identified (in perception) or conceptualized (for action) as the object or 
circumstance without which another object or circumstance would not have come about 
seems to be the only attribute which all instances of matters called “causes” have in common 
                                                                                                                                                        
own successful acting – a case of observational learning, but non-sufficient observational learning (cf. Adolph & 
Berger 
6
2006). 
92
 Because learning by doing cannot be expected until the second half of an infant’s first year due to lack of hand 
control (cf. Mandler 2004, 2010), observational learning will be primary at least for this developmental period. 
93
 One need only ponder on the very little number of natural objects (objects which did not undergo poietic acts) 
with which infants and toddlers get into contact in order to get an impression to what high degree the top-down 
affordacnes of objects are prescribed to us by purpose of design. One would expect then a wider range of top-
down affordances of objects for members of praxes with few(er) artefacts who use natural objects to numerous 
purposes. Sinha & Jensen de López (2000) provide evidence that this might indeed be the case. 
94
 The notion of affordances based on pertinence, i.e., top-down affordances, also captures what Folli & Harley 
(2008) attempt to find in the notion of “teleological capability” which they characterize as “the inherent qualities 
and abilities of the entity to participate in the eventuality denoted by the predicate.” (Folli & Harley 2008). This 
characterization seems rather unspecific. One does not know what “qualities and abilities” actually are, what 
counts as “entity” and what as “eventuality”, and whether “inherent” captures features that would fall under 
bottom-up affordances in the present account, or whether they also include top-down affordances.  
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(cf. Lakoff & Johnson 1999: 177). Apart from that the members of the category CAUSE seem 
to exhibit extensive family resemblances (cf. Mervis & Rosch 1975, Wittgenstein 
4
1980).  
Philosophical investigation in causality is old (e.g., Aristotle 1995, Hume 1960, Kant 1998, 
von Wright 1974) and many old ideas – especially Hume’s – have survived into the present 
and into actual psychological models of causality (cf. White 1990, Penn & Povinelli 2007
95
 
for two overviews). We are concerned here with the psychological notion of causality because 
we are concerned with the question of how we perceive and conceptualize causality, i.e., 
causes and effects in order to understand how it is reflected in linguistic
o
 structures.
96
 It is 
important to note that we do not deal here with objective causes (whatever this might be) but 
with those co-occurrences of objects, states, processes, or activities which 
perceivers/conceptualizers treat to be instances of causation in everyday life, as indicated by 
their (verbal) judgments about states, processes, and activities in their lifeworld. As such, we, 
as participants in everyday life, are in a sense naïve with respect to causal relations, since we 
are severely biased in our judgments without being aware of these biases, and we usually do 
not engage in a thorough investigation of what could have been the cause(s) of the 
circumstances unfolding before our eyes. Rather, we simply take as real what we identify and 
conceptualize (see Moskowitz’ (2005: 21) notion of “naïve realism”), although it could have 
been identified and conceptualized otherwise. Therefore, in the above characterization of 
causes as necessary conditions for objects or circumstances the most important aspect is its 
general dependence on someone’s identification and/or conceptualization performance. 
Causes are therefore not objectively given but imposed in a top-down manner. In other words, 
in our everyday verbal interaction we make causal judgments of the type given in (II.1) all the 
time, without having made prior scientific investigations about them. We make causal 
judgments as if causes were present and perceivable in the states, processes, and activities 
unfolding in front of us, although, as has been mentioned, perception is both fallible and 
underspecified with respect to several matters, especially including causation (see above, 
section 3.1.4). Apart from this constructive nature there is a second aspect about causal 
cognition which deserves mentioning, namely the necessity of being able to conceptualize 
counterfactual things, states, processes, or activities, since this is implied in the 
characterization of causation (“an object or circumstance without which another object or 
circumstance would not have come about”).  
We can now approach the question of what it is for humans what we term “causes”. In 
accordance with the programme pursued so far I will assume that causal cognition is 
grounded in our everyday perceptual experiences in our lifeworld (cf. White 1988, 1989, 
2009b). So, what is it that makes the relation between two objects or circumstances not 
accidental but causal in identification? Above, conceptualization was characterized as 
simulated perception, so it is consequent to consider those cues which are treated as critical 
for detecting a causal relation in perception to be critical in conceptualization, too.  
Crucially, states, processes, and activities involve things. We have seen (section 3.2.1.2 on 
affordances) that things and their features and affordances determine the range of states, 
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 This article is questionable in its claims regarding animal cognition (cf. Janich 2010), but it is a fair survey of 
proposals concerning causal cognition in humans. 
96
 See Schaffer (2007) for an overview about ongoing (analytic-) philosophical discussion about “the 
metaphysics of causation”. 
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processes, and activities these things may stand or occur in. So, a state, process, or activity 
spa1 which is a candidate cause of another state, process, or activity spa2 is a candidate cause 
thanks to some feature/s or motion/movement of one of its constitutive things without which 
spa2 did not exist. For detecting relations in egocentric and allocentric space it is necessary to 
recognize something which bears some spatial relation to some other thing. If there were no 
things, there would be no states, processes, and activities. Therefore, one cannot properly state 
that either circumstances or objects are the exclusive constituents of causal relations, i.e., 
instances of causes and effects. Rather, both are constituents.
97
 Because something is round it 
rolls down hills (cause as state, effect as process). That is, this thing affords rolling because it 
is round. Because the wind blows the door slams shut (cause and effect as processes). That is, 
the wind affords blowing and the door affords motion. The door’s affordance is actualized 
because the affordance of the wind is actualized beforehand. Because the milk carton has a 
flat bottom side, is higher than it is long and wide, it stands (cause and effect as states). That 
is, because it has these features the milk carton affords standing. Because the pope is old he 
breaks his femur when he falls (cause as state, effect as process). That is, because the pope is 
a physical body he affords falling. Because his femur is osteoporotic it affords fracturing.  
In principle, the circumstances making up a causal relation are independently describable. 
Hume (1894: 29) states that “[t]he mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed 
cause, by the most accurate scrutiny and examination. For the effect is totally different from 
the cause, and consequently can never be discovered in it.” That means the effect is not 
contained in the cause in the sense of a logical connection, so that the relation between cause 
and effect is not an analytical one, as Kant (1998) would claim (though vetoing Hume). If 
there is no logical relation between causes and effects, what kind of necessity is it I have 
talked about above? In the sections on perception and identification it has been argued that the 
objects, circumstances, and especially the features we know are objects, circumstances, and 
features thanks to our differentiation performances within our lifeworld activities. It has also 
been stated that it is by experience that specific things occur in specific circumstances, 
depending on what they afford. And what they afford depends on the features they are 
identified to exhibit. Object affordances restrict the range of states, processes, and activities 
these objects may stand in. Because our differentiation performance in everyday praxis serves 
practical concerns (purposes and conceptualizing the means to get there) we aim at the 
explainability and predictability of what happens in our environments. Causal cognition must 
therefore also be seen in this context. It serves being capable of acting. Whatever objective or 
logical causality might be, then, it is not the type of concept important here. Rather, we can 
identify the kind of necessity in question as an experientially based necessity which once 
more rests on differences made within our lifeworld activities. Then, what is necessary is that 
the objects involved in the candidate cause of an effect must exhibit those affordances the 
presence of which makes this effect possible at all. And the objects involved in the effect must 
likewise afford what “has been caused” about them.  
 
An instance of causation thus consists in the actualization of mutually dependent affordances 
in both the objects in the cause and the objects in the effect.  
                                                 
97
 This is the reason that I will occasionally talk of objects as causes/effects, and occasionally of circumstances 
as causes/effects. 
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The absence of the respective affordances excludes the possibility that it is an instance of 
causation. The causal relation is in this sense an experientially and practically necessary one. 
In anticipating what is yet to come this can be illustrated by means of our frequently-used 
example (II.1). For Nicole to be identified as the cause of the falling-event involving the milk 
carton it is necessary to know about the fact that Nicole as a human being and as physical 
body affords movement (action and behavior) and exertion of physical force (making contact 
and transmitting force through movement). One also has to know about the fact that the milk 
carton does not afford (self-induced) movement but – because of its physical features – only 
motion. Importantly, the milk carton affords motion only relative to human scale 
(embodiment); for an ant and for another milk carton it would certainly not. If in this visual 
perceptual circumstance nothing else than Nicole and the milk carton move, Jessica is all but 
forced to identify Nicole as the cause of the carton’s falling down.  
It is also this kind of mutual dependence in affordances which allows a characterization of the 
concepts of enabling and preventing (cf. Wolff & Song 2003): Some object o1 can only enable 
some object o2 to actualize some motion schema ms which o2 affords, if otherwise o2’s motion 
would have been prevented by some object o3 which blocks o2’s actualization of the 
respective motion schema because o2’s and o3’s affordances do not combine to produce the 
effect. For illustration imagine a bathtub filled with water and a plug blocking the water’s 
running out through a drain. The water affords a special kind of motion (“running”). Being 
caught in a container (the bathtub) the actualization of this affordance would be made possible 
by an opening (the drain). The drain, however, is blocked by the plug, i.e., the plug prevents 
the water from running out of the bath. Because the actualization of the affordance of running 
of the water is dependent on features of the environment (in this case there being a drain 
affording “passing”, and there not being a plug affording “blocking liquids”), prevention 
depends on the mutal dependence of the affordances of the objects involved. Removal of the 
plug, on the other hand, enables the water running out of the bath. 
Identification/conceptualization of preventers and “enablers” involve an aspect of 
counterfactuality: One can only talk about preventing and enabling if the “actual” affordance 
to be actualized is known, i.e., conceptualized previously. In order to know that in the above 
circumstance something is prevented or something must be enabled, I have to know in 
advance that water actually affords running and the drain passing. 
Note that causality (including prevention and enabling) characterized this way is an entirely 
conceptual matter, i.e., the (visual) percept “contains” no causality, at least not the kind of 
causality discussed here. 
This conception of causality was inspired by the proposal of White (2009a) which aims to 
characterize “the kind of understanding of causality that humans possess” (White 2009a: 
1228). Similar to the programme pursued here, “there is no claim that this understanding 
accurately represents the truth about causality.” (Ibid). In few words, what White proposes is 
that a causal relation is “a generative relation in which a causal power of one thing operates 
on a liability of another thing to produce some sort of outcome under a suitable releaser.” 
(Ibid.). In the “causal power of one thing” we find the actualization of an affordance of the 
thing involved in the (candidate) cause. And in the “liability of another thing” we find the 
actualization of the affordance of either undergoing some motion or change by the thing 
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involved in the effect or of preventing it because of the liability being too great relative to the 
causal power. The causal relation exists only relative to the mutually dependent actualizations 
of affordances of both objects (“the causal power of one thing operates on a liability of 
another thing”). Contact is what provides transmission of force from one thing to the other 
and what releases the power of the causing thing to result in the outcome of the entire causal 
relation. If the causal power of a stone hitting a window is high enough in relation to the 
latter’s resisting liability, then its causal power is released and produces the outcome, e.g., a 
broken window.  
This does not mean that the mere existence of affordances suffices for the occurrence of any 
instance of causation. Rather, judging retrospectively whether two given relations are causally 
connected depends on their exhibiting the appropriate mutual affordances. If they do not, this 
could not have been an instance of causation. If they do, they are candidates for a causal 
relation. If in addition transmission of force is identified or conceptualized, this increases the 
probability that the relation is judged as a causal one. 
There is obviously a problem with such a “causal power” and “liability” account as presented 
here. Whether or not something is identified/conceptualized as a causal relation depends on 
whether some transmission of power through contact is identified/conceptualized. Causality 
assessments remain precarious and rest on very limited evidence. In the case of identification 
in perception, causality assessments are always directed backwards in time, i.e., they are 
retrospective. An instance of causation will most probably be identified, for instance, if the 
candidate causes and effects perceived can be identified as actualizations of mutually 
dependent affordances in the things involved in the respective states, processes, or activities, 
and if contact can also be identified. Now, in many cases in which we make causal 
assessments, transmission of power is simply not perceived, although contact is perceived. In 
other words, while contact is visually perceivable, transmission of power is not. That means, 
unless it is the “I” which exerts or undergoes physical force, transmission of power is not 
perceived. Subtract transmission of power from two events, e.g., the flying of a stone against 
a window and the window shattering, and what you get is the mere conjunction of two events 
with the temporal and spatial priority of the former relative to the latter. Nothing in both 
events makes the relation a causal one, even if this conjunction was a constant one, i.e., if 
windows always shattered when a stone flew against them (cf. Hume 1894). Hume presumes 
that causation is not directly observable. Because causation was introduced as a manner of 
speaking, such an assertion would constitute a category mistake (causes are not things). But 
one could say that it is not directly observable whether there exists a causal relation between 
some states, processes, or activities. However, one could reply that it can in fact be directly 
observed. One need simply replace the window in the above example involving the flying 
stone by oneself and one will know that transmission of power is perceivable by the self. 
Then, the primal experience underlying our concept of causation might lie in our haptic 
system and the sensation of force (cf. Lederman & Klatzky 2009 on haptic perception, cf. 
Johnson 1987: 43 in the context of image-schemas).  
 
“In essence the haptic system, comprising skin pressure sensors and articular kinaesthesis […] 
registers information about the exertion of force and its effect on the object acted on […]. [T]he 
haptic system functions as a mechanoreceptor system […], that is, it detects the mechanics of 
interactions [i.e., interplay – SK] between the body and objects. As such it provides the 
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fundamental data for causal understanding in terms of not contingencies but forces, specifically 
forces involved in actions on objects.” (White 2009b: 155) 
 
We can once more appeal to evidence from dissociations to ponder the plausibility of a primal 
haptic experience of physical forces. In cases of sensory neuropathy the respective patients 
lack proprioception to certain degrees. To name but one case, Cole and Sedgwick (1992) 
report on a patient suffering from neuropathy from the neck downwards. He performs poorly 
in tasks in which estimating and gauging physical force is necessary and stands 
representatively for this clinical picture which entails severely impaired causal cognition (see 
also Lafargue et al. 2003). Contrasting everyday performance of the congenitally blind and in 
patients of neuropathy indicates that while vision is expendable for intact causal cognition, 
haptics is not.  
For assessing the causal status of stones flying through windows or girls knocking over milk 
cartons on the basis of visual perception this means that identifying this relation as causal 
instead of accidental involves an analogical application of one’s own primal haptic experience 
of transmission of force to the case of an (only) visually perceived process or activity. Before 
explaining what is meant here by “analogy” it has to be pointed out first what other cues 
generally accompany the primary haptic experience of exerting/undergoing physical force: 
Michotte (1963) presented visual stimuli (moving rectangles) to probands showing one 
rectangle A moving towards another rectangle B with constant speed, then coming into 
contact with B and stopping, while rectangle B moves off in the same direction as formerly A 
with constant speed. We have here the case of unperceivable transmission of force from A to 
B (actually, because it was presented on a computer display there was no force at all), while 
there is contact. Probands reported that A caused B to move which has come to be known as 
the “launching effect”. However, the launching effect disappeared if the contact was too long, 
i.e., if too much time passed between A and B’s contact and B’s moving off (between 100 and 
150 milliseconds; cf. White 1988: 38, Chaput & Cohen 2001). That means absence of 
temporal contiguity results in probands’ identification of two causally independent events. 
Consequently, transmission of force is under normal circumstances accompanied by temporal 
contiguity of the processes/activities in question. But while the former implies the latter, the 
presence of the latter is contingent on that of the former. 
Likewise, the launching effect disappears, if the spatial gap between A and B is too great 
(>10mm), or if the direction of B’s motion after contact with A is too dissimilar from that of 
A (cf. White 1988: 39, Leslie & Keeble 1987). There is then also a spatial contiguity present 
when there is transmission of power, whereas the presence of the latter is again contingent on 
the former. Another condition for the occurrence of the launching effect is, roughly spoken, 
the identity or similarity of what is transmitted before and after the contact (e.g, a ball A 
rolling in a straight line against another ball B will normally not cause B to move off in a zig-
zag-pattern).  
All in all, the cues in visual perception accompanying transmission of power which is 
originally only haptically perceivable can be summarized in the so-called “contingency 
model” (cf. Cheng 1997: 367). It captures the induction process in a perceiver who faces 
several perceptual clues eventually indicative of causation. In doing so he/she has to “decide” 
whether this is an instance of causation or not. What the perceiver does in such cases is to 
calculate the contingency between a candidate cause and an effect by subtracting the 
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probability of the effect given the absence of the candidate cause from the probability of the 
effect given the presence of the candidate cause. The probability values depend on the 
frequency of co-occurrence of the effect with the candidate cause. The more positive the 
resulting difference is the more probably is the candidate cause a “generative” cause. The 
more negative it is the more probable it becomes that a cause is a “preventive” cause. If it is 
neither positive nor negative but nearly zero, it is more probable that the relationship is 
noncausal.
98
 In the case of non-perceivable transmission of force as is the case with all visual 
perception, we must rely on cues for causality which are always contingent on transmission of 
force. Most importantly, however, such covariation data say actually nothing about there 
“really” being a causal relationship or not. 
Although there is little conclusive research on the neuronal substrates of causal cognition, I 
would like to propose the following: Perception – including identification – of a relation as a 
causal one involves neuronal activity associated with identification of temporal and spatial 
contiguity, identity of what is transmitted and – most importantly – the neuronal substrates of 
haptic perception (which also knows a “what” and “where” pathway, cf. Lederman & Klatzky 
2009). The respective neuron populations fire synchronously.  
 
Now, in identifying a causal relation in the absence of haptic perception it is conceivable that 
those synchronously firing neurons also re-enact (simulate) the primal haptic perception of 
physical force alluded to above, despite the actual absence of a haptic stimulus. This would 
constitute a very similar kind of simulation as with conceptualization as simulated visual 
perception (see section 3.2.1). 
 
Neuronally, the question of whether or not a tactile perception of physical energy is 
neuronally re-enacted is critical with respect to the question of whether or not some relation is 
identified/conceptualized as a causal one. If the identification of causality or non-causality is 
linguistically
o
 expressed and thus made intersubjectively accessible, this may surface as a 
causative alternation, e.g., The window breaks vs. The stone breaks the window.  
It is very well possible that causal assessments subserve practical concerns, as defined in the 
subsequent section. That means judging some relation to be an instance of causation or not 
could be utilized as means to certain purposes. It follows from this that causal judgments can 
be used strategically, as an instance of action. On the other hand, such strategic 
identification/conceptualization processes can possibly be routinized to a high degree, i.e., 
they might be performed even in the absence of one’s awareness of one’s current goals and 
interests. In other – and presumably numerous – cases such processes are clearly instances of 
behavior, namely where the neuronal activities associated with causal cognitive activities are 
conditioned to certain stimuli. It is possible that many causal judgments – despite the absence 
of haptic “evidence” and the presence of only visual information – rely on stimulus 
generalization, i.e., there might be firing of neuronal populations specialized for tactile stimuli 
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 ΔPi = P(e|i) – P(e|ī), where P is probability, e is effect, i is candidate cause (present) and ī is candidate cause 
(absent). 
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even in the absence of these stimuli, resulting in causal judgments on the basis of insufficient 
cues (cf. White 1989).
99
  
 
Applying the considerations about causal cognition to our scenario in (II.1) this means that 
Sarah and Jessica are forced by the perceptual evidence to infer a causal relation between 
Nicole and the milk. There is spatial and temporal contiguity between Nicole’s movement and 
the motion of the milk carton, there is contact between them, and what is transmitted is 
straight movement/motion. Causality must nonetheless be inferred because there are 
insufficient cues: Sarah and Jessica lack tactile experience of the contact. However, 
affordances and causality do not account for the different judgment of the event by Sarah and 
Jessica. So the next sections take into consideration some general principles that govern the 
most important cognitive operations people make. These principles will tell us why Nicole’s 
knocking over the milk can be judged in fundamentally different ways.  
 
 
3.2.1.4 The actor/cognizer as (limited, self-serving) pragmatic  
The above treatment of identification and conceptualization, the central involvement of the 
notion of pertinence, and the dependence of feature identification and conceptualization on 
several biases reveal the most important characteristic of human conceptual activities: They 
subserve practical concerns.  
 
This means identification and conceptualization subserve our purpose-driven interplay and 
interaction within and with our environments and in conformity with the sociocultural praxes 
we live in.  
 
 This is the point where we turn towards a new subcompetence, 
action/attribution, and where – regarding our research-programmatic 
model – we leave the domain of cognitive psychology in order to turn 
to rather philosophical, sociological, and social psychological 
considerations. 
Peter White (1984) calls individuals within the lifeworld “laypersons”. Laypersons are 
opposed to experts. For our purposes experts would be, for instance, those individuals 
engaged in the scientific disciplines identified in sections 2.2.5/2.2.6 which are relevant for 
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 Covariation and contiguity information, coupled with stimulus generalization could be the factors underlying 
the learnability of the concept of causation, thus making a nativist conception of causal cognition unnecessary 
(cf. Saxe & Carey 2006: 162ff.; cf. Spelke 1994 for an example of a nativist conception of knowledge, including 
causal knowledge). 
The idea that our concept of exertion of force consists in the simulation of a tactile experience as added to, or 
complementing, a visual (spatial) experience, might be similar to what Mandler (2010: 35ff.) has in mind when 
she claims that some of Johnson’s (1987) image schemas are not primitives (for schemas see sec. 3.3.4). In 
particular, Mandler proposes that at least Johnson’s image schemas of FORCE, RESISTANCE, and BALANCE are 
derivable in the following way: Only the spatial base underlying these claimed image schemas are indeed image 
schematic and can thus be captured by other, already existing spatial image schemas, like TRANSFER OF MOTION 
and others. Then, “force is a spatial concept that becomes enriched by becoming associated with certain sensori-
motor experiences” (Mandler 2010: 36), and similar with RESISTANCE and BALANCE. I have attempted to trace 
those “certain sensori-motor experiences” back to a primal experience of pressure and stimulus 
overgeneralization. If I have understood Mandler properly, our considerations are compatible. 
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the subject-matter of this book. If one additionally takes their practical orientation into 
account, this makes laypersons “pragmatists”, in White’s terms.100    
According to White (1984: 333f.) being a pragmatic layperson includes the 
 
“primary orientation […] to the practicalities of living. This involves a large number of practical 
concerns that vary in salience across persons and across situations. […] Processes of judgment, 
attribution, and inference are engaged in because of, to contribute to, and in a context of practical 
concerns. Outcomes of such processes are optimal when they satisfy whatever practical concerns 
are salient at the time.” 
 
Note that White uses the term “salience” here in a way which was reserved here for 
“pertinence” above (sec. 3.2.1.1). By “concerns”, one can understand purposes, i.e., goals and 
interests as defined above (section 2.4; see also White 1984, fn. 1). Individuals in their 
lifeworlds might not even be aware of the pragmatic character of their cognitive activities, and 
this fact complements their naïve realistic attitude: People hold true what they perceive, 
without being aware of the pragmatic bias of their judgmental processes in identification and 
conceptualization (and, as will be shown, attribution). This is an important point because if we 
want to know more about people’s verbal interactive competence, we need not know about 
how things actually are but about how people believe things are. It is how people 
conceptualize things to be what they code linguistically
o
, not how things actually are. It took a 
long time for such non-objectivist semantics to become acceptable (cf. Lakoff & Johnson 
1980, 1999, Jackendoff 1983, 2002: 294ff., Talmy 2000, I, ch. 1, Langacker 2008a). As 
outlined in the introduction to part I of this book, Cognitive-Functional Linguistics has risen 
in the last decades, filling in this blank.  
In other scientific disciplines, taking in perspective perception and action for understanding 
people’s action and behavior was accepted earlier, and the mistake of viewing human 
cognition as a mirror of nature was not made. Perhaps one could say, for instance, that 
branches of sociology and social psychology did not adopt a computational theory of mind, so 
they escaped the mirror-of-nature fallacy. Human action and behavior are motivated, and it is 
their motives which influence and bias cognitive activities, so it is impossible for concepts to 
be “realistic” in the sense of corresponding in a 1:1 manner to the things in our environments 
– as illustrated by the biases characterized so far. 
Viewing the cognizer, i.e., the perceiver and/or conceptualizer, as a pragmatic also runs 
counter to the tendency in branches of social psychology to treat him/her as a lay scientist. 
Harold H. Kelley was a leading researcher in the field of causal attribution, i.e., in a field the 
subject-matter of which is highly relevant for our present purposes, namely uncovering the 
biases and mechanisms underlying perception and conceptualization that enter language 
structures. Following Fritz Heider (1958), Kelley (1973) proposed that  
 
“the man in the street, the naïve psychologist, uses a naïve version of the method used in science. 
Undoubtedly, his naïve version is a poor replica of the scientific one – incomplete, subject to bias, 
ready to proceed on incomplete evidence, and so on. Nevertheless, it has certain general properties 
                                                 
100
 But stricto sensu, “layperson as pragmatist” is a contradictio in adjecto insofar as a pragmatist is a 
representative of a pragmatist philosophical position and as such the exact opposite of a layperson. Again, the 
difference between object- and meta-language has to be respected. Terming the layperson a “pragmatic” 
presumably fits the intended meaning better. 
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in common with the analysis of variance [for making causal attributions – SK] as we behavioral 
scientists use it.” (Kelley 1973: 109) 
 
According to the lay scientist view, people on the street try to understand what happens 
around them by employing scientific methods (in certain ways poorly). Although one could 
consider it idle to evaluate the adequacy of a term like “lay scientist”, I would argue that its 
application is indeed inadequate and that this has important consequences for the theory 
proposed here. Concerning the former claim, we are not lay scientists because we do not 
employ scientific methods in conceptualization. Research in social psychology (for overviews 
cf. Kunda 
5
2002, Smith & Mackie 
2
2000, Moskowitz 2005, Aronson, Wilson & Akert 
7
2010, 
see also Hilton 1990) and research on naïve physics (cf. McCloskey 1982, 1983) in the last 
decades has uncovered systematic shortcomings in our physical and psychological reasoning 
performances. According to White (1984: 336), 
 
“[t]he errors made by subjects in human inference research are real but they occur because 
laypeople aspire to a set of standards different from those of logic. Lay inferential procedures are 
designed for information of the type and structure that is encountered in everyday reality; and 
independently of that, selection of inference or judgment is guided by pragmatic rather than by 
logical criteria. Subjects may not care, for example, to make an inference that implies an improper 
grasp of social reality. When common sense and logic conflict, common sense will win for 
practical reasons.” 
 
For the adequacy of the characterization of the “man on the street” as lay scientist this means 
that  
 
“[b]oth logical and scientific methods are unsuitable for the layperson. Scientific methods are only 
optimal to the extent that they are practical, and for laypeople under the circumstances of everyday 
life they are generally not.” (White 1984: 338) 
 
In what follows I will argue for the person on the street – I will call him/her actor/cognizer 
from now on because he/she perceives, conceptualizes, behaves, and acts within a 
sociocultural praxis – as pragmatic and against him/her as lay scientist. In order to do so I will 
present some evidence in favour of the former and some evidence against the latter. I will then 
show how being a pragmatic shapes one’s attribution and judgment performance and how 
some residual determinants in identification and conceptualization can be deduced (see the list 
in section 3.1.4). 
The exemplary cases I want to present in favour of the actor/cognizer-as-pragmatic view 
concern (a) self-serving attributions, (b) the attempt to attain closure in aid of predictability in 
spite of insufficient data, and (c) scientifically inadequate strategies in hypothesis 
confirmation.
101
 Further arguments against the lay scientist view are (d) the correspondence 
bias, (e) the preference of efficiency over accuracy, and (f) the significance of the to-be-
judged person for identification.
102
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 These are only examples of the astonishing shortcomings in human judgment and attribution performance, 
especially when it comes to other people. Kunda (
5
2002) provides a comprehensive overview over them. There 
is no a priori reason why these limitations in human understanding should be restricted to the social domain. 
Quite the contrary, as for instance McCloskey’s (1982, 1983) and Smith & Casati’s (1994) research shows. It 
extends quite consequently to the “mere” physical domain (see also Bertamini, Spooner & Hecht 2005). 
102
 For further arguments see White (1984: 335f.). 
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(a) One important dimension in attribution, i.e., in imposing causal relations on percepts, is to 
evaluate whether someone (say, some woman) acted the way she did (e.g, she writes an essay 
indicating a positive/negative attitude towards Kim Jong Un) because of a personal stable 
disposition (e.g., she is pro/anti Kim Jong Un) or because of a situational factor (e.g., she was 
forced to write the pro/anti essay) (cf. Heider 1958 on “internal” and “external” attributions; 
Jones & Harris 1967 on this specific task (with Fidel Castro, not Kim Jong Un)). Confronted 
with the question of whether the woman was pro or anti Kim Jong Un, and given the belief 
she had had free choice to write the essay, most people would say that she was pro Kim Jong 
Un, if she wrote the pro essay, and against him, if she wrote the anti essay. This is not 
surprising. However, when asked what people think is the true attitude of the woman, and 
given the information that she was forced to write the essay, people did not refrain from 
giving the answer that corresponds to what the woman wrote – although they knew she had no 
choice but to write pro or against the dictator. What people do in this task is to severely 
underestimate the power of the situation (external factors) and to overestimate personal 
dispositions (internal factors). This effect is called the “correspondence bias” (cf. Gilbert & 
Malone 1995). There is, however, one condition under which the situation factor is not 
underestimated.  
 
This condition relates to the so-called “actor/observer difference” (cf. Jones & Nisbett 1972, 
Moskowitz 2005: 275ff., Aronson, Wilson & Akert 
7
2010: 139f.). Linguists might rather 
recognize effects of the person hierarchy in it (cf. Silverstein 1976, Bickel 2010). The 
correspondence bias is absent, if the to-be-judged action is that of oneself, i.e., the actor or 1
st
 
person. It is present, if the action in question is that of someone observed, i.e., a 3
rd
 person 
(but see below for further factors).  
 
In other words, our attribution would be quite different in the Kim Jong Un experiment, if we 
were personally concerned. It would not occur to anybody sane to attribute to himself a 
positive attitude towards Kim Jong Un solely on the basis of an essay one has written under 
external pressure. Imagine holding social, liberal, and democratic opinions belongs to your  
self-concept, i.e., the things you know, and know to belief, wish, fear etc. about yourself (cf. 
Aronson, Wilson & Akert 
7
2010: 150; Smith & Mackie 
2
2000: 104). Then you expect 
yourself to act accordingly. If you do not, this threatens your self-esteem, whereby “self-
esteem = success : pretension” (James 1890, I, 310). If you know, or reassure, or admit that 
you could not have done otherwise because something about the situation forced you to do 
what you did, and that it was not your personal disposition that made you do it, then neither 
your self-concept nor your self-esteem are threatened. According to Aronson, Wilson & Akert 
(
72010: 141; my emphasis), “when people’s self-esteem is threatened, they often make self-
serving attributions.  
 
To put it simply, these attributions refer to our tendency to take credit for success (by making 
internal attributions) but to blame others or the situation (by making external attributions) for 
our failures […].” (See also Gould & Sigall 1977, Brehm & Aderman 1977, Zuckerman 1979, 
Jonas, Stroebe & Hewstone 
52007: 168ff.). We can substitute “success” and “failures” by 
“accomplishments” and “misaccomplishments” to bring this more in line with our action 
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theory. In fact, what I will call the accomplishment/misaccomplishment difference is another 
determining factor in how actors/cognizers close their underspecified percepts (and concepts) 
by means of attribution (see 3.2.3/3.2.4.). 
 
Concerning the actor/cognizer, taking credit for accomplishments and blaming others for 
misaccomplishments as a habit in the scientific circus would not be very courteous. In 
everyday life it is quite common (cf. Sagatun & Knudsen 1982)). 
(b) In section 3.1.3.3 I introduced the law of closure in the context of sensation. It states that 
in sensation missing elements are “filled in”, if this yields a “good” shape then (cf. 
Wertheimer 1923).  
 
We can observe a similar effect in our causal judgments, a large-scale law of closure, as a 
manner of speaking. 
 
According to the large-scale law of closure, there is a need for closure in human identification 
processes. That means because the world is in constant flux, causal relationships, beginnings 
and ends of processes and activities are mostly imposed on what we perceive. We perceive 
events the beginnings of which (their causes) we did not perceive, and we also do not 
necessarily perceive their ultimate outcomes. In trying to evaluate the causes of some 
recognized process we search for a possible cause of the motion in our visual field. If we 
identify a plausible cause, we stop seeking. In certain circumstances, any explanation will 
suffice (cf. Moskowitz 2005: 215ff.). The need for closure is a need for structuring one’s 
environment, for removing ambiguity and uncertainty from one’s environment by giving an 
explanation to what is where around one. Structuring one’s environment in this way makes 
action planning possible. If there is nothing predictable around us, it is impossible to plan our 
own movements in our environments. Bringing to closure what is happening around us is an 
effective strategy for being capable of acting at the expense of accurate causal judgments (cf. 
Moskowitz 2005: 364ff.). Systematically ignoring alternative explanations in favour of one’s 
capability of action is a clear indicator of practical concerns. Action serves goals and interests. 
A scientist has to evaluate concurring explanations for a phenomenon and being satisfied with 
any one explanation is inadequate even for a lay scientist. 
(c) If scientists want to know whether their data are compatible with their hypotheses, they 
look where the data fit the predictions of the hypotheses and they look where the data possibly 
contradict those predictions. Actors/cognizers in everyday life do not. They rely on a strategy 
usually called “positive test strategy” (Klayman & Ha 1987). If people have prior hypotheses 
or expectations about something to-be-identified, they search the perceptual data only for the 
evidence that fits their hypotheses and expectations. Negative evidence is not taken into 
account (cf. Kunda 
52002: 112ff. for the relevant case studies). To use Kunda’s example for 
illustration, imagine a single woman you know. Imagine further a friend of yours tells you he 
is interested in meeting someone. The woman should be extraverted, i.e., “friendly, outgoing, 
and comfortable around other people” (Kunda 52002: 112). Your task in this scenario is to 
evaluate whether he would like the woman you know, i.e., whether she is extraverted (this 
question functioning as hypothesis or expectation here). An accurate judgment would include 
finding evidence and counter-evidence.  
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“It turns out, however, that we usually do not conduct such a balanced search for evidence. Rather, 
our searches tend to be one-sided. Most people would try to determine whether their friend is an 
extravert by seeking mostly evidence that she is in fact extraverted, and would not look nearly as 
hard for evidence that she might suggest the opposite.” (Kunda 52002: 112) 
 
(d) In (a) above the correspondence bias was introduced and it has been shown that its 
underlying mechanisms stand in opposition to scientific, or quasi-scientific, standards because 
it serves sustaining our self-concepts. Besides that, its underlying mechanisms are also often 
characterized as originating in the makeup of our perceptual apparatus (cf. Aronson, Wilson 
& Akert 
7
2010: 132ff., Moskowitz 2005: 280ff.). Above we have seen that salience and 
pertinence of stimuli determine the contents of identification and conceptualization. To put it 
plainly, the correspondence bias arises because people and things (the role of traits/features of 
which are overestimated) are far more salient (and pertinent) than the circumstances in which 
they are involved (the role of which is underestimated, cf. Trope & Gaunt 2000), or, to put it 
differently, circumstances are not isolable stimuli (cf. Taylor & Fiske 1975 on the importance 
of perceptual salience).  
(e) In making attributions about people and things, i.e., in inferring unperceivable traits and 
features of people and things, respectively, from what we perceive we apply certain heuristics. 
On closer look, however, these heuristics are rather rules of thumb than statistically adequate 
methods. According to the representative heuristic, for instance, we identify what we perceive 
as belonging to a particular category, if the stimulus is sufficiently similar to the exemplar or 
prototype concept in our memory. The stimulus is seen as representative of the category, then. 
In doing so, we often ignore factors which are also decisive of category membership in 
addition to similarity, especially base-rates. “Base-rate” refers to the frequency of occurrence 
of an instance of a category relative to the frequency of occurrence of instances of all other 
categories. Take the example of professions: The base-rate of bankers in the population is 
higher than that of bomb disposal technicians. Therefore, although some stimulus person 
might in some respect resemble a bomb disposal technician and might be rather dissimilar to a 
banker, base-rate information suggests a higher probability for the person to be a banker. 
Now, people tend to ignore base-rate information in favour of representativeness information 
(cf. Kunda 
52002: 57ff.). This is yet another example of actor/cognizer’s reliance on 
scientifically inadequate methods in favour of heuristics or “rules of thumb”. Actors/cognizers 
face then a problem: Their judgments, attributions, and inferences about what they perceive 
must be accurate enough to make them capable of acting/behaving in their environments. As 
we have seen, their “methods” (if they can be called methods at all) do not conform to 
scientific standards, i.e., they might be inaccurate and result in inappropriate results, thus 
rather hindering instead of facilitating action/behavior. This insufficiency might be due to the 
fact that we have limited cognitive capacities and that we need quick (re-) actions, whereas 
thorough reasoning in aid of higher accuracy would take time.  
 
What we apparently do is therefore to optimize the outcome of our cognitive activities by 
modulating an optimal relation between accuracy (applying adequate methods) and economy 
(put as little effort as possible into the task).  
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In other words, actors/cognizers do neither strive for accuracy nor for economy, but for 
efficiency, i.e., for maximizing both when they conflict (cf. Moskowitz 2005: 173ff.). 
(f) In science, the outcomes of data analyses must not be dependent on positive or negative 
feelings towards the data. Judgments concerning the data must therefore always have an open 
outcome. People judging other people do not adhere to this ideal. Rather, the positivity or 
negativity of judgments regarding some person’s action or behavior seems to be biased by the 
actor/cognizer’s preconceptions about the to-be-judged person in terms of sympathy and 
antipathy, respectively. In this way, for some underspecified percept of an event which might 
be identified either as deserving credit or blame, credit will more likely be attributed to a 
person with which the actor/cognizer sympathizes and blame to one towards whom the 
actor/cognizer feels antipathy (cf. Gould & Sigall 1977, Brehm & Aderman 1977; note, that 
this sympathy/antipathy difference will be shown to interplay with the actor/observer 
difference; see sec. 3.2.3 and 3.2.4).  
In sum, actors/cognizers aim at preserving or enhancing their self-esteem and for cognitive 
efficiency. Both facts fit the characterization of the actor/cognizer as pragmatic, the former for 
obvious reasons, and the latter because efficient processing optimizes one’s capability of 
action/behavior in one’s environment which is clearly a practical concern. Actors/cognizers 
are not lay scientists, since they do not attribute, judge, and infer accordingly. “Attributions 
are made for social and practical purposes, not for scientific or knowledge-gaining purposes.” 
(White 1984: 342). In science, a principle of least effort might be desirable but it is 
appropriate only if results do not suffer from it. Taking into account the above evidence, it 
seems equally reasonable to view the individual in its lifeworld not as a lay scientist but also 
to turn the tables and to view the scientist as a methodologically educated and disciplined 
pragmatic who knows about his/her shortcomings and how to avoid them (cf. Kuhn 
2
1970). 
The above considerations should have made clear that – besides salience, pertinence, and the 
effects of frequency – the character of the actor/cognizer as well constitutes a central factor 
biasing and determining identification, conceptualization, and attribution activities. Being 
subjected to fulfilling practical concerns, being cognitively efficient, and 
preserving/enhancing self-esteem shapes the way we impose specifications on otherwise 
underspecified percepts. In what follows I will attempt to frame the mechanisms underlying 
attribution on the basis of the actor/cognizer as pragmatic. In doing so I will show how the 
factors determining and biasing identification and conceptualization (determinants) bring 
about certain effects in attribution (determinates). In later chapters I will try to relate people’s 
attribution performance to linguistic
o
 structures. For now, Table 3.2 shows the 
“determinants/biases” and “determinates/biased” in identification and conceptualization. 
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Table 3.2: Determinants/biases and determinates/biased in identification and 
conceptualization 
 
Our starting point was the assumption that what we perceive is underspecified with respect to 
several matters that are highly relevant with respect of our interaction and our social living 
together. It is to a considerable degree along matters of personal dispositions, forces of 
situations, purposes, accidents, pertinence, sympathy, antipathy, and so on, that our praxes are 
organized. Adequate identification of our perceptual input is the precondition of our purpose-
rational engagement and our behavior within and towards our environments. Perceptual 
experiences must therefore be brought in line with those differentiations. If this is 
accomplished we attain closure (see above) which in turn makes controllable what happens 
around us in the sense that it becomes partially explainable and predictable (cf. Moskowitz 
2005: 327f.). A state of closure is attained if the perceived relations among the objects in the 
visual field fit prior assumptions, expectancies, interests, or goals. Because actor/cognizers’ 
identification and conceptualization performances are determined by such matters as listed in 
table 3.2 they might not even be aware of the underspecification of what they perceive. 
However, social psychologists have in part uncovered the factors and their interrelations 
(determinants/biases) on the basis of which it is possible to a certain degree to explain and 
predict which specifications are imposed on what is recognized (determinates/biased).  
It must be emphasized that table 3.2 is not intended to suggest straightforward association 
between those elements in the two columns which share a line. Rather, the interplay of a 
particular setting of the factors in the left column determines the respective factors in the right 
column to come about. Another setting in the left column changes the outcome in the right 
column. Before these interrelations will be outlined, action competence (B A4) and action 
understanding (B A2) shall be discussed which are necessary for understanding how the 
interplay of the determinant factors leads to different outcomes in attribution/judgment 
performances of people. 
 
 
3.2.2 Action competence and intersubjectivity 
 In what follows I will outline in what ways the shortcomings of 
human actors/cognizers relate to their attribution performance. This in 
turn shall clarify the puzzle about scenario (II.1): How do Jessica and 
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Sarah come to make different judgments about Nicole’s deed? What 
this means in terms of our research-programmatic model is given in 
Figure 3.12. 
 
 
Figure 3.12: Action, action planning, understanding, and attribution as sub-competences of 
the linking competence that are developed throughout sections 3.2.2 to 3.2.4 
 
 
3.2.2.1 Action competence  
 In section 2.4 I presented an action theory. The differentiations it 
comprises are intended to serve as a terminological guideline, since 
these differentiations are grounded in everyday praxis and therefore 
warrant maximal intersubjective traceability of theoretical concepts 
and claims for their validity. One should therefore understand this 
action theory to be located at the research-programmatic level and as a 
normative manner of speech. It concerns the research programme 
because it deals with the question of how to talk about a subject-
matter instead of with the subject-matter itself. For related reasons it is 
normative: Claims for validity in science cannot be justified by 
empirical research alone. Here and now we are concerned with an 
action theory as a subject-matter on the object-level of the theory, not 
on the research-programmatic level (B A4). It is obvious from the 
scope of the research programme, however, that we cannot leave the 
ground of the research-programmatic action theory when talking about 
what people think action is or is not.  
The most important notions to be dealt with are again action and behavior. Research-
programmatically, they have been characterized in the following way: Behavior concerns 
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those movements the occurrence of which is perfectly explainable and predictable by means 
of natural laws as established by the natural sciences. Action, on the other hand, cannot be 
explained and predicted in the same manner because it can be desisted from. There are no 
laws established, neither by natural sciences nor by humanities, by which action or 
interdependences of action would have ever been predictable. When it comes to the 
actor/cognizer, the person on the street, there are three main differences in his/her concepts of 
action and behavior from the research-programmatic one. First, the actor/cognizer does not 
use measurement devices or conduct experiments; more often than not he/she does not have 
any instruments and methods for doing so. He/she is a scientifically naïve judge and relies on 
rules of thumb (see above). That means he/she might have more or less good reasons for 
making and defending his/her judgments. Second, he/she pursues goals and interests. The 
correspondence or non-correspondence of a recognized state of affairs to his/her goals and 
interests influences his/her judgments. The person on the street therefore faces the difficulty 
of balancing the accuracy of judgment and the pursuit of goals/interests, when they are not 
easily brought in line, i.e., he/she has to get his/her judgments from face-to-face interaction. 
Third, his/her judgments and attributions serve his/her interplay and interaction with things 
and persons in his/her environment; therefore they have practical consequences, not research-
programmatic ones. From these considerations three facts follow:  
First, the person on the street might err and actually does err. Many linguistically
o
 coded 
judgments in everyday praxis remain unchallenged, as I would purport. It is their practical 
consequences which count. Therefore, truth values are primarily something scientists grapple 
with. In (II.1) above Jessica asserts that it was Nicole who caused the milk carton to fall 
down, in particular by means of a using linguistic
o
 form which in German implicates 
deliberate action (cf. Kasper [submitted for publication]). Although her mother controverts 
her assertion and “corrects” Jessica, she could as well have uttered something like “Go, get a 
cloth!” which leaves Jessica’s assertion untouched but takes the blame off Nicole. 
Second, the actor/cognizer might judge irrationally or selfishly. It might be because of a 
recent, non-resolved quarrel that Jessica readily blames Nicole for having caused the milk 
carton to fall down in (II.1) above. She might therefore identify the event in question as an 
instance of a deliberate knocking over of the milk carton. Were she not biased by her 
revengeful feelings (as temporal antipathy), she might have assessed the event differently.  
Third, if one codes one’s attributions/judgments linguisticallyo, i.e., makes them 
intersubjectively accessible, one has to face the consequences of these judgments/attributions. 
Not only does Nicole have to accept the blame for what she has caused (she is blamed by 
Jessica), but Jessica has to take on responsibility for her utterance as well, i.e., her sentencing 
Nicole’s deed (Jessica’s judgment is vetoed by her mother). 
It follows from this that people err and judge irrationally or selfishly with respect to the 
question of attribution of action or behavior to others and themselves (self-serving 
attributions; see above). Someone might attribute action to some other one because of some 
rule of thumb or some practical concern, although one could possibly have shown by adequate 
methods (or effortful reasoning) that this person’s activity was behavior. 
It shall therefore be proposed that the differentiation of action and behavior is not only 
research-programmatically but also psychologically significant. Because of the differences 
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between scientists and pragmatic actors/cognizers mentioned above the criteria for 
distinguishing both notions cannot be identical.  
 
The criterion proposed here by which people in everyday praxis distinguish action from 
behavior is their attributing or non-attributing responsibility to someone for the occurrence of 
some state, process, or activity in question in accordance to the attributional praxis these 
people are part of.
103
 Attribution and non-attribution of responsibility to someone – which 
might be a covert and internal activity – is indicated and intersubjectively traceable only by 
the overt expression of credit or blame, praise and reprimand to others – as (verbal and non-
verbal) action.  
 
Then, what is the knowledge of the scientist about which available method to apply to his/her 
data, that is the knowledge of the actor/cognizer in his/her lifeworld about what the conditions 
are under which to attribute action or behavior to him-/herself or others (i.e., to attribute credit 
or blame to someone, to praise and reprimand someone). As Janich (2001: 25; my translation; 
emphasis in original) puts it, 
 
“acts are ascribed to [zugeschrieben] or imputed on [zugerechnet] us by fellow human beings in 
the following sense: When, for instance, in a throng someone steps on some other person’s foot or 
jostles him with the elbow in the ribs, the decisive criterion for all involved persons is whether this 
happened intentionally [mit Absicht] or accidentally [versehentlich]. This example stands for a 
general distinction which is indispensable for people’s living together. There is then a distinction 
between what is ascribed to a person by his fellow human beings as accomplishment, credit, or 
fault, and what a person could not help doing [wofür diese Person nichts kann].”104 
 
Often, intentionality and/or deliberateness are mentioned as indicators of the presence of 
action (especially in analytic philosophy, cf. Setiya 2010 for an overview). In the account 
pursued here, both notions are methodically subordinated to that of action. That means one 
can characterize what action is without referring to intention/deliberateness but not the other 
way around. To have this illustrated, imagine a scenario in which you observe someone 
holding a hammer in his/her right hand and a nail between his/her left thumb and forefinger. 
He/she holds the nail against the wall and delivers a powerful hit to his/her thumb. According 
to Hartmann (1996: 83; my translation), because we know 
 
“that in such situations something usually should be hung (on a wall), we also know, without 
needing to ask the person about [his/]her intentions, which action was originally intended as an 
appropriate means for doing this (namely hammering the nail into the wall). Attempts are often 
made to explain the distinction between action and behavior with the remark that, in contrast to 
behavior, actions are deliberate or intended movements. This is in fact true, but unfortunately, 
methodically, the term ‘deliberateness’ cannot be defined before the term ‘action’ has been 
explained. Whilst the distinction between action and behavior can be established by means of 
examples without recourse to the term ‘deliberateness’, talk of ‘deliberateness’ does not become 
relevant until it is related to a failed act.” 
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 For reasons of convenience of expression, the phrase “attribution or non-attribution of responsibility to 
someone” should be understood to also include “overtaking or non-overtaking of responsibility” where the 
judging person is also the causer. 
104
 Orienting myself on sociological terminology, I consider ascribe and impute to be synonymous in this 
citation, and both to be synonymous with the term I have used so far, attribute.  
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Neglect of this problem in the psychological literature is noteworthy. Although Hartmann’s 
concerns are questions of the philosophy of science, his considerations are nevertheless 
applicable to a characterization of the person as pragmatic in everyday praxis. Because 
Hartmann conceives of the theoretician (and of himself as a philosopher of science) as a 
participant in a sociocultural praxis and not as an external observer, he is originally in a 
position similar to that of any other of its participants, especially including the person “on the 
street”. The psychologist, the neuroscientist, the philosopher, and the sociologist face the 
problem of how to define the conditions under which intention can or should be attributed to 
someone or not. Similarly, the actor/cognizer “on the street” faces the problem of how to 
decide, given limited positive evidence, whether or not to attribute intention to someone, i.e., 
whether or not to blame someone for what he/she has “done”. Unfortunately, theoreticians 
often forget two things about “intentions”. First, the felicity conditions of the application of 
the term include being able to trace it back to lifeworld differentiations, because otherwise 
there are no means by which claims of validity for its application could be maintained. 
Second, if it can be grounded in lifeworld differentiations, we have to ask under which 
circumstances the actor/cognizer has learned its adequate application. Simply speaking, what 
authority can judge the veridicality of the attributions of (i) the theoretician with respect to 
his/her subject-matter, i.e., some individual, (ii) the lifeworld pragmatic with respect to some 
recognized other individual? The answer is: There would be none if the theoretician-attributor 
and the lifeworld pragmatic-attributor were not themselves participants in a sociocultural 
praxis which provide the criteria for the validity of their claims, i.e., the origin of their 
attribution competence. With this, we have arrived at the question of how we gain the ability 
to understand others’ movements (action or behavior), i.e., to decide – given the respective 
perceptual experience – whether what we have just observed is an instance of action or 
behavior. One need only think of so-called “bodily emission” events (cf. Goldberg & 
Jackendoff 2004: 537), e.g. farting, belching, stinking, and the conditions under which they 
are considered to deserve credit/blame or to be excusable, for a sample of how delicate these 
tasks are in everyday praxis.   
According to Janich (2001: 25), for most action theories, the starting point for reflections on 
the capability of acting is the individual being. A reflection on the conditions of action – of 
which its embeddedness in a cultural praxis (interaction) is part – is therefore missing from 
the very beginning, resulting in the aporia of justifying claims for validity and the origins of 
understanding action at all. We must therefore agree with Janich in saying that any attempt to 
understand human action that does not start out from an already functioning praxis of a 
community is doomed to fail.  
 
In other words, the capability of an individual to act/behave can be understood only if one 
explains it in terms of the genuine commonality of the everyday praxis (see also Mead 1934: 
6f., Abels 
4
2007, ch. 1, Schneider 
3
2008, ch. 3, Abulafia 2008, and other works on symbolic 
interactionism).
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 Symbolic interactionism shall serve here only as an example of a sociological theory which defies 
“individualistic” conceptions of an action theory. It does not broach the issue of claims of validity, however. 
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This praxis is the ineluctable instance for judging any assertion concerning human 
competences. And it seems to be the case in the cultural praxis many of us are participating in 
that there is a lifeworld distinction between what is “intended action”, “guiltlessness”, and 
“negligent action” in jurisdiction. They resemble what has been called “action” (including 
desistance) and “behavior” in the research-programmatic action theory in section 2.4, and 
what could be called “permissive action”, (cf. Janich 2001: 26, Harras 2002), respectively. 
The difference between the terms taken from jurisprudence and those concepts taken from the 
lifeworld lies in the applicability of the latter to any possible instance of movement, whereas 
the former are applied to events with somehow negative outcomes.  
 
“When people in everyday interaction [täglicher Umgang] as well as in the legislative system 
enact these graded differentiations (namely in judging other persons as well as in evaluating one’s 
own deeds) and in doing so accept them, we have to ask next where people get that competence 
from.” (Janich 2001: 26; my translation) 
 
Now, taking these suggestions as a rationale, it would seem that action and behavior are not 
objective notions for actors/cognizers in their lifeworlds. They are learned through praxes of 
attribution. And if that is so, their application in identification, conceptualization, attribution, 
and verbalization has to be acquired, i.e., learned by means of examples and counter-examples 
in our early ontogeny.  
 
“With respect to the actions of the persons closely attached to the child that are executed in its 
presence, the following factors play an important role: demonstration and imitation as well as 
commentaries on what is demonstrated, corrections of what was imitated inaccurately, praise for 
accomplishments of the child etc. That means that demonstrating and imitating are verbally 
conducted by these persons. This attendance when imitating consists in, for example, praise or 
reprimand, encouragement or correction, in short: a positively or negatively sanctioning 
commentary. The child is casually schooled in apprehending and executing those activities which 
are attributed to it as accomplishments or misaccomplishments by their closely attached persons. 
With this, the following appears as a primary and important criterion for the presence of an action: 
(an) action is what is attributed to the actor as credit or fault by other humans. […] Positive or 
negative sanctions therefore refer to success and failure – in the opinion of the sanctioning 
person.” (Janich 2001, 28f.; my translation) 
 
What is crucial here is that the attribution of credit and blame depends on the belief of the 
attributor. Who executed an action, then, or not, depends on who is attributed action or not by 
the actor/cognizer, independently of what might objectively be the case. Credit and blame for 
successful or failed actualizations of actions schemas is, however, not the only evaluative 
dimension here. If it is eventually the purpose of a child to be praised it is a precondition to 
actualize some action schema successfully. As the distinction between successful/failed and 
effective/ineffective with respect to the relation between action schemas and purposes 
implicates (see Figure 2.7), the relation between the successful actualization of an action 
schema and the coming about of the purposed circumstance is a contingent one. That means 
the desired praise might be missing, although the action was successful. It is not until the 
child realizes this contingency that its assessment of its own action is detached from the 
attributions of its closely attached persons. 
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Janich (2006: 80f.) calls this notion of action “ascriptivistic” and opposes it to an 
“authenticistic” one.106 The difference between the two lies in the authority which decides 
whether some movement is to be identified as an instance of action or behavior. By contrast, 
according to an authenticistic conception of action, this authority is the mover himself. An 
ascriptivistic conception of action is based on the assumption 
 
“that every actor[/cognizer – SK] must have had a learning biography within a culturally molded 
action and discourse community [Handlungs- und Redegemeinschaft] in order to have learned 
what he is attributed as credit or blame – as opposed to mere behavior which receives no such 
assessment. […] That means we are attributed by other people, first of all in our learning 
biography, whether or not we act – therefore shall this concept of action be termed ascriptivistic.” 
(Janich 2006: 81; my translation) 
 
Crucially, this does not only concern internal attributions and assessments, i.e., those 
complementing identification and conceptualization, but mainly externalized ones, i.e., those 
conceptualizations which are coded linguistically
o
, since they are intersubjectively accessible. 
As a consequence, before we (in ontogeny) “know” what instances of action and behavior are, 
we are attributed with credit and blame by those nearest us for what we (neutrally spoken) 
“do” (i.e., our movements). Being attributed credit and blame and experiencing praise and 
reprimand for our “action” in childhood (which are real, concrete experiences) means being 
ascribed the competence to conceptualize a circumstance we want to come about (the 
competence to set purposes autonomously), being able to conceptualize alternative 
appropriate (sequences of) acts to bring it about (means-end rationality), and the competence 
to actualize the respective action schema(s) to bring this circumstance about. That means we 
might be treated as intentional and action-competent beings even before we “learn” what 
intentionality actually is (in the sense of Hartmann), namely a manner of speaking about 
invariances in the relation of action schemas to purposes as we have learned them within our 
cultures by observing how our attachment figures judge us or others (by observational 
learning) as well as by their feedback to our attempts to make judgments about others (by 
means of learning by doing).  
 
We must learn what is attributed to us as action and what is not in order to become part of a 
cultural praxis, and within a community there is hardly a way not to learn it. What I have 
called the genuine commonality of everyday praxis is thus the precondition for understanding 
action in general.  
 
To pick up my criticism toward Cognitive-Functional Linguistics from section 2.1.2 again: It 
is precisely at this point, with the distinction between “authenticistic” and “ascriptivistic”, that 
CFL, emphasizing individual cognition, falls short of supra-individual matters of language. 
The autonomy of the pragmatic actor/cognizer consists in his/her competence to conceptualize 
any state, process, and activity he/she wants to come about, avoid, or maintain. This 
competence is presupposed by any member of a sociocultural praxis for any of its members, 
and it is the ineluctable reference point for assessing interactions at all. Rationality of means-
end choice consists in the competence to dynamically conceptualize the means (which 
                                                 
106
 The German terms are “askriptivistisch” and “authentizistisch”. 
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ancillary action schemas to actualize) to a purpose, i.e., to be able to conceptualize the most 
effective means to a purpose, depending on the circumstances of the task (see Figure 2.7: 
relation of action schemas to purposes). Control over one’s own actions based on a “model” 
of one’s environment is clearly part of an action competence and needs to be mentioned, but 
shall not be discussed further. The emphasis rather lies on partially common physical 
substrates for action and perception as outlined above which shall serve as a basis to model a 
knowledge structure in which perception and action are intimately linked.  
 
 
3.2.2.2 Intersubjectivity and understanding action  
 
Understanding an act requires the ability to specify to which purpose the movement (chain) in 
question was considered a means to put into effect. Understanding action in general requires 
the ability to tell apart those movements which are acts and those which are instances of 
behavior on the basis of the attribution praxis enacted within the respective lifeworld.  
 
Identifying (in perception) and conceptualizing someone’s action thus involves extensive 
simulative cognitive activity because in order to identify/conceptualize someone’s actual 
movement as an act toward some purpose the realization of which potentially lies in the 
future, we must prospectively simulate performing what the other is actually performing to 
understand his/her purposes by conceptually simulating bringing his/her purpose about by 
oneself.
107
 We therefore need some knowledge about “typifications of interaction [and 
interplay – SK] patterns which are socially approved ways of solving typical problems […].” 
(Schutz 1956: 75). These typifications take the form of action and event schemas. When I see 
someone standing at a wall, facing it and holding a nail against it with the left hand and when 
this person hauls out with the other arm in which is a hammer, then I can identify that this 
movement is an instance of hammering which is part of the action chain the purposed 
outcome of which is a nail plugged into a wall. For being able to identify the whole action 
chain by simulating its outcome prior to its completion I must have experienced events of this 
type before which have led to an entrenched concept of HAMMERING NAILS INTO WALLS by 
means of the long-term potentiation synaptic connections. Commentaries, previously 
explicated action plans, credit and blame, praise and reprimand accompanying the 
performance could serve as indicators of the outer boundaries of processes and activities for 
an observer, e.g., a child perceiving such an event the first time, thus aiding the development 
of schemas. 
Conceptualizing an action chain in order to understand to which purpose some action is a 
means can only function if this conceptualization takes place from the perspective of the 
observed person. In other words, the act must be conceptualized, i.e., simulated as the one of 
the person who shall be understood. For instance, Ruby & Decety (2001) have shown that 
conceptualizing action of a third person results in a neuronal activation pattern that largely 
overlaps with that of actual first person action. This simulation process is often termed 
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 This simulation might take the form of a mental, or cognitive, simulation, involving activations of regions in 
the premotor cortex which are also activated when some action schema is physically actualized (cf. Rizzolatti 
2005). 
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perspective-taking, a hot topic in sociological theories since decades and having entered 
cognitive sciences rather belatedly (cf. Etzrodt 2003: 208ff. for an overview in sociology, 
MacWhinney 2005 for a resumption of older ideas in cognitive science). Schütz & Luckmann 
(2003: 99) talk about the idealizations of the “interchangeability of perspectives” 
[Vertauschbarkeit der Standpunkte] in this context. It is a theoretical idealization, however, 
because in praxis we do not know to which degree our simulation of another’s action plan 
conceptually resembles the person’s own action plan (note that concepts function modally as 
simulated perception). Possible dissimilarities remain undetected as long as they do not result 
in obvious misunderstandings.  
 
This means complete understanding is an idealization, since the entire overlap of 
conceptualizations of “me” and “you” and “him/her” is – due to differences in concepts and to 
differences in pertinence systems – virtually impossible (see also introduction to chapter 4). 
 
A further indicator for what is to happen in a “person-hammer-nail” scenario could be the 
affordances of the “things” involved for an observer, e.g., a child. Let us assume the child 
knows that self-induced movement and exertion of physical force are affordances of humans, 
and that it has at some time or another examined separately a hammer and a nail or something 
similar in features. Then the child could potentially conceptualize an action based on the 
affordances of these things, namely a person clasping the handle of the hammer and striking 
with the flat face of the hammerhead at the nail head. This is in no way farfetched given the 
fact that hammers and nails are artifacts, the shapes of which exhibit mutual affordances by 
purpose of design. Inferring a relation between them on the basis of their shape is therefore 
only natural.  
However, affordances give no hint as to the purpose of the act. Even if the child knew that the 
hammer thing should strike the nail thing, it could not infer what this is good for. For this, the 
clues (and frequency of observation) mentioned above would be required, namely an 
inescapable lifeworld in which acts are constantly embedded in means-end dependencies and 
where states, processes, and activities are accompanied by mimic, gestural, or spoken 
comments.  
At this point we can return to the sympathy/antipathy difference briefly. So far this difference 
cannot be deduced from the overall framework developed here with regard to perception, 
conception, and action, whereas the notions of salience, pertinence, frequency, the 
actor/observer difference, and the accomplishment/misaccomplishment difference can be 
derived from it. I will attempt to make up for this now.  
 
I would like to propose reducing the sympathy/antipathy difference broadly to the believed 
presence or absence of a shared purpose, respectively. 
 
This in turn can be reconstructed by means of the notions of simulation and 
embodiment/resemblance in the following way: I have claimed above that the default case in 
the “natural attitude” within our lifeworld is that of a person pursuing purposes. At the same 
time we take for granted that other persons are pursuing purposes as well (cf. Schütz & 
Luckmann 2003: 29ff.). Conceptually, purposes – which are either goals or interests – take the 
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form of state, process, or activity concepts, i.e., simulations of perceptions of circumstances. 
Now, a shared purpose is believed to be present when the actor/cognizer believes that the 
concept of the purpose of the person in question matches the concept of his/her own purpose 
and if this person’s actualization of some action schema in question looks to the 
actor/cognizer as if it were the appropriate means to put into effect “their” coinciding 
purposes. What the actor/cognizer has done in this case is to identify someone’s (believed) 
purpose with his/her own purpose. In this sense of “identify”, one could say, the 
actor/cognizer makes one purpose out of two. As a consequence, what applies to one’s 
purpose also applies to the other’s. What is crucial, however, is that the actor/cognizer 
believes, or actually judges the purpose of the person in question to be identical with his/her 
own. It need not factually be identical. (It is identical if both persons have a common purpose 
and know that they do.) Now, his/her belief in identical purposes is what causes the 
actor/cognizer to sympathize with someone with respect to this person’s movement. The more 
incompatible the purposes of both the actor/cognizer and the perceived person become, the 
less sympathy the former brings up for the latter in his/her attribution processes. 
Incompatibility could be thought of as empirical incompatibility and governed by frequency 
and recency. Imagine I want my partner’s and my house wall to become yellow (i.e., the 
house wall being yellow is my goal) and my partner buys red paint. Then I know from past 
experience that buying red paint is most probably not an act which qualifies as appropriate 
means to put the purpose of having a yellow house wall into effect. As a result, I will not 
identify my partner as having the same goal as I do. Incompatibility presumably increases 
with the degree of inappropriateness of some (identified) action schema relative to an 
(attributed) purpose. 
Now, attributing those purposes to other persons that match our own plausibly correlates with 
these persons’ capability and competence of conceptualizing sufficiently similar states, 
processes, and activities as desired outcomes of action as we do. It is possible and plausible to 
assume that we ascribe this capability and competence to beings that share the habits of our 
sociocultural praxes to the highest degree. These beings would therefore most probably be our 
most closely attached persons, i.e., mostly kin, partners, and friends, as well as other human 
participants within our lifeworlds, and so on, maybe quite similarly to the logic of animacy 
hierarchies as they are established in linguistics (e.g., Silverstein 1976, Comrie 1981, Bickel 
2010). The units on such a hierarchy of “resemblance” to the self can thus be identified as 
being socioculturally determined, with the “resemblance” of close others originating in 
similar biographies and joint ventures within a sociocultural praxis the action and attribution 
performances of which are shared by the self (see also section 4.2 on this topic). Descending 
along the hierarchy we find beings that increasingly deviate from that and from our bodies 
and modes of action, thus resembling us less and less. Maybe, such an internalized sense of 
“embodiment” is the reason for our refraining from attributing “we”-intentional states to 
(most) animals and inanimate objects, in the sense that we do not share purposes with them.
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 The idea of treating the animacy hierarchy as a scale concerning the similiarity of an entity to the self is not 
new. To my knowledge, Langacker (1991) was the first. Dahl (2008) makes a similar proposal. However, both 
lack a full-fledged action-theoretic grounding, or reconstruction, of the notion. 
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3.2.2.3 Causes and reasons 
We have reached a point where we can distinguish the factors that influence an 
actor/cognizer’s identification or conceptualization of motion, behavior and action (the latter 
two as instances of movement) and their relation to causation. The following considerations 
rely on most topics discussed in section 3.2. The Figures to follow are organized into three 
“layers”. The uppermost layer represents sensation/identification/conceptualization. The 
middle layer shows how one would talk about the identified/conceptualized events in terms of 
causation. The lowermost layer captures the events in action-theoretic terms. To start with, 
consider Figure 3.13 first: 
 
 
Figure 3.13: Cause attribution in identification/conceptualization with inanimate object 
 
Consider an event, either perceived or freely conceptualized, for instance, a billard ball hitting 
another billiard ball such that the second billiard ball rolls across the pool table (billiard being 
a familiar example for discussions about causality; cf. Hume 1894: 28f., 1960: 164, 
Langacker 
2
2002: 209ff., Dowe 2007). The first billiard ball is recognized as a single object 
(OBJECT1, as a figure in sensation, depicted as circle). Its identified features (on the basis of 
salience and pertinence) restrict the range of states, processes, and activities in which the 
object may stand or occur, i.e., the states, processes, and activities which can actually be 
identified on the basis of the identification of a billiard ball. If the billiard ball cannot be 
identified due to the lack of a concept, its features are inferred on the basis of its overall 
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featural similarity with familiar objects (e.g., tennis or golf balls). If the event is freely 
conceptualized the features and affordances are simulated/re-enacted in the now familiar way. 
Anyway, the range of states, processes, and activities in which the object may stand is 
restricted because the billiard ball affords certain states, processes, and activities on the basis 
of its features. Note that its features are not depicted in the above Figure for the sake of 
simplicity. Affordances are given by ellipses. Among the many affordances of the billiard 
ball, two are actualized, namely MOTION and EXERT FORCE. Their actualization is indicated by 
the solid lines. Non-actualized affordances are indicated by dotted lines. Due to frequent past 
experiences with billiard balls, similar objects, or by inferring its features by analogy, the 
OBJECT1 in question affords MOTION. Because it affords MOTION and not MOVEMENT, it cannot 
move by itself, but must already have received an impulse (indicated by the dotted zig-zag 
line to its left.) Now, the recognized motion and identified exertion of force are directed 
towards another billard ball (indicated by the zig-zag arrow leading to OBJECT2). Because the 
perceiver/conceptualizer of this event “is” not the first billiard ball and cannot experience the 
exertion of force from one billiard ball to the other, he/she simulates it in the way described 
above (neural re-enaction of primal haptic experience of force). By doing this, he/she infers 
the causal relation, he/she does not sense it. What he/she senses is only spatial and temporal 
contiguity and identity of form of motion of the two objects (i.e., rolling, indicated by the 
straight arrow leaving OBJECT2 to the right) and perhaps other clues indicating transmission of 
force (e.g., auditory stimuli). MOTION and EXERT FORCE as affordances of OBJECT1 can only be 
actualized because OBJECT2 “allows” this, i.e., it is “liable” of undergoing force (cf. White 
2009a) in terms of mutual affordances. Now because both objects are 
identified/conceptualized as actualizing mutual affordances and because their relation is 
identified/conceptualized to be one of transmission of force, it is a relation in which the first 
object is the cause (or the first process consisting in OBJECT1 moving, respectively) and the 
second object’s motion is the effect, or outcome.  
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Figure 3.14: Cause attribution in identification/conceptualization with human individual 
 
Now, imagine a door (OBJECT1) pushing against a person (OBJECT2), such that the latter 
stumbles away from it. The only difference between this type of event, as schematically 
depicted in Figure 3.14, and the type of event as depicted in Figure 3.13, lies in the character 
of OBJECT2, i.e., its being human which makes the outcome, or result, of the instance of 
causation a movement, in this case most likely an instance of behavior (because the individual 
is unlikely to be made responsible for its being pushed). The dotted zig-zag arrow to the left 
of OBJECT1 indicates that its motion is most likely to having been caused as well.  
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Figure 3.15: Reason attribution in identification/conceptualization 
 
Figure 3.15 shows an instance of (identification/conceptualization of) causation as action, for 
instance, someone kicking a ball, and the ball rolling along a straight line afterwards. There is 
one main difference in causation as action in relation to causation as motion and behavior in 
the previous Figures. It is the absence of OBJECT1’s being forced to exert force itself, i.e., 
OBJECT1 (a person) is attributed that he/she could have resisted from kicking the ball. Rather, 
these events are identified/conceptualized and attributed by an actor/cognizer to rest on 
purposes, i.e., the person (OBJECT1) is attributed to want some circumstance to come about, for 
which he/she considers his/her act (exerting force on object2) to be a means to put into effect. 
As such, the person’s engagement is an instance of causation for the underlying movement 
schema to perform he/she had a reason (cf. also Hartmann 1996, Malle 1999, Janich 2001: 
60). 
There is one more case in which there is a reason present, while there is no cause in the sense 
defined above. This is given in Figure 3.16 below. 
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Figure 3.16: Reason and action 
 
Figure 3.16 shows an instance of action in which no object except a human individual is 
identified or conceptualized. Examples for this would be someone running or swimming 
(actively). The idea of human action to be uncaused, and instead depending on reasons which 
take the form of purposes is simply presupposed in our everyday praxis which crucially is 
based on people’s overtaking responsibility and attributing it to others for circumstances that 
have been brought about. 
 
 
3.2.3 The significance of attribution for the linking competence 
 We can now conclude the comprehensive sections on sensation, 
identification (further matters of conceptualization are yet to come), 
and on the various factors determining how a percept is “closed” by a 
perceiver (in the sense of the gestalt law of closure) by means of 
attribution, and evaluate the relevance of these cognitive 
psychological, sociological, and social psychological matters (from 
the species/community level of the research programmatic model) for 
the linking competence.  
In the previous sections I have attempted to characterize what I have called 
“underspecification” of the percept, i.e., the output of sensation. In order to be able to act 
within and towards our environment and in accordance with practical concerns, the percept 
has been claimed to require closure, i.e., it must be closed in accordance with the 
corresponding (large-scale) gestalt law. I have tried to outline the most important parameters 
by which closure is attained under the headings of “attribution” and “judgment” as 
complementing identification and conceptualization. Furthermore, it has been argued that 
what is underspecified about the percept constitutes the interactional variables of a given 
verbal interaction. Thus, we can now summarize the parameters active in attribution which 
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constitute the interactional variables of a given verbal interaction. The determining, i.e., 
biasing factors (see Table 3.2) are the following:  
  
 the actor/observer difference: 
It says that actors/cognizers assess circumstances differently depending on 
whether they are involved in them as actors (1
st
 person) or observers (3
rd
 person). 
 the accomplishment/misaccomplishment difference: 
It says that actors/cognizers assess circumstances differently depending on 
whether they identify the circumstance (i.e., its result/outcome) as an 
accomplishment or misaccomplishment. 
 the sympathy/antipathy, or one could say empathy, difference : 
It says that actors/cognizers assess circumstances differently depending on 
whether they feel sympathy or antipathy towards the person involved in them. 
(One can also conceive the crucial factor as empathy.) 
 
The determined factors are the following, i.e., the actor/cognizer assessing a percept or 
concept is biased with respect to: 
 
 whether the actor/cognizer assesses a circumstance to have been caused by stable 
dispositions of the involved person or by forces of the situation 
 whether the actor/cognizer assesses a circumstance to have been brought about by 
accident (externally caused) or intention (reason) 
 whether the actor/cognizer assesses the person having brought about a 
circumstance (i.e., its result/outcome) to deserve credit or blame 
 
The way the percept is “closed” by the actor/cognizer is, as has been shown, mainly 
determined (or biased) by these factors captured by attribution theory in social psychology 
(cf. Moskowitz 2005, ch. 6, 7, 8, Smith and Mackie 
2
2000, ch. 7, 8), complemented and 
brought together here by my own considerations. Where understanding some activity of 
someone is not immediately possible, these factors apply. Thus, where it is not possible to 
specify unanimously in accordance to some attributional praxis whether some movement 
(chain) happened as aiding some purpose, these factors determine how actor/cognizers’  
attribution will work out. 
The attribution of cause and reason, credit and blame, the assessment of whether it is personal 
dispositions or situations which determine the coming about of states, processes, and 
activities, and whether, as a result, someone is attributed responsibility for what he/she has 
brought about depend on those constellations listed above and explicated in Table 3.3 
below.
109
 The determinants and determinates in attribution are those introduced in Table 3.2 
                                                 
109
 One factor which is related to those given in Table 3.3 but which is nevertheless qualitatively different from 
them is the nature of the addressee to which some conceptualized situation/event is communicated. This factor 
presumably does not influence the way in which a situation/event is identified or conceptualized but the way in 
which it is verbalized, namely in accordance or discordance with the expectations/desires/purposes of some 
addressee, and along some parameters related to the distribution of power.  
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and discussed in the sections following the statement concerning the underspecification of the 
percept. Table 3.3 below will be commented in turn.  
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Table 3.3: Determinant parameters and determinate factors in attribution as part of 
identification/conceptualization 
 
The column on the left shows the abbreviated setting of the identified determinants. In the first 
line one finds “actor/accomplishment/sympathy – disposition/reason/credit”. The first three 
notions correspond to determining factors. The last three notions correspond to determined 
factors. That means that some actor/cognizer is the actor in this circumstance (and not the 
one observing another person), identifies his/her movement as accomplishment (and not as 
misaccomplishment), and sympathizes with him-/herself (instead of feeling antipathy towards 
him-/herself, i.e., distancing him-/herself from his/her own goals or means-end choice). This 
leads to some constellation of the determinate factors, such that it leads to a disposition 
attribution (the movement in question is identified to originate in some disposition of the self, 
not in some causing factor in the situation), to the attribution of intention/reason to the self 
(instead of identifying it to have happened accidentally, i.e., by external causation), and to the 
possibility of attributing oneself credit (instead of blame, or neither credit or blame). The 
other lines in the table can be read analogously. 
 
If the processes depicted in Table 3.3 were the whole story, however, then the event as such 
(that what can be observed) was irrelevant for the judgment of whether this was an “agentive” 
or a “patientive” event. What must be taken into account is therefore the familiarity of the 
event in question, i.e., its typification or schematization and its eventual embeddedness in 
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action plans. A single activity, e.g., letting go of a milk carton such that it falls into the 
garbage can, receives different assessments depending on whether an observer knows that this 
is part of a whole chain of actions that belong to waste management and which requires 
organized interdependent action and participation of different persons. When a child 
experiences that “putting things into the garbage can” is repeatedly executed by their parents 
and finally results in the cleanness of the living environment such that there is space for 
everyday activities, which would be obstructed otherwise, then it will learn that each instance 
of this event is part of a plan of keeping the living environment clean.  
Applying the socio-cognitive regularities captured in the scenarios in Table 3.3 to our 
introductory scenario (II.1) we find that for Jessica’s utterance scenario F would be an 
explanation: Nicole, as the causer, is the third person relative to Jessica produces a 
misaccomplishment. If in addition Jessica felt antipathy towards Nicole, then her utterance 
which allows blaming her sister would be consistent. 
In contrast, Sarah’s utterance does not attribute responsibility to Nicole, so that blaming her is 
prohibited. The decisive criterion for her different attribution must lie in the 
sympathy/antipathy difference, since the other two factors are constant relative to Jessica’s 
utterance. Assuming that Sarah, in opposition to Jessica, feels sympathy towards Nicole, it is 
perfectly predictable that she makes an utterance that exonerates Nicole from the 
responsibility for having knocked over the milk.  
Before turning to some empirical evidence, it must be strongly emphasized that the 
parameters in Table 3.3 above are those identified for Western cultures. There is some 
evidence that the determining parameters are cross-culturally stable, while their determining 
potential varies cross-culturally, mainly along a Western-Eastern axis, as it seems (cf. Kunda 
5
2002, ch. 11; Smith and Mackie 
2
2000: 114ff., 127f., 311f.; Moskowitz 2005: 37f., 117f., 
303f.). Further research is without question necessary and desirable here. 
 
 
3.2.4 Case study: Attribution in precarious events 
I will now present some results from a research project that illustrate how the attributional 
mechanisms outlined above are supposed to work. By the word “precarious” in the title of this 
section I mean exactly those events whose percepts are underspecified and where people will 
not unanimously attribute responsibility or not. For instance, someone pulling a friend out of a 
swamp will always be attributed the responsibility for having done this. In contrast, someone 
breaking a glass will be attributed responsibility only under certain conditions the parameter 
settings of which are the topic of this study.  
 
 
3.2.4.1 The research project “Syntax of Hessian Dialects (SyHD)” 
The research project Syntax of Hessian Dialects (SyHD) in which my own study is embedded 
aims to investigate, document, and analyze the syntax of the dialects spoken in Hesse, which 
dialectally is presumably the most heterogenous federal state in Germany. Methodically, the 
project is inspired by the indirect methods of the “Syntactic Atlas of Swiss German Dialects 
(SADS)” and the “Syntactic Atlas of the Dutch Dialects (SAND)” but has developed them 
further (cf. Fleischer, Kasper & Lenz 2012). In its first phase an indirect method – posting 
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questionnaires – was employed, in its second phase direct explorations will be used. The 
present study stems from the first phase. 
A grid consisting of approximately 165 squares was laid over Hesse. In each of these squares 
we found a village of about 500 to 1500 inhabitants, in each of which we found three to ten 
dialect speakers. The informants are so-called non-mobile, older rural males and females 
(NORMS and NORFS; cf. Chambers & Trudgill 
2
1998: 29–31). These sociolinguistic 
parameters increase the probability that speakers will be competent in their local dialects. 
From a cognitive-psychological perspective it seemed necessary to present the stimuli in the 
questionnaire tasks in a written dialectal form: We know that nearly all German dialect 
speakers have competence not only in their dialect but also in a variety close to spoken 
Standard German, which they “activate” depending on the situation (Lenz 2003, Schmidt & 
Herrgen 2011). Giving them Standard German stimuli would therefore have resulted in 
“tapping” their Standard competence. We know that there are about 17 dialect regions in 
Hesse, based on phonological factors. Therefore, the stimuli in each questionnaire were 
translated into the dialects of these 17 regions. From a linguistic perspective, one version per 
village would have been the ideal solution, but from a logistical perspective, the 17 existing 
versions are what could actually be accomplished. Figure 3.17 gives an example of a task 
from a SyHD questionnaire in a dialectal form
110
 (for details on the various question types 
employed and on the technique of “dialectalizing” Standard German stimuli see Fleischer, 
Kasper & Lenz 2012).  
 
 
13. Markus, son of Bruno, already had some girlfriends in the past, but never anything 
serious. Bruno gets worried about this and says: Markus, der Sohn von Bruno, hat zwar 
schon ein paar Freundinnen gehabt, aber noch nie war es etwas wirklich Ernsthaftes. Bruno 
ist darüber langsam besorgt und meint: 
 
 Please place a checkmark next to the sentences you can say in your dialect (multiple 
answers are permitted). 
 
a)   Also eich        waaß    net,    ob er             emol        will       heirode. 
 Well I.1NOM know.3 NEG if  he.3NOM sometime want.3 marry 
 ‘Well, I don’t know, if he wants to marry, anyway.’ 
b)   Also eich        waaß     net,  ob er               emol        heirode will. 
  Well I.1NOM know.3 NEG if  he.3NOM sometime marry   want.3  
  ‘Well, I don’t know, if he wants to marry, anyway.’ 
 
 Would you usually say this sentence in a form that is not mentioned? 
If so,please write down the sentence as you would usually say it: 
 
c).............................................................................................................. ............................... 
 
 Which sentence is the most natural for you? 
a)  , b)   or c)  
 
Figure 3.17: A question from a SyHD questionnaire 
                                                 
110
 Here: the dialect spoken in the transition zone between Central Hessian and Moselle-Franconian. 
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In this type of grammaticality/acceptability judgment task (one of several task types 
employed) there is always a brief description of a situation or event at the top. This 
description serves to give some background information about the contents in the sentences to 
be judged ((a) and (b) in Figure 3.17), to introduce some discourse referents, and to determine 
an information structure for the sentences to be judged. It also serves to embed these 
sentences into a type of discourse informants are familiar with from their lifeworlds. 
Informants are then asked to place a checkmark next to the sentences they can say in their 
dialects. The following sentences are then given in lay dialect notation (since there are no 
conventionalized orthographic systems for dialects). If informants want to give a response that 
does not match (a) or (b), they can insert it above the dotted lines ((c) in Figure 3.17). Finally, 
they are asked to determine the sentence which is the most natural for them in the given 
context. Informants have the opportunity here to mark their own sentence, too. 
With respect to attribution tasks, my hypothesis was the following: 
 
 Given some description of a precarious event and two possible verbalizations 
of that event, one of which suggests an interpretation by its form where the 
causer in the event is attributed responsibility, and one of which suggests an 
interpretation by its form where the attribution of responsibility to the causer is 
prohibited,  
 then modulating the determining factors in attribution in accordance to the 
scenarios in Table 3.3 leads to preferences in informants for the sentence with 
the responsibility attribution predicted by that scenario. Because matters of 
attributional praxes are important here and because the investigated area can be 
identified as a small part of a huge, homogenous sociocultural area (tentatively: 
Western Europe)
111
, no areal variation in preferences is expected despite 
considerable linguistic
o
 differences in the dialects investigated. 
 
This can be exemplified by means of the following question that has actually been used in the 
SyHD questionnaire. In all, I will demonstrate this by means of three of the scenarios from 
Table 3.3. 
 
 
3.2.4.2 Scenario D 
The question below is completely translated into English here except for the stimuli which are 
given in Standard German (a selection of the original, dialectal variants of the question can be 
found in Appendix B). I have added boldface to the phrases in the event description at the top 
of the question for reasons outlined in turn. 
 
 
7. You borrowed several glasses from a friend for a family celebration. During the party one of 
the glasses gets broken by your father Willi who is sick with the flu. When you return the 
glasses to your friend, you say: 
 
                                                 
111
 See references cited at the end of section 3.2.3. 
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 Please place a checkmark next to the sentences you can say in your dialect (multiple 
answers are permitted). 
   
a)        Der            Willi  hat   eins          von deinen       Gläsern         runtergeworfen. 
  DET.NOM Willi has.3 one.ACC of    your.DAT glasses.DAT down-throw.PTCP 
  ‘Willi knocked over one of your glasses.’ 
b)      Dem         Willi ist   eins           von deinen       Gläsern         runtergefallen. 
  DET.DAT Willi is.3 one.NOM of    your.DAT glasses.DAT down-fall.PTCP 
  ‘(It happened to Willi that) one of your glasses broke.’ 
 
 Would you usually say this sentence in a form that is not mentioned? 
If so,please write down the sentence as you would usually say it: 
 
c)….......................................................................................................... ...................................... 
 
 Which sentence is the most natural for you? 
a)  , b)   or c)   
 
Figure 3.18: Attribution task 1 from SyHD questionnaire 
 
The precarious event in question consists of breaking a glass here. There are contexts 
conceivable in which breaking glasses constitutes action, i.e., in which the causer could desist 
from breaking them, but in most contexts breaking glasses is conceived of as accidental 
behavior, not as action. That means it is not possible to decide on the basis of having 
perceived that event (here: having read the description of the event above the dialect 
sentences) whether the causer is to be made responsible or not because the description 
(percept) of the event does not specify intentions or absence of intentions. Grammatically, the 
sentences differ in that the (a) variant is the causative variant of the (b) variant. However, in 
German, anticausative constructions as in (b) need not suppress the causer but may verbalize 
it by means of a dative complement which is the case here. The boldface in the event 
descriptions illustrates how the determining factors in attribution are built in and modulated 
here. They are supposed to manipulate the attribution performance of the informants:  
 
 The actor/observer difference is built in by means of the specification that it is a 
third person – Willi – which is involved here. 
 The accomplishment/misaccomplishment difference is built in by means of the 
specification that the event in question consists of breaking a drinking glass at a 
party (usually a misaccomplishment).  
 The sympathy/antipathy or empathy difference is specified by construing Willi as 
the father of the cognizer who is also sick with the flu, thus triggering empathy.  
 
This scenario corresponds to the parameter setting in scenario D in Table 3.3. In this way, 
scenario D is built into this description. According to the mechanisms in attribution the setting 
of the determining factors should lead the cognizer (i.e., the informant) to attribute Willi‘s 
deed  
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 to forces of the situation,  
 as having happened accidentally by external causes,  
 and that Willi is not to blame for this.  
 
As a result, the cognizer should conclude that the causer cannot be made responsible for the 
circumstance he has brought about. This in turn is predicted to show up in the preference of 
the informants for a syntactic construction which does not suggest the agentive but the 
“patientive” involvement of the causer. 
 
 Sentence (a) in Figure 3.18 allows, or even suggests, an agentive interpretation of 
the causer.
112
 
 Sentence (b) in Figure 3.18 disallows an agentive interpretation of the causer.  
 
As a consequence, informants should prefer sentence (b). The results are given below:
113
  
 
 
Table 3.4: Results for SyHD question corresponding to scenario D
114
 
 
The results confirm the hypothesis.  
 
 
3.2.4.3 Scenario B 
The question below is again translated into English here except for the stimuli which are 
given in Standard German. 
 
 
25. While your daughter and son-in-law are on holiday, you are taking care of their houseplants. 
While checking their apartment, you bump against your son-in-law’s biggest trophy. It falls 
down and breaks. When the vacationers come back, you say to your son-in-law: 
 
                                                 
112
 Why these sentences allow or suggest particular readings but not others is the topic of chapter 4. 
113
 The most natural variants were counted. Where no most natural variant(s) were given, the checked boxes in 
the upper part of the task were counted, i.e., responses to the question at the bottom of Figure 3.15. Deviant 
responses are those that could not be classified as instances of the (a) or (b) types. For instance, if informants 
prefered another verb in the (a) variant and wrote this down under (c), and if this verb is substitutable with that in 
the (a) variant syntactically and thematically, then (c) was classified as an instance of (a). 
114
 A list of the dialect regions can be found in Appendix B. For further details see the SyHD homepage 
(www.syhd.info), Fleischer, Kasper & Lenz 2012, Kasper (under review).  
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 Please place a checkmark next to the sentences you can say in your dialect (multiple answers 
are permitted).  
  
a)    Ich         habe            deinen        Pokal  runtergeworfen. 
 I.1NOM have.1AUX your.ACC trophy down-throw.PTCP 
 ‘I knocked over your trophy.’ 
 
b)    Mir          ist            dein              Pokal  runtergefallen. 
 Me.DAT be.3AUX your.3NOM trophy down-fall.PTCP 
 ‘(It happened to me that) your trophy broke.’ 
 
 Would you usually say this sentence in a form that is not mentioned?  
If so,please write down the sentence as you would usually say it: 
 
c)........................................................................................................................... ........................ 
 
 Which sentence is the most natural for you? 
a)  , b)   or c)   
 
Figure 3.19: Attribution task 2 from SyHD questionnaire 
 
The precarious event in question consists in causing a trophy to break. There are contexts 
conceivable in which breaking trophies constitutes action, i.e., in which the causer can desist 
from breaking them, but in most contexts breaking goblets is conceived of as accidental 
behavior, not as action. That means it is not possible to decide on the basis of having 
perceived that event whether the causer is to be made responsible or not. The event 
descriptions leave that unspecified. Grammatically, the sentences differ again in that the (a) 
variant is the causative variant of the (b) variant again, but nevertheless (b) contains a causer 
complement. The boldface in the event descriptions illustrates how the determining factors in 
attribution are modulated here. They are supposed to manipulate the attribution performance 
of the informants:  
 
 The actor/observer difference is built in by means of the specification that the 
causer – the addressed person – is identical to the observer. 
 The accomplishment/misaccomplishment difference is built in by means of the 
specification that the event in question consists in breaking someone’s trophy.  
 The sympathy/antipathy or empathy difference is not separately specified but it is 
assumed as the standard case that the causer is sympathetic with himself.  
 
This scenario corresponds to the parameter setting in scenario B in Table 3.3. In this way, 
scenario B is built into this description. According to the mechanisms in attribution the setting 
of the determining factors should lead the cognizer (i.e., the informant) to attribute his own 
(imagined) deed  
 
 to forces of the situation,  
 as having happened accidentally by external causes,  
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 and that he/she cannot be blamed for this.  
 
As a result, the cognizer should conclude that he/she cannot be made responsible for the 
circumstance he/she has brought about. This in turn is predicted to show up in his/her 
preference for a syntactic construction which does not suggest his/her “agentive” but his/her 
patientive involvement in the event. 
 
 Sentence (a) in Figure 3.19 allows, or even suggests, an agentive interpretation of 
the causer. 
 Sentence (b) in Figure 3.19 disallows an agentive interpretation of the causer.  
 
As a consequence, informants should prefer sentence (b). The results are given below:  
 
 
Table 3.5: Results for SyHD question corresponding to scenario B 
 
The results are nearly identical to those of scenario D and confirm the hypothesis. 
 
 
3.2.4.4 Scenario F 
The Figure below again contains a SyHD question translated into English. The stimuli are 
given in Standard German and are annotated. 
 
 
13. Tilers have been working in your house for two weeks in order to re-tile your bathroom. When 
the tilers are gone and it is quiet again, you notice that a piece is broken off the sink. You tell 
your husband: 
 
 Please place a checkmark next to the sentences you can say in your dialect (multiple answers 
are permitted). 
  
a)         Die                   Handwerker haben                 das         Waschbecken kaputt gemacht. 
  The.3NOM.PL tiler.PL         have.3PL.AUX the.ACC sink               broken-make.PTCP 
  ‘The tilers broke the sink.’ 
 
b)       Den               Handwerkern ist                    das                 Waschbecken kaputt gegangen. 
  The.DAT.PL tiler.DAT.PL  be.3SG.AUX the.3SG.NOM sink               broken-go.PTCP 
  ‘(It happened to the tilers that) the sink broke.’ 
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 Would you usually say this sentence in a form that is not mentioned? 
If so,please write down the sentence as you would usually say it: 
 
c)........................................................................................ ............................................................ 
 
 Which sentence is the most natural for you? 
a)  , b)   oder c)   
 
Figure 3.20: Attribution task 3 from SyHD questionnaire 
 
The precarious event in question consists in breaking a piece off a sink. There are cultural 
contexts – e.g., tearing down houses – in which breaking sinks constitutes action, i.e., the 
causer can desist from breaking them, but in most contexts breaking sinks is conceived of as 
accidental behavior, not as action. That means it is not possible to decide on the basis of 
having perceived that event whether the causer is to be made responsible or not. The event 
descriptions leave any clues with respect to agentivity unspecified. Grammatically, the 
sentences differ in that the (a) variant is again the causative variant of the (b) variant, but 
where (b) contains a causer complement in the dative. The boldface in the event descriptions 
illustrates how the determining factors in attribution are modulated here. They are supposed to 
manipulate the attribution performance of the informants:  
 
 The actor/observer difference is built in by means of the specification that the 
causer – the tilers – is someone different from the observer. 
 The accomplishment/misaccomplishment difference is built in by means of the 
specification that the event in question consists in breaking someone’s sink.  
 The sympathy/antipathy or empathy difference is built in by means of the 
specification that the time of working in the house was long and noisy, which 
should have taxed the patience of the persons concerned, causing feelings of 
antipathy (or low sympathy/empathy).  
 
This scenario corresponds to the parameter setting in scenario F in Table 3.3. In this way, 
scenario F is built into this description. According to the mechanisms in attribution the setting 
of the determining factors should lead the cognizer (i.e., the informant) to attribute the tilers’ 
deed  
 
 to stable dispositions,  
 as having been brought about intentionally,  
 and that they can be blamed for their deed.  
 
As a result, the cognizer should conclude that he/she can make the tilers responsible for what 
they have brought about. This in turn is predicted to show up in his/her preference for a 
syntactic construction which suggests their “agentive” involvement in the event. 
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 Sentence (a) in Figure 3.20 allows, or even suggests, an agentive interpretation of 
the causer. 
 Sentence (b) in Figure 3.20 disallows an agentive interpretation of the causer.  
 
As a consequence, informants should prefer sentence (a). The results are given below:  
 
 
Table 3.6: Results for SyHD question corresponding to scenario B 
 
The results confirm the hypothesis. 
 
 
3.2.4.5 Evaluation  
The simulated percepts underlying the events described in the SyHD questions above – as 
well as in the fictional introductory scenario (II.1) – lack information about external causes 
and other physical properties and relations, they lack information about the wider context of 
the event, the potential presence or absence of purposes in the causer, and potential stable 
dispositions of him/her or situational forces on him/her. In sum, they are underspecified 
exactly with respect to those matters outlined in section 3.1.4. Specifying what is 
underspecified about these circumstances is entirely left to the actor/cognizer (the SyHD 
informants) in terms of attribution which makes use of the determining and determined factors 
uncovered in the sections on salience, pertinence, causation, but especially in the sections on 
the self-serving actor/cognizer who falls victim to inaccurate socio-cognitive rules of thumb, 
and on the ascriptivistic action concept. On the other hand, sentences (a) and (b) in each of the 
above scenarios are means to verbalize the events in the scenarios in ways that imply some 
statements with respect to what is actually underspecified about these events. The sentence 
pairs are therefore different strategies of externalizing originally internal attributions by 
means of verbal utterances. For someone who accepts the (a) sentences as attributions about 
what the respective events in the scenarios describe it is possible (and appropriate from an 
attributional perspective) to reward or reprimand the involved persons. The syntactic 
structures of the (a) sentences allow, or even suggest the rather agentive involvement of the 
referents of their nominative complements. In contrast, for someone who accepts the (b) 
sentences it is inappropriate (though not impossible) to reward or reprimand the involved 
persons – it would count as performative inconsistency. One cannot, or actually ought not, 
accept a sentence of the (b) form, the syntactic structure of which prohibits an agentive 
reading, and then honestly reward or reprimand the person in question. This is because 
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accepting (a) means attributing the responsibility for having brought about the critical event to 
the involved person. The (b) sentences, on the other hand, exonerate the persons from this 
responsibility. What it is exactly in the structures of the (a) and (b) sentences in the above 
scenarios that makes these attributions but not others possible is the topic of part III.  
 
One can state already at this point, however, that there must be more to the semantics of 
utterances than – literally – meets the eye. A single event might underlie both (a) and (b) 
sentences in each of the above scenarios, i.e., two actors/cognizers perceiving a single event 
might be led to different attributions and to uttering (a) and (b) respectively, only on the basis 
of the determining factors in attribution. 
 
In fact, this is my central thesis for which the scene in (II.1) with Nicole and the milk carton 
stands. It makes clear why describing the semantic part of the linking competence must not 
rely on an objectivistic semantic theory. When the linguist who models the competence of a 
native speaker specifies the argument structure of a predicate (e.g. play [x=agent, y=patient]), 
he/she acts as if the thematic status of persons (here: ‘x’) in circumstances (here: ‘play’), or as 
we could say the factors governing the attribution of responsibility to them, were simply 
given, could definitively be characterized, or could simply be drawn from what can be 
perceived. Chapter 3 up this point should serve to show that in doing so one falls victim to 
naïve realism, too. Characterizing the linking competence means characterizing an imperfect 
actor/cognizer. Subscribing to the assumption that syntactic matters are at least in part shaped 
by semantic matters must therefore take into account exactly this kind of actor/cognizer.  
 
Behind the theoretical metaphor of thematic role assignments of actors/cognizers to persons in 
circumstances they perceive lies a complex machinery of attribution which cannot go 
unquestioned in theories of the linking competence of the same actors/cognizers. 
 
Two questions about the present study shall be discussed briefly before turning to the next 
sections. Firstly, why are there not stronger, or even categorical, preferences for the predicted 
sentences and where does variation in the degree of preference across regions come from, as 
indicated by standard deviations? I think it is unquestionable that we – and the SyHD 
informants – are dealing here with quite subtle semantic matters. A unanimous preference for 
the predicted sentences would thus be rather surprising. The actual results demonstrate a quite 
consistent preference for the predicted sentences. At the same time, the subtlety of theses 
semantic matters comes along with the violability of their preferences. That means if there are 
less subtle differentiations to be judged, then rather the attributional preference is violated 
than, for instance, a “harder” formal constraint. If, for instance, some (a) variant is the 
attributionally preferred one but includes a particle before the verb that is rare or unusual in 
the respective dialect region, informants may choose the (b) variant for these formal reasons, 
although from a semantic (attributional) perspective (a) would be preferable. For a related 
reason, only 14 of 17 regions have been included in the results (see Appendix B): In the three 
remaining regions there are partial dative/accusative syncretisms with only accusative forms 
preserved. The (b) sentences contain datives, thus the informants unfamiliar with the dative in 
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their dialects would have to reject the (b) variants for formal reasons despite their presumed 
preference for the (b) variants in semantic (attributional) terms. 
The second question concerns the person talked to in the event descriptions (scenario D: 
friend, scenario B: son-in-law, scenario F: husband): Is it not possible that the preferred 
sentence and thus the underlying attribution is co-determined by the power structure between 
the cognizer and the person talked to? For instance, if the cognizer was afraid of suffering 
penalty from his/her interloctor because of honestly uttering (a) or (b), then he/she could 
eventually switch to the sentence which is presumably the preferred one by the interlocutor. 
Because of that I have tried to hold the power structure between the cognizer and the person 
talked to relatively constant. 
Summing up, the previous sections should serve to doubly ground our task-related cognitive 
activities, namely in perception and action/sociocultural praxis. Whatever the principles are 
that are operative between specific phonological strings and specific conceptual contents and 
attributions in specific circumstances, it is conceptual structure and attribution and how they 
work which determines how a linking theory should be described. Roughly speaking, a theory 
about the competence of linking utterances on the one hand and concepts and attributions on 
the other hand requires a cognitive theory that is psychologically plausible, since reference to 
cognitive activities is the only way to answer the question of what is coded by syntactic 
structures. This is the primary reason why so much space is dedicated here to grounding the 
semantic part of the linking competence. Grounding part of semantics in sociocultural praxis, 
attribution in particular, was the topic of the preceding sections. Next I will demonstrate how 
spatial-conceptual and temporal-conceptual matters are systematically related to the syntactic 
structures found by linguists. 
A last note concerns the notion of “agentivity” used above in a pre-theoretical manner: What 
varies in scenarios A–H above is apparently the “agentivity” of the person involved in the 
described event as conceptualized in a top-down manner by the actor/cognizer. What follows 
from this is firstly that especially the much discussed concept of agentivity can be derived 
from the factors underlying attribution in the present framework. Secondly, agentivity 
transpires as a notion that has no objective basis but one entirely originating in sociocultural 
praxes and constituted by attribution performances. By lack of an objective basis I mean the 
fact that agentivity – taking the form of attributed responsibility – is not present in the 
percepts of the states, processes, and activities we encounter but instead that it is imposed 
onto them. Where a person attributed responsibility is also identified to be a causer, a 
perceptual notion comes into play. A responsible causer, as a special type of agent then, 
seems to have a special role in language comprehension (see section 4.2). I have tried to show 
that one can only do justice to the notion of agentivity, if it is based on perceptual and actional 
considerations.
115
 In section 2.1.2 I expressed reservations against CFL’s “Generalization 
Commitment” (CFL A2) and “Cognitive Commitment” (CFL A3) because they focus on 
individual cognition only. One can state now more properly that the mechanisms underlying 
attribution are not matters of individual cognition alone. Attribution of responsibility is a 
                                                 
115
 The notion of agentivity proposed here seems to fit the RRG notion of agentivity best, where an animate 
causer (“effector”) is interpreted as an agent, by means of pragmatic implicature (van Valin & Wilkins 1996, 
Holisky 1987). Other interpretations of agentivity can be found, for instance, in Dowty 1991, Primus 1999, 
Ackerman & Moore 2001, Grimm 2005, Fillmore 1968, Gruber 1970, Jackendoff 1990, Grimshaw 1990, 
Culicover & Wilkins 1986. 
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socioculturally determined all-or-nothing matter and does not show the properties many 
individual cognitive matters show, e.g., the prototype structure of concepts. 
 With respect to the model underlying the research programme pursued 
here, the multidisciplinary sections can be concluded now. In the 
forthcoming chapters the perceptual, conceptual, and actional notions 
of the linking competence discussed at the species/community level of 
the model will be systematically related to linguistic
o
 structures. I will 
outline the principal mechanisms governing their relationship. This 
means moving away from the sub-competences closer towards the 
linking competence in the narrow sense.  
 
 
3.3 The conceptualization of spatial relations and their coding in language 
 
In the previous sections sensation (which is completed by recognition) and 
identification/conceptualization have been differentiated. Then, aspects of identifying and 
conceptualizing states, processes, and activities were characterized that are not contained in 
the (mostly visual) percepts because they are not perceivable. Rather, these non-conceptual 
contents must be imposed on percepts/concepts in a top-down manner by means of 
attribution. It includes physical and especially causal knowledge, knowledge about causes and 
reasons, shortcomings of actors/cognizers and others, culminating in an attribution theory. 
The notions employed in this attribution theory originate in the ways people live and act 
together in their particular communities, for instance, the conditions under which cause and 
reason are attributed, or in what ways object affordances are exploited for the sake of specific 
actions. These sections should serve to point out the socioculturally determined character of 
our conceptualizations and attributions, i.e., our grasp of circumstances around us beyond 
what is given to our senses. At the same time, it is these socio-cognitive notions which are 
usually not taken into consideration in theories dealing with the conceptualizations underlying 
verbal utterances. Rather, the relationship between concepts as symbolized by language and 
states of affairs in the world are often assumed to be much simpler. Generalizing 
considerably, Johnson (1987), Lakoff (1987), and Lakoff & Johnson (1999) call those theories 
of meaning “objectivistic” which define meaning as constituted by the correspondence 
between states of affairs in the world on the one hand, and propositions underlying verbal 
utterances or conceptualizations on the other hand. I have tried to point out, however, that it is 
epistemologically highly problematic to conceive of states of affairs in the world and the 
conceptual activities of people as existing independently of each other in self-contained 
realms, or to conceive of the circumstances around us as being intelligible without further 
ado. Such a view fails to take into consideration our physical makeup as well as sociocultural 
constraints which are essential to the constructive nature of our conceptual and actional 
knowledge. From the culturalist and constructivist perspective on epistemology taken here, it 
is simply improper to treat notions like agentivity and reasons in an objectivistic way as 
somehow contained in the world we perceive. 
This does not mean, however, that the states, processes, and activities we observe and deal 
with cognitively did not take place in space and time. Although the question as to whether 
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someone broke a vase accidentally or intentionally might not be answerable by recourse to the 
actor/cognizer’s sensation alone, he/she nevertheless makes a statement about some state of 
affairs in the world once he/she verbalizes his/her conceptualization. In other words, although 
actional notions might not be “visible”, they nevertheless “operate” on conceptualizations of 
states, processes, and activities that have some position in space and time. However, space 
and time are not things, but, as in the case of the mind, they are – as “space” and “time” – 
termini of reflection. As such, they are a practical means for reasoning (which I take to be 
simulated speech; cf. Hartmann 1998: 168–176) talking about the relation of things to other 
things, or the continuity, change, necessity, or the (im)possibility of a relation between things 
in general, i.e., independent of specific instances of relations. Relations between things are 
sensed in terms of figure/ground configurations (see section 3.1.3). So, figure and ground are 
also termini of reflection in the first instance. In the concrete event of sensation it is always a 
specific object that is segregated in relation to what else is there. In talking about these 
matters of sensation independently of particular sensations, we term the object that is 
segregated in relation to some other thing “figure” and the latter “ground”. Bearing this in 
mind, we can state that all the processes summarized under “closure of the percept” and 
“attribution” operate on percepts made up of spatial figure/ground configurations relative to 
points in time. Spatial relations in the context of sensation were the topic of earlier sections. 
Since we are still dealing with conceptual structures here, we will now turn to the 
identification and conceptualization of spatial relations. The discussion will again build on the 
assumption that conceptualization is simulated perception (and/or action). But in contrast to 
the characterization of actional matters in identification (i.e., the mechanisms underlying 
attribution) – which do not have counterparts in percepts, as has been shown – the 
conceptualization of spatial relations can be seen quite analogously to the sensation of spatial 
relations.  
 
In other words, because conceptualization is simulated perception, the integral parts of the 
conceptualization of spatial relations have counterparts in sensation (cf. Langacker 2000, ch. 
7).  
 
 Section 3.3 is structured as follows: I will characterize the significance 
and the integral parts of the conceptualization of spatial relations and 
the basic mechanisms as to how they are coded in language. Two 
global modes of coding will be identified in this context, namely 
motivation and exploitation. This is indicated in the partial research-
programmatic model given in Figure 3.21. I will also discuss the 
acquisition of motivated and exploiting conceptualization-syntactic 
structure mappings and show how the conceptualization of 
circumstance types can be captured by means of the notion of 
constructions. This procedure thus utilizes notions from the perceptual 
psychological and social psychological parts – circumstance 
perception, conceptualization, and attribution – of the research 
programmatic model and outlines the mechanisms by which they are 
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related to the use of syntactic structures, thus approaching the linking 
competence step by step.  
 
 
Figure 3.21: Diagrammatic iconic linking, hypostatization, and schematization as sub-
competences of the linking competence that are developed in section 3.3 
 
 
3.3.1 The significance of spatial relation conceptualization and coding 
Above, conceptualization has been defined as simulated perception (and/or action). We have 
seen that in the case of vision there are groups of neurons which are sensitive toward specific 
features of stimuli but not to others. The features of the things in the visual field co-determine 
what is singled out as a figure in sensation. It has also been shown that what a figure is is also 
necessarily co-determined by that against which it is singled out – the ground. In addition, 
figure/ground segregation in sensation has been shown to occur without attention most of the 
time.  
 
Now, structuring the visual field by means of figure/ground segregation is of great importance 
for language (cf. Talmy 2000, I, 5).  
 
However, when talking about linguistic
o
 structures, attention plays a different role than in 
vision. In verbally communicating something perceived we can only verbalize those states, 
processes, and activities we have attended to. “Objects that are not consciously processed are 
neither recognized nor stored for future recall.” (Bertenthal 1996: 434; I take this statement to 
also hold true for circumstances; see section 3.5 on the relation between objects and 
circumstances). Future recall would be necessary for communication, however. In what ways 
are figure and ground important for language? As an example, speakers avoid (in most but not 
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all contexts) utterances like the building is in front of the car in favour of the car is behind the 
building. Now, Talmy (2000, I, 5) has shown that in verbalizing such (even metaphorical) 
relations of location or motion/movement, the syntactic structure of the utterance (here: NP-
V-P-NP) seems to “respect” or to a certain degree “reflect” perceptual figure/ground 
segregation. In Talmy’s terms, the building would have been conceptualized as figure in the 
first sentence and as ground in the second by the speaker and hearer, respectively. Both 
sentences are grammatically well-formed but the first one seems inappropriate because of its 
association of figure and ground with certain syntactic constituents in the syntactic structure. 
Remember the gestalt laws: An object is figure-apt, if it is mainly small and movable relative 
to a ground. It is the car and not the building which appears small and movable in this 
example.  
In addition, it is not only possible but crucial in verbal communication that a speaker is able to 
describe some (visual) perceptual experience of a state, process, or activity he/she had to 
someone who did not perceive it himself, e.g., Alex fell off his bike today in front of the 
institute. The addressee thus has not perceived the event and therefore has not attended to it in 
the way the speaker has; he/she did not have the vantage point the speaker had and so on.  
 
However, the internal organization of the speaker’s utterance is something like an instruction 
for the hearer to conceptualize the event the speaker has described to him/her verbally, 
because it consists of that to which the speaker has attended in this circumstance, or what has 
been pertinent to him/her about this event. Although this does not provide the addressee with 
the same visual experience, it allows him/her to imagine or conceptualize this event in a way 
that can be described as a simulation of the speaker’s visual perceptual experience.116 Because 
of this rationale, I will call the theory developed here “Instruction Grammar”. 
 
We are dealing here with the questions of how the structure of what to convey can be 
described (percepts and concepts), how the structure of the symbolic device can be described 
(syntax), and, most importantly, how the relationship between both can be described (linking). 
In this subsection I make the claim that this relationship is not arbitrary.  
 
In particular I claim that parts of speech in the syntactic constructions underlying utterances 
(as identified by linguists) are arranged in a systematic way that allows interpreters to (re-) 
construct from those constructions figure/ground configurations in order to be able to 
conceptualize states, processes, and activities for the sake of several praxis-relevant 
reasons.
117
  
 
This means claiming a tight, motivated relationship between syntax and conceptualization. If 
it is a valid proposal that linguistic
o
 structures respect, or in some way reflect, figure/ground 
configurations, this means that figure and ground can be decoupled from actual (visual) 
                                                 
116
 Cf. Spivey et al. (2002), Spivey, Richardson & Gonzalez-Marquez (2005); there may also be a (partial) 
simulation of the activity itself there, eventually. This has already been discussed here along the lines of neuronal 
re-enactment outlined in section 3.2.1; on this aspect see also McWhinney (2005). 
117
 In the introduction to chapter 2 I have characterized language as organizing praxes and at the same time as 
being constitutive of praxes. Language use was characterized as action. Taken together, local verbal interaction 
serves mostly the purpose of organizing praxes. 
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experiences, if utterances serve the interpreter as an instruction for simulating a visual 
experience in the absence of the respective stimuli. This means that figure and ground are also 
present in and relevant for conceptualization, and that they are coded in actual syntactic 
structures.  
Imagine my colleague Alex really fell off his bike in front of our research institute, that I have 
witnessed this event, and that later I were – by some reason or other – to report this to you 
who most probably does not know Alex, his bike, the way he rides it, and the institute. 
However, I have perceived this event, so all the processes characterized in the former sections 
take place, including figure/ground segregations. Hence, I have sensed, recognized, and 
integrated into wholes the objects involved in this event. I also have identified/categorized 
them. That means from the constant flux of impressions around me I have singled out – 
among other things – Alex from the background, his bike from the background, Alex from his 
bike, the institute from the background, Alex and his bike from the institute, all this through 
time. I have identified the objects involved as being members of categories of differing 
generality. ALEX is a very specific concept, as well as ALEX’ BIKE and the INSTITUTE. 
According to the gestalt laws and to the purpose-dependency of identification/categorization, 
I could have identified them as members of other, more general categories, as well. For 
instance, I could have treated Alex as some UNSPECIFIED PERSON, possibly resulting in a 
verbalization like Someone fell off his bike or I could have treated Alex and his bike as one 
(Alex fell over in front of the institute). I even could have identified the whole event in a very 
general way (An accident happened in front of the institute). I could even say Something 
happened in Marburg and “mean” that Alex fell from his bike in front of the institute.  
This is an important point which demonstrates how figure/ground segregation in sensation 
may differ from figure/ground segregation in identification (and conceptualization): The 
components of the sensed event remain the same (Alex, the bike, the institute). The 
figure/ground segregation of my sensing the event is rather fixed. But in the moment top-
down identification (and conceptualization) comes into play, this fixation is lapsed. Let us for 
now presuppose verbal utterances refer to conceptualizations. Conceptual flexibility in 
figure/ground segregation would be demonstrated in utterances like Alex fell in front of the 
institute, although Alex and his bike fell. What I have done in uttering this is conceptualizing 
[Alex and his bike] which from the perspective of sensation are two objects as a single object 
referred to by Alex, more precisely as an integrated figure relative to the institute which 
functions as ground here. To be sure, the figure/ground configuration of the sensation of this 
event remains the same. But I am able to flexibly “operate” on this figure/ground structure 
conceptually and to apply figure/ground segregations on different levels of specificity and 
generality in identification/conceptualization, in dependence of the purposes I pursue.  
From now on I will terminologically accommodate this difference between sensation and 
identification/conceptualization with respect to figure and ground, such that the conceptual 
analogues of them will be termed “trajector” and “landmark”, respectively (cf. Langacker 
1987 et sqq.).
118
 Then, one can state that trajector-landmark configurations can be recursively 
organized, while this is less clear for figure/ground configurations. By recursion I mean 
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 Notice, however, that my usage of the terms differs from that of Langacker who does not draw the analogy 
from sensation in the same manner as I do. 
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embeddedness in the sense that one trajector-landmark configuration can function as trajector 
of a higher-order trajector-landmark configuration.  
 
To be more precise, actors/cognizers can apply trajector-landmark segregation, depending on 
their (maybe communicative) purposes (pertinence), at different levels of 
specificity/generality of conceptual contents, whether retrieved from memory or with respect 
to novel conceptualizations.  
 
If figure/ground segregation in sensation is all about integrating visual features from the 
visual field into whole objects, and if trajector-landmark segregation is conceptually more 
flexible in the way outlined, and if finally conceptualization is simulated perception, then we 
have to ask what an object in identification/conceptualization (cf. Humphreys & Riddoch 
2007) is. The negative answer must be that it cannot be fixed in the way objects in sensation 
are.
119
 To have this demonstrated, consider Figure 3.22 a) below which is adapted from 
Jackendoff (2007: 18): What we see in Figure 3.22 a) is x’s. However, the arrangement of x’s 
in (a) can be treated to exhibit different figure/trajector-ground/landmark configurations. I 
will treat (b) to (g) as different possibilities of carrying out figure/trajector-ground/landmark 
segregations on the basis of (a).
120
 In (b) we can “see” two x’s arranged in pair1 blocks (i.e., 
one pair block as figure/trajector). That means we can single out from the Figure (a) any pair 
block and segregate it as figure/trajector from the rest which functions as ground/landmark 
then. In (c) x’s are arranged in a column (i.e., a column can be picked out from (a) as 
figure/trajector), in d) x’s are arranged in a higher-order2 block that can be singled out from 
(a) as figure/trajector), in (e) x’s are arranged in a higher-order3 line, picked out from (a) and 
functioning as a possible figure/trajector. Due to a violation of gestalt laws (proximity; 
indicated by “#”) it is more difficult to treat a higher-order2 column, as in (f), or a higher-
order2 line, as in (g), as a possible figure/trajector, if both shall be singled out from (a). 
Finally, (a) itself as a whole can also possibly function as a higher-order3 block, such that the 
whole block can be treated as figure/trajector relative to a (back)ground.  
 
xx  xx  xx  xx
xx  xx  xx  xx
xx  xx  xx  xx
xx  xx  xx  xx
xx  xx  xx  xx
xx  xx  xx  xx
xx  xx  xx  xx
xx  xx  xx  xx
xx  xx  xx  xx
xx  xx  xx  xx
xx  xx  xx  xx
xx  xx  xx  xx
xx  xx  xx  xx
xx  xx  xx  xx
xx  xx  xx  xx
xx  xx  xx  xx
a)
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 In fact, they are not. But objects in conceptualization are even less fixed. 
120
 In what follows, subscripts symbolize the level at which segregations are executed, since figure/trajector-
ground/landmark segregations may be embedded in “higher-order” segregations. The latter have number 
subscripts, higher numbers indicating more embeddings. 
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Figure 3.22: Recursion in vision 
 
It seems that the more embedding there is the more difficult it is to conceive of the unit in 
question as figure/trajector, such that it is easiest to treat a block pair (b) as figure/trajector 
and most difficult to treat a higher-order3 block (a) as figure/trajector (except for the Figures 
involving gestalt violations). It is difficult to decide whether these visual effects that arise 
when looking at Figure 3.22 a) belong to sensation or identification. However, the latter 
should allow for the greater recursive flexibility. One could speculate, however, that figure-
aptness and trajector-aptness split up the more complex a unit becomes, from least complex 
(b) to most complex (a) (ignoring (f) and (g) again).  
One indicator that this could indeed be the case is the above example of Alex falling off his 
bike in front of the institute. Conceiving of this whole configuration as functioning as an 
integrated figure (in sensation) seems impossible. Humphreys and Riddoch (2007: 537f.) 
discuss what the largest unit of sensation might be, and they conclude that the crucial factor is 
co-occurrence of objects in states, processes, or activities. Statistically, the more frequently 
objects co-occur in them (e.g., they obey the gestalt law of common fate in that they move 
together relative to a stationary ground) the more easily they can be integrated into a whole. 
How often do we observe persons, their bikes, and buildings moving together relative to a 
stationary ground? Hardly ever, I would think. However, imagine you “zoom out” of the 
scene of Alex falling off his bike in front of the institute such that you see the institute with 
the street in front of it and Alex with his bike from 30 meters above, including neighboring 
buildings, bushes, streets etc. Now imagine an earthquake happens that affects only the 
institute, Alex and his bike in front of it, leaving neighboring buildings, bushes, streets etc. 
out. Only the former are shaken by it. What you have accomplished conceptually then is 
making the whole configuration of Alex, the bike, the institute, and the relations between 
them a conceptual trajector relative to a stationary ground, on a very high level of generality. 
Another indicator could be the previously discussed high correlation between foveal seeing 
and attending, i.e., the identity of what we visually focus on and of what we attend to (see 
section 3.1.4.1). Embedding figure/ground configurations into ever greater figure/ground 
configurations deprives the perceiver (in dependence of his distance to the stimuli) of being 
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able to focus the figure. This might be what makes it impossible to treat Alex, his bike, and 
the institute as a figure in sensation relative to Marburg as a whole – there is usually no 
viewing arrangement achievable in which this could be focussed. 
The main reason why conceptualization seems to be more flexible than sensation with respect 
to figure/ground segregation is the character of conceptualization as simulation. This absolves 
the conceptualizer from actualities like his/her vantage point – if he/she wanted he/she could 
“view” everything from the bird’s eye view, thereby applying a very general trajector-
landmark segregation to the objects and locations in his/her (simulated) visual field. 
To sum up, we have seen that conceptualization as simulated perception even extends to the 
mechanisms of object integration. The mechanism of figure/ground segregation in sensation 
parallels the mechanism of trajector-landmark segregation in identification/conceptualization. 
The difference lies in the flexibility with which the latter makes use of the mode of operation 
of the former. While it is easy to say what the shape and outer boundaries of [Alex on his 
bike] is on the basis of the features of this unit in sensation, it is much harder to say what the 
features of the trajector [Alex on his bike in front of the institute] are. In conceptualization the 
definition of “object” is somewhat blurred. 
I would like to take syntactic structures reflecting trajector-landmark configurations in fairly 
regular ways as evidence for the viability of the claim that syntactic structures indeed code 
conceptual structures.  
 
If linguistic
o
 structures are conceived of as instructions for conceptualizing states, processes, 
and activities, and if conceptualization mechanisms parallel mechanisms of sensation, then it 
is highly plausible that languages have developed means to externalize these organizing 
mechanisms of sensation and conceptualization for the sake of communicative needs which, 
in turn, are practical needs. 
 
In the next section I will illustrate the systematic character of trajector-landmark segregations 
in conceptualization and their linguistic
o
 realization.  
 
 
3.3.2 Motivation and exploitation in trajector/landmark-syntactic structure mappings  
By means of the following examples I will try to demonstrate the component parts of 
trajector-landmark configurations, and the regularities in how they are syntactically 
expressed. 
 
(3.1)  The ball rolls into the room. 
   
(3.2)  John dances. 
 
(3.3)  The sun is going down. 
 
(3.4)  I hate you. 
 
(3.5)  I have a headache.  
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(3.6)  I give you flowers. 
 
(3.7)  Tom pours water into the glass. 
 
(3.8)  Alex    ähnelt       Mario. 
  Alex.3.NOM  resemble.3 Mario.DAT 
  ‘Alex resembles Mario.’ 
 
(3.9)  Mario   ähnelt         Alex. 
  Mario.3.NOM resemble.3 Alex.DAT 
  ‘Marion resembles Alex.’ 
 
(3.10) Mario          und Alex                     ähneln        sich. 
  Mario.3SG.NOM and Alex.3SG.NOM resemble.3PL each other/themselves 
  ‘Mario and Alex resemble each other.’ 
 
(3.11)  Vor    der Kirche  steht   Alex    rechts von Matthias. 
  In front of the.DAT church  stand.3 Alex.3  right    of   Matthias 
  ‘Alex is standing to the right of Matthias in front of the church.’ 
 
(3.12)  Sie       stehen   vor             der Kirche.  
  They.3 stand.3  in front of the church 
  ‘They are standing in front of the church.’ 
 
(3.13)  Something happened in Marburg. 
 
Up to this point, figures/trajectors have been symbolized by circles and grounds/landmarks by 
rectangles. This must now be refined. It has been mentioned in section 3.1.3.3 that grounds 
(and therefore landmarks) come along as either locations or as exhibiting object features, just 
like figures. These types of landmarks will now be distinguished symbolically, as given in 
Figure 3.23 below. 
 
 
Figure 3.23: Location and object landmark (to be refined once more in section 3.4.8) 
 
For the sake of “iconicity” location landmarks will eventually be depicted as large rectangles, 
emphasizing the size of the locations they symbolize. 
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Now consider the approximate corresponding representations of sentences (3.1) to (3.13) in 
terms of trajector-landmark configurations.
121
 These configurations are schematizations. Such 
spatial schemas are further discussed in section 3.3.4. 
 
 
Figure 3.24: Correspondences between spatial conceptual structure and linguistic
o
 structure 
for (3.1) The ball rolls into the room 
 
In Figure 3.24 some object is conceptualized as moving relative to some location, whereby 
the first object is a ball and the location is a room (as a three-dimensional container, 
presumably). This takes place within the simulated visual field (dotted lines leaving “C”) of 
the conceptualizer (“C”; lines leaving C indicate his/her shoulders and thus our view on the 
scene from above). The ball functions as trajector and the room as landmark here. This is 
because the ball is smaller and more mobile, hence the “better” trajector. The trajector moves 
along the path indicated by the arrow and ends inside the room. The landmark extending 
beyond the conceptual field of the conceptualizer shall capture the fact that he/she presumably 
cannot conceptualize the entire three-dimensional container but only part of it (due to the fact 
that his/her perspective is limited). Note that temporal relations are not depicted here and that 
the end of the arrow is the only indicator of the resultant situation. One should also keep in 
mind that the trajector is never conceptualizable without a landmark, and that the whole event 
must be thought of as taking place relative to an implicit, higher-order ground “behind” the 
depicted schematic, in relation to which the event of the ball rolling into the room functions as 
trajector. In the case of such a motion event the trajector is realized as an NP with nominative 
case which agrees with the verb. The landmark is coded by another NP with oblique case
122
. 
The verb encodes some motion and manner of motion. The preposition contributes the path to 
the motion. Together, verb and preposition encode the relation in which trajector and 
landmark stand. 
 
 
                                                 
121
 For symbolology see the list of symbols at the beginning of this book. 
122
 For now only the presence of nominative cases is of some importance. All other cases will be treated as 
oblique for now (cf. Blake 
2
2001: 30f.). But see chapter 4. 
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Figure 3.25: Correspondences between spatial conceptual structure and linguistic
o
 structure 
for (3.2) John dances 
 
Figure 3.25 depicts an event in which some relatively small, mobile object moves in relation 
to an unspecified, relatively large, immobile background. The object, a person moving either 
around its own axis or along a trajectory or both, is therefore again conceptualized as trajector 
relative to an unspecified ground. The background might, but need not be, entirely in the 
conceptual field. It is, however, not linguistically
o
 realized but left implicit, as is the concrete 
manner of movement. The trajector functions again as nominative NP, agreeing with the verb. 
Note how much conceptual freedom a hypothetical speaker leaves for a hearer in making this 
utterance (given the hearer has no percept of this event at his/her disposal). If John dances 
really encodes the speaker’s conceptualization and must be decoded to enable the hearer’s 
conceptualization, and if conceptualization is simulated perception, then there need not be 
much overlap in both conceptualizations to make successful communication possible in this 
case (depending on the communicative goals of the interactants). 
 
 
Figure 3.26: Correspondences between spatial conceptual structure and linguistic
o
 structure 
for (3.3) The sun is going down 
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Figure 3.26 shows the spatial conceptual layout of the sun going down.
123
 The sun is – 
apparently – the moving object here. It is also small relative to the landmark against which it 
moves. The trajector leaves the conceptual field here and has no specified point of destination. 
That the sun moves further downwards after it left the conceptual field is an inference but not 
an experience. It is possible that the sun disappears while it remains in the scope of the 
conceptual field. This might sound contradictorily but imagine that the ground against which 
the sun moves consists of the sky and the ocean. Then the sun will gradually disappear in 
front of the sky but behind the ocean. That means the landmark turns out to be bipartite as the 
trajector is moving. In other words, the sun as trajector occludes part of the upper landmark 
but the lower landmark gradually occludes the entire trajector. Again it is the trajector which 
is linguistically
o
 realized as nominative NP and which agrees with the verb. Neither of the 
landmarks is realized but clearly implicit in the directed motion of the trajector. Only the path 
of the trajector is realized by means of the particle down. 
 
 
Figure 3.27: Correspondences between spatial conceptual structure and linguistic
o
 structure 
for (3.4) I hate you 
 
There are two aspects in which the constellation in Figure 3.27 differs from the previous ones. 
First, the conceptualizer is identical with the trajector. Second, featurally the landmark hardly 
differs from the trajector, i.e., both objects seem to be similarly trajector-apt. The reason why 
conceptually “I” is the trajector is that it is “I” whose state is specified relative to “you” and 
not the other way around. That means “you” is the entity against which the status of “I” is 
characterized, just like the room is the entity against which the status of the ball is 
characterized in (3.1) above, and like the implicit background of the sun is the entity against 
which the downward motion of the sun is settled in (3.3) above (cf. Talmy 2000, I, 315f.). 
What we see here is that some non-spatial relation – hate of one person toward another – 
exploits the conceptual mechanisms originating in the spatial domain and with this in (visual) 
perception (cf. Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 1999; see sections 3.3.2/3.3.3 on a discussion of 
“exploitation”). Although there is no movement involved in the circumstance of a person 
hating another person there is a grey arrow depicted in Figure 3.27, complementing the black 
line indicating a stative relation. This arrow symbolizes fictive motion/movement. That means 
building a concept from the utterance I hate you involves the fictive movement of the eye 
gaze of the conceptualizer/trajector to the referent of you, or, in other words, the directedness 
of the circumstance of hating. The linking mechanism is the one familiar from the previous 
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 Icon: the body of C indicates our looking at the scene from the side. 
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examples: The trajector is linked to the nominative NP, the landmark is linked to an oblique 
NP, the circumstance is expressed by the verb. 
 
 
Figure 3.28: Correspondences between spatial conceptual structure and linguistic
o
 structure 
for (3.5) I have a headache 
 
Possession, which we are talking about when dealing with (3.5), is a quite intricate matter. 
Even apart from its formal expression in language linguists have no unanimous concept of 
possession (e.g., Seiler 1983; Chappell & McGregor 1996; Heine 1997; Lehmann 1998; 
Langacker 2000, ch. 6; Stolz et al. 2008). However, something like a minimal consensus 
seems to be that possession exhibits at least some specific components: a possessor (PR), a 
possessee (PM), and the possessive relation itself which is often characterized as PM’s 
location at PR and/or PR’s control of PM (cf. Stolz et al. 2008: 17ff.). Moreover, the relation 
between PR and PM may vary along a scale of separability, usually termed (in)alienability. I 
would like to put the control aspect aside for now (this is rather an actional matter; see section 
3.2.2) and capture the intuitions on possession by means of location and separability alone. 
PMs that have a constant, fixed location at PR and/or are hardly separable from them are 
inalienable from PR to a high degree. An example would be the body parts of an animate 
possessor. Things whose position may be at PR but where their being located at PR is a 
contingent and temporal matter are more alienable. An example would be the knife, fork, and 
spoon someone “has” during dinner. Looking at the spatial conceptual structure underlying 
(3.5), it is only a stative relation of a trajector relative to a landmark such that the former “is 
located at” the latter. But possession is not location but supposedly location plus something 
else to which separability belongs. I would like to characterize this second component of 
possession by means of looking at the verb have in English (and haben in German) which is 
the most conventional means of expressing (clause-level) possessive relations. When we look 
into the semantics of have we actually find a spatial conceptual correlate of control: English 
have and German haben derive from Germanic *habǣ- which is the durative form of 
Germanic *hafja- ‘lift’ (‘heben’) (cf. Kluge 242002). Thus, have has gone through a process of 
meaning extension at the beginning of which it meant something like ‘hold’ (German halten) 
which can very well be treated as the durative of ‘lift’. Applying these insights to the spatial 
conceptual structures underlying possession, one can identify it as the combination of PM’s 
being located at PR and at the same time making contact (in terms of “holding”) with it. 
When we relate this to the perceptual mechanisms outlined in previous sections, we see that a 
possessor and its possesse – apart from standing in a possessive relationship – also make a 
good figure if integrated into one. When a human possessor “has” some possessee and 
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engages in some movement, then he/she is, as a whole, the figure of movement such that the 
PM moves with him/her. If he/she does not have it, it does not move with him/her. It is then 
alienable. On the other hand, body parts always (or nearly always) move with their PR. 
Together, PM and PR make a good integrated figure, even more so when one considers their 
frequency of joint occurrence, i.e., they never (or hardly ever) occur in isolation. This special 
form of contact is simply the part/whole relation of body and parts and consequently the 
inalienable possessive relation par exellence. Holding cutlery in one’s hands while moving, in 
contrast, makes the mover with the cutlery also a good figure, but they often occur 
independently of each other, and so this is an alienable instance of possession. 
Keeping the making-contact core of possession in mind, we see that the PM must be the 
trajector relative to the PR. The PM is more mobile and changes location more often relative 
to the PR. At the same time, the PR has the PM at his/her “disposal” (cf. Langacker 2000: 
177), i.e., he/she can (in the case of dishes) or must (in the case of an ache) act with it. 
Something like this must be the core of the concept of possession, i.e., its conceptual structure 
without any metaphorical extensions and sociocultural impositions the additions of which 
yield the concepts underlying gehören zu ‘belong to’ or besitzen and gehören ‘own’. 
The emergent pattern from the cases further above is that trajectors are syntactically realized 
as nominative NPs which agree with the verb. But in the present example it is obviously the 
PR, functioning as a landmark of the PM, which occurs in this form. It is characteristic of the 
possessive relation with have that the trajector/landmark-syntactic complement mapping is 
reversed in its syntactic realization.
124
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 This analysis disagrees with that of Langacker (2008a: 507) who identifies PM as landmark and PR as 
trajector. Given the definitions of trajector and landmark developed here, there this analysis is not available here. 
However, Langacker characterizes his trajector differently, namely as “the entity being located, evaluated, or 
described.” (cf. Langacker 2008a: 70). However, I think that in a sentence like Alex has the earrings Alex is the 
entity being evaluated, but that the earrings are those being located. Consequently, both entities must be analyzed 
as trajectors, while there are apparently no landmarks, which I deem an impossible and undesirable 
configuration. In contrast to Langacker, Lakoff & Johnson (1999) note the shift in trajector-landmark 
configuration in going from a locational to a possessive relation. 
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Figure 3.29: Correspondences between spatial conceptual structure and linguistic
o
 structure 
for (3.6) I give you flowers 
 
 
In (3.6) and the corresponding Figure 3.29 another factor comes into play, complicating 
matters considerably: time. While in the foregoing examples the trajector was mostly situated 
relative to a landmark and changed its position relative to that same landmark, we have here 
multiple trajectors and landmarks at different levels of generality, due to the fact that the 
objects involved in the event play different roles at different points in time of the event. 
Although the temporal factor will be topic of section 3.4, consider the following: In the event 
of me giving you flowers it is the conceptualizer (me) functioning as landmark in the first 
instance. For the first conceptualized part of the event the flowers are located at and in control 
of me (i.e., a possessive relation). “I” am a larger object than the flowers and the flowers are, 
given their affordances on the basis of what a human individual can potentially do with them, 
more mobile. In transferring the flowers to you, I must engage in movement, i.e., I must 
somehow act such that the flowers move towards you. In doing so only part of the giving 
person moves, namely the arm (indicated by the thin lines leaving C/tr towards tr/lm). Even if 
I hand over the flowers while walking it is the arm which moves additionally to the rest of my 
body, which makes the faster movement, and which is smaller relative to the rest of the 
moving body; the movement of the arm is embedded in the movement of the body. On this 
level of generality/specificity the flowers in the hand of the moving arm function together as 
the trajector relative to the rest of the body. On a more general level “me”, as a whole, 
including my state or movement plus my moving arm and the flowers, functions as a trajector 
relative to you. In that way I, whether moving my whole body or not, but with the moving 
arm, with the flowers in hand, am – as a trajector – situated or characterized as a whole 
relative to you, namely in that Í am the giver of flowers with respect to the landmark which is 
you. Note that there are switches in focus of attention involved here, or, as one could say, 
switches in the mode of seeing, like with the Rubin face or the Necker cube (see Figures 3.2 
and 3.3 above). It is therefore not possible to simultaneously conceptualize the arm of “I” as 
trajector and the whole “I” including the arm, also as trajector. Thus, conceptualizing a giving 
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event may involve several such switches which constitute changes in trajector-landmark 
configurations, while it remains an integrated event. Figure 3.29 above can therefore only 
approximately capture the actual circumstances in a giving event (but see section 3.4 and 
chapter 4.4.4). One should note, however, one additional aspect, namely the flowers’ 
(depicted as lm/tr) functioning as landmark of the giver’s movement towards it, and as 
trajector of its own motion relative to the addressee of giving. The linguistic
o
 realization of 
this event will be discussed later. It is worth mentioning that the utterance I give you flowers 
seems to emphasize not the “I”’s possession of flowers, but the transfer of the latter. Thus, the 
trajector of the first movement/motion sub-part of the entire event of giving is realized as an 
NP in the nominative, agreeing with the verb – in the now familiar and straightforward way. 
Both other objects are realized as oblique NPs (for the how and why, again see sections 3.4 
and 4). 
 
 
Figure 3.30: Correspondences between spatial conceptual structure and linguistico structure 
for (3.7) John pours water into the glass 
 
In Figure 3.30 the movement of John (tr) towards the water (lm) is depicted. In a further sub-
part of the circumstance the water becomes a trajector when it moves towards, i.e., in 
reference to, the glass. The first mover in this event (John), which is also the first trajector, is 
again realized in the familiar way. The object functioning as landmark of John’s movement 
and as trajector of the motion towards the glass (namely, the water) is realized as an oblique 
NP. The concept of GLASS as a landmark is realized as an NP following a preposition. We see 
here again that not only the applied level of specificity/generality in conceptualization (as in 
the case of the body, arm and flowers in 3.6) but also the temporal organization of 
circumstance concepts is associated with changes in trajector-landmark configurations.  
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Figure 3.31: Correspondences between spatial conceptual structure and linguistico structure 
for (3.8) Alex ähnelt Mario ‘Alex resembles Mario’ 
 
In Figure 3.31 we have the famous case of a seemingly symmetric relation. Symmetry in this 
context means that one would think that the relation of Mario to Alex is identical to that of 
Alex to Mario. This is not valid for I hate you, for instance, because while the relation of “I” 
to “you” is one of hating, the reverse need not be the case. But while it might be true that if 
Mario resembles Alex, Alex also resembles Mario, this ignores the role of the distribution of 
attention (and simulated foveal seeing in terms of fictive motion/movement) in such relations. 
Obviously, we have two similar candidates for being the trajector here. The reason Alex 
functions as trajector here is that it is Alex whose state, i.e., some feature of him and not of 
Mario, is specified relative to Mario and not the other way around. That means Mario is the 
entity against which some feature of Alex is characterized. As it were, the simulated eye gaze 
of the conceptualizer starts at Alex, picks out some feature (which is only possible by means 
of (simulated) foveal seeing, i.e., a simulated visual focus on it) and checks it against the 
landmark constituted by Mario. This course of events clearly differs from that in which the 
roles are reversed, as given in Figure 3.32 below, even if the results of both 
conceptualizations may be identical. It is in both cases the trajector which is realized as the 
nominative NP that agrees with the verb. 
 
 
Figure 3.32: Correspondences between spatial conceptual structure and linguistic
o
 structure 
for (3.9) Mario ähnelt Alex ‘Mario resembles Alex’ 
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Figure 3.33: Correspondences between spatial conceptual structure and linguistic
o
 structure 
for (3.10) Mario und Alex ähneln sich ‘Mario and Alex resemble each other’ 
 
In discussing Figure 3.33 we will start by looking at the linguistic
o
 structure first and ask then 
what conceptual implications it bears. In this Figure I have proposed a static spatial 
conceptual structure supposedly underlying Mario und Alex ähneln sich ‘Mario and Alex 
resemble each other’ but involving fictive motion again. Generalizing on the mechanisms of 
the previous cases where the trajector was linked to the nominative NP agreeing with the verb 
one would treat Mario und Alex as a unit here, functioning as trajector conceptually, since 
they stand in nominative case and, constituting a plurality of individuals, agree with the verb. 
Figure 3.33 shows something different, however. The reason is that I consider the 
implications of the solution just mentioned as mistaken. It is actually not the case that the 
sentence means that [Mario and Alex] resembles [Mario and Alex] but that Mario resembles 
Alex and that Alex resembles Mario, which are not identical with respect to the course of 
conceptualization, as we have seen. There is thus not a unique trajector [Mario and Alex] but 
the spatial conceptual structures underlying Alex ähnelt Mario and Mario ähnelt Alex added 
together. Conceptually this would mean that we have the spatial conceptual structures shown 
in Figures 3.31 and 3.32 together, conceptualized one at a time, as underlying (3.10). It is 
conceivable that first the conceptualization underlying Mario ähnelt Alex takes place and 
then, by a shift of focus, that underlying Alex ähnelt Mario. In other words, the spatial 
conceptualization of Mario and Alex ähneln sich would be constituted by the simulated (and 
maybe repeated) gaze of the conceptualizer from Mario (trajector) to Alex (landmark) and 
from Alex (trajector) back to Mario (landmark). From this perspective, the relation between 
the linguistic
o
 structure of (3.10) and the spatial conceptual structure in Figure 3.33 is all but 
straightforward, in that the nominative NP does not code a single trajector or landmark but 
two trajectors from two different conceptualizations at two different points in time at once.
125
 
But for reasons of learnability and cognitive economy it would be desirable to be able to 
relate trajector-landmark structures straightforwardly to syntactic structures. But what [NP 
and NP ähneln sich] codes lies simply outside what is conceptually possible, since it is an 
instruction to simulate a perception that cannot be obeyed as easily as (3.1) or (3.2). Why 
should such structures exist, then? For a symbol system it is no problem to develop a unique 
symbolic assembly (Mario und Alex ähneln sich) coding two relations at a time that must be 
                                                 
125
 That this problem is not due to the coordination in the nominative and agreeing NP can simply be 
demonstrated by examples like Mario and Alex enter the book store where Mario and Alex together constitute a 
unique though complex (i.e., non-atomic) trajector relative to the landmark of the book store. 
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conceptualized one after another; see especially section 3.3.8 on this feature of the linguistic
o
 
symbol system). From the perspective of conceptualization and because conceptualization is 
simulated perception it is impossible for us to preserve this simultaneity the syntactic structure 
pretends. We cannot distribute our attentive foveal seeing and track what is going on in our 
environments in the way it would be required by this sentence, if understood as an instruction 
for conceptualization, due to the limitations of our biotic makeup. In syntax it is possible to 
fuse two conceptualizations that are similar but not aligned with respect to their trajector-
landmark configurations into one structure, i.e., to synchronize, or compress, what is 
conceptually asynchronous, or uncompressed.  
 
 
Figure 3.34: Correspondences between spatial conceptual structure and linguistic
o
 structure 
for (3.11) Vor der Kirche steht Alex rechts von Matthias ‘Alex is standing to the right of 
Matthiasin front of the church.’ 
 
What is new in Figure 3.34 above is two things. This is first the implementation two trajector-
landmark configurations from two levels of specificity into one clause. In (3.11) the position 
of Alex in space is determined relative to the position of Matthias in space. That is, Alex 
functions as trajector relative to the landmark Matthias. The conceptualizer singles out Alex 
and specifies his position in reference to Matthias. Now both Alex’ and Matthias’ joint 
position is again specified relative to a higher-order landmark against which Alex and 
Matthias function as an integrated trajector. This higher-order landmark is Vor der Kirche ‘In 
front of the church’. Hence, in the sentence (3.11) a higher-order landmark is made explicit, 
while it is left implicit in, for instance, (3.2) above (John dances). In this way the higher-order 
landmark situates the relation in which Alex and Matthias stand in the conceptual field, while 
it leaves the inherent nature of the relation untouched.  
The second new aspect in (3.11) and the correspondent Figure 3.34 is that the position of the 
trajector Alex relative to Matthias can be specified only by resorting to a reference frame that 
is applied to the relation between Alex and Matthias. Forget Figure 3.34 for a moment and 
treat (3.11) as an utterance detached from the spatial relations depicted in that Figure. Then 
you might find the utterance ambiguous with respect to the exact relation of Alex and 
Matthias. What does rechts von ‘to the right of’ mean here? Is Alex to the right of Matthias 
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relative to (a) their position in the conceptualizer’s conceptual field? Or is Alex to the right of 
Matthias relative to (b) Matthias’ viewing direction? The answer depends on the reference 
frame one applies (cf. Evans & Green 2006: 71ff., Levinson 1996). If the speaker leaves 
unspecified the reference frame he/she has applied (let’s say (a) the conceptualizer-based 
frame) and if the hearer takes the utterance as an instruction to conceptualize a situation, 
he/she might conceptualize it differently from the speaker (let’s say by using (b) the 
landmark-based frame) which might lead to a misunderstanding.  
With respect to the linguistic
o
 realization, Alex is an NP in nominative case that agrees with 
the verb. Matthias is realized as NP in an oblique case, governed by a preposition which 
together with rechts specifies the relation between the two NPs. The higher-order landmark 
Vor der Kirche is realized as a distinct and optional syntactic unit, namely a prepositional 
phrase. Alex’ and Matthias’ role as a higher-order trajector is only implicit in (3.12). 
 
 
Figure 3.35: Correspondences between spatial conceptual structure and linguistic
o
 structure 
for (3.12) Sie stehen vor der Kirche ‘They are standing in front of the church’ 
 
Sentence (3.12) and Figure 3.35 leave unspecified the spatial relation between the objects 
referred to by sie ‘they’. It is also unspecified whether it is persons, cars, Alex and Matthias, 
or the Ten Commandments carved in stone that stand in front of the church in the 
circumstance coded by (3.12). In any case the referents of sie are treated as an integrated 
trajector here and are located in reference to the church as landmark. If it is Alex and Matthias 
from Figure 3.34 which constitute this trajector here, it is the higher-order trajector-landmark 
configuration left implicit in Figure 3.34 (i.e., that between [Alex and Matthias] and the 
church) which is verbalized in (3.12). Syntactically, the higher-order landmark in Figure 3.34 
(the church) becomes an obligatory NP in Figure 3.35, and the implicit higher-order trajector 
in Figure 3.34 ([Alex and Matthias]) functions as nominative NP and agrees with the verb in 
Figure 3.35. Note that the obligatoriness of the oblique NP in (3.12)
126
 is the result of the fact 
that this sentence codes a trajector-landmark configuration on a single level of specificity, 
while in (3.11) the PP Vor der Kirche is optional because it constitutes a higher-order 
landmark relative to the trajector-landmark configuration of Alex standing besides Matthias.  
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 Sie stehen ‘They are standing.’ may be a grammatical sentence in German when the question of how ‘they’ 
are located in space is focused. A focus on where they are located makes a PP obligatory. 
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As a result, what we see when considering (3.11) and (3.12) as well as their corresponding 
conceptual structures is that when applying different trajector-landmark configurations to a 
single real-world circumstance conceptually, this results in very different syntactic structures 
when verbalizing these concepts, demonstrating a quite regular conceptualization-syntactic 
structure correspondence. 
 
 
Figure 3.36: Correspondences between spatial conceptual structure and linguistic
o
 structure 
for (3.13) Something happened in Marburg 
 
The syntactic structure of (3.13) is similar to what we have seen, but sentence (3.13) and the 
corresponding Figure 3.36 demonstrate the power of language especially clearly. Marburg 
functions as the landmark here against which something is specified, whereby “something” is 
seemingly functioning as the trajector here. However, “something” has a potential generality 
which is not achievable in sensation and eventually even in conceptualization. (As has been 
mentioned, there is no conceivable figure/ground configuration associated with something if 
this refers to the conceptualization ALEX FALLS OFF HIS BIKE IN FRONT OF THE INSTITUTE. We 
have seen, however, that trajector-landmark segregation is more flexible. How can a tr-lm 
configuration underlying (3.13) be specified, then? Taken as an instruction for a hearer and 
abiding by the rule that trajectors are realized as nominative NPs that agree with the verb, the 
hearer will interpret something in this position as anything that is conceivable as an object in 
sensation and conceptualization. However, the verb happen requires the expression for a 
whole event in that position, i.e., a whole trajector-landmark configuration instead of an 
object as trajector. Trivially (from a sensation perspective), an event is not an object and 
cannot be one, given the way in which objects have been characterized in previous sections. 
Even if conceptualization might be more flexible with respect to the trajector-landmark 
configuration than sensation is with respect to figure/ground configuration, it cannot make an 
event an object. (What this means for linking and for interpretation will be discussed in the 
rest of this chapter.) 
To sum up, spatial conceptual structures of states, processes, and activities are reflected in the 
syntactic realizations of the respective circumstances in fairly regular ways. Possible 
generalizations based on the sample above are the following: 
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(i) The trajector-landmark asymmetry in conceptualization is reflected by an asymmetry 
in syntactic structure. The trajector is mostly expressed by means of a “privileged”127 
syntactic complement (PSC) – an NP – that bears nominative case (in German) and 
agrees with the verb. The landmark is expressed by other means, mostly by NPs in 
dative or accusative case or as part of PPs. What one finds here is an instance of 
diagrammatic iconicity (Peirce 
2
1960, 1983: 64, Haiman 1980, 1983, 1984, Manning 
& Parker 1989): “An iconic diagram is a systematic arrangement of signs, none of 
which necessarily resembles its referent, but whose relationships to each other mirror 
the relationships of their referents.” (Haiman 1980: 515). Thus, while a PSC does not 
necessarily  resemble an instance of a trajector (in fact, it hardly ever does), and any 
other complement hardly ever resembles an instance of a landmark, the tr-lm 
configuration can be diagrammatically reflected by the syntactic configuration. In 
this sense, a syntactic structure can be said to be motivated (Saussure 1916: 186ff.).  
 
To be sure, which object is trajector and which object/location is landmark is 
determined by the same factors that are operative in figure/ground segregation (see 
section 3.1.3.3). There is some optionality there, when more than one object is 
figure-apt. 
 
 There seems to be a strong tendency in German and English to make the trajector of 
a state, process, or activity the PSC. Is there any explanation for that? Remember 
what makes objects figure-apt. They are small and mobile relative to what else is 
there. In the section on salience it was shown that figures are also attention-grabbing 
(which correlates with eye-fixation and foveal seeing). Both aspects apply to 
trajectors, too (except that they receive attention because of their pertinence, not their 
salience). It is thus constitutive of trajectors that they need something like anchoring 
in space (their position relative to what else is there) and time (their position relative 
to their previous and next position) which can very well be considered an aspect of 
the now familiar large-scale law of closure. Anchoring trajectors contributes to 
closure in that an otherwise “free-floating” trajector is more or less definitely situated 
against a landmark. Crucially, this situating of the trajector does not only involve the 
landmark but also the relation holding between it and the landmark. This is the 
reason trajectors are preferred as privileged syntactic complements: Because of its 
inherent features the conceptualizer preferably follows the trajector’s path with 
his/her gaze and produces a verbalization that is somewhat iconic with respect to the 
order of the event, pursued by means of the trajector. However, this does not exclude 
the possibility of making the landmark the PSC, as demonstrated, for instance, by 
have-possessives, certain verbs often treated as having recipient or experiencer 
subjects (e.g., receive, get, obtain, recall, miss, need), and passives. This corresponds 
to an alternation in the mode of conceptualization, but leaves the component parts 
unaltered. These cases will be treated here as inversed mappings. Concerning the 
respective conceptualizations, a state, process, or activity concept is built by 
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 The term is borrowed from van Valin (2005) who calls “privileged syntactic argument” what was traditionally 
called “subject”. Van Valin rejects the subject notion. 
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conceptualizing some state of an object or a relation between objects in terms of (a) 
trajector-landmark configuration(s), in just the way described above and in previous 
sections. However, research in visual imagery has shown that cognizers are able to 
“examine” what I call concepts in different ways (cf. Thompson et al. 2008). Thus, 
when a concept has been built up, from an allocentric or egocentric perspective, the 
conceptualizer is able to examine the concept and thereby examine the spatial layout 
of the scene by changing his/her perspective. This could happen by scanning the 
scene in terms of simulated eye fixation on parts of the (complex) concept, starting at 
the landmark and proceeding to the trajector.  Thus the verbalization can be iconic in 
two ways: It either respects the sequence of the trajector’s positions through time 
relative to the landmark (e.g., NP is in NP’s hands) or it respects the course of 
examination of the whole circumstance concept in terms of the path of the simulated 
eye gaze of the conceptualizer (e.g., NP has NP).
128
 In the former case, we get a 
pairing of the trajector with the PSC and of the landmark with another complement. 
In the latter case, we may get a pairing of the landmark with the PSC and of the 
trajector with another complement.
129
 Scanning a circumstance is even possible in 
the case of stative, i.e., simple circumstances – where the percept/concept does not 
have any sub-parts. Where this applies I will talk about fictive movement/motion (cf. 
Talmy 2000, I, ch. 2, Langacker 
22002, ch. 5, on “fictive”, and “subjective” motion, 
respectively). 
 
(ii) The relation of trajector and landmark to one another is expressed by verbs or by 
verbs plus prepositions. A PP therefore incorporates part of the landmark and part of 
the relation which holds between the trajector and the landmark. 
 
(iii) If trajector-landmark (tr-lm) configurations from different levels are expressed, the 
coding of the lower level respects (i) and (ii) (see Figures 3.34 and 3.35). The higher-
level tr-lm configuration uses the lower-level tr-lm configuration as the trajector and 
mostly PPs as the landmark.  
 
(iv) If a trajector-landmark configuration relates real possessors and possessees (i.e., 
relations going beyond mere location and factoring in alienability and part/whole 
relations), the syntactic realization may be shifted towards an inverse mapping (see 
Figure 3.28). 
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 Langacker handles this by means of two concurring concepts: trajector-landmark alignment and so-called 
“reference point relationships”. The latter is reserved for situations in which it is necessary to “invoke the 
conception of one entity in order to establish ‘mental contact’ with another.” (Langacker 2008a: 83). The first 
entity functions as a reference point for the second. At least to me it is not clear how trajector-landmark 
relationships and reference point relationships can be differentiated from each other. Wherever there is a 
reference point, it seems to me, this is – by definition – a landmark in the sense employed here. Langacker needs 
reference point relationships to account for the kind of “inversed” processing observable in possessives, for 
instance. 
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 At least with respect to passives we know that their interpretation takes longer and is less accurate than with 
the corresponding active sentences (cf. Ferreira 2003). It has been shown that this effect is not syntactically 
induced. It is a future task to test whether it is the landmark-PSC pairing which causes these effects.  
183 
 
(v) The organization of syntactic structures in terms of how parts of speech are arranged 
to form well-formed structures seems to be “blind” to the level of 
specificity/generality of some trajector-landmark configurations coded by a such a 
structure (Figures 3.24 to 3.36 work by the same syntactic rules and illustrate this 
nicely), but it seems to be “sensitive” to situations where trajector-landmark 
configurations from different levels of specificity/generality enter a single syntactic 
structure (as illustrated by the comparison of the conceptual structure-syntactic 
structure correspondences in Figures 3.34 and 3.35). 
 
(vi) Among the circumstances which show special behavior with respect to their 
linguistic realization are are those allowing for alternative verbalizations, e.g., 
resemblance (ähneln ‘resemble), commercial and other exchanges (kaufen ‘buy’, 
verkaufen ‘sell), and so-called experiencer relations (jmdn. vermissen ‘miss s.o.’, 
jmdm. fehlen ‘be missed by so.’). These verbalizations compete against each other 
with regard to the question as to which participant “object” concept is verbalized as 
the PSC: the trajector or the landmark. This competition can now be shown to have 
two possible sources: First, the objects involved are equally figure/trajector-apt, so 
they are equally good candidates for being realized as the PSC, and this is lexicalized 
in the respective verbs (resemblance, commercial exchange; cf. Fillmore 1977). 
Second, inverse mapping of a state, process, or activity is lexicalized (where the 
verbalization with vermissen is inversed in that the landmark is the PSC). 
 
In the previous section I have already hinted at several shortcomings in the regularity of the 
relationship between spatial conceptual structure and syntactic structure. The most important 
ones are summarized here: 
 
(vii) The conceptual trajector tends to but need not be syntactically realized as the PSC. 
This holds for two-participant relations (NP has NP) and for certain circumstance 
sub-parts in three-participant relations. As has been shown, in a ditransitive relation 
the transferred thing functions as both the landmark and the trajector in the course of 
conceptualization. In its role as trajector the transferred thing (as moving relative to 
the landmark of the addressee of the transfer) it is not realized as the PSC. This 
complicates acquisition for the language learner and interpretation for the hearer.  
 
(viii) Syntax can compress what is actually conceptually uncompressed. When 
considering (3.10) once more, we find exactly this case. The syntactic structure 
makes us believe that there is a single relation holding between two objects (Mario 
und Alex ähneln sich). However, as I have outlined, there is no corresponding single 
relation in conceptualization (*MARIO AND ALEX RESEMBLE EACH OTHER). Rather, 
where language suggests a static relation there is actually a complex 
conceptualization process encompassing two relations at a time (MARIO RESEMBLES 
ALEX and ALEX RESEMBLES MARIO).  
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(ix) A related problem is that if one posits a tight (spatial) conceptual structure-syntax 
relationship, i.e., a systematic diagrammatic iconicity between both, then syntax 
makes us believe that nominal expressions code concepts of objects. This is clearly 
not the case. The reason why this is not the case is neither a methodical (semantic 
considerations have no additional explanatory value; cf. Chomsky 
2
2002) nor a 
theoretical one (the mind is modularly organized; Chomsky 1986, 13), but an 
empirical one: In perception objects were characterized by recourse to the integration 
of features into figures and the segregation of figures from grounds. In 
conceptualization we have seen that this same organizational principle (in terms of 
trajector and landmark) is more flexibly applicable because the conceptualizer is not 
subjected to vantage point limitations in conceptualization to the same degree as in 
actual perceptual situations. What is the biggest possible object in conceptualization, 
then, when we apply the perceptual definition of object to conceptualization? Is 
[Alex falling from his bike] a possible object in conceptualization? Is [Alex falling 
from his bike in front of the institute] a possible conceptual object? Is [the 
discrimination of women in Wilhelmine Germany] conceptually an object? The 
answer must be a clear “no” in all cases because these units refer to whole 
circumstances that have temporal extension. They do not have object features, 
although they can all be verbally expressed by a single pronoun, as in [This] 
happened in Marburg, too. The consequences for the syntax-semantics relationship 
as well as for the linking competence (especially interpretation) will be the topic of 
the subsequent chapters. 
 
Before we can turn to the question of how these  shortcomings can be handled in the context 
of a theory of the syntax-semantics relationship, the abovementioned correspondences and 
discrepancies between sensation, conceptual structure and syntactic structure are sketchily 
summarized in Figure 3.37. 
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Figure 3.37: Correspondences and discrepancies in the relationship between sensation, 
spatial conceptualization, and syntactic structure 
 
Figure 3.37 illustrates that sensation and spatial conceptualization share their organizational 
principle: the segregation of the visual/conceptual field in terms of figure/ground and 
trajector/landmark, respectively. This is indicated by the double arrow connection the levels. 
In these respects, the two levels are iconic relative to each other. There is a difference in 
quality, however, in how they make use of this organizational principle. While sensation 
meets a bodily, i.e., anatomical, biophysical limit in what can function as figure, the character 
of conceptualization as a simulation – which is not bound to actualities – allows it to take any 
conceivable vantage point to look at some state of affairs and to apply trajector-landmark 
segregations on higher levels of generality than in most cases of sensation. This happens at 
the expense of the definiteness, or individuation, of objects (see next section). That the two 
levels diverge in this respect is indicated by the absence of arrows in the line connecting them. 
Quite similar to the relationship between sensation and spatial conceptualization, the latter 
stands in a close relationship also with syntactic structure in that there are regular 
correspondences between their organizational principles (diagrammatic iconicity). The parts 
of speech identified by linguists are arranged in a way in syntactic structures which 
demonstrates a fair correspondence with the spatial conceptual notions of trajector and 
landmark: The trajector is coded by the privileged syntactic complement, the circumstance is 
coded by the verb (plus preposition), and the landmark is coded by an oblique complement.  
 
On the other hand, we have seen that in using language, speakers tend to exploit these 
correspondences between both levels in that they code some conceptual contents as if they 
were object-like, although actually they are not, e.g., the PSC or the oblique complement code 
whole circumstances instead of objects in the perceptual and conceptual sense. In doing so the 
same means of the symbol system are utilized to code conceptual structures of different sorts, 
e.g., objects and circumstances. One could term this type of language use hypostatization: 
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Speakers treat circumstances as if they were objects in the sense outlined in the sections on 
sensation (see also Foley 1937; Mackenzie 2004; Hartmann 1996, 2006; Hartmann & Lange 
2000; Janich 2009).
130
 Without pursuing this much further here, and without claiming 
explanatory adequacy, sensing an object that makes a “good” figure and making this the 
trajector in identification/conceptualization, and then coding it as the PSC in syntax 
presumably constitutes maximal “nouniness” some part of speech can acquire. But the more 
the syntactic level exploits the mode of functioning of the conceptualization level, the less 
“nounier” this part of speech will become. This could be one of the causes of the cross-
linguistically observable syntactic category squishes: Some nouns are nounier than other 
nouns. The present proposal gives a partial explanation of the non-trivial fact that concrete, 
perceptible things are the nouniest nouns if expressed by nominals (cf. Sasse 2001 for an 
overview). Since it takes motivation to be primary to exploitation, the present proposal 
furthermore predicts that if a language hypostatizes states, relations, quantifications etc. by 
using nominal expressions for them, it also has nominal expressions for “true” objects in 
sensation/conceptualization. 
 
To sum up, while the relationship between the concept ALEX and the expression Alex is 
arbitrary, and while the relationship between the conceptualization of A BALL ROLLING INTO A 
ROOM and its expression as The ball rolls into the room is one of motivation due to 
diagrammatic iconicity, the relationship between the conceptualizations ALEX RESEMBLING 
MARIO and MARIO RESEMBLING ALEX, and its expression by compression as Mario und Alex 
ähneln sich is one of exploitation. 
 
 
3.3.3 Hypostatization and the relationship between trajector/landmark and thing/circumstance 
Clearly, it is hypostatization in the form of exploiting the organizational similarities between 
conceptualization and syntax which allows speakers to make utterances like Unemployment 
threatens the youth in Spain, I have a headache, or The immune system fights off disease (last 
example by Lakoff & Johnson 1999: 217), utterances we hear and produce every day, since 
the underlying mechanisms have become second nature for us.
131
 Though, when looking at 
these utterances we see that maximum the referent of I may constitute an object in the now 
familiar sense (if identified with the body). Unemployment, the youth, a headache, the 
immune system and disease are clearly not objects but – very roughly – features of objects or 
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 Foley (1937: 491f.) characterizes hypostatization as “the frequent tendency to consider purely conceptual 
constructs as real substances or forces, i.e., to make them into and to regard them as separate, distinct, actual, or 
personal existences.” However, the problem seems to lie even deeper than this. In the view taken here, what is 
hypostatized is not even “purely conceptual constructs”, but purely linguistico constructs considered thing-like in 
conceptualization by speakers (among them scientists, especially in faculty psychology). Hartmann (1996: 325f.; 
my translation) describes the problem more properly by stating that “objects [Gegenstände], postulated at the 
level of theoretical constructs, are in their methodical status no longer differentiated from objects on the 
phenomenal level, and thus subsumed with them in the domain of the physical.” In doing so one ignores the fact 
that objects at the level of theory are – in contrast to objects at the level of phenomena – not accessible and 
traceable independently from the theories in which they occur (cf. Hartmann 1996: 326). Hypostatization is 
without question a universal or nearly universal property of language but must be avoided in scientific theories. 
Often, nominalizations may be unproblematic. But in other cases they generate philosophical/scientific pseudo 
problems: While “movement” allows questions as to its beginning, end, direction, and so on, it not necessarily 
possible to state synonymous questions by using the verb “move” (cf. Janich 2009: 128f.). 
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 Indeed, make an utterance is also an instance of hypostatization, as is hypostatization. 
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states “in” which objects “stand”. Other examples of non-objects occupying trajector 
positions are locations (I love the countryside), activities (Waiting makes me angry), and 
events (Akira caused the destruction of the city). Nevertheless, they occupy syntactic 
positions which should – presupposed that motivation by diagrammatic iconicity is by default 
desired – be reserved for trajectors and landmarks, which we should be able to trace back to 
objects of perception, if the theory is adequate. So, how can these considerations be 
accommodated? I propose that one can approach that problem by taking into account at least 
three factors: the notion of conceptual metaphor, affordances (as introduced earlier), and the 
interactive and the practical functions of language as competing motivations. 
 
 
3.3.3.1 Conceptual metaphor and the status of target domain “concepts” 
One source of hypostatizations is conceputal metaphor. The central idea underlying the notion 
of conceptual metaphor (originally Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 1999, 2002) is that we use 
domains of sensorimotor experiences (the scope of which are defined by our sense-organs; see 
section 3.1) in order to conceptualize and verbalize matters for which we do not have any 
means of direct bodily experiences but which nevertheless concern us. That they concern us 
means that they are pertinent for engaging in the physical and social world around us. They 
thus force us to differentiate them by means other than perception. Prominent examples are 
the metaphors TIME AS SPACE, according to which we conceptualize matters of time by means 
of the space concept (e.g., the future is in front of us, the past behind us, time passes by, we 
are approaching the final days etc.), KNOWING IS SEEING, according to which we 
conceptualize the domain of knowing by that of seeing (to shed some light on sth., to get clear 
about sth., the era of enlightenment, I see etc.). One crucial feature of conceptual metaphors is 
that the mapping from a source domain (sensorimotor) to a target domain (not sensorimotor) 
not only comprises punctual correspondences but whole inference structures, i.e., we are able 
to reason (i.e., simulate speaking) about some target domain by utilizing the means of the 
source domain because what is mapped is whole domains with rich internal structures. At the 
same time it is important to note that the target domain “concept” is not identical to the source 
domain concept, i.e., time is not space, and knowing is not seeing (see, for example, Murphy 
1996, 1997, Rakova 2002). This non-identity shows up in the limits of the cross-domain 
mappings, for instance. In the context of the TIME AS SPACE metaphor there is a sub-mapping 
in which we move through time towards the future as we move through space towards some 
destination. When we have missed the exit on the road we are clearly able turn around and to 
drive back and take it. When we have missed an opportunity (which is a temporal notion), we 
are not able to turn around to go back and take it. Rather, the opportunity may occur again. 
This is also the reason why there are multiple metaphors for one target domain the inference 
structures of which may interfere strongly (cf. Murphy 1996: 184ff.).
132
 If one takes the idea 
of conceptual metaphor seriously, one must presumably state that target domains cannot have 
a topological structure on their own (ultimately originating in an retinal image) if they borrow 
the structures of different source domains at the same time which might logically exclude 
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 In introducing the TIME AS SPACE metaphor I have given one example of the MOVING TIME metaphor and one 
of the MOVING EGO metaphor. This is an example of multiple metaphors for a single target domain. Murphy’s 
example is LOVE: LOVE IS A JOURNEY, LOVE IS AN OPPONENT, LOVE IS INSANITY etc. 
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each other. That is, target domains do not have a spatial conceptual structure the origin of 
which would have been constituted by sensorimotor experience. This in turn means they do 
not have an internal trajector-landmark organization but must “borrow” it from concepts 
which do have one. The discussion is still going on about whether target domain concepts 
have their own structures, and if they do, how they can be characterized and described. 
Although I will not be able to answer these questions, I will propose the following treatment 
of conceptual metaphor with respect to our problem of the hypostatization of concepts 
through language: The “concepts” constituting target domains in conceptual metaphor theory 
– time, emotion, the mind, action, social relations, etc. – are without doubt matters which 
concern us, i.e., our engagement in our environments, our engagement in our lifeworlds and 
the organization of our living together. As such we are forced to differentiate them. We 
cannot do this by means of sense organs. But because they are of huge practical relevance for 
us, we need to reason (simulate speaking) about them, communicate them and transduce them 
into instructions for action. I think we accomplish this in the following way: Let us take the 
example I have a headache. A headache is clearly not an object and there is no spatial 
configuration which would be “visible” in someone suffering from an ache in the head. 
However, there may be a similarity in having an object at one’s disposal and suffering ache in 
the head, namely the experience that it is “at” or “in” one, that both relations are mostly of 
limited temporal extension, that it comes and goes, that one has to deal with it once it is there 
and so on. This does not mean that HAVING A HEADACHE has no own internal structure, 
whatever it might be like. Where there is similarity, there must be something to be similar. 
Headaches might upon reflection “seem like” having things at one’s disposal (i.e., possession) 
in the abovementioned respects. It might feel like some other concepts in other respects, 
depending on the actual communicative or other purposes of the cognizer, depending on the 
aspect he/she is attending to. In the same vein time might be conceptualized as moving, or the 
conceptualizer might be conceptualized as moving, dependent on his/her actual purposes. In 
other words, target domain “concepts” are actually no concepts because they do not simulate 
anything (hence the quotation marks) but borrow simulations from other, sensomotorily based 
domains. They appear to be similar to familiar sensorimotorily based concepts in certain 
respects and so conceptualizers reason and talk about them in the way they reason and talk 
about familiar concepts. In order to talk about these things and make them operative for action 
we have to borrow manners of speech from (other) conceptual domains. Depending on the 
multiple purposes one can pursue it is to be expected that conceptualizers make use of the 
verbalization strategies of various source domain concepts in order to structure the target 
domain “concepts”. Speech communities determine which source domains are utilized to 
structure target domains in the linguistic
o
 conventions of a given language (cf. Boroditsky 
2001 with respect to different conventions in the conceptualization of time). It is also 
expected that different speech communities avail themselves of differing conventions to 
structure their non-sensorimotorily based “concepts”, although their experiences with pain in 
the head, time and so on presumably feel similar. Children born into such an environment in 
which verbalization strategies concerning non-sensorimotorily based experiences are 
practised are forced to associate conceptualizations with verbal utterances. Thus, they also are 
forced to associate conceptualizations with verbalizations concerning target domains. This 
makes children routinize reasoning (simulated speaking) about these domains in terms of 
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other (i.e., source) domains. In acquisition children therefore need not re-invent or motivate a 
metaphor in order to acquire appropriate ways of talking about them. Within constellations of 
joint attention they need only learn the conventions and conditions under which someone 
utters it, perhaps first gaining insight into its motivatedness long after having begun using it 
themselves (cf. Bruner 1975, Clark 2003, Tomasello 2003). Nevertheless, it is possible for a 
person to acquire the contingent conventions of a foreign speech community regarding which 
universal (since they are sensomotorily based) source domains are used to organize which 
target domains.
133
 Because, for example, time cannot underlie simulated perceptions but in 
certain respects feels like moving through space, languages may differ in the extent to which 
they exploit this similarity linguistically
o
. One can demonstrate this with headaches and 
possession: While in both English and German you can have and get a headache, only in 
English can something give you a headache (example from Lakoff & Johnson 1999: 196). In 
“concrete” language, i.e., in talking about things underlying source domain concepts like FISH, 
BOOKS, and MONEY, the extension of “givable” things is the same for German and English 
speakers.  
 
In sum, one source of such hypostatizations is that because talking about target domains is 
required, we make use of verbalization strategies that are associated with source domain 
concepts. By doing so, we impose trajector-landmark configurations on matters that actually 
do not exhibit a trajector-landmark organization on their own. 
 
 
3.3.3.2 Affordances again 
Hypostatized circumstances not only occur in syntactic positions that should be reserved for 
concepts of more object-like entities, they also seem to behave differently syntactically. An 
example would be that given in (3.14): 
 
 (3.14)  Der gestrige   Tag hat wieder viele  Stürze       von Fahrern gesehen.  
  The  previous day  has  again  many accidents  of   cyclists   seen  
  lit. ‘The previous day saw accidents of many cyclists again.’ 
 
(3.14) could be a headline commenting on a normal Tour de France day. Inserting more 
object-like entities in the complement positions would result in something like (3.15): 
 
 (3.15)  Der Priester hat viele   Jungen gesehen.  
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 The mere presentation of different ways in how different speech communities conceptualize time in, for 
instance Lakoff & Johnson (1999, ch. 10), Radden (2003), or Evans (2004) strongly suggest the validity of the 
learnability thesis. If these conventions were not learnable or accessible by speakers of other languages, these 
presentations in textbooks would not have been possible (unless they are incorrect). This is also the reason the 
strong Whorf-hypothesis (cf. Whorf 1956) cannot be right: Whorf would not have been able to characterize the 
Hopi language and its underlying conceptualizations if his hypothesis (in its strong reading; cf. Evans & Green 
2006: 96ff.) was right. Thus, our conceptual systems are broadly compatible with each other in the sense that 
approximately similar conceptualizations are in principle possible. However, relativity, or better: complications, 
reside somewhere else, namely in the mappings between conventions of borrowing verbalization strategies with 
respect to target domains and cultural praxes which are effects and grow out of these conventions, and where 
these mappings are not transparent (cf. Foley 1997, ch. 10). 
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  The  priest     has many boys     seen 
  ‘The priest saw many boys.’  
 
Now it is remarkable that the passivized version of (3.14) would presumably be rejected by 
most speakers of German as inappropriate in any possible context. In contrast, the 
passivization of (3.15) is certainly grammatically well-formed and appropriate in many 
contexts. 
 
 (3.16) 
#
Viele  Unfälle    von Fahrern sind  vom     gestrigen Tag gesehen worden. 
  Many accidents of  cyclists  are    by-the previous  day seen        were    
  lit. ‘Many accidents of cyclists were seen by the previous day.’ 
 
 (3.17) Viele Jungen sind vom     Priester gesehen worden. 
  Many boys    are   by-the  priest     seen      were 
  ‘Many boys were seen by the priest.’ 
 
Although the sentence pairs show identical syntactic structures, their behavior differs. My 
proposal for an explanation of this phenomenon is that (a) one has to consider object 
affordances again and (b) ask for the factors that restrict passivization. (a) Affordances 
concern the question of what objects afford to perceivers and conceptualizers, i.e., what 
objects “tell” them about the circumstances in which they may stand on the basis of their 
identified features (see section 3.2.1.2). We are concerned here only with the affordances of 
the conceptualized “objects” underlying the PSC positions in the active sentences.134 
Consequently, we must ask what a day affords to a perceiver/conceptualizer and the answer 
must clearly be “nothing”. Affordances are the circumstances of objects that a conceptualizer 
identifies to be possible or actual states, processes, and activities on the basis of a simulated 
percept. A day simply does not make retinal images, and therefore cannot function as a 
simulated percept. Therefore a day has no affordances. A consequence of this is that it also 
cannot be part of causal relations (as defined in section 3.2.1.3). One might now ask where the 
causal relation in seeing something is. But our “concept” of seeing also makes use of a 
conceptual metaphor, namely SEEING IS PHYSICAL CONTACT (cf. Lakoff & Johnson 1999: 398f. 
for discussion). While a priest affords CAUSATION (which has been characterized in section 
3.2.1.3 by recourse to physical contact), a day does not. (b) Passivization of a sentence is 
mostly – and across grammar-theoretic frameworks – explained and restricted by recourse to 
one or the other form of a thematic hierarchy (e.g., Jackendoff 1972, Dik 1997, Langacker 
1987 et sqq., Goldberg 1995, Grimshaw 1990) or the hierarchy between generalized thematic 
roles (e.g., Primus 1999, van Valin 2005). The basic idea can be condensed to the 
generalization that the PSC in the active must be (close to) agentive (however defined), that 
the other complement(s), if present, must not range higher on the thematic hierarchy, and that 
there must be some causal relation between the participants coded by the complements. To 
anticipate my later treatment of passivization, I am largely consonant with these proposals, 
but will reconstruct thematic roles and their hierarchization from spatial conceptual structures 
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 Replacing gestrigen Tag ‘the previous day’ in (3.16) by Priester ‘priest’ would make the sentence well-
formed. 
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(including affordances) and from actional knowledge (see also Appendix A). Because the 
PSC referent in (3.14) does not afford anything, it takes no “position” in whatever thematic 
hierarchy and does not participate in a causal relation. Therefore, its passive variant is 
predicted to be ill-formed.  
This explanation obviously conceals why a conventional linguistic
o
 pattern in which “days see 
something” should develop, at all. I cannot accomplish this here, but I would suppose that 
conceptual metaphor plays a role, i.e., that day is conceptualized by means of some source 
domain with which it shares some aspect of experiencing it, whereby the target domain from 
which day comes does not provide us with spatial conceptual structures. 
 
 
3.3.3.3 Competing motivations, instances, and generalizations  
The matter of hypostatization becomes really complicated when looking at nouns and noun 
phrases like unemployment, the destruction of the city, or all men, where the underlying 
concepts concern temporally extended properties of (a) person(s), temporally extended 
processes in which some higher-order object loses its integrity (as caused by something), and 
where each and every member of the category MAN is designated, respectively. Can whatever 
is coded by these noun phrases conceptually afford anything, e.g., by inheriting the 
affordances of some possible source domain from which they borrow their spatial structure? 
When looking for conceptual correlates of parts of speech it is worth looking at how 
Langacker (1987 et sqq.) and Talmy (2000, I, ch. 1) treat these cases, since they are the 
authorities in the field of cognitive semantics. 
According to the “content requirement”, a strong working hypothesis in Cognitive Grammar, 
“the only elements ascribable to a linguistic system are (i) semantic, phonological, and 
symbolic structures that actually occur as parts of expressions; (ii) schematizations of 
permitted structures; and (iii) categorizing relationships between permitted structures.” 
(Langacker 2008a: 25). The content requirement implies that grammar consists of symbolic 
assemblies and only them. Thus, the difference between destroy and destruction must not only 
reside in their phonological poles but also in their semantic poles (for the following see 
Langacker 
2
2002, ch. 3). By semantics Langacker first of all means conceptual content and 
second of all how this content is “construed”. Destroy and destruction have identical 
conceptual content but are construed differently. The verb – describing a process – construes 
the event by means of “sequential scanning”, while the noun construes it as a thing by means 
of “summary scanning”. That means the process underlying destroy is construed as “a series 
of component states scanned sequentially through conceived time” (Langacker 22002: 98), 
whereas in the construal underlying destruction “the states are still accessed in their natural 
sequence”, but “undergo summation: that is, they are mentally superimposed, resulting in 
their simultaneous activation. […] The end result is that all the component states are 
simultaneously active and available.” (Langacker 2008a: 111). Taken together, a noun 
profiles a thing and a verb profiles a process, where the profile is the particular substructure of 
the visual field on which the viewing attention rests (cf. Langacker 2008a: 66). This can be 
summed up by stating that in Cognitive Grammar the nominalizations we are talking about 
indeed have distinct conceptual import in that nouns construe states of affairs in a thing-like 
fashion thanks to summary scanning and grouping together. 
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In Talmy’s (2000, I, ch. 1) account, the domains of space and time share fundamental 
properties in that they allow quantification (two miles, fifty hours) and so on. Because of that  
 
“a verb root that lexicalizes expression of an act or activity as a temporal quantity can be 
associated with grammatical forms, including nominalizations, that signal a cognitive operation of 
reification. By the semantic effect of this operation, the referent becomes conceptualized as an 
object or a mass, one that can participate in many of the same actions – such as being given or 
gotten – as a physical quantity […].” (Talmy 2000, I: 43) 
 
Taken together, Langacker and Talmy take reification to be a real cognitive activity and not 
just a linguistic
o
 activity. That is, producing or interpreting a nominalization of a relation or 
feature corresponds to a conceptual process in which a relation or feature is treated as an 
object. I deem this treatment of nominalization problematic. 
Both Langacker and Talmy leave open what “thing”/“object” means outside conceptualization 
(maybe because they stick to a bilateral linguistic
o
 sign); they seem to presuppose a 
prescientific understanding of the term. Otherwise one would be forced to conclude that an 
object is what is scanned in a summary-like fashion and grouped together (Langacker) or 
reified conceptually (Talmy) which is clearly circular. In any case the relation between 
circumstances (states, processes, and activities) and things is unspecified, i.e., we do not know 
what constrains the processes of reification/summary scanning and the reverse processes of 
“actionalization” (Talmy 2000, I, ch. 1), and sequential scanning and grouping together 
(Langacker). Why are linguistic
o
 expressions not arbitrary in most languages with respect to 
what is expressed by nouns or verbs, if both space and time share so many properties that one 
can construe nearly everything as thing or circumstance? What is it that is thing-like in the 
concept RECIPE (which is not the paper on which it is written) when its component steps are 
grouped together by summary scanning? (example from Langacker 2008a: 107)? These are 
important questions that both proposals largely leave unexplained. 
It seems to me that both Langacker and Talmy take the idea that language is a window to 
cognition very seriously. Otherwise the symbolic thesis and the content requirement would 
not be feasible working hypotheses. To me it seems as if they believe their eyes too 
unquestioningly when looking through the language window. This forces one to look for 
conceptual correlates of linguistic
o
 phenomena where there might potentially not be any. For 
instance, Broccias & Hollmann (2007) have recently called into question the feasibility of the 
scanning modes Langacker postulates, because they lack theory-independent evidence. 
Langacker (2008b) has responded and defended the concept on the basis of rather subjective 
phenomenological and theory-dependent (Cognitive Grammar) arguments. Moreover, 
Langacker admits that there is at the present time no independent evidence for the notion, 
although elsewhere he strongly emphasizes his search for converging evidence when claiming 
theoretical concepts (cf. Langacker 1999: 26ff.). When looking into cognition through other 
than linguistic
o
 windows as is attempted here by means of a multidisciplinary account, one 
becomes sceptical with respect to the cognitive reality of the processes “underlying” 
nominalization, reification, or hypostatization.  
I will try to demonstrate how a proper treatment of hypostatization follows from the 
theoretical and research-programmatic tools I have been developing so far: I have 
characterized conceptualization as simulated perception. I have also outlined that we perceive 
those features as features which we differentiate as being salient or pertinent with respect to 
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our lifeworld activities. Keeping this in mind, we can first state that there can be no objects in 
conceptualization which could not potentially serve as objects in perception. Otherwise they 
would not be concepts by definition. It has been demonstrated, however, that 
conceptualization exploits the figure/ground segregation of the visual field with greater 
flexibility. That does not mean that conceptualization can make thing-like what is not thing-
like in perception but that the conceptualizer can take vantage points in conceptualization 
which perceivers take very infrequently if at all. So maybe someone has never seen Marburg 
from above such that he/she could have segregated it as a figure from a background. But the 
person is able to conceptualize, however vaguely, Marburg as exhibiting object features when 
taking a vantage point in the sky. The range of conceptual contents is restricted by the range 
of possible perceptions, such that the range of possible objects in conceptualization is 
restricted by what is a potential object in perception (or, to be more precise, sensation).  
Secondly, it has been shown that there are regularities between spatial conceptualizations and 
how they are syntactically coded. However, there are syntactic structures which only 
“pretend” to code trajector-landmark structures, while they actually do not because what they 
seemingly code as trajector cannot serve as a potential object in perception. Exploitation in 
this sense is possible because the functioning of syntax can in principle be contingent on 
conceptualization (cf. Bierwisch 2008). In other words, syntax exploits perceptual/conceptual 
organization, because in principle its mode of operation as a symbol system allows this. 
Motivation in the form of diagrammatic iconicity illustrated above is not a logically necessary 
relationship between form (syntax) and content (conceptualization and actional knowledge), 
but only a psychologically desirable one, for the sake of learnability. A basic idea of the 
Instruction Grammar proposed here is that the (syntactic/grammatical) organization of an 
utterance is something like an instruction for simulating a perceptual experience on the side of 
the hearer. As is well-known, not everything about the conceptualization that the speaker 
wants to share is relevant for a given discursive purpose (cf. Grice 1975). Hence, there is quite 
an economically driven need for a strategy to minimize or reduce utterances (or “domains”; 
cf. Hawkins 2004) without developing new combinations of syntactic units which would undo 
the economic effect right away (cf. Haiman 1983). So, why not take the well-motivated (by 
diagrammatic iconicity) clause structures (where the PSC codes the conceptual trajector and 
another complement codes the conceptual landmark) and exploit them for economic purposes. 
Such considerations make The destruction of the city caused unemployment of the inhabitants 
out of many clauses in which possible objects in conceptualization occupy the positions of the 
PSCs and oblique complements, respectively.
135
 In interactions in which such a compressed 
sentence is well understood it is not of relevance who destroyed the city, which city, how this 
happened in detail, when this happened, who exactly became unemployed, unemployed of 
what and so on, or it is already known by the interlocutors (cf. Piantadosi, Tily & Gibson 
2012). To utilize Bickel & Nichols’ (22007) notion of indexicality, the level of specificity in 
                                                 
135
 Obviously, destruction and unemployment as nominalizations reduce the syntactic valence of the underlying 
verb destroy and the adjective unemployed. But in order to conceptualize the nominal expressions the objects 
involved in this relation and this state (the conceptual “objects” DESTROYING and DESTROYED and BEING 
UNEMPLOYED), respectively, must nevertheless be conceptualized. So the reduction is only one of form, not (to 
the same degree) one of conceptualization. Actually, the conceptual valence of a relation often seems to be 
higher than its syntactic valence actually is (cf. Heringer 1983, 1985). 
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this utterance suffices for the interlocutors in order to be able to identify the referents, or the 
referents simply need not be specific. 
 
Thus, at its core hypostatization has an aspect of motivation and one of exploitation at the 
same time. It is motivated by economic considerations, and it exploits the diagrammatically 
iconic relations between conceptualization and syntax.  
 
From the utterance-as-instruction-for conceptualization perspective of Instruction Grammar, 
an utterance like Alle Männer fallen in Marburg vom Rad ‘All men fall off their bikes in 
Marburg’ is an instruction to conceptualize, one after another, each and every man falling 
from his bike, respectively.
136
 From a maxim-of-quantity perspective it is clear that not any 
single man is relevant here and that the full-conceptualization-instruction need not be 
executed, which would take the following form: “Take the first man and conceptualize him as 
falling off his bike in Marburg. Take the second man and conceptualize him as falling off his 
bike in Marburg. Take the third man…”137 
It follows that there is no one-to-one correspondence between utterances including 
nominalizations or quantifications and unique conceptualizations for these utterances, such 
that conceptual trajectors could correspond to parts of speech like all men or unemployed 
youth or the destruction of the city. Or, to put it differently, there is, for instance, no unique 
ALL concept underlying the expression all. How can the appropriate use of all be learned, 
then? Imagine yourself as a two-year-old child who wants to have one of the uncountable 
marbles in front of you. Your six-year-old brother knows this and says All marbles are mine. 
You do not know what all means and try to get the blue marble right in front of you. You get 
your wrist slapped. So you try the green one. The same happens again. You try the next one 
and get slapped once more. Eventually you conclude that for any given marble you touch your 
brother will punish you. Next time any one says All x are y you know that you need not apply 
y to any given instance of x but that it does not matter which x you take, y is applies to it. And 
now that you are a person interested in language and read All men are mortal you do the same 
without requiring a unique ALL concept.
138
 
In the introduction to part I language was said to organize (and co-constitute) praxes. At the 
same time it must serve what Langacker (e.g., 1999) calls a semiological function, i.e., coding 
conceptualizations.  
 
It can be stated now that the diagrammatic iconicity between conceptualization and syntactic 
structure is motivated by the semiological function (ideally, a biunique conceptual structure-
syntax relationship), while the exploitation of conceptual mechanisms by syntax through 
hypostatization is motivated by its practical function (“interactive” in Langacker 1999):  
 
                                                 
136
 This sentence exhibits a distributive meaning of all in which there is a bike for each man, not a collective 
meaning in which all men fall from one bike which could make all men a potential figure/trajector, i.e., a 
potential object (cf. Brooks & Braine 1996 for details). 
137
 There is typological evidence that such (logical) conjunctions, expressed here asyndetically, may indeed lie at 
the heart of universal quantification. Conjunctions and universal quantification are grammatically, lexically, or 
otherwise related in so many languages that it cannot be due to chance (cf. Gil 2011). 
138
 Here, all exhibits a collective meaning such that all marbles could potentially refer to a unique 
figure/trajector. 
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For understanding all x and for acting accordingly there is no unique ALL concept necessary. 
Similarly, generic, general or non-referential statements are hypostatizations and they are part 
of language, since they prove useful in the practical function of language. Utterances coding 
individual states, processes, and activities are mostly motivated (see examples (3.1) to (3.12) 
above), since they prove useful in making mutual conceptualizations possible.  
If the present treatment of hypostatization, i.e., exploitation, is right, then one would expect 
that hypostatized instances of language use are acquired later and are dispreferred in language 
processing than motivated instances. Obviously, nouns that are not concrete (i.e., that cannot 
in principle be experienced by our senses) and nouns that are derived mainly from adjectives 
and verbs are treated here as instances of hypostatization. And there is indeed evidence in the 
psycholinguistic, neurolinguistic and typological literature that support the present proposal: 
Abstract nouns are acquired later than concrete nouns in language acquisition (e.g., Bassano 
2000 for French); the acquisition of nominalizations is finished considerably later (eventually 
as late as age 15 in Hebrew) than that of non-derived nouns (cf. Ravid & Avidor 1998); 
different frequency bands are involved in memorizing concrete and abstract nouns indicating 
that they are processed differently (cf. Weiss & Rappelsberger 1996); concrete nouns are 
named faster in word-naming tasks (cf. Strain, Patterson & Seidenberg 1995); nouns without 
an argument structure are produced faster than nouns with an argument structure (Collina, 
Marangolo & Tabossi 2001); concrete nouns are recognized faster in word recognition 
experiments, are better recalled, their meaning is accessed faster in sentence comprehension 
(cf. Paivio 1991) and in lexical decision tasks (cf. Kroll & Merves 1986); abstract nouns in 
opposition to concrete nouns show activation in brain areas previously associated with verbal 
working memory, whereas concrete nouns activate those regions commonly associated with 
imageability (cf. Binder et al. 2005). All in its distributive meaning (where the quantified 
referents do not constitute a single figure/trajector: Alle Männer fallen in Marburg vom Rad) 
is acquired later than all in its collective meaning (where the quantified referents potentially 
constitute a figure/trajector: All marbles are mine; cf. Brooks & Braine 1996) and seems to 
occur only in those languages which also have all in its collective meaning (cf. Gil 1995). 
Results like these are concordant with the above assumptions according to which there is no 
possible unique concept associated with hypostatized nominal expressions (abstract nouns, 
deverbal nouns, deadjectival nouns, NPs containing universal quantifiers with distributional 
meaning), and this is due to their lack of figure/trajector-aptness. For understanding 
unemployment threatens the Spanish youth more extensive conceptualizations are necessary: 
In order to be able to simulate any perceptual experience and evaluate its practical relevance it 
is – presumably – necessary to trace unemployment back to some concrete object (person) 
which exhibits this property and to trace Spanish youth back to some concrete members of 
this category. When you hear the string threatens the Spanish youth you must also know that 
irrespective of which young Spaniard you take, he/she will exhibit the property of being 
threatened by unemployment, similar as in the case of all marbles above. If unemployment 
threatens the Spanish youth is literally, or better, faithfully taken as an instruction for a 
conceptualization, this is again impossible. It is rather the instruction: Conceptualize this as 
far as we both know that it is sufficient in our present discourse and infer the practical 
relevance of it. Understanding is clearly easier for a dog threatens the child.  
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It must be noted at this point that there is obviously some evidence as to differences between 
nouns that designate thing concepts and nouns that do not, but that very little is known about 
the meaning of, i.e., the concepts underlying, the latter. What is claimed here is that 
hypostatizations seem to be more demanding with respect to the linking between syntax, 
conceptualization, and action. 
 
 
3.3.3.4 How linguistic
o
 hypostatization feeds back to conceptualization 
If hypostatization is indeed motivated practically in that it reduces phonetic material of an 
utterance (e.g., by reducing the syntactic valence of an element in the case of nominalizations 
(destroy vs. destruction)), while it makes successful communication possible at the same time, 
this does not mean that it does not have an effect on conceptualization. Hypostatization 
compresses what is conceptually uncompressed, and this may lead to a less detailed 
conceptualization due to its linguistic
o
 compression: the destruction of the city will 
presumably be conceptualized in a less detailed manner than Akira destroyed the city, since 
for the former there is no need to put much cognitive effort in conceptualizing the destroyer. 
Similar effects have indeed been observed for progressive vs. perfective verbs (John painted 
houses last summer vs. John was painting houses last summer), where speakers conceptualize 
more details in progressives than in perfectives (cf. Matlock 2011), or with the linguistic
o
 
coding of spatial conceptualizations which are described in the next section. 
 
 
3.3.4 The status of spatial schemas: what relational expressions designate 
In living our lives and pursuing our goals and interests in everyday life it is of prime 
importance that we are able to conceptually bring order to what happens around us. By doing 
so we acquire the ability to predict to a certain degree how particular states, processes, and 
activities will work out in the future, so we can attune our acts to them. If we are able to 
identify similarities among different instances of states, processes, and activities, and if we 
have observed that often types of these states, processes, and activities develop into others, 
then we are able to predict by generalization that this will often or always be the case. This 
would be an effective means for realizing purposes more successfully in the future. The 
central question about how this works concerns the nature of the identified similarity between 
states, processes, and activities. Obviously, most of what happens around us is unique. Every 
instance of the ball rolling into the living room when my nephew is playing will differ from 
any other instance in some respects, and so does John’s pouring water into a glass (see (3.1) 
and (3.7)). The similarities are produced by my treating all those instances as being instances 
of the same action or motion schema, respectively. Merely by uttering “The ball rolls into the 
room every time my nephew plays” I prescind from those features139 which make these events 
differ from each other. By substracting their distinctive features (in dependence of my present 
purposes) I construe some “schematic” similarity between them. When I talk about the ball 
rolling into the room in this way, I render distinctive features irrelevant, maybe because I utter 
it in the context “The ball rolls into the room every time my nephew plays, and that amuses 
                                                 
139
 Remember that features are features thanks to differentiation performances due to salience and pertinence. 
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me”. It is irrelevant in this context, for instance, whether the ball rolls into the room 
describing a curve or whether it follows a straight line. 
This is an example of how schematizations are produced by treating specific circumstances 
alike linguistically
o
.  
 
But true to the motto “There is nothing in language that was not first salient or pertinent in 
perception, action, and behavior” (e.g., Clark 2004, Casasola 2008), the primary instance of 
producing schematizations is by making differentiations in doing, i.e., by acting or behaving 
similarly towards slightly differing configurations of the things in the environment. As 
Johnson (1987: 29) puts it, “[a] schema is a recurrent pattern, shape, and regularity in, or of, 
these ongoing ordering activities”. Linguistico activity is only one possibility. 
 
It seems that the differentiations we make with respect to location states and motion events 
are similar across many cultures but that means of linguistically
o
 coding these relations differ: 
For instance, Korean and English speakers code similar spatial relations differently: For 
Korean speakers the critical features in the spatial relationship between two things seems to 
be TIGHT FIT vs. LOOSE FIT, and within LOOSE FIT we find te opposition LOOSE CONTAINMENT 
vs. LOOSE SUPPORT. For English speakers the critical features are CONTAINMENT and SUPPORT, 
irrespective of TIGHT FIT and LOOSE FIT (cf. Bowerman 1996, Bowerman & Choi 2003, 
McDonough, Choi & Mandler 2003). This is depicted in Figure 3.38 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.38: Spatial conceptualizations and their linguistic
o
 codings in English and Korean 
(adapted from Bowerman 1996: 152f. and McDonough, Choi & Mandler 2003: 233) 
 
Since differentiations are what underlies features in perception, and since perception feeds 
into conceptualization, our conceptualizations of spatial relations and motion patterns seem 
similar. That means, although Korean and English people conceptualize space and motion 
alike (since this is simulated perception), they choose prepositions to code different aspects of 
198 
 
these relations which leads to conflations of differentiations: The English prepositional system 
(here: in and on) conflates the differentiation between TIGHT FIT and LOOSE FIT, the Korean 
one (here: nehta, nohta, and kkita) conflates the differentiation between CONTAINMENT and 
SUPPORT, when things fit loosely. This may very well lead to different actions when 
instructed. And such coding conventions seem to feed back to identification/categorization: 
Speakers of both languages are able to identify each of the four differentiations but tend to 
identify only those coded by their respective prepositional systems. As McDonough, Choi & 
Mandler (2003: 241) suggest, “the most salient construal of a scene is influenced by the way it 
is most commonly described in language.”  
 
Most importantly, this means that in principle one language has the expressive means to code 
the differentiations of the other but that the expressive means do not have the same status:
140
  
 
For instance, prepositional systems are highly grammaticalized and prepositions constitute a 
closed class. Alternative strategies for expressing similar circumstances would have to rely on 
lexical and open class material. There is psycholinguistic evidence that closed-class elements 
are more easily accessed and processed (cf. Friederici 1985, Rayner et al. 1989). From a 
learning perspective their use seems to be highly routinized, i.e., more than that of open-class 
elements. In other words, feedback mechanisms from grammatical systems to differentiation 
performance are not inevitable (cf. Gennari et al. 2002, Clark 2004: 474, Kemmerer 2006, 
Papafragou 2007, Pourcel 2009).  
 
In order to identify the differentiations other languages make by grammatical means, more 
cognitive effort might be required, since in one’s own language non-grammatical means 
might be necessary to code the same differentiations (see also Everett 2013: 105–108).  
 
From this perspective – if one commits oneself to an interpretation of it – the famous Whorf-
hypothesis (cf. Whorf 1956) could be said to be wrong in both its strong and weak reading (cf. 
Werlen 2005, Papafragou 2007), since the means of coding concepts in a language do not 
affect the concepts speakers of that language can have or actually have. On the other hand, 
they do feed back to the identification/categorization and action routines, which is something 
completely different (cf. Gennari et al. 2002). First of all the difference between what 
actors/cognizers/speakers actually do and what they are able to do is neglected in Whorf’s 
principle of relativity (cf. Whorf 1956: 214, 221), and secondly, the degree to which there is a 
straightforward relationship between linguistic
o
 expressions and concepts (i.e., what is 
motivated about the relationship between conceptualization and syntactic structure according 
to Fig. 3.33 above) is overestimated. Thirdly, I am not quite sure what Whorf and others mean 
by “thought”.141 
                                                 
140
 Actually, this is what Bowerman and colleagues did in their papers: When describing their experimental setup 
they described exactly those semantic differentiations which are coded by Korean nehta, nohta, and kkita in 
English. In order to understand their own descriptions they had to conceptualize these differentiations, even if 
they spoke only English but not Korean. 
141
 If thought is characterized as simulated speaking, as is claimed here, then postulating that one’s language 
exerts influence on one’s thought is tautological at best, if not nonsensical. 
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How do we know that speakers of different languages do not (significantly) differ in their 
spatial relation and motion pattern concepts and how they schematize them? In other words, 
how do we know that the presupposition of the above categories SUPPORT, CONTAINMENT, 
TIGHT FIT, and LOOSE FIT is adequate for both Korean and English people? The answer to this 
question must go beyond linguistic
o
 evidence and include other behavioral evidence, i.e., it 
must be shown that people make similar differentiations in non-linguistic
o
 activity. Then one 
can locate the break where relativity comes into play:  
 
If people make similar differentiations with respect to spatial relations in non-linguistic
o
 
activity (among this perception), and if people make non-similar differentiations in language, 
then one can locate the break where relativity enters the modelling of the linking competence, 
namely in the step from non-symbolic activities to symbolic activities. This relativity does not 
imply the (complete) autonomy of the formal side of language (i.e., the symbol system, or 
grammar), since it still works on the substrate of diagrammatic iconicity, but avails itself 
different strategies in molding this iconicity. 
 
The non-linguistic
o
 evidence mentioned above stems from behavioral data of different 
sources, mainly of pre-linguistic
o
 infants, children, and also adults (for overviews see Lerner, 
Easterbrooks & Mistry 2003, Clark 2004, Mandler 2004, Goswami 
2
2010, Bremner & Wachs 
2
2010 on perceptual and cognitive development). For instance, Liben and Christensen (
2
2010) 
report on studies that show that pre-linguistic
o
 infants do not only differentiate between depth 
and shallowness, sizes, shapes, distances, and changing positions of objects relative to each 
other (ABOVE vs. BELOW), but they also generalize across objects (it is irrelevant what is 
above/below what), thus differentiating only between spatial configurations. This is clearly an 
instance of schematization: The infants act/behave similarly towards similar spatial relations 
although different objects constitute the relation. It is also reported that infants preferably 
employ egocentric reference frames in orientating themselves in space but that they are also 
able to employ allocentric reference frames from a very young age. 
Depending on the relative complexity, some spatial relational concepts are acquired earlier 
than others, namely simple (including a dyadic relation of a single figure/trajector relative to a 
ground/landmark) ones like ABOVE, UNDER, LEFT, RIGHT before more complex ones 
(involving a triadic relation, thus requiring more complex sensational and conceptual 
processes) like BETWEEN. Relations like CONTAINMENT in which one thing (figure/trajector) 
becomes – unexpectedly – occluded by another one, namely the container (ground/landmark), 
are acquired – i.e., differentiated – earlier than salient relations like SUPPORT (figure/trajector 
loosely located on ground/landmark) or PROXIMITY (figure/trajector next to ground/landmark) 
in which nothing salient happens (cf. Casasola 2008). Crucially, before children can 
schematize some relation like UNDER behaviorally, they must be able to recognize specific 
instances in which they do not yet prescind from the familiar objects involved but in which 
they rely on these objects. As Casasola and Cohen (2002: 261) put it, “infants first learn to 
recognize the spatial relationships between specific objects before they learn to generalize the 
relationship to novel objects.” With about 14 months, children schematize the relations 
themselves, i.e., differentiate between, for instance, SUPPORT and CONTAINMENT, irrespective 
of whether their target language employs grammatical means for expressing these relations. 
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(cf. Casasola & Cohen 2002, Casasola, Cohen & Chiarello 2003, but see Choi 2006). (A non-
existent differentiation between, for instance, SUPPORT and TIGHT FIT relations is given, when 
children differentiate between the objects involved in these relations, whereas they treat the 
relations in which these objects stand alike.) With respect to adults speaking unrelated 
languages, Malt et al. (2008) showed that differentiations between types of containers differed 
considerably in dependence on the spoken language when they were based on linguistic
o
 
performance (naming on the basis of perception), but did not significantly differ when based 
on non-linguistic
o
 performance (sorting on the basis of perception), leading to the conclusion 
that, while people name things differently, they perceive them similarly. 
Generalizing over the findings, it seems that people can schematize objects, locations, 
situations, events, relations etc. to a large extent independently of and prior to language in that 
they treat their instances alike behaviorally in dependence on salience and pertinence. That is 
exactly the point: Identification/categorization performances hardly ever occur in 
circumstances where actors/cognizers do not pursue any purposes. If one’s purposes force a 
speaker of English to differentiate between “tight fit” and “loose fit” spatial relations because 
this difference becomes pertinent, then he/she will be able to do so. If he/she has no reason to 
do so (because of the lack of a corresponding purpose and pertinence), he/she will not make 
the differentiation, if it does not correspond to his/her routine which may be linguistically
o
 
rooted (English closed-class prepositional system). In many experiments (e.g., McDonough, 
Choi & Mandler 2003) English probands are actually not given reason to deviate from their 
linguistically
o
 induced differentiation routines, since they are not given a corresponding 
purpose in the lab situation;
142
 thus, they show language-congruent differentiation behavior – 
it simply constitutes the least cognitive effort.  
In the acquisition of spatial schemas it is mainly on the basis of salience that differentiations 
are made and schematizations develop, since the notion of pertinence is closely related to 
action competence and action planning which are acquired later (see section 3.2.2). That 
means 
 
  people’s treating instances of some object category alike across all the circumstances 
in which they occur allows us as linguists to talk about these schematizations as 
“figures”/ “trajectors”;  
  people’s treating instances of the location category alike across all the circumstances 
in which they occur allows us as linguists to talk about these schematizations as 
“grounds”/“landmarks” when objects are singled out against them; 
  people’s treating instances of simple and complex, stative and processual spatial 
relation categories alike across all occurrences allows linguists to talk about these 
schematizations as “spatial schemas”. 
 
Thus, figure/trajector, ground/landmark, and the manifold spatial relation schemas (for an 
attempted listing cf. Mandler 2010) in which they occur are themselves schematizations. The 
spatial relations depicted in section 3.3.2 are thus not depictions of the concrete relations 
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 In fact, they admit (McDonough, Choi & Mandler 2003: 235) that “adults understand the differences between 
containment and support as well as between tight and loose, but it was not clear to us that they would focus on 
the spatial relations in a task that uses many highly varied objects and that has no explicit instructions.” 
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expressed in the corresponding sentences (3.1) to (3.13) but only the underlying motivated 
schemas syntactic structures elaborate. Languages make differentiations by grammatical 
means using closed-class elements. These differentiations have mostly already been acquired 
by language learners and subsume only a subset of the circumstances people are actually able 
to conceptualize and to verbalize (by lexical means, employing open-class elements (for 
further neurological and psycholinguistic evidence cf. Kemmerer 2006, Kemmerer & Tranel 
2000. The latter argue that there is a double dissociation in differentiation performance with 
respect to conceptual spatial cognition and spatial language). The following Table 3.7 
summarizes the findings of the previous sections and will be commented on in turn. 
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Table 3.7: Universal and contingent aspects of the spatial conceptualization-syntax 
relationship 
 
The leftmost column contains properties of speakers and languages the status of which 
regarding their universality – whether they are universal or contingent – is given in the second 
column. The third one depicts the universal aspect and the fourth column depicts universal or 
contingent implementations of the universal and contingent aspects, respectively. 
The topmost panel captures the fact that human sensational abilities and behavior (as 
described in sections 3.1) are universal. All people (irrespective of expected interindividual 
differences and pathological cases) are able to sense the same range of objects and their 
circumstances. Sensation is an instance of human activity and depends on the physical and 
biotic makeup of the sensing person. That means the fundamental principle of figure/ground 
segregation in sensation should be universal as well as the ability and actual performance of 
singling out a glass (as figure) and sensing it as standing in a specific spatial relationship 
relative to the table (as ground). 
The second panel concerns persons’ conceptual abilities, i.e., the range of conceptual 
differentiations they are able to make. All the different aspects of the spatial relationship 
between the glass and the table that are actually differentiated somewhere by someone in an 
intersubjectively traceable and acceptable way can in principle be differentiated and thus be 
identified by everyone. Although only certain differentiations become externalized verbally, 
actually, e.g., the ‘support’ relation between the glass and the table in English on, all the other 
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identifiable circumstances could in principle also be identified and thus be externalized, e.g., 
‘loose fit’ in English as loose fit.  
What is presumably also universal is given in the third panel: the regular correspondences 
between the organizational mechanisms of conceptualization and syntax, namely 
diagrammatic mappings from the basic components of the first – trajector-landmark 
configurations – to the basic components of the second – parts of speech. English- and 
German-oriented syntactic structure should be interpreted here in this sense as an illustration 
of the universal aspect: as a placeholder for any possible regular mapping between these 
domains in any possible language. The specific implementation shows the motivated 
relationship between the domains as already illustrated in section 3.3.2. 
Where languages differ, however, is with regard to the question of which conceptual 
differentiations they have developed to code by which means: grammatically or lexically, by 
closed-class elements or open-class elements. This is given in the fourth line and has been 
demonstrated by means of the English and Korean prepositions, illustrating how there can be 
apparent arbitrariness within the motivated relationship between conceptualization and 
syntax. There is diagrammatic iconicity anyway, but it is molded in a hardly predictable way. 
The fifth and last line concerns what some would call Whorfian effects, i.e., the feedback of 
conventions of linguistic
o
 coding into differentiation activities, i.e., externalized 
differentiations, either linguistic
o
 or other. This is where linguistic
o
 relativists usually cite 
evidence that, for instance, people whose languages employ only absolute reference frames 
will orient themselves in their environments in terms of non-linguistic
o
 differentiations that 
make use of exactly these reference frames and hardly of others, if at all (on reference frames 
see Levinson 1996). From the way sensation, perception, conceptualization, and action have 
been characterized here it should be clear that these cases concern only the actual 
differentiation performances of these people, not those they are able to perform and to which 
they could be led to perform, given the appropriate tasks (see also Landau, Dessalegn & 
Goldberg 2009 on this topic). 
 
 
3.3.5 Manner and path in relational expressions 
With respect to the question of how languages code matters of space, two often discussed 
notions deserve special attention: manner and path (cf. Talmy 1985, 2000; Levin & Rappaport 
Hovav 2005, Slobin 2000, 2005, Bohnemeyer et al. 2007, Pedersen 2008, Beavers, Levin & 
Tham 2010, Croft et al. 2010, Croft 2012 from linguistic perspectives; cf. Johnson 1987, 
Mandler 2004, 2010 from cognitive psychological perspectives). In the spatial 
schematizations in section 3.3.2 (Fig. 3.20 to 3.32), relations are schematized only as 
“motion”/”movement” or “state” (i.e., location), symbolized by straight arrows and lines, 
respectively. Obviously, the motion/movement relations are not differentiated there with 
respect to what kind of motion/movement is given, i.e., how someone or something moves, 
and whether the path of motion/movement is telic or atelic. For instance, in (3.1) The ball 
rolls into the room the manner of motion is “by rolling” and the event is telic, i.e., the path 
reaches its inherent “telos” when the ball is in the room. In (3.3) The sun is going down the 
manner of motion seems to be zero, i.e., although motion is impossible without some manner, 
the perceived/conceptualized motion downward in a straight line is something like the default 
204 
 
case, maybe because it constitutes the easiest possible conceptualization of motion. In 
contrast, there is no conceivable default path, except a straight one, but not with respect to 
direction. Any deviation from straight, uniform manner of motion/movement would thus 
count as salient (it defies expectation) or pertinent (for some reason or other, the way in which 
something/someone moves becomes pertinent). The path designated in The sun is going down 
has no endpoint because it consists only of the continuous motion downward. In The sun is 
sinking, the same is true, presumably.  
What is special, however, is that there is a tendency in English and German (as the languages 
here from which most examples stem) that they code manner in the main verb (roll, (literal) 
go, give, pour, fallen ‘fall’, fahren ‘drive’, etc.), while they code (a)telic path outside the main 
verb (or its root stem), whereas in Romance languages like Spanish there is a tendency to 
code (a)telic path in the main verb and make manner the “satellite” (cf. Talmy 2000), as in La 
botella entró flotando a la cueva (lit. ‘The bottle entered (into) the cave floating’. Other 
languages have developed additional preferences or exclusive strategies including 
coordinated, serial, or compounded verbs (cf. Croft et al. 2010).  
The question here is that concerning motivation, i.e., the one concerning the relationship 
between syntactic structure and conceptualization. Obviously, many languages tend to 
“source out” either path or manner information from the verb stem, but nearly universally at 
least one of both. Why should this be the case? Why should manner information (like in Engl. 
humble) and path information (like in Engl. enter)  in a verb stem exclude each other instead 
of allowing the type *henter? This question is puzzling and at the same time hardly explored 
empirically (cf. Huang & Tanangkingsing 2005). I would like to propose the following 
treatment: Manner and path (direction) are aspects of each and every instance of 
motion/movement (see the sections on perception). But it is difficult to conceptualize 
simultaneously someone moving somewhere and thereby “employing” some manner. Foveal 
seeing is presumably possible only when the observer focuses on either the manner in which 
something is executed or on the direction to which it aims. Similarly, it is possible that in 
conceptualization the simulated eye gaze of the conceptualizer cannot simultaneously focus 
on or attend to both manner and path aspects of one motion or movement, whereas it is 
possible to focus on either motion/movement and manner or motion/movement and path. In 
the former case one attends to, i.e., focuses on the parts of the moving object that constitute 
the manner, e.g., moving legs relative to a stationary torso, without simultaneously focussing 
the object as a whole moving relative to a landmark – which would constitute a shift in 
trajector-landmark configuration. In the latter case one attends to the change of position of the 
whole moving object relative to some landmark without focussing on the part of the object 
which constitutes the manner of motion/movement.  
 
In any case, conceptualizers have to sequentially conceptualize one aspect of 
motion/movement before the other. In this sense the “outsourcing” of one of the manner and 
path aspects is diagrammatically iconic with respect to the course of conceptualization and 
conforms to the idea of linguistic
o
 utterances as instructions for simulating perceptions. (It is, 
however, not iconic with respect to the course of an event and therefore not diagrammatically 
iconic with respect to the course of events, since manner and path are aspects of the same 
process/activity).  
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If this is true, then one question remains: Why does exploitation not concern relational 
expressions to a similar degree to which it concerns nominal expressions in syntactic 
complement positions? Regarding these, exploitation means that languages can pretend that 
circumstances are objects, i.e., unique concepts, i.e., trajectors or landmarks, in that these 
languages allow circumstances to occupy syntactic positions that, from the perspective of 
motivation, are reserved for objects. In this respect spatial relations as designated in language 
are unsuspicous per se, since they actually designate simple, unique states and relations. 
Candidates for exploited relational expressions are rather to be found in other verb classes, 
e.g., those containing verbs with highly social meanings like lie, betray, promise, etc. which 
only pretend to be instructions for simulating unique perceptual experiences. Sentences (3.8) 
and (3.9) above, which contain the verb ähneln ‘resemble’ are also examples of exploitation 
because resemblance is not an originally spatial relation. Here, the language learner cannot 
trace back the meanings of these verbs to spatial configurations by “obeying the instructions” 
but he/she must use these expressions as prompts to evaluate their meanings in sociocultural 
praxis. For that he/she must have acquired their appropriate use in constellations of joint 
attention within the same sociocultural praxis (see section 3.3.7 for details).  
A further aspect of why manner and path are syntactically separated might be of economic 
nature and concern memory and learnabiliy. The set of objects that can move in specific 
manners and the set of objects that can move along specific paths (and to specific 
destinations) is not identical, due to object affordances: A paper plane can probably move (or 
be moved) along most or even all conceptualizable paths, but it cannot do this in any 
conceptualizable manner. It does not afford hobbling, crawling, and other activities that only 
objects with arms and legs afford. Most objects strongly afford only very few manners of 
motion/movement. So because of the object affordances involved, Spanish El aeroplano entró 
a la cueva ‘The plane enters the cave’ suggests that it does so volando ‘flying’ unless 
specified otherwise by a satellite phrase. The same verb can be used in El chico entró a la 
cueva, even though the manner is less clear because the boy affords many kinds of movement 
that are possible here, among them crawling, walking, or swimming. That means if each 
manner was conflated with each path in unique stems of verbs of motion, then the number of 
verbs would grow immensely. Splitting manner and path expressions allows only using one of 
them, usually path, leaving manner to inference (which is often easy because of affordances). 
But why should there be languages, then, expressing manner in verb stems by default, when 
manner often seems to violate the maxims of relevance and quantity, i.e., is irrelevant or 
known. I would purport that these languages as well have developed highly frequent verbs of 
motion/movement which in certain contexts actually do not express manner information but 
only motion/movement schematically. In German Ich gehe ins Kino ‘I go to the cinema’ or 
English Peter went to school, go does not necessarily mean that my movement to the cinema 
and Peter’s movement to school happened by two-legged locomotion. It is very well possible 
that we “went” by bus, bike, or by other means. 
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3.3.6 Fixing reference in acquisition 
Because this work is about an important aspect of the linking competence, namely the 
competence to encode and decode concepts of states, processes, and activities by means of 
verb-complement structures in an appropriate manner, the topic of acquisition must briefly be 
mentioned here. In the sections on actional notions it has already been sketched how the 
corresponding attributional competence is supposed to be acquired (see sections 3.2.2). 
Things are different in the acquisition of spatial relation coding. Actional knowledge has been 
shown to be imposed on concepts that are grounded in (mainly visual) perception. It is stricto 
sensu not conceptual content, since it is not grounded in perception but “closes” otherwise 
underspecified percepts and conceptualizations. That means because actional notions are not 
of a “perceptual” kind, their coding cannot be acquired in the same manner as spatial 
relations. One crucial mechanism which aids the acquisition of the latter is “joint attention” 
(cf. Bruner 1975, Scaife & Bruner 1975, Tomasello 2003, Tomasello 2008). A situation in 
which a learner learns how something he/she senses is linguistically
o
 coded consists of 
him/her, some competent speaker, some circumstance both participants can monitor, and an 
utterance by which the speaker refers to that circumstance. It is necessary that both learner 
and speaker know that the other is visually attending to the same state, process, or activity that 
is taking place and that what is taking place is in their joint attentional focus in terms of eye 
fixation on the involved objects. This constitutes something like a triangulation (term 
borrowed from Davidson 1982) and helps the learner fix reference. This is schematically 
depicted in Figure 3.39. To be sure of what it is that the speaking person is actually referring 
to in an utterance, the learner uses several non-linguistic
o
 cues, among them the looking 
direction of the person, body posture, and speaking direction (cf. Baldwin 1991). 
 
 
Figure 3.39: Joint attention 
 
Another ingredient is the learner’s making use of distinctive oppositions (cf. Croft 2001, 
Tomasello 2003: 169ff.). For example, if the speaking person says This is a glass in the 
depicted situation, the learner does not know whether the person refers to the glass, the table, 
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parts of the glass or the table, or to features of the glass or the table (cf. Wittgenstein 
4
1980: 
256). Reference is thus (allegedly) indeterminate. But if, at another occasion, the speaking 
person says again This is a glass when the glass is standing on the cupboard, the learner can 
infer that glass was not referring to the table last time. Saying This is a table in the absence of 
a glass in the (joint) visual field reinforces this inference. The novel and unexpected variable 
in an already familiar construction has always something salient about it and grabs attention. 
With sufficient repetition, this creates a slot in the utterance This is a  /__X__/ in which the 
learner can put and expect expressions for things in perception. Other types of utterances that 
consist of other parts of speech work in a similar way, like The glass/mouse/Peter 
stands/lies/sleeps on/under/between the table/sofa/car and the tree (cf. Tomasello 2003).   
When the child has learned that the function of some objects having similar perceptual 
features is that of drinking-out-of-them, irrespective of minor differences in size, shape, or 
color, and when it experiences that it is always called glass, then it is unlikely that the child 
will infer that it is the size, shape, or color that is designated by glass. Additionally to their 
joint visual attention, when it is clear to both mother and child in a situation that they both 
have the same purpose of preparing the child something to drink, and when the child knows 
that the diaphanous, container-like thing on the table affords drinking out of it, then it will 
presumably infer that in the mother’s utterance I’ll give you some water. This is your glass, 
isn’t it?, glass refers to the whole object, not just some feature of it (see also Markman 1990, 
Gentner & Boroditsky 2001). The child need only have had former experiences in which the 
diaphanous, container-like thing was called glass. What disambiguates the indeterminacy of 
reference here is firstly making use of distinctive oppositions, and secondly what Tomasello 
(2003, 2008) calls “common ground” (“frame” in Ninio & Bruner 1978). This includes the 
ability to synchronize visual attention and actual purposes with one another and it fixes to a 
certain degree what is pertinent to putting this purpose into effect (cf. section 3.2.1.1): For the 
situation described above, it cannot plausibly be the color, shape, or size of the thing which is 
designated by glass. Thus, what is not depicted in Figure 3.39 is that there is a “common 
ground” for both speaker and learner without which joint visual attention is only an 
insufficient mechanism in acquisition. These indispensable competences that aid language 
acquisition, especially that of sharing, or synchronizing, purposes, leads us straight back to the 
participation in sociocultural praxis and the corresponding cognitive competences as a 
precondition for language, not only from an ontogentic, but also from a phylogenetic 
perspective.  
These considerations suggest that children in constellations of joint attention learn mappings 
between percepts and words, mediated by identification, and thus fix reference from the very 
beginning. Though, this is only a later step in acquisition (for details see Tomasello 2003, 
Clark 2003). At least one prior step is important in the present context: “pivot schemas” 
(Braine 1963, 1976, Tomasello 2003). They consist of at least two words, one of which is a 
stable element of an utterance with which the child is already familiar. The other element is 
variable and maybe new. It can, as a variable, be put into the slots that are open in pivots, like 
more juice and more car for the pivot schema more [__X__]. Other candidates are this 
[__X__], there [__X__], big [__X__] or not eat [__X__].  
From a semiotic, or reference, perspective the pivots in these examples seem to have another 
character than the variables: Variables designate objects in sensation or conceptualization, 
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pivots often do not. Bunnies, dads, glasses and Alex are things to which the corresponding 
child expressions bunny, dad, glass, Alex can refer, and children can learn by means of joint 
attention that these expressions can stand for the things. But what about this, there, big, or not 
eat? They do obviously not refer to objects in sensation or conceptualization but to 
circumstances (including locations and activities). What they stand for cannot so easily be 
fixed, since it is not unique percepts or concepts. Instead, these expressions stand – from a 
sensational and conceptual standpoint – for something more complex, namely states or 
situations that are parts of or which are aspects of things. Such circumstances can only be 
referred to linguistically
o
 because they are circumstances by virtue of the objects that 
constitute them. So, assuming a constellation of joint attention and common ground, it is easy 
to learn that if something is about thing X, one says X. It is less easy to learn that if the 
position of X relative to you is p in egocentric space, and if you want mommy to attend to X, 
then to say there X, because the conditions under which one uses there are less transparent 
and more complex.  
That nouns are more readily acquired is – notwithstanding criticism – well documented (cf. 
Gentner 1982, Gentner & Boroditsky 2001; cf. Choi & Gopnik 1995 for criticism, cf. 
Tomasello 2003: 45ff. for reconciliation). The reason is mainly one that follows directly from 
the theories of sensation and conceptualization proposed here: that figures in sensation or 
trajectors in conceptualization are expressed as nouns. That this is the case does not rule out 
that children learn other expressions, too, namely when the shared purposes, saliences and 
pertinences make sufficiently clear under which conditions to use an “unnouny” noun (when 
mommy shouts Alex, breakfast!), a state, process, or activity expression (Kimmy spit; shoe off; 
Kendall down; examples taken from Braine 1976), or some “social” expression (like hello, 
bye, or thanks) (cf. Tomasello 2003: 46). 
 
This section shall be summed up by stating that joint visual attention mainly helps fixing the 
reference of expressions, and this works primarily for objects of sensation and 
conceptualization, and that shared purposes and shared pertinences mainly help fixing the 
conditions of the use of expressions when joint visual attention is not informative. This works 
for all types of expressions, but especially when dealing with sensationally and conceptually 
non-basic referents. 
 
 
3.3.7 Fixing reference in motivated and exploitated language use 
In this section the ideas of the last section on acquisition, reference, and use shall be brought 
together with the ideas on motivation and exploitation in the previous sections. Figure 3.40 
illustrates the now familiar functioning of motivation (a) and the two modes of exploitation 
discussed above (b and c). 
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Figure 3.40: Motivation and exploitation in the relationship between spatial 
conceptualization and syntax 
 
To recapitulate, exploitation by hypostatizing a circumstance (i.e., (b) in Figure 3.40) is given 
in the case that the regular correspondences between conceptualization and syntax (as 
depicted in (a), the motivated relationship) are exploited by making a conceptual circumstance 
the privileged syntactic complement in syntax, thereby pretending that this is a possible object 
of sensation/conceptualization, for instance in Unemployment threatens the Spanish youth. 
Exploitation by hypostatizing, or compressing, multiple conceptualizations (i.e., (c) in Figure 
3.40) is given, when originally multiple conceptualizations of some circumstances are coded 
by a single syntactic structure such that this sentence pretends to code a single and unique 
conceptualized state, process, or activity, for instance in All men fall off their bikes in 
Marburg. 
What the acquisition of case (a) looks like, i.e., how the regular correspondences between the 
basic components of sensation, conceptualization, and syntax can be learned, is depicted in 
Figure 3.41 below.  
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Figure 3.41: Acquisition of spatial relation coding by means of joint attention and extraction 
of diagrammatic iconicity 
 
The basic arrangement is familiar from Figure 3.39, but note that the lines symbolizing joint 
visual attention are left out here for reasons of clarity, though joint visual attention and 
common ground are presupposed in this Figure. In the situation depicted here the speaker is 
uttering The glass is standing on the table and the learner hears this, while both are visually 
focusing on the glass. The idea is that the learner is frequently exposed to such scenarios. 
Assumed he/she senses in terms of figure and ground, and conceptualizes in terms of trajector 
and landmark, then he/she will firstly find similarities in what he/she perceives, namely that a 
figure relates somehow to a ground. The learner will secondly find similarities in what the 
speaker utters in these circumstances, namely that his/her utterance is structured in a regular 
manner. In terms of distinctive oppositions, the learner finds that different figures cause the 
first part of speech to be altered, different grounds cause the last part of speech to be altered, 
and that different relations between both alter the middle part. In this way the learner can 
recognize a regular correspondence between the parts of speech of the speaker and the 
figure/ground configuration in what is jointly perceived. A further step is then to identify this 
regular pattern irrespective of the specific things that can be identified (categorized) to be 
present in the visual field. That means it does not matter whether this is a glass on a table, a 
mouse lying under the sofa, or a tree standing beside another tree, the relationship between 
what the learner senses (and identifies) and what the speaker says is in any case regular. So 
the learner can generalize from the specific instance in which he/she senses and identifies a 
glass on a table to a general schema linking spatial configurations and syntactic structures. 
(Because “extracting schemas” means “making differentiations in doing”, this can be thought 
of as treating the spatial configurations in question alike linguistically
o
, i.e., coding them by 
means of utterances with similar underlying syntactic structures.) 
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Figure 3.42: Utterance as instruction for conceptualization in the absence of stimuli and joint 
attention 
 
Once the learner has gained insight into how parts of speech identified in the utterance of the 
speaker correspond to spatial configurations, he/she can use this knowledge to decode 
utterances referring to something that is not present in the joint visual field of speaker and 
learner. Such a case is given in Figure 3.42. The speaker utters Alex was lying in bed but 
although both persons grab each other’s attention, triangulation is not possible since there are 
no objects in perception to which the utterance could refer. But because the learner knows 
which parts of speech belong to which parts of recognized or conceptualized spatial 
configurations, he/she is now able to “generate” a conceptualization from the utterance, 
precisely in accordance with the characterization of utterances as instructions for simulating 
visual experiences. What makes this possible is the motivated correspondence between 
conceptualization and syntactic structure due to diagrammatic iconicity into which the learner 
has gained insight: bits of conceptualization correspond to bits of utterances quite regularly. 
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Figure 3.43: Utterance as instruction for conceptualization fails due to exploitation of 
diagrammatic iconicity 
 
Now, what if the speaker utters something that exploits diagrammatic iconicity in the sense 
characterized in the previous sections, as in Figure 3.43? The learner will try to obey the 
instruction to simulate a perceptual experience just like in the case of Alex was lying in bed. 
The syntactic structure underlying the utterance Unemployment is threatening Spanish youth 
pretends to be relatable to parts of conceptualizations, i.e., to trajector, landmark, and the 
relation between both. It will turn out, however, that this is not possible, since neither 
unemployment nor the Spanish youth can serve as trajector or landmark, respectively: 
Unemployment is not a possible figure, Spanish youth is not a possible ground in sensation, 
and conceptualization is not so flexible as to make them a possible trajector or landmark, 
respectively. So it is not possible for the learner to generate a simulated experience from this 
ostensible instruction, due to hypostatization of a circumstance in accordance to case (b) in 
Figure 3.40. Something similar is true for All men fall off their bikes in Marburg, but this 
utterance exploits diagrammatic iconicity differently, namely by compressing multiple 
conceptualizations in a single construction, thus constituting case (c) in Figure 3.40. 
Even if the learner cannot productively apply the linking schema he/she has acquired on the 
basis of motivated instances of language use, it must nevertheless be learnable: In fact, 
utterances like Unemployment is threatening Spanish youth are made, and they are accepted. 
But when one looks at the typical acquisition scenario (see Figure 3.39), it becomes evident 
that this is not available here, either: There is nothing on which joint visual attention could be 
directed. So how can such an utterance be understood? To give it a try, someone must firstly 
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know that most people have to go to work in order to earn money. Second, someone has to 
know that not having work means being unemployed, and that being unemployed has an 
effect on many people just like being physically threatened by someone or something (see 
section 3.3.3.1 on metaphors). Third, the Spanish youth can presumably not be made a 
conceptual landmark, since it lacks the necessary features. Fourth, one must be able to 
simulate the feeling of being threatened, must apply it to a young Spaniard, and must then be 
aware of the fact that for (nearly) every young Spaniard it is true that he/she is being 
threatened (as an instruction: Take the first young Spaniard and conceptualize him/her as 
threatened, take the second young Spaniard and conceptualize him/her as threatened, take the 
third …, etc.), when he/she conceptualizes himself as not having a job, i.e., not going to work 
and getting money for it. 
The list could be continued, and each of these sentences I used to very roughly characterize 
the meaning of this sentence could again be broken down in numerous single 
conceptualizations exhibiting “true” conceptualizations with “true”, i.e., possible, trajector-
landmark configurations. What is crucial is that there is no one-to-one correspondence 
between parts of conceptualization and parts of speech, although the syntactic structure 
suggests a conceptualization that is similar in simplicity like a sentence like Peter kicks the 
ball. But if the person uttering this sentence claims validity for what he/she is saying, then 
he/she had to have run through numerous “true” conceptualizations which he/she has then 
compressed into this single sentence.
143
  
If this is true, then it is expectable that the conceptualization of single words designating 
possible objects in perception/conceptualization (concrete nouns like sphere) or simple states, 
processes, and activities (like blue or wash) show different neuronal activation patterns than 
the conceptualization of single words pretending to designate possible objects or simple 
circumstances in perception/conceptualization (abstract words like success, respect, or 
swindle). In an experiment about the retrieval of concrete and abstract semantics, Noppeney 
and Price (2004) found that conceptualizing (“retrieving the meaning” in Noppeney & Prince) 
of abstract words in contrast to concrete ones increased activation in the left inferior frontal 
and middle temporal gyrus, the superior temporal sulcus, and the left anterior temporal pole. 
These areas have previously been shown to be involved in semantic processing at the sentence 
level. From these findings, Noppeney and Price (2004: 168) conclude that  
 
“these differential activations might reflect a particular retrieval mechanism or strategy for abstract 
concepts: as abstract concepts do not correspond to physical objects in the external world, subjects 
might generate an appropriate semantic context that fully explores and specifies their meanings.”  
 
Translated into the present theoretical account this means that in order to “fully explore” the 
concepts underlying some word designating perceptually/conceptually non-basic matters, it is 
necessary to decompress it into those basic instances of states, processes, and activities (in 
terms of trajector-landmark configurations) for the whole of which the use of the word would 
be appropriate.  
 
                                                 
143
 In All men fall off their bikes in Marburg there is also compression, but here multiple similar 
conceptualizations are compressed, since similar spatial relations underlie each instance of a man falling off his 
bike. Multiple different conceptualizations underlie Unemployment threatens the Spanish youth.  
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The reported differential activations could thus be argued to directly follow from the 
differential acquisition modes (possible vs. impossible joint visual attention on things in the 
environment in concrete vs. abstract language) and from the fact that hypostatized (abstract) 
language “processing” requires decompression into multiple trajector-landmark 
conceptualization sequences. 
 
For using Unemployment is threatening Spanish youth appropriately there is a thus a common 
ground necessary between speaker and hearer that is richer than can specified here and most 
likely a co-text (either written, spoken, or by gesture). The hearer must decompress what this 
sentence designates to a degree that is determined by the purposes and pertinences of the 
present discourse.
144
 In order not to misunderstand each other, both speaker and hearer must 
have sufficiently similar concepts of what the world would look like, if this sentence were a 
generally acceptable characterization of what is going on in Spain – they must conceptualize 
the practical consequences of this sentence similarly. 
 
Thus, while the conditions on appropriate use of motivated language is learned in contexts of 
joint attention, joint pertinences, and joint purposes, in which triangulation between speaker, 
learner, and the object/circumstance talked about helps fix reference, the conditions on 
appropriate use of exploited language are learned in contexts of joint pertinences and joint 
purposes which crucially require rich additional knowledge repertoires that are not supplied 
by triangulation plus common ground, e.g., knowledge about languages’ conventionalized 
metaphors, about how to decompress linguistically
o
 compressed conceptualizations, about 
evaluating (conceptualizing) only the practical consequences of the validity of an utterance 
instead of blindly obeying to the language-as-instruction objective if this is impossible.  
 
In fact, reference is not fixed in these instances, or only fixed to the degree that the 
conceptualization of the practical consequences of the utterance’s validity is shared by the 
interlocutors to a degree which does not lead to misunderstandings in the following 
interaction. 
In the light of these considerations it would be interesting to look at hypostatizations in 
childrens’ speech. As a prediction, it would be rather surprising if children frequently 
produced hypostatizations, i.e., instances of exploited language use. They can presumably not 
even understand utterances like Unemployment is threatening Spanish youth, i.e., they might 
not even know what to conceptualize at all.  
 
 
3.3.8 Limits of hypostatization 
It was noted above that hypostatization is motivated economically in that it discharges the 
speaker (and, if it feeds back to routines of conceptualization, the hearer) of workload. Are 
there limits to hypostatization? From a technical perspective, the answer is certainly “no”. 
Hypostatization is treating circumstances linguistically
o
 as if they were possible 
figures/trajectors or grounds/landmarks in sensation or conceptualization, respectively. It is 
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 For instance, if the “context” is clear, this facilitates reading of hypostatized instances of written language on 
the sentence level, relative to when context information is not available (cf. Schwanenflugel & Shoben 1983). 
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thus a matter of using symbols phonetically, graphically, or gesturally to stand for some other 
things (in the broadest possible sense). But because symbols, let us say morphs like {high}, 
{un-}, {the}, {-s}, {fox}, are not identical with for what they stand, they can be arranged in 
any possible way without having effects on the things for which they stand, namely when they 
are not treated as symbols. If one combined some morphs in a fully arbitrarily way and then 
treated the resultant arrangement of morphs as symbols again, he/she would automatically try 
to use it as an instruction for conceptualization. It would be impossible for most of these 
arbitrary arrangements to decode them in terms of complex conceptualizations, e.g., for /s fox 
the high un/. Among the possible strings would be, given all morphs of a language, also ones 
like /colorless green ideas sleep furiously/ and this can indeed be argued to be an instance of 
multiple hypostatizations, i.e., exploitation. People have indeed offered interpretations for this 
utterance. As has become clear, this is possible by assuming that it compresses multiple 
conceptualizations which, when decompressed, will refer to some states, processes, or 
activities that are pertinent to some interlocutors in some ongoing discourse. They will be able 
to communicate successfully using such utterances only if a sufficient common ground and 
co-text is available (e.g., Everett 2013: 133–135). When asking a stranger on the street Excuse 
me, do you know if colorless green ideas sleep furiously?, this communication will not come 
to a happy (or at least successful) end unless a common ground is established beforehand.  
 
That means arbitrary arrangements of symbols that incidentally correspond to some 
conventional patterns of how symbols are combined in a language force people to generate 
conceptualizations from them. But the limits of hypostatizations would be reached where 
misunderstandings arise, notwithstanding a common ground between interlocutors which 
could set the stage for the adequate decompression of what is seemingly compressed in a 
hypostatization.  
 
And language, as a symbol system, provides the means to produce such hypostatizations by 
its infinite character (cf. Chomsky 
2
2002). The finiteness of what is in principle possible in 
sensation and conceptualization, and the infinity of what is in principle possible with a 
linguistic
o
 symbol system are accommodated in the below Figure 3.44 which reconstructs 
Figure 3.37 as a semiotic triangle as it is known from Ogden & Richards (1965).  
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Figure 3.44: Correspondences and discrepancies in the relationship between sensation, 
spatial conceptualization, and syntactic structure as a semiotic triangle 
 
The additional cycle employing arrows which is attached to the syntactic structure panel 
symbolizes the “idling cycle” that is built into its mode of functioning.  
 
The idling of linguistic
o
 signs due to the infinity of the system is what harbors the risk of 
decoupling combinations of signs from possible conceptualizations and what leads 
theoreticians to the postulation of an explanatorily self-contained syntax (cf. Chomsky 
2
2002, 
1965). Where hypostatizations lead to misunderstandings, precisely this decoupling has taken 
place.
145
 In this sense syntax can be said to be partially autonomous from those actional, 
perceptual, and conceptual considerations which are the topic of this work.
146
  
 
On the other hand, both sensation and conceptualization are strictly bound to the biotic 
makeup of our sense organs and what the environment offers to them. They are strictly 
definite and without idling cycles. Although a language’s syntax can shape routines of making 
differences (categorizing) conceptually (see section 3.3.4), it cannot alter what is in principle 
possible in conceptualization. In this sense sensation and conceptualization are autonomous 
from syntax. As cognitive competences, they are complete without syntax. 
  
 
3.3.9 Spatial relations and syntactic constructions 
The examples for pairings of conceptual structures and syntactic structures in the previous 
sections have made use of only one type of spatial relation, namely trajector-relation-
                                                 
145
 I think this is what Wittgenstein (
3
2001: 16) means when he says that „language goes on holiday“. The 
German formulation is that “die Sprache feiert”, meaning literally ‘language celebrates’ (Wittgenstein 41980: 
260). 
146
 Please note that this statement abstains from declaring whether or not syntax is partially self-contained. What 
is not motivated about syntax by action, perception, or conceptualization in the sense posited here may very well 
be motivated by other factors, or it may not. 
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landmark, and of only one type of syntactic structure, namely NP-V-P-NP. Concentrating now 
on German, it is clear that there are more syntactic structures than this one. Since we are 
dealing here with verb-complement structures, the following list of syntactic constructions is 
confined to the most important of them and not claimed to be exhaustive. 
 
syntactic 
construction
example glossing Engl. paraphrase
NP
nom
-V (1) Philipp tanzt.
(2) Die Tür öffnet sich.
(3) Es schneit.
(4) Tiger jagen.
(5) Die Arbeitslosigkeit sinkt.
Philipp.3.NOM dance.3SG
DET.3.NOM door open.3SG REFL.ACC
It.3.NOM snow.3SG
Tiger.3PL hunt.3PL
DET.3.NOM unemployment sink.3SG
'Philipp is dancing.'
'The door opens.'
'It is snowing.'
'Tigers hunt.'
'Unemployment is decreasing.'
NP
acc 
-V (1) Mich friert. Me.1.ACC freeze.3SG 'I am cold.'/'I am freezing.'
NP
nom
-V-NP
acc  
(1) Kinder fürchten Gewitter.
(2) Das Spiel dauert zwei 
Stunden.
(3) Ich hasse dich.
(4) Gewitter ängstigen Kinder.
(5) Ich habe Kopfschmerzen.
(6) Alex verfolgt Matthias.
(7) Alex öffnet die Tür.
(8) Arbeitslosigkeit bedroht die   
     spanische Jugend.
(9) Willi hat eins von deinen 
     Gläsern runtergeworfen
Child.3PL fear.3PL thunderstorm.PL
DET.3.NOM match last.3 two hour.PL
I.1.NOM hate.1 you.ACC
Thunderstorm.3PL frighten.3PL child.PL
I.1.NOM have.1 headache.PL
Alex.3.NOM follow.3 Matthias.ACC
Alex.3.NOM open.3 DET.ACC door
Unemployment.3.NOM threaten.3SG. 
DET.3.ACC Spanish youth
Willi.3.NOM have.3 one.ACC of your glasses
throw-down.PTCP
'Children fear thunderstorms.'
'The match lasts two hours.'
'I hate you.'
'Thunderstorms frighten children.'
'I have a headache.'
'Alex is following Matthias.'
'Alex is opening the door.'
'Unemployment is threatening Spanish 
youth.'
'Willi knocked over one your glasses.'
NP
nom
-V-NP
dat
(1) Das Bild gefällt mir.
(2) Alex vertraut seiner Mutter.
(3) Alex folgt Jürgen.
(4) Matthias hilft Alex.
(5) Alex ähnelt Mario.
(6) Mario ähnelt Alex.
(7) Mario und Alex ähneln sich.
(8) Willi ist eins von deinen 
Gläsern runtergefallen.
DET.3. NOM picture please3. me.DAT
Alex.3.NOM trust.3 his.3.DAT mother
Alex.3.NOM follow.3 Jürgen.DAT
Matthias.3.NOM help.3 Alex.DAT
Alex.3.NOM resemble.3 Mario.DAT
Mario.3.NOM resemble.3 Alex.DAT
[Mario and Alex].3PL.NOM resemble.3PL each 
other.DAT
Willi.3.DAT be.3 one.NOM of your glasses
down-fall.PTCP
'The picture pleases me.'
'Alex trusts his mother.'
'Alex is following Jürgen.'
'Matthias is helping Alex.'
'Alex resembles Mario.'
'Mario resembles Alex.'
'Mario and Alex resemble each other/
Themselves.'
'(It happened to Willi that) one of your 
glasses broke.'
NP
nom
-V-NP
dat
- 
NP
acc
(1) Ich sende dir Blumen.
(2) Horst entzieht Uta die Kinder.
(3) Alex stellt Christoph Katrin vor.
(4) Das Auto macht Alex nur Ärger.
I.1.NOM send.1 you.DAT flower.ACC.PL
Horst.3.NOM deprive.3 Uta.DAT       
DET.ACC.PL child.PL
Alex.3.NOM introduce.3 Christoph.DAT 
Katrin.ACC
DET.3.NOM car make.3 Alex.DAT only 
trouble.ACC
'I (will) send you flowers.'
'Horst deprives Uta of the children.'
'Alex is introducing Katrin to Christoph.' 
'The car is only causing Alex trouble.'
NP
nom
-V-NP
acc
- 
NP
acc
(1) Christoph lehrt Alex den 
Aufwärtshaken.
Christoph.3.NOM teach.3 Alex.DAT DET.ACC 
uppercut
'Christoph is teaching Alex the 
uppercut.'
NP
nom
-V-PP (1) Sie streiten vor der Kirche.
(2) Vor der Kirche steht Alex 
rechts von Matthias.
(3) Sie gehen in die Kirche.
(4) Alle Männer fallen in Marburg 
vom Rad.
They.3PL argue.3PL in front of DET.DAT 
church
In front of DET.DAT church stand.3 Alex.3.NOM 
right of Matthias.DAT
They.3PL go.3PL into DET.ACC church
All.ADJ man.3PL.NOM fall.3PL in Marburg
off-DET.3SG.DAT bike.DAT
'They are arguing in front of the 
church.'
'In front of the church Alex is standing 
to the right of Matthias.'
'They are going into the church.'
'All men fall off their bikes in Marburg.'
NP
nom
-NP
acc
-
PP
(1) Christoph gießt Wasser ins 
Glas.
(2) Ich sende Blumen an dich. 
(3) Robert belädt den Wagen mit 
Heu.
(4) Robert lädt Heu auf den 
Wagen.
(5) Er öffnet die Tür mit dem 
Schlüssel.
Christoph.3.NOM pour.3 water.ACC into-
DET.ACC glas
I.1.NOM send.1 flower.ACC.PL to you.ACC 
Rob.3.NOM load.3 DET.ACC wagon with 
hay.DAT
Rob.3.NOM load hay.ACC onto DET.ACC 
wagon
He.3.NOM open.3 DET.ACC door with 
DET.DAT key
'Christoph is pouring water into the 
Glas.'
'I (will) send flowers to you.'
'Robert is loading the wagon with hay.'
'Robert is loading hay onto the wagon.'
'He is opening the door with the key.'
 
Table 3.8: German syntactic verb-complement constructions 
  
In the leftmost column types of syntactic structures are listed. They are called syntactic 
constructions here, since they can be shown to be corresponding to simple trajector-landmark 
configurations, i.e., to circumstance types, quite regularly. In the second column exemplary 
instantiations of each syntactic construction are given. The instances of a construction vary 
according to several parameters, the most important of which are in the present context 
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whether they are motivated (Sie stehen vor der Kirche ‘They are standing in front of the 
church’) or exploiting instances (Alle Männer fallen in Marburg vom Rad ‘All men fall off 
their bikes in Marburg’), whether they code egocentric (Ich hasse dich ‘I hate you’) or 
allocentric space (Alex verfolgt Matthias ‘Alex follows Matthias’), whether they are simple or 
telic (Sie gehen in die Kirche ‘They are going into the church’) or atelic states, processes or 
activities (Sie streiten vor der Kirche ‘They are arguing in front of the church’), and whether 
they code the trajector (Ich hasse dich ‘I hate you’) or the landmark (Ich habe Kopfschmerzen 
‘I have a headache’) as the PSC, i.e., whether they exhibit regular or inversed mapping. 
Of each construction (except the NPnom-V-NPacc-NPacc construction) – many of which also 
occur in English – at least one instance has been characterized in terms of spatial relations so 
far in this chapter (section 3.3.2). Some constructions seem to correspond to a single type of 
trajector-landmark configuration, e.g., the NPnom-V and the NPacc-V constructions. This snarl 
will be unraveled in part III where the findings about actional, spatial, and temporal relations 
will be brought together.    
The syntactic constructions in Table 3.8 were not introduced earlier because what has been 
said about the NP-V-P-NP construction (i.e., NPnom-V-P-NP) with the exemplary instances 
The ball rolls into the room and The glass is standing on the table holds true for the other 
constructions as well: They are originally diagrammatically iconic with respect to particular 
trajector-landmark configurations, i.e., circumstance types, and are thus motivated; they can 
be and in fact are frequently exploited in that they compress multiple trajector-landmark 
configurations into one syntactic structure or hypostatize circumstances; the way in which 
they are regularly linked to conceptualizations (in terms of trajector-landmark configurations) 
is learned in constellations of joint attention and common ground; early exploited instances 
are more holistically learned in terms of conditions of use in constellations of a common 
ground, where common pertinences, purposes, and practical consequences concerning the 
utterance in question are shared.  
This idea in part reflects those of Fillmore (1968, 1977, 2006) on “frames”, and of Goldberg 
(1995: 39) on “humanly relevant scenes”. Goldberg (1995: 39), building on Fillmore’s work 
in Case Grammar and frame semantics, formulates a “scene encoding hypothesis” according 
to which “[c]onstructions which correspond to basic sentence types encode as their central 
senses event types that are basic to human experience.” Constructions can be defined here in 
the spirit of Goldberg as form-meaning pairings at the sentential level. Examples of “humanly 
relevant scenes” that are “basic to experience” are, according to Goldberg, “someone causing 
something, someone experiencing something, something moving, something being in a state, 
someone possessing something, something causing a change of state or location, someone 
experiencing something [sic!; SK], and something having an effect on someone.” (Goldberg 
1995: 39). The participants in these scenes are also relevant, namely with respect to their 
thematic roles the set of which Goldberg largely adapts from Fillmore (1968, “deep cases”) 
and Gruber (1970) and which includes among others agent, patient, recipient, and goal (cf. 
Goldberg 1995: 43). For her scene encoding hypothesis she cites evidence from language 
acquisition, according to which children’s utterances code exactly the abovementioned basic 
scenes, with the participants bearing the abovementioned roles. Thereby, children employed a 
“set of meanings” that has “to do with agency, action, location, possession and the existence, 
recurrence, nonexistence, and disappeareance of objects […].” (Bowerman, cit. in Goldberg 
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1995: 42). Goldberg’s arguments concerning the question of what makes a scene “basic to 
experience” draw upon other theoretical proposals, especially Langacker’s archetypes and 
Fillmore’s deep cases, and upon language acquisition data, according to which some verb 
meanings (“light verbs” like do, go, make, put) are learned earlier and more easily than others. 
Their meanings are supposed to correspond closely to the meanings of argument structure 
constructions (namely do to the simple (in)transitive construction, go to the intransitive 
motion construction, make to the resultative construction, and put to the caused motion 
construction).  
While I agree with Goldberg on the fact that the important notions here are whole “conceptual 
packages” (i.e., concepts of states and potentially complex processes and activities) instead of 
concepts detached from any circumstances, and complex syntactic structures (coding these 
states, processes, and activities) instead of isolated syntactic categories, I am rather reserved 
with respect to three aspects in this proposal: 
 
  What is meant by “relevant” in Goldberg’s account remains unclear. This leaves 
open what it is exactly that makes a scene relevant. 
  Notions of action and agentivity are treated along with spatial notions like location 
and goal.  
  The basal character of “humanly relevant scenes” remains somewhat vague in that it 
is not quite obvious how to connect their basal character to aspects of experience, 
although they are supposed to be basic to experience.  
  Light verbs and their meanings which correspond to the meanings of argument 
structure constructions need not be learned first and more easily than “heavy” verbs. 
 
I claim these points to be reconstructable in terms of the present proposal. As to the first point, 
what is relevant about a scene, i.e., some circumstance, is determined by its role in action 
planning as being pertinent. This shall not be repeated here. Instead, be referred to sections 
3.1.4.1 and 3.2.1.1 on features and action planning.  
Concerning the second point, it has been argued extensively in part II so far that matters of 
action (as opposed to behavior) and agentivity (as opposed to “mere” causation) are grounded 
and acquired quite differently from spatial relations in that there is no correlate of actional 
notions in sensation but that concepts of spatial relations are grounded exactly in sensation. I 
conclude from that that these knowledge bases are not similar and that one cannot presuppose 
that they are similarly accessible or readily applicable in language acquisition, as Goldberg 
does, though building on the proposals of others. Just like in the case of hypostatized 
language, knowledge about actional notions is not acquired in situations of joint visual 
attention and triangulation, because, as has now often been mentioned, intentions, dispositions 
etc. are not visible. Rather, what is learned is the conditions under which to appropriately 
make certain attributions. 
Regarding the third point, what makes a state, process, or activity (Goldberg: “scene”) basic is 
closely related to what is pertinent (Goldberg: “relevant”). Since what can be pertinent 
depends on what is, or can be, differentiated by someone (see sections 2.4 and 3.1), “basic” 
circumstances are those that are differentiated from others on such a schematic level that each 
concrete state, process, or activity that is differentiated instantiates one of the few schematic 
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ones. In other words, light verbs prescind from coding fine-grained differences, i.e., they treat 
as invariant what is actually not invariant. In Harry went to Australia the underlying go can 
refer to walking, driving by bus, driving by car, going by ship, flying in a plane, swimming, 
and so on at the same time. However, one uses and understands this either because making 
finer differentiations is not necessary because they are not pertinent, or someone does not 
have the means of coding at his/her disposal (“heavier” verbs), or someone has not learned to 
make some differentiations, yet (he/she has not yet seen someone swimming or flying). Thus, 
humanly relevant scenes concern states, processes, or activities of things that are pertinent in 
the context of some conceptualization, and they are stricto sensu not basic to experience but 
with respect to people’s identification performance, i.e., with respect to the high level of 
schematization they apply to them (see also section 3.4 on temporal organization). 
That the high level of schematizing circumstances would be a necessity for children in 
acquisition can be called into question anyway: Using the example of the dative alternation in 
English, Campbell and Tomasello (2001) demonstrated that light verbs are actually not 
privileged in language acquisition. If they are used preferentially, this is due to their more 
frequent occurrence in the children’s input. Children however very well do use “heavy” verbs. 
From the perspective taken here, where only spatial configurations are discussed it is 
irrelevant whether a verb is a light or heavy one. Give as a light verb and feed as a rather 
heavy verb actually code similar spatial relations at the trajector-landmark level of 
schematization, notwithstanding their degree of “heaviness”. In this regard, and remembering 
joint visual attention and common ground as ingredients of the acquisition situation par 
excellence, one cannot expect light verbs to be more “basic” than others. 
 
 
3.4 The grounding of temporal relations and their coding in language 
 
 Section 3.3 has dealt with differences and commonalities in how 
spatial relations are sensed, conceptualized, and linguistically
o
 coded 
by means of regular and inversed mappings. Analogously, the present 
chapter deals with the question of how, or by what means, temporal 
relations are sensed, conceptualized, and coded, and what role actional 
knowledge plays in this. These general principles governing the 
syntax-semantics relationship are given in Figure 3.45 in the context 
of the research-programmatic model. 
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Figure 3.45: Multi-level segmentation and coding of circumstances as sub-competences of the 
linking competence that are developed in section 3.4 
 
By temporal relations I mean the temporal organization of states, 
processes, and activities, either simple or complex, in terms of their 
beginnings, ends, durations, and transitions. This organization will be 
shown to be closely intertwined with the actional and spatial 
organization of circumstances as they have been described in part II so 
far.  
 
 
3.4.1 Temporal relations and their significance  
Any circumstance of an object can be identified to be an instance of a state, a process, an 
activity, or a combination or repetition of these. I have already characterized these notions in 
section 2.4 in terms of lifeworld differentiations, as well as how they relate to situations, 
events, and relations. This is repeated here and will be illustrated by some examples in turn: 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Types of circumstances and their characteristics 
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Table 2.1: Complexity and adicity of states, processes, and activities 
 
 
 
Table 2.2: Situation 
 
 
 
Table 2.3: Event 
 
 
 
Table 2.4: Relation 
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What is important here is that by adicity those trajectors and landmarks are meant that are 
actually conceptualized (in order to produce a particular utterance) and those that must be 
conceptualized (in order to interpret an utterance), respectively. Many grounds/landmarks 
cannot be conceptualized as objects because they lack the respective features. They are 
locations, e.g., rooms, forests, countries etc. (see section 3.1.3.3). However, they are part of 
conceptualization, even if only portions of them are conceptualized.
147
 On the other hand, 
complexity is measured by the number of figure/ground or trajector-landmark configurations 
that make up the circumstance. 
 
I. Circumstances that can be identified/conceptualized as states are: 
(3.18)  Peter being sick, complexity 1, adicity 1 
(3.19)  a glass standing on the table, complexity 1, adicity 2 
(3.20)  Marburg lying between Giessen and Kassel, complexity 1, adicity 3 
 
II. Circumstances that can be identified/conceptualized as processes are: 
(3.21)  the water running, complexity 1, adicity 1 
(3.22)  the ball rolling down from the carpet, complexity 2, adicity 2 
(3.23)  the drier spinning the laundry, complexity 1, adicity 2 
(3.24)  the door pushing the ball against the wall, complexity 2, adicity 3 
(3.25)  the queue pushing the ball over the table into the hole, complexity 3, adicity 4 
 
III. Circumstances that can be identified/conceptualized as activities are 
(3.26)  Peter running,  complexity 1, adicity 1 
(3.27)  Peter rolling himself down from the carpet, complexity 2, adicity 2 
(3.28)  the laundrer spinning the laundry, complexity 1, adicity 2 
(3.29)  Kelly pushing the ball towards the wall, complexity 2, adicity 3 
(3.30)  Kelly pushing the ball over the table into the hole, complexity 3, adicity 4 
 
Most linguists dealing with the temporal organization of circumstances, or what many call 
“event structure” (e.g., Vendler 1967, Bach 1986, Pustejovsky 1995, Rappaport Hovav & 
Levin 2001, Levin & Rappaport Hovav 2005, van Valin 2005, 2006), approach the topic from 
a naïve realistic stance. Because it is not mentioned otherwise, I have understood that states, 
processes, events etc. are taken to be what they are by nature, or objectively, in these 
proposals, i.e., independently of embodied perception, purpose-driven 
identification/conceptualization, and attribution. Exceptions to this are, at least in part, 
Engelberg 2000, the Cognitive-Functional Linguists (e.g., Langacker 2008a, Croft 2012, and 
                                                 
147
 The distinction between an object-ground/landmark and a location-ground/landmark is often not easy to draw. 
For instance, a caravan, or trailer can be an object, e.g., when a bird flies against it, such that the caravan is at the 
same time the ground/landmark to the bird, and an object that can be recognized/identified. If the bird flies into 
the caravan, its interior – where the bird is – cannot be said to be an object but rather a location. Maybe a valid 
criterion to tell them apart is the presence of an actualized affordance EXERT FORCE or UNDERGO FORCE: If 
something exerts force or undergoes force, then it is not a location-ground/landmark. The distinction between 
object-grounds/landmarks and location-grounds/landmarks is related to Langacker’s (e.g., 2008a) setting/ 
participant distinction. 
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some neo-Whorfian studies, e.g., Bohnemeyer & Pederson 2011), and psycholinguistic 
studies in the ambit of CFL (e.g., the volume by Hirsh-Pasek & Michnick Golinkoff 2006). 
 
In contrast, I take the position that the temporal organization of what verbs (together with 
their complements in co-composition; cf. Pustejovsky 1995) designate originates in how 
circumstances (states, processes, action, behavior, situations, events, relations) are sensed, 
identified/conceptualized, and how they undergo attribution. That means the temporal 
organization of circumstances is – like the actional and spatial-conceptual relations – 
independent of linguistic
o
 data.  
 
Verbs, or verbs with their complements, i.e., constructions, only code circumstances whose 
identity is fixed in sensation, conceptualization, or attribution. How this works is discussed in 
the following sections. Prior to that I will briefly illustrate that linguistic
o
 data are not a 
reliable measure for the temporal organization of circumstances. In short, just like there is 
exploitation of motivated spatial conceptualization-syntactic structure mappings in the form 
of hypostatizations, there are instances of syntactic structures that only pretend to be coding 
some circumstance with n adicity and n complexity, while they actually do not. Because most 
of sensation, identification, and conceptualization (but not of attribution) are (due to 
embodiment) in a biological, psychological, neurological, or anatomical sense necessary,
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they are more reliable sources for explaining the cognitive activities of people than are 
linguistic
o
 data which – as has been argued for and incorporated in the theory by means of the 
idling cycle of the symbol system (see section 3.3.8) – work partially independently of action, 
perception, and conceptualization. 
 
 
3.4.2 Syntactic structures suggesting another adicity than there is conceptually 
Consider sentence (3.31) first. 
 
(3.31) Er schläft den ganzen Tag. 
 ‘He sleeps the whole day.’ 
 
Comparing (3.31) with a more motivated instance of the same construction like Ich liebe dich 
‘I love you’ reveals that they are instances of the same NPnom-V-NPacc construction. But while 
the former only pretends to designate some dyadic circumstance, only the latter really does. A 
day is neither a possible object-landmark nor a location-landmark conceptually. The 
straightforward mapping is exploited here with respect to adicity in that the syntactic structure 
in (3.31) codes as dyadic what is conceptually monadic. This is visualized in the following 
schematics. 
   
                                                 
148
 In addition, they are to a sufficient degree accessible independently of linguistic
o
 evidence. The fact that up to 
this point any aspect of the linking competence has been grounded independently of linguistic
o
 evidence should 
be seen as the attempt to validate this claim. Another important aspect here is that identification and 
conceptualization are in an action-theoretic sense necessary, namely in that they are purpose-dependent, i.e., 
their functioning depends on what is pertinent from an action-theoretic perspective. 
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Figure 3.46: Monadic circumstance pretending dyadicity 
 
 
Figure 3.47: Dyadic circumstance mapped straightforwardly 
 
In contrast, (3.32) constitutes the case in which a sentence codes as monadic what is 
conceptually dyadic.  
 
(3.32) Tiger jagen nachts. 
 ‘Tigers hunt by night.’ 
 
Hunting is clearly an activity in which a figure/trajector stands in some spatial relation to an 
object-ground/landmark. (3.32) does not contain an expression for a ground/landmark. From 
the perspective of diagrammatic iconicity, it thus pretends to designate a monadic activity, 
while it is actually an instruction for a competent speaker/hearer to conceptualize a dyadic 
relation, as given in Figure 3.48. 
 
 
Figure 3.48: Dyadic circumstance pretending monadicity 
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In a similar manner (3.33) and (3.34) below suppress an object that is there in the spatial 
conceptualization of the designated event, respectively. In (3.33) it is the butter which is 
“incorporated” here in the verb (e.g., Gruber 1970, Jackendoff 1990, Pustejovsky 1995). 
When also conceptualizing a knife with which the buttering is executed, one could argue that 
a circumstance with adicity = 4, paraphrasable as “John, using a knife, smears butter on his 
toast” is being dealt with. In (3.34) the second sub-part of a causal relation is expressed 
without expressing the causing circumstance without which the caused circumstance would 
not have taken place.  
 
(3.33) John buttered his toast. 
 
 
Figure 3.49: Triadic circumstance pretending dyadicity 
 
In Figure 3.49 the trajector (John) acts with a limb (arm) towards the object landmark (butter) 
so that the butter moves as trajector onto the toast which is its landmark.  
 
(3.34) The window broke. 
 
 
Figure 3.50: Dyadic circumstance pretending monadicity 
 
In Figure 3.50 the causing circumstance not expressed could have been one in which exertion 
of force of some trajector is directed at the window by means of an activity using some limb. 
Traditionally, adicity is discussed in the context of the valency of a lexical, mostly verbal, 
item and in the context of the so-called argument/adjunct distinction (cf. Ágel et al. 2003, 
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2006 for an overview on valency).
149
 The following sentence (3.35) will make clear why 
adicity is discussed in the present context.
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(3.35) Alex makes coffee. 
 
The question discussed here is which circumstances verbs (and their complements) designate 
and by what features these circumstances are constituted. Because the temporal structure of 
circumstances is not determined by syntactic issues or linguistic
o
 facts, as has been argued, 
but by issues of perception, conceptualization, and action, the example of making coffee 
constitutes a problem with respect to adicity. To be precise, the activity of making coffee 
includes quite a number of objects and their relations to each other, such that a nearly 
exhaustive conceptualization of such an activity could easily be constituted by an adicity > 10 
(cf. Cooper & Shallice 2000, 2006, Cooper & Glasspool 2001, Jackendoff 2007: 123ff.).  
At first glance, (3.35) looks rather unsuspicious. Though, it starkly compresses the conceptual 
load of making coffee in a simple NPnom-V-NPacc construction, thus pretending conceptual 
simplicity. Now, many linguistic theories face the problem that they have to analyze (3.35) as 
a simple event, actually, i.e., as an event with only two sub-parts (e.g. Grimshaw 1990, 
Pustejovsky 1995, van Valin 2005).
151
 There might be linguistic
o
 reasons for this (scope of 
adverbs and other formal-syntactic operations the construction can undergo), while it is 
conceptually and from the perspective of an action theory rather implausible. Understanding 
and using Alex macht Kaffee appropriately – i.e., being able to simulate a perceptual 
experience from the utterance, and/or evaluating its practical consequences by drawing from 
common ground and co-text in the case of hypostatization – must plausibly include going 
down to its spatial and actional structure; this was argued for in the setting up of the research 
programme (see part I). The foundations of how this works were laid down in the previous 
sections and they are continued here. 
The task for the next section is then to outline the mechanisms by which circumstances are 
temporally organized in sensation, identification/conceptualization, and action/attribution. 
Then I will investigate whether there are regularities in how the resulting structures are related 
to verbs, complements, and the constructions which designate circumstances. 
 
 
3.4.3 The temporal organization of circumstances in sensation 
Strictly speaking, talk of “temporal conceptualization” is misleading. Conceptualization is 
simulated perception, and sensation, as the bottom-up part of perception, is restricted by the 
capacities of our sense organs. Because we lack the corresponding sense organs there is no 
way to sense temporal relations, and consequently no way to simulate such sensations. 
Because a satisfactory treatment of time, whatever it might be (cf. Mortensen 2011 for a brief 
overview on philosophical positions), is illusory here, I deduce the following treatment from 
                                                 
149
 The literature on the topic is hardly manageable. In general, most theories of syntax or grammar take a 
position with respect to what is “argument” and what is not by what criteria.  
150
 In fact, regarding contents one could very well also have discussed the topic in the section on spatial 
conceptualization. 
151
 Roughly, as an event consisting of an activity (“making coffee”) that is followed by a state (“there being 
coffee”). 
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what has been said so far: “Time” is a terminus of reflection, and a motive of thinking or 
speaking about temporal matters constitutes itself when actors/cognizers recognize, identify, 
or conceptualize the changes of objects in the sense of their motion/movement relative to 
some ground/landmark, in the sense of getting or losing integrity (i.e., object features), or in 
the sense of getting or losing one or more features without losing their integrity. This is the 
reason why the temporal organization of circumstances is closely intertwined with their 
spatial organization, as mentioned above. The temporal organization of circumstances in 
sensation is thus implicit in what has been said in the sections on sensation:  
 
Boundaries between circumstances are constituted by changes in figure/ground 
configurations, (a) feature(s) of (a) figure(s) or its/their integrity as recognized by a perceiver 
from his/her particular vantage point.  
 
Sensing Alex making coffee is then constituted by sensing innumerable such changes. (Note 
also that each of these changes is an actualization of an affordance of the involved figure, and 
each affordance is dependent on one or more features of the figure. When a ball is rolling, this 
is possible because the ball affords rolling, and it does so because it is round.) To facilitate 
matters a bit, let us assume Alex made tea (using a teabag), not coffee. Then, “event 
structure” at the level of sensation consists in a number of figure or figure/ground changes.152 
This is illustrated in Figure 3.51 below in a necessarily simplified manner. 
 
 
Figure 3.51: Temporal organization of circumstances in sensation (simplified) 
 
Figure 3.51 shows a sequence of different figure/ground configurations. The arrows at the 
bottom symbolize elapsed time, the vertical lines separating the panels symbolize time 
segments. The second and third segments show that the ground of one figure/ground 
configuration can function as the figure of another figure/ground configuration. The idea is 
that in the first sub-part Alex (as ground) takes a teabag (figure), in the second he (figure) puts 
the teabag (first ground, then figure) into a cup (ground), in the third Alex (figure) pours 
water (first ground, then figure) into the cup (ground). In the final sub-part Alex (ground) 
takes the tea (figure). The flux of impressions is thus segmented by means of bottom-up 
processes in sensation.  
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 I take this to be in line with the statement of Zacks et al. (2007: 279), according to which “event segmentation 
depends on changes in the environment […]. Physical changes in the environment can drive event segmentation 
in a bottom-up fashion by increasing the potential for prediction error.” 
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3.4.4 The temporal organization of circumstances in identification/conceptualization 
Now it is possible that the circumstances from Figure 3.51, as recognized by an 
actor/cognizer, are identified to be instances of some processes or activities for which the 
actor/cognizer already has concepts. This is illustrated in Figure 3.52 below. 
 
 
Figure 3.52: Temporal organization of circumstances in identification/conceptualization 
 
In Figure 3.52, the figure/ground configuration of the first time segment is identified to be 
ALEX TAKING A TEABAG, i.e., the figure is identified to be Alex, the ground is identified to be 
a teabag, and the relation between both is identified to be one of reaching, grasping, and 
taking. (Actually, the figure/ground configuration(s) underlying the conceptualization of Alex 
taking a teabag could be analyzed in a more fine-grained manner, of course, but Figure 3.52 
simplifies the correspondences between sensation and identification for the sake of 
comprehensibility). The percepts of the following time segments could likewise be identified 
as ALEX PUTTING THE TEABAG INTO THE CUP, ALEX POURING WATER INTO THE CUP, and ALEX 
TAKING THE CUP. The darker ovals symbolize actualizations of some of the affordances of the 
involved objects.  
Now, frequent prior sensational experiences with similar types of events, knowledge about the 
affordances of the involved objects, accompanied by long-term potentiations resulting from 
similar identification performances in the past lead to schematizations (one could also say: to 
the development of schemas) in identification/conceptualization. Schematizing consists in 
invariant behavior towards varying stimuli (see sections 2.4 and 3.3.4) but it can also consist 
in treating as one what is actually many. One type of such schematizations consists in the 
knowledge about how perceived motion sequences (processes) will work out: Although 
putting a marble into a marble run is followed by several changes in figure (=marble)/ground 
(=walls/obstacles) configurations which constitute many events in sensation, our knowledge 
about the physical behavior of the marble (because of its features and affordances) in the 
marble run (because of its features and affordances, and the mutual affordances with the 
marble) allows us to conceptually predict how the event will work out, namely in the marble’s 
rest at the bottom of the marble run. In sensation, what happens from the marble’s entering 
the marble run until its resting position at the bottom is multiple events. But when identifying 
the entire sequence of figure/ground changes as the instance of a motion schema, then what 
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happens between the marble’s entering the run and its rest can be said to be a single process 
(namely as a schema).
153
 
What is of central importance here is that although identification/conceptualization can unitize 
by schematization what is separated in sensation, the outer boundaries of the superordinate 
event of the marble running through the marble run overlap in sensation and identification: 
The marble’s entering the marble run and its coming to rest constitute changes in 
figure/ground configurations at the level of sensation as well as they start and conclude the 
motion schema as a whole at the level of identification. That means 
identification/conceptualization cannot “make” boundaries where there are not at the same 
time boundaries in sensation.  
 
 
3.4.5 The temporal organization of circumstances in attribution 
Obviously, what is depicted in Figure 3.52 on the sensation and identification levels is the 
multiple spatial relations underlying the superordinate event of Alex making tea. Knowing 
this is, however, not possible on the basis of the percept, and not possible on the basis of 
identification alone, as has been argued extensively in sections 3.1 and 3.2. The reason is that 
perception, i.e., the activities of sensation and identification, are underspecified with respect 
to action-theoretic considerations, namely intentions, reasons, and purposes. All this is 
specified in the context of attribution which operates on the basis of sensational and 
conceptual data in that it is imposed on what we recognize, identify, and conceptualize. 
That means on the basis of sensation and identification/conceptualization we cannot 
determine that ALEX TAKING A TEABAG, ALEX PUTTING THE TEABAG INTO THE CUP, ALEX 
POURING WATER INTO THE CUP, and ALEX TAKING THE CUP are parts of a superordinate action 
schema. That ALEX MAKING TEA is indeed the action unitizing the partial activities from 
identification and sensation is determined not until attribution: Let us say I am, as observer of 
these events (=actor/observer difference) sympathetic with Alex (=sympathy/antipathy 
difference), and I consider making tea an accomplishment 
(=accomplishment/misaccomplishment difference), then the attribution theory developed in 
section 3.2 predicts that I judge what Alex is doing in such a way that he has reason to do so, 
that he does so because of stable dispositions, and that he deserves credit for what he does. 
The conclusion is that what he does is an instance of action and that he can be made 
responsible for what he is doing. The crucial point is what is implied by the fact that he is 
attributed a reason for his activities. This means he has a purpose, i.e., he is acting in order to 
put into effect a specific circumstance. The above activities (ALEX TAKING A TEABAG, ALEX 
PUTTING THE TEABAG INTO THE CUP, ALEX POURING WATER INTO THE CUP, and ALEX TAKING 
THE CUP) thus get the status of ancillary action schemas of a superordinate action schema 
which is a means to the end of ALEX HAVING TEA TO DRINK.  
Apart from these action-theoretical considerations there is neurological evidence that these 
postulated top-down mechanisms in organizing circumstances from the perspective of 
attribution can be dissociated from the bottom-up mechanisms characterized previously. 
Zalla, Pradat-Diehl & Sirigu (2003), Zalla et al. 2004, and Zalla et al. 2006 have shown that 
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 This also agrees with Zacks et al. (2007: 279). According to them, “event segmentation” can also be governed 
by bottom-up and top-down processes in perception. 
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schizophrenic patients with frontal lobe damages show normal performance in low-level (i.e., 
sensation-based) segmentations of events but poor performance in higher-level (i.e., 
attribution-based) ones (see also Brunet, Safarti & Hardy-Baylé 2003). 
The interrelations discussed in this section are depicted in Figure 3.53 in which the levels of 
sensation and identification are supplemented by that of attribution. 
 
 
Figure 3.53: Temporal organization of circumstances in attribution 
 
What Figure 3.53 shows is that it is solely by means of attribution that the four independent 
circumstances from identification can be bound together to constitute a single, superordinate 
action schema. In addition, it shows that attribution is imposed on the spatio-temporal 
relations from identification, i.e., it cannot contribute sub-parts of the circumstance by itself. 
In the previous section it has been argued that superordinate circumstances in identification as 
a result of schematizations in turn respect the boundaries of spatio-temporal relations from 
sensation, i.e., one cannot create boundaries of circumstances in identification which are not 
at the same time boundaries in sensation. This basic insight is also expressed by Zacks et al. 
(2007: 278). They say “[i]f viewers segmenting at a fine grain were spontaneously grouping 
fine-grained events into larger units, one would expect coarse-grained event boundaries to be 
a subset of fine-grained event boundaries.” Note that the studies cited in this section (see also 
Baldwin et al. 2001, 2008) also provide additional evidence in favor of the thesis that actional 
knowledge (attribution) is imposed on otherwise underspecified spatial conceptualizations. 
From all this it follows that by attribution one can unitize innumerable figure and 
figure/ground changes by making them parts of an action chain that serves to put into effect a 
superordinate purpose. Although making tea is a complex action schema already, consider 
what – from the perspective of the sensation and identification levels – is contained in the 
action schema PRIVATIZING THE SOVIET BUSINESS COMPANIES, for instance. In traditional 
event structure theories it consists of two sub-events at a single level which clearly does not 
do justice to the complex and intertwined understanding activities people enact in these cases. 
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To sum up, by climbing the levels from sensation over identification (and conceptualization) 
to attribution it is possible to unitize ever more figure and/or figure/ground changes (e.g., 
reaching for a teabag) into superordinate circumstances, either by schematizing processes (in 
identification/conceptualization, e.g., the marble run) or by attributing action chains for 
putting superordinate purposes into effect (e.g., making tea). 
 
 
3.4.6 Coding the temporal organization of circumstances 
Looking next at the verb-complement structures by which the temporal organization of 
circumstances are coded linguistically
o
, it is easily observable at first sight that these 
constructions may designate circumstances from sensation, identification/conceptualization, 
as well as from (identification/conceptualization plus) attribution levels. I have tried to 
illustrate this by implementing yet another level (“language”) into Figure 3.53. The revised 
version is given as Figure 3.54 below. 
 
 
Figure 3.54: Linguistic
o
 coding of the temporal structure of circumstances 
 
The language level illustrates that there are simple syntactic constructions for coding each of 
the four sub-parts of the ALEX MAKING TEA activity on the attribution level. One should not be 
irritated by the fact that the corresponding utterances strongly resemble the “concepts” of 
these sub-parts on the identification level. Remember that this notation (e.g., ALEX TAKES 
TEABAG) is only a convenient means for presenting concepts, i.e., simulated percepts. There 
are also means of expressing the first two sub-parts (Alex puts a teabag into a cup) or the first 
three parts (Alex prepares tea) of the superordinate activity by a simple construction 
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consisting of a simple verb-complement structure. More or less trivially, Alex makes tea codes 
the entire structure in that way. There might be several lexicalization patterns more besides 
those listed, maybe even more appropriate ones.
154
 
What are the semiotic implications of that? Does Alex takes a teabag stand for a figure/ground 
configuration from sensation, and does Alex makes tea stand for differentiations that are made 
in attribution? I will propose the following: In the present and the previous sections I have 
tried to show that there are no boundaries in attribution that do not exist in 
identification/conceptualization, and that the latter do not contain boundaries that are not there 
in sensation.  
 
In other words, the circumstance segmentation from sensation which functions by means of 
figure and figure/ground changes is preserved in the higher levels of 
identification/conceptualization and attribution.  
 
That means there is no temporal structure of a circumstance in 
identification/conceptualization and attribution that was not first in sensation. With respect to 
these temporal organizations utterances code what we identify/conceptualize and – in the case 
of activities – attribute. Though, the differentiations that are coded originate in sensation. This 
is captured in Figure 3.55 below using the example sentence Alex macht Kaffee ‘Alex makes 
coffee’. 
 
 
Figure 3.55: What utterances code 
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 Talmy (2000, I, 4) has developed a typology of the syntactic means by which sub-parts of circumstances are 
coded or not. The cognitive correlate of these grammatical and lexical mechanisms is called “windowing of 
attention” by Talmy. The event of a bird flying out of the window through the air and onto the roof has several 
sub-parts. Linguistically
o
, this can be coded by The bird flew out of the window through the air onto the roof, 
where all sub-parts are expressed (“windowed”), alternatively by The bird flew out of the window onto the roof, 
where one medial sub-part is gapped, by The bird flew out of the window, where the last two sub-parts are 
gapped, or by The bird flew onto the roof, where initial and medial sub-parts are gapped. Talmy’s idea is that 
these windowing and gapping mechanisms are co-determining attentional processes of interpreters. 
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The idea expressed in Figure 3.55 and defended in this work is that linguistic
o
 utterances 
containing verb-complement structures externalize pertinent differentiations made in 
conceptualization and attribution by means of a symbol system.  
 
Pertinent are those features in identification/conceptualization and those matters of attribution 
which serve putting some purpose into effect. Attribution applies wherever some animate 
object is involved in some circumstance. “Inside-out” in the context of attribution means that 
in producing or interpreting the utterance, the speaker or hearer is the attributor. If there is no 
animate object involved, the utterance externalizes differentiations made only in 
identification/conceptualization. This is symbolized by the dotted line between 
conceptualization and attribution. The dotted line between conceptualization and “sensation 
(recognition)” symbolizes that differentiations made in sensation are preserved in 
conceptualization, but that linguistic
o
 utterances externalize only the latter, not the former 
(That is also why it is possible to talk about things not present, i.e., which are not sensed). 
Differentiations made in sensation may be due to salience, i.e., perceivers are forced to 
identify, for instance, two processes because some figure/ground change has taken place 
which – by its salience – forces the perceiver to identify it. These cases of stimulus-driven 
identification are independent of purposes and pertinences. As much as the spatio-temporal 
boundaries of circumstances from sensation are sustained in conceptualization, the 
competence of engaging successfully in inside-out attribution originates in the experience of 
outside-in attribution, i.e., in those cases in which the child is not the attributor but undergoes 
attribution by others. However, outside-in attribution cannot be said to be sustained in inside-
out attribution in the same way that sensational differentiations are sustained in conceptual 
differentiations. It does not supplement sensation in the way inside-out attribution 
supplements conceptualization, either. Therefore, outside-in attribution is separated from both 
inside-out attribution and sensation by solid lines. 
Figure 3.55 can easily be transferred into the semiotic triangular form known from section 
3.3.8. One can also distinguish the production from the comprehension perspective. Figure 
3.56 shows the production perspective: 
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Figure 3.56: What utterances code (production perspective) 
 
The comments on Figure 3.55 also hold for Figure 3.56. The latter additionally emphasizes 
that utterances code differentiations made in conceptualization which on the one hand 
originate in sensation but on the other hand do not, namely where they are imposed by 
attributions. The mediated and non-straightforward, but nevertheless causal relationship 
between sensation (and outside-in attribution) and conceptualization (+/- inside-out 
attribution) is symbolized by the dotted arrow. The even less direct relationship between an 
utterance and sensation is symbolized by a dotted line. The directions of the arrows stand for 
the assumed order in language production from (if present) sensation over conceptualization 
(+/- attribution) to utterance. Figure 3.57 depicts the comprehension perspective: 
 
 
Figure 3.57: What utterances code (comprehension perspective) 
 
The comprehension process is more complex, since for a speaker the to-be-coded concepts 
and eventually the contents of attribution are definitely known, while for a hearer they are not. 
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Instead of this, the hearer takes the utterance to be an instruction for a conceptualization 
(which in the case of hypostatizations cannot be completely obeyed), whereby what he/she 
conceptualizes eventually – in the case some activity is coded – requires attributions. Because 
utterances are often and conceptualizations are always underspecified with respect to actional 
matters (intentions, causes, reasons, dispositions etc.), an utterance either leaves the manner in 
which some simulated perception is imposed by attributions entirely to the hearer, or it 
suggests to him/her how to judge the simulated percept from the perspective of attribution: 
Given a speaker senses and identifies/conceptualizes an event of Peter killing Mary and then 
utters Peter killed Mary, then both the percept, the spatio-temporal conceptualization 
underlying this event as well as the utterance are underspecified with respect its actional 
status (agentivity, intention etc.). In this case the manner in which the corresponding 
simulated perception on the basis of the utterance is imposed by attributions of the hearer is 
entirely left to him/her. He/she can judge the event as either action or as (mere) behavior of 
Peter. If the speaker uttered Peter murdered Mary instead (which includes a different 
attribution performance on the side of the speaker with regard to the same event), this 
suggests how the hearer ought to judge the simulated percept from the perspective of 
attribution, namely as an agentive event involving action on the side of Peter.
155
 It is 
nevertheless – and crucially – left to the hearer to accept the speaker’s attribution as it is 
externalized in the verb murder or to challenge it. But, as a rule, using murder triggers a 
variant of the so-called positive test strategy, a well-known cognitive shortcoming, on the side 
of the hearer, presumably making it more probable that he/she accepts the speaker’s judgment 
of the event.
156
 In the case of using kill, on the contrary, this shortcoming is not triggered and 
the hearer’s judgment may turn out to be more accurate.157 
 
 
3.4.7 Transitions and the identity of states, processes, and activities 
Returning to the temporal organization of circumstances, the taxonomy of circumstances 
proposed above, including states, processes, and activities, obviously lacks a unit 
corresponding to what Pustejovsky (1995) calls “transition” and what van Valin & LaPolla 
(1997), van Valin (2005), and Croft (2012) call “accomplishment” and “achievement”, based 
on Vendler (1967) (see Levin & Rappaport Hovav (2005), chapters 3.2 and 4 for an 
overview).
158
 Like Croft (1991) but for different reasons I do not assume that such a unit is 
necessary. I think that any “transition”, “accomplishment”, or “achievement” – for instance, a 
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 The insight that lexical items – here kill and murder – differ as to whether they include a statement as to 
agentivity or not, is the basic insight of the proposals on the “agent” thematic role by Holisky (1987) and van 
Valin & Wilkins (1996). One of the main goals of the present proposal is the socio-cognitive and conceptual 
underpinnings of this “lexicological” insight. 
156
 See section 3.2.1.4 and the references cited there on the positive test strategy. Here, a variant of this strategy 
might be involved because perceptual data (to which this strategy was restricted in section 3.2.1.4) are not the 
critical data with respect to attribution, but rather those determining factors outlined in the sections on 
attribution.  
157
 See section 3.2.1.4 on the relationship between accuracy, economy, and efficiency. 
158
 Any theory of the syntax-semantics relationship has descriptive means to capture more or less fine-grained 
distinctions in the temporal organization of circumstances. Because the disagreements on the research 
programmatic level between these theories which belong either to Chomskyan or Cognitive-Functional 
Linguistics traditions, and the theory proposed here are located at a very general level, the technical details of 
CL’s and CFL’s event structure theories will not be discussed in detail. See Levin & Rappaport Hovav (2005, 
chapters 3.2 and 4 for theory-neutral overview). 
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glass changing from being physically integer to being broken, a door changing from being 
open to being closed, a balloon changing from being inflated to being popped, or the change 
from having an idea to having forgotten it  – is itself either a process or an activity. Using a 
common example, a glass being broken (or breaking) does not constitute a transition but 
a(nother) process linking two states, or two processes, or a state and a process, or a process 
and a state. Getting up does not constitute an accomplishment but an(other) activity linking 
two states, two activities, a state and an activity, or an activity and a state. The problem is now 
that this is not objectively the case. Consider a sub-part of making tea again: Someone’s 
pouring water from a can into a cup can be said to be an activity, but the water’s streaming 
down from the can into the cup can be said to be a process. Is this contradictory? I think the 
answer is negative and follows immediately from what has been said in section 3.4.5: From 
the perspective of sensation, the figure/ground change of the water leaving the can, 
approaching and filling the cup is describable as several circumstances. From the perspective 
of identification/conceptualization the water’s leaving the can, approaching the cup, and 
filling the cup can be identified/conceptualized as the instantiation of a single process schema. 
From the perspective of action/attribution the person’s grasping and lifting the can, tilting the 
can, and the water’s leaving the can, approaching the cup, and filling the cup can be judged to 
be an instance of the action schema POURING WATER INTO A CUP. 
It is therefore adequate to say that pouring water into a cup is an activity, if this is meant in an 
action-theoretic sense. At the same time is also adequate to say that the water’s streaming into 
the cup is a process, if this is meant as a conceptual schematization or as a single or as several 
processes in sensation. Both treatments of partially the same circumstances differ only in 
aspects, but do not imply objective differences.
159
  
 
As a consequence, any attempt to capture the “meaning” of a verb or co-composed verb-
complement structure by means of a semantic decomposition (e.g., Jackendoff 1972 and sqq., 
van Valin & LaPolla 1997, Wunderlich 1997) reduces the factual complexity of some 
circumstance(s) like Peter’s pouring water into a cup in a way that seems inappropriate in 
consideration of what conceptualization and attribution performance an interpreter has to 
accomplish when hearing a corresponding utterance (e.g., Peter pours water into a cup) and 
trying to understand it.  
 
When asked whether Peter’s breaking or opening a window was a state, process, or activity, 
the proper answer would be that this is a matter of aspect, i.e., a question of whether 
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 I think that these explanatory devices are able to capture one of the basic insights of the work on “event 
structure” by Jeffrey Zacks, Barbara Tversky, and their colleagues (e.g., Zacks & Tversky 2001, Martin & 
Tversky 2003, Zacks et al. 2007, Zacks & Swallow 2007, Tversky et al. 2011), namely  
 
“that people do not perceive event boundaries on only one timescale. Rather, they perceive event 
boundaries on multiple timescales simultaneously but selectively attend to one timescale in 
response to instructions or other experimental manipulations. According to this view, when 
activity is coherent, participants segment it at multiple timescales and can choose to attend to finer 
or coarser grains.” (Zacks et al. 2007: 278) 
 
What they call “boundaries on different timescales” mirrors nearly exactly the idea that circumstance boundaries 
originate in sensation, identification/conceptualization, or attribution, depending on where the respective salient 
or pertinent differentiations originate. 
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perceptual (concerning sensation), conceptual, or actional differentiations apply.
160
 I take this 
to be one of the most basic insights about the temporal organization of circumstances. It is 
also backed by Zacks et al. (2007: 281) who suggest “that movement features may play a 
particularly strong role in identifying the smallest units of activity but that other features may 
be important in identifying which of those low-level event boundaries are also boundaries 
between larger units of activity.” 
It is then the task of the hearer, or interpreter, of the well-known alternations in (3.36a) to (c) 
to know which syntactic construction is associated with the differentiations made on which 
level.  
 
(3.36a) The window opens/breaks. 
(3.36b) Peter opens/breaks the window. 
(3.36c) The window is open/broken. 
 
In a language like Kalam (cf. Pawley 1993, 2006, 2011) which mostly lacks the lexical means 
to code complex action schemas like making tea by means of a simple NP-V-NP structure, 
verbs mostly designate differentiations from the level of sensation, i.e., differentiations very 
close to simple figure or figure/ground changes like those depicted in Figure 3.51 above. In 
order to express a complex action this has to be coded by a series of “low-level” verbs (“serial 
verb constructions”). For instance, expressing that someone fetched some firewood – a 
complex action schema – must be broken down lexically and grammatically to its component 
parts – closely corresponding to segmentations in sensation or identification – such that verbs 
designating GOING, HITTING/BREAKING, GETTING, COMING, and PUTTING must be combined to 
code the complex concept of FETCHING (cf. Pawley 1993: 95). From the perspective of the 
present proposal, speakers of Kalam – and those of any other language – of course schematize 
actions like fetching something in terms of “high-level” action schemas, while they only 
employ different (conventionalized) strategies for expressing them linguistically
o 
(see section 
3.3.4 and Table 2.7 on matters of universality and contingency). Bohnemeyer and colleagues 
(e.g., Bohnemeyer et al. 2007, Bohnemeyer et al. 2011) have proposed a semi-linguistic
o
 
feature for classifying such strategies typologically: the macro-event property (MEP). 
According to them, “a construction has the MEP if temporal operations such as time 
adverbials, temporal clauses, and tenses necessarily have scope over all subevents encoded by 
the construction.” (Bohnemeyer et al. 2007: 3). The MEP could thus be considered a 
conventionalized strategy for coding circumstance segmentations from higher levels. 
Although the research programme pursued here attempts to avoid inducing cognitive 
categories of cognizers from linguistic evidence
161
, the MEP constitutes a useful criterion for 
classifying how languages code circumstances, although it falls out of the scope of the present 
proposal. One can only speculate that some constructions have the MEP because they code 
schematizations from the identification and/or attribution levels. It is likewise possible that the 
MEP is part of the idling cycle of syntax, or that it is (partially) otherwise motivated. 
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 Note that this does not mean that aspect is a grammatical category. 
161
 Syntactic structures shall be grounded actionally, perceptually, and conceptually, not the other way around 
(see part I). 
239 
 
3.4.8 “Event headedness”, “co-composition”, and “boundedness” 
Consider once more the example of Alex making tea. It has been shown that the utterance 
Alex makes tea embraces temporal segmentations from sensation, identification/ 
conceptualization, and action (attribution) levels. In particular, the utterance even codes an 
ancillary action schema in which there is already tea there, namely the last one in Figure 3.54 
above in which Alex takes the cup with the teabag into which he has previously poured the 
water. That means part of the conceptualization underlying Alex makes tea consists of some 
spatio-temporal configuration in which the making of the tea is already finished. One could 
ask now if it is not inappropriate to (co-)designate a state of there being tea with a verb 
actually designating the activity of bringing this tea about. (3.37) is an utterance that can 
accomplish this. 
 
 (3.37) (Right now) Alex is making tea. 
 
In (3.37) there is not yet tea but the activity of making tea. However, no one would claim that 
using the verb make with the complement tea is appropriate only in the present progressive. 
Contrariwise, one could claim that uttering (3.37) was not appropriate until it was 
(conceptually/actionally) certain that Alex’ activity was followed by a situation where there 
was tea. And this is exactly the point. Because if the result of Alex’ activity was stock, and 
not tea, then it would not have been appropriate to utter (3.37) beforehand. What this line of 
argument shall illustrate is that (3.37) and any other utterance containing verb-complement 
structures do not pick differentiations from sensation for coding, and thus do not code 
objective circumstances in the environment, but that they generally code units from 
conceptualization (+/- attribution), and in particular schematizations of circumstances, i.e., 
process, behavior, or action schemas. Remember what has been said about what constitutes an 
action schema in section 2.4. This is repeated here, applied to the tea scenario: When I have 
made tea successfully, i.e., there is tea after my acting, then I have actualized the action 
schema of making tea, since the resulting state of there being tea is the condition for the 
foregoing action being an instance of the schema “making tea”. As a consequence, uttering 
that someone is making tea by using the verb make and the complement tea implies that the 
cognizer has identified and attributed the actor’s activity to be an instance of the action 
schema “making tea”, independently of the tense, aspect, and mood of the corresponding 
utterance.  
 
Identification and attribution includes that of the result of the instance of the schema – there 
being tea – which determines its identity. 
 
The above problem is closely related to what Pustejovsky (1995: 72ff.) discusses as “event 
headedness”. He (1995: 72) states, though informally, that “the head is defined as the most 
prominent subevent in the event structure of a predicate, which contributes to the ‘focus’ of 
the interpretation. We can view [headedness – SK] as a relation between events […].” In 
addition, Pustejovsky (1995: 72) assumes that what he calls events has at most two sub-
events. In what follows I will try to reconstruct his event headedness by means of the notions 
developed here. Ignoring for the moment that in Pustejovsky’s proposal states are called 
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events, too, that “focus” is not defined, and that being able to interpret Russia privatizes the 
Soviet business companies requires at most two sub-events, make would be classified as 
consisting of only one event, a process, where this process would also be the head, because 
intuitively it contributes the focus of the interpretation. In contrast, make tea would be 
characterized as consisting of two sub-events, a process (the making) and a state (there being 
tea) with the head being the state, for the same reasons.
162
 With respect to the famous 
commercial event (which is familiar from frame semantics; cf. Fillmore 1977, 2006), sell is 
right-headed, focusing presumably on the customer having the goods, while buy is left-
headed, focusing presumably on the customer having the goods, too. Both buying and selling 
occur simultaneously, i.e., they are entirely overlapping, describing different aspects of the 
same circumstance.  
In the present account, sell and buy designate very different conceptualizations (+ 
attributions) because conceptualization is simulated perception and therefore perspective-
dependent. Figure/ground and trajector/landmark distribution are more or less reversed in 
both events. Because from a perceptual point of view there are no symmetric events – 
figure/ground segregation is necessary and necessarily asymmetric – the buyers and sellers 
are attributed being engaged in instances of different action schemas, respectively. 
Headedness is nothing more than the definiens of selling and buying, respectively, namely 
that the action schema of selling or buying has been actualized such that the customer has the 
goods, where these actional considerations operate on largely different spatial 
conceptualizations, which are part of what sell and buy (together with their complements) 
designate, respectively. They cannot be conceptualized and attributed at the same time by the 
same actor/cognizer.  
Going a little bit more into detail, reconsider what has been said in section 3.3.2 about the 
regularities of spatial conceptual structure-syntactic structure mappings: Some circumstances 
allow alternative lexicalizations, e.g., symmetric verbs, some so-called psych-verbs, and the 
commercial exchange verbs. These alternatives originate in the comparable figure-aptness of 
the involved objects (e.g., in the case of resemble) or they lexicalize what has been called 
inversed mapping, in which not an iconic conceptualization process of a figure’s 
state/movement/motion relative to a landmark is lexicalized (as in x is at y, x moves to y) but 
rather the simulated eye gaze of the conceptualizer who is examining a concept (as in y has x, 
y gets x). These alternative lexicalizations are thus characterized by an inverse mapping 
between trajector/landmark and the PSC and oblique cases in that the landmark is realized as 
PSC (as in get sth., have sth., miss sth. obtain sth. etc.). In the previous paragraph I have 
outlined that the identity of a circumstance (its being an instance of a schema) depends on its 
result as identified/attributed.  
 
The result of a circumstance can now be said to be closely related to the role of the landmark 
in this circumstance, i.e., where something is located or moves is identifiable only with regard 
to the landmark. In other words, landmark and circumstance result, circumstance result and 
circumstance identity, and therefore landmark and circumstance identity are closely 
associated: With respect to the way a verb (+ complements) codes some circumstance, the 
                                                 
162
 But note that both make tea and build a house involve “incremental themes”, and that the latter is analyzed by 
Pustejovsky (1995) as left-headed (i.e., process as head) event; see the discussion later in this section. 
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“head” (in Pustejovsky’s terms) of the coded circumstance depends on how the verb 
lexicalizes its landmark, namely either as a PSC or as an oblique complement:  
 
For verb-complement structures expressing both trajector and landmark, verbs whose PSC 
codes a landmark would be left-headed in Pustejovsky (1995); verbs whose PSC does not 
code a landmark would not be left-headed. Right-headedness consists in the fact that with the 
corresponding verbs (+ complements) the landmark of a state/motion/movement in the 
penultimate or ultimate sub-part of the circumstance on the conceptual/actional level is coded 
either as an oblique NP or PP. 
Pustejovsky’s examples for right-headedness are arrive, sell, and walk home. Their oblique 
complements are NPs or PPs and they indeed code landmarks of the penultimate or ultimate 
sub-parts of the respective circumstances: Approaching or being at the final destination (i.e., 
landmark) is encoded as a PP with arrive, the goods approaching or being at the buyer (i.e., 
landmark) is encoded as NP PP/NP NP with sell, approaching or being at home (i.e., 
landmark) is encoded as NP with walk home.  
Pustejovsky’s (1995) first example for left-headedness is buy. In buy, the landmark is encoded 
as PSC, as predicted, because the buyer is the goal and location (i.e., landmark) of the good in 
the penultimate and ultimate sub-part of buying, respectively. The second example is build, 
and this is more puzzling, since its oblique complement is an “incremental theme” (Dowty 
1991) or “measuring out the event” (Tenny 1992) or “bounding” the event (Jackendoff 1996): 
The coming into existence of a house is co-extensive with the activity of building. It is 
therefore difficult to determine the house’s role as landmark in the activity of building a 
house. From the perspective of the attribution of an action schema, building a house is 
unproblematic. The attribution of the result marks its identity. But on the conceptual level it is 
more difficult. On the basis of the fact that the PSC of build does not code a landmark, I am 
forced to conclude that build is not left-headed. 
The above generalizations obviously apply only to verb-complement structures expressing 
both trajectors and landmarks, i.e., circumstances that are located or directed towards 
landmarks. What about utterances like John walks, John dances, John is sick, The clock goes 
off which do not (explicitly and necessarily) have results and do not express landmarks which 
could serve as the defining characteristics of the respective circumstances? Here I assume that 
interpreters attribute these activities to be actions with ends in themselves, unless co-text and 
common ground information suggest something different; in the case of states and processes I 
assume that interpreters identify them with their results, i.e., they treat the state of John’s 
being sick and the process of the clock beeping at the same time as the result of these states 
and processes. 
It is the role of the landmark, then – whether it is a location or direction of the figure (as in be 
at home, or go home), whether it is an object with which the figure interplays/interacts 
physically (as in get sth. sell sth., hit sth.), whether the landmark changes some feature, state, 
or location (as in build a house, drink a glass of beer, mow the lawn), and whether some 
landmark is expressed at all (which it is not when someone dances, beeps, stinks, or is lazy) – 
which is determinative of the identity of the circumstance and which to a large degree co-
determines its temporal organization in terms of its “holism”, “incrementality”, “bounding”, 
“measuring out” and “affectedness” (for an overview cf. Levin & Rappaport Hovav 2005 on 
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“aspectual approaches” and the references cited there). And as alternative lexicalizations of 
circumstances show, it is not only oblique complements (i.e., grammatical objects) expressing 
landmarks that have this status, but also those verbalized as PSCs (cf. Jackendoff 1996). The 
crucial role of the landmark will be captured here by refining the symbols for the landmark. 
This is given in Figure 3.58: 
 
 
 
Figure 3.58: Types of landmarks (final version) 
 
Concluding this section, (3.38) to (3.41) list some exemplary utterances containing holistic, 
incrementally effected, and affected landmarks as well as change-of-state landmarks, 
respectively: 
 
(3.38) Alex likes George. holistic landmark 
(3.39) Alex blows up a balloon. incr. effected landmark 
(3.40) Alex crumples the paper. incr. affected landmark 
(3.41) Alex loads the wagon. change of state landmark 
 
What I suggest, then, is that characterizing conceptualization as simulated perception and 
making it dependent on the workings of mainly visual perception brightens up much of what 
seems nebulous about the role of traditional themes/patients in aspectual considerations. One 
need only take into account as what some observed circumstance is identified/conceptualized 
or attributed (e.g., as a circumstance of making tea) and how the landmark behaves in that 
circumstance (does not change, changes some feature/its location, goes out of existence, 
comes into existence). 
 
 
3.5 On the significance of verbs and circumstances 
 
 This rather short section takes some of the central ideas as outlined in 
sections 3.1 to 3.4 and sketches their consequences for the relationship 
between verbs and circumstances. At the same time, it connects the 
previous sections on the general principles of the syntax-semantics 
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relationship with part III in which I discuss specific aspects of that 
relationhip and the linking competence. 
In particular, the actional, perceptual, and conceptual devices developed so far allow us to 
reconstruct most of the traditional notions considered to play a role in the linking problem, 
i.e., in the relationship between syntactic forms and conceptual contents (+/- attributions). 
One of the essential ideas pushed forward in previous sections was that circumstances of 
objects or between objects are in a sense inherent to the objects, namely as affordances which 
in turn depend on the features of the object(s). They are not objects themselves because – to 
put it roughly – they do not make retinal images. In other words, circumstances express 
themselves only in objects. For the “semantic” side of the syntax-semantics relationship – 
comprising actional, perceptual, and conceptual differentiations – this means that 
circumstances are in part secondary to objects, i.e., logically as well as conceptually 
downstream objects. It is impossible to think of or conceptualize some polyadic and/or 
complex circumstance – event, process, activity, or relation – without thinking of some thing 
by which it constitutes itself.  
 
One could call this the pivotal role of objects in semantics. 
 
Looking now at the syntactic side of the syntax-semantics relationship we find these roles 
reversed. There is no doubt that the verb is the critical element upon which crucial aspects of 
a syntactic structure largely depend, namely in terms of government (cf. Moravcsik 1993), 
dependency (cf. van Langendonck 2003), syntactic valence (cf. Ágel 2000), subcategorization 
(cf. Chomsky 1981) and also agreement.  
 
In consideration of these facts one can talk of the pivotal role of verbs (besides mainly 
adjectives and prepositions) in syntax.  
 
The following quotes illustrate this. 
 
“Thus it is the valency of the verb which determines how many other elements the construction 
may or must have […], not the valency of an object which determines that there must also be a 
subject and a verb or the valency of the subject which determines whether there may also be a verb 
and a direct object.” (Matthews 1981: 100) 
 
“The verb not only determines the case of its direct term arguments, it also specifies the number of 
dependents and in many instances some of their properties. […] Adpositions and verbs determine 
properties of their arguments, not the other way around, and therefore they are the heads.” (van 
Valin 2001: 87) 
 
“In some constructions, one slot has a special status in that the items that can fill that slot must be 
listed in the lexicon, while its sister constituents are not so constrained. These are instances in 
which one constituent is SUBCATEGORIZED with respect to its ability to occur with a particular 
set of sister constituents.” (Zwicky 1985: 5)  
 
The reversal of the dependency relationships between semantics and syntax is captured in 
Figure 3.59 below: 
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Figure 3.59: Dependency reversal 
 
The arrows indicate the relations from the independent to the dependent units. One could 
think of The ball rolls into the room as a possible instance of the construction depicted. 
Irrespective of whether one deals with a head-marking or a dependent-marking language, it is 
the verb which determines certain formal properties of the dependent elements like their very 
occurrence, their morphological case, or their word category. These properties serve the 
encoding and decoding of the definitive circumstance of one or between more objects, or – 
simplifying matters – what some would call the “who did what to whom”. The presentational 
format of written, spoken, or gestural language forces conceptual (+/- attributional) matters 
into linearity such that what is actually synchronous must be presented asynchronously, in 
particular by means of grammatical morphemes and/or restrictions in word/phrase order. 
(Another possibility is leaving the coding of circumstances ambiguous where their concrete 
conceptualization is left to co-textually or non-linguistically
o
 induced inferences.)  
 
What manifests itself conceptually in nothing but the involved object(s), namely the 
circumstance, is phonetically, graphically, or gesturally materialized as verb (+ preposition) 
and thus as the organizational center of the sentence. 
 
Contrariwise, conceptualization does not work with symbols, does not code anything, does 
not present anything, but is simply the simulation of perceptual experiences. It has thus no 
grammar and no signs with any morphology but in conceptualization anything is what it is.  
 
A circumstance is literally nothing but an actualized affordance of some object(s), an aspect 
of it or them. It has no “form” outside that of the involved object(s) – there is no analog of a 
verb in conceptualization.  
 
From this perspective the verb opens a relation to its complements although their designations 
have entirely different states than their material manifestations. Strictly speaking, linguistic
o
 
expressions for relations – among whose verbs are the primary instances – must be considered 
hypostatizations:
163
 Conceptually, it is nonsensical to say that some object bears some relation 
to a circumstance, while it is perfectly okay to say that a verb bears some syntactic relation to 
its complements. As has been mentioned, this special instance of hypostatization is quasi 
                                                 
163
 This is not valid for the circumstance of an object when one attempts to conceptualize it as standing in no 
circumstance – which is of course a circumstance. 
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maximally motivated by the necessarily linear and temporally ordered nature of the symbol 
system. 
Because of this it is conceptually – and consequently with respect to some notion like the 
mental lexicon – simply not possible to source out into verbs the conceptual “load” of object 
concepts in conceptualizing circumstances. The consequence is furthermore that the 
contribution of verbs to conceptualization is diminished to the role of relating object concepts 
to one another and specifying their relationship which is in principle already present in the 
potentialities of the involved objects in the form of their (mutual) affordances. Verbs are what 
narrows down and mostly definitely picks out one of these potentialities by assessing its 
actuality, while the others remain potentialities that are discarded for the moment. Co-
composition should be understood in this sense: The heavy load of conceptual composition is 
carried by object concepts which are realized as nominal expressions. 
 
 
3.6 Summary of part II 
 
Remembering the model underlying the research programme proposed in part I (Figure 2.3), 
“theories of competences and interaction” range at the species/community level. These 
theories are supposed to contribute to the explanation of the linking competence by means of 
converging evidence (Figure 2.4). With respect to the linking competence they take the form 
of sub-competences. The linking competence in turn should test these theories in that it draws 
from their modes of functioning (partially, at least). Explaining the linking competence is thus 
a multidisciplinary undertaking. The goal of Part II was to characterize these sub-competences 
on the species/community level and to relate them to syntactic structures on a general level. 
The first sub-competence (section 3.1) presented was perception. It splits up in bottom-up 
sensation and top-down identification/categorization (3.2). It turned out that the percept is 
fundamentally underspecified with respect to several types of information that are relevant for 
linking. Several biases in top-down identification – matching percepts with concepts – have 
been identified. With the help of neuroscientific evidence, conceptualization – as the second 
sub-competence – was then characterized as simulated perception and/or action. The crucial 
notion of affordance has been deduced. Because of the simulation rationale, the 
underspecification of the percept applies to concepts and conceptualization, too. The 
information types with respect to which percepts and concepts are underspecified are mainly 
those that are important for an assessment of circumstances in the causal and actional, or 
social, realm. Causality has been reconstructed on the basis of a covariation model and a re-
enaction proposal. With respect to actional matters the actor/cognizer has been demonstrated 
to be a self-serving pragmatic that does not rely on scientific methods to make his/her 
judgments about circumstances. On the basis of sociological and social psychological 
evidence an attribution theory – as a third sub-competence – has been developed by means of 
which actors/cognizers “close” percepts and concepts in accordance with a “large-scale” law 
of closure. In this way, actional matters, i.e., attributions, are imposed on spatio-temporally 
restricted and thus underspecified percepts and concepts. The working of attribution and its 
effects on linguistic
o
 structures have been demonstrated in a case study. 
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Moving away from the sub-competences and closer to the linking competence in the model 
underlying the research programme, conceptualization could be shown to have an internal 
structure in terms of trajector-landmark configurations (3.3). On the basis of its structural 
organization, conceptualizations can be related to the structures of utterances. The idea of the 
utterance as an instruction for simulating a perceptual experience was developed. Motivated – 
on the basis of diagrammatic iconicity – and exploiting – pretending diagrammatic iconicity – 
conceptualization-syntactic structure mappings have been extensively discussed, including 
their acquisition modes, their internal logic, and their limits. Syntactic structures have been 
described with the help of the construction notion, constructions being the formal units 
exhibiting diagrammatic iconicity to circumstance types. 
The notions of adicity and complexity were meant to clarify the internal temporal 
organization of circumstances (3.4). These segmentations are applicable to several levels of 
descriptions, namely (from bottom to top) sensation, identification, attribution, and language. 
Circumstance segmentations on higher levels turned out to respect segmentations from the 
lowest level(s), but not the other way around. Language has the power to compress 
innumerable low-level segmentations into single utterances, forcing interpreters to 
decompress the conceptualizations underlying the respective utterance. Within single 
circumstances and constructions the role of landmarks and their expressions are of central 
importance, respectively. The status of the landmark is what fixes the back end (telicity) of 
circumstances and gives them their identity in terms of motion or movement schemas. Using 
the notion of affordances and the significance of the landmark in circumstances, the role of 
circumstances in semantics has been downgraded in favor of the role of objects. Because of 
its character as a semiotic system, language reverses this dependency relation at the expense 
of objects and in favor of verbs (or adjectives and prepositions).  
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Part III: The linking competence 
 
Introduction 
 
In the final part of this work the many and manifold explanatory notions and devices from the 
previous chapters are brought together in order to demonstrate how their interplay constitutes 
the crucial part of the linking competence – the ability to encode and decode concepts of 
potential and actual states, processes, and activities by means of verb-complement structures 
that are both well-formed and appropriate. The notions and devices will be used in the 
following to model the linking competence in a phenomenon-oriented way. The glossary at 
the end of the book provides an overview of the most important of these notions and devices.  
 
 
Figure 4.1: Mastering the formal and non-formal means of externalizing concepts (+/- 
attributions) as parts of the linking competence that are developed in sections 4.1 and 4.2 
 
 With respect to the research programme, we are at the heart of the 
model now, its subject-matter in the narrow sense: the individual level 
on which the theory of the syntax-semantics relationship describes the 
linking competence. This is depicted in Figure 4.1 
 
 
4 Linking syntax and semantics 
 
Let us first reconsider briefly what linking exactly means on the basis of the previous 
chapters:  
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In Instruction Grammar, linking is the well-formed and appropriate employment of parts of 
speech, morphology, and word order by actor/cognizer/interlocutors in an actual utterance 
such that this utterance can be utilized (i.e., when motivated) as an instruction to simulate a 
perceptual experience of a circumstance and to eventually perform a corresponding attribution 
with respect to the actionally underspecified concept of that circumstance.  
 
The “nature” of language as a means for organizing praxes requires the sufficient similarity of 
the conceptualizations and eventual attributions of the interlocutors for the sake of its 
serviceability. This bears two main problems:  
Firstly, it has been shown that the nature of languages as symbol systems makes them 
imperfect, i.e., not fully specified, public, means for externalizing in a sense “perfect”, i.e., 
fully specified, private, conceptualizations plus attributions. In utterances (e.g., The child is 
crying) and even more in their linguistic
o
 structures (NPnom-V) the experiential richness of any 
possible conceptualization (and sensation) of a crying child is schematized and thus reduced, 
simplified, and condensed to invariance. Utterances and constructions code as identical what 
is different in perception and conceptualization. This is hardly ever considered in many 
theories of linking, mainly because perception is mostly – and understandably – not part of 
them. Two interlocutors will – due to the perspective dependence of any (simulated) 
experience and due to different top-down identification processes – never have identical 
percepts or concepts of “one” circumstance.  
 
When talking about such circumstances they live in the illusion of understanding each other in 
the sense of having similar conceptualizations of them.  
 
This illusion persists as long as there appears no fundamental, verbally or non-verbally 
mediated disagreement about some circumstance, e.g., some inappropriately answered 
question, or some inappropriately executed command.
164
 
Secondly, it has been argued that most verb-complement structures do not code agentivity 
(unless lexically; think of kill vs. murder). What is true for conceptualization is then also true 
for attribution: Interlocutors believe they make similar attributions to the animate objects 
coded in some utterance as long as their verbal or non-verbal discourse succeeds. This is an 
instance of the illusion of understanding, too. 
These two aspects constitute the reason why the word “meaning” has been avoided in this 
work where possible, except for the purpose of reporting other theories. In CFL “meaning” is 
conceptualization. Because conceptualization is private, meaning must be, too. I think this 
treatment falls short of the meaning (= significance, relevance) of “meaning”. My proposal is 
that the meaning of an utterance is not identifiable. Rather, it can only be formulated 
negatively:  
 
The meaning of an utterance is what did not let fail the interaction, or alternatively, the 
meaning of an utterance is what sustains the illusion of understanding (cf. Bailey 2004).
165
 
                                                 
164
 That is, some failed instances of requesting, informing, and sharing which are the basic motives of 
communication (cf. Tomasello 2008). 
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All this shows that not only verbs, or in general, lexical items as atomic units, are 
underspecified (cf. Pustejovsky 1995 and the examples in (2.1) to (2.3) in section 2.1.2). Even 
in co-composition the elements making up an utterance remain fundamentally underspecified 
for the above reasons. This means that taking an utterance as instruction for conceptualization 
(and attribution) involves more than relying on the syntactic form. This is illustrated in Figure 
4.2. As a context for the situation depicted imagine the person on the left (speaker) has talked 
to the person on the right (hearer) about all the things that Willi did that day, when the speaker 
comes to utter ... als Willi die Lampe getroffen hat (speech balloon). 
 
Figure 4.2: Multiple underspecification 
 
The scenario depicted in Figure 4.2 can be described as follows: Earlier that day the speaker 
has perceived that a person named Willi was hit by a lamp. The percept of this event is 
underspecified in that it contains no actional (i.e., attributional) information. The speaker, 
however, has identified the spatial structure of the event, the causal relation (re-enactment of 
force, spatial and temporal contiguity) between the lamp and Willi, and has not attributed 
Willi responsibility. In contrast to the percept and the (spatial) concept (depicted by the 
“modal” cloud), only the concept plus attribution fully specifies the pertinent aspects of the 
event. The motivated mapping of the conceptualized event (plus attribution) to a linguistic
o
 
structure (depicted in the “mapping” cloud) results in the speaker’s utterance ...als Willi die 
Lampe getroffen hat ‘when the lamp hit Willi’ with the structure NPacc-NPnom-V (depicted by 
                                                                                                                                                        
165
 Although it is possible to understand some action in terms of being able to identify the purpose to which it is a 
means, it is hardly possible to conceptualize this person’s purpose identically to that person’s own 
conceptualization.   
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the speech balloon). This shall serve for the hearer as an instruction for simulating the same 
experience that the speaker had. However, the speaker has ignored that Willi and die Lampe 
are ambiguous with respect to case such that their form can indicate both nominative and 
accusative, respectively, and can thus result in a reverse mapping between the NPs on the one 
hand and trajector and landmark on the other hand. Because word category, case morphology, 
agreement, and word order are the grammatical means for coding conceptualizations, the 
structure of the utterance allows the hearer to identify Willi (bearing nominative and agreeing 
with the verb) as trajector and die Lampe (in oblique, i.e., accusative case) as landmark 
(depicted by the hearer’s mapping cloud), thus resulting in an utterance in which Willi hit the 
lamp (depicted in the hearer’s thought cloud). In this case the hearer uses this utterance as an 
instruction to build up the respective conceptualization including its spatial and causal (re-
enactment of force, spatial and temporal contiguity) structures. Furthermore, he/she may 
attribute Willi responsibility for his hitting the lamp. This is depicted in the hearer’s mapping 
cloud. His/her interpretation can be expected because of the “subject preference” (see section 
4.2.1) and because up to this point the speaker has talked about things Willi did this day, so 
that the hearer expects this to continue rather than things happening to Willi. This illustrates 
that the utterance and its underlying formal structure are as underspecified to the hearer as the 
percept was to the speaker. In addition, the hearer performs an attribution the speaker could 
not make because in the latter’s concept Willi undergoes force instead of exerting it and the 
lamp does not afford movement by itself.  
Although these conceptualizations (plus eventual attribution) differ crucially, it is possible 
(though certainly improbable) that this remains undetected in the discourse for some reason or 
other. Then the interlocutors proceed with the illusion of having understood each other.  
 
Perhaps ironically, then, only what is private is not underspecified, namely the concept plus 
attributions. 
 
 This chapter is structured as follows. With the shortcomings of the 
formal means of coding conceptualizations and attributions in mind, 
the next section discusses the contributions of the central formal units 
to the en- and decoding of semantic (=conceptual and attributional 
notions originating in sensation and sociocultural praxis) contents. 
Although there are many utterances that are formally underspecified 
like in the above example, misunderstandings seem to be relatively 
rare. Therefore section 4.2 deals with strategies of reducing the formal 
underspecification of verbal utterances. In section 4.3 the general 
principles of encoding circumstances by means of verb-complement 
structures are presented from an (partially) incremental perspective. 
The same happens in section 4.4 for the decoding of utterances. The 
final section then serves to implement these strategies using the 
example of verb-complement structures from German that are 
instances of “classical” linking problems. 
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4.1 The division of labour of the formal constituents 
 
In the following sub-sections the role shall be clarified that the formal constituents making up 
a syntactic construction contribute to (the illusion of) understanding each other, i.e., to the fact 
that utterances function as instructions for simulating perceptual experiences that can be 
imposed by attributions. The presentation will be limited to motivated instances of language 
use and will be rather general. 
I am clear about the fact that breaking down the constituents of constructions in the manner of 
the following sections is stricto sensu an inadequate reduction. When discussing the 
contribution of the “bare” construction (irrespective of inflectional morphology) in the next 
section some aspects of the contribution of, for instance, word/phrase categories must be 
anticipated, although the constructions and the phrase categories they consist of are 
inseparable. However, I deem this a convenient manner of presenting the main contributions 
of these constituents. The presentation takes the utterance-as-instruction-for-simulating-a-
perception view literally: The interpretation of a spoken utterance takes place as it is uttered 
and mostly long before it is completed. The interpreter cannot remain indifferent to incoming 
parts of the speech stream and “wait” for all elements making up an unambiguous 
circumstance before he/she begins to interpret them, but he/she makes predictions with regard 
to this circumstance at any point in the time of the utterance, thereby using any clues available 
to maximize the efficiency of his/her prediction (cf. Marslen-Wilson 1973, Crocker 1994, 
Stabler 1994, Bornkessel-Schlesewsky & Schlesewsky 2009a, 2009b). In this way the 
interpreter builds up a circumstance concept using formal constituents. The following sections 
shall illustrate how this works. 
 
 
4.1.1 The “bare” construction (irrespective of inflectional morphology) 
 
A construction is the formal means to code in a diagrammatically iconic way how the 
conceptualization of some circumstance is organized in terms of trajector and landmark.  
 
This circumstance can be some simple or complex, monadic or polyadic state, process, or 
activity of something relative to something (relative to something). Conceptualization is 
organized in terms of trajector-landmark configurations which are grounded in figure/ground 
configurations from sensation. With respect to the verb-complement structures in question the 
above-mentioned formal means making up a construction are mainly syntactic categories like, 
for instance, a noun phrase together with a verb and another noun phrase or a prepositional 
phrase (plus their inflectional and agreement morphology).  
 
 
Table 4.1: Constructions 
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The important point is that the construction gets its significance for linking only through the 
combination of several of these categories. The most important of these combinations in terms 
of constructions are listed in Table 4.1. For a construction to code a conceptualization of some 
circumstance accurately with respect to communicative requirements it must allow building a 
schematic concept of the objects making up the circumstance. A “bare” syntactic construction 
(lacking morphological information) consisting only of an NP and a V can thus be said to 
have – however schematic – conceptual import in that it signals a trajector or landmark 
involved in some circumstance. A construction with three NPs and a V signals the 
involvement of three objects one of which functions as trajector, one as landmark, and one as 
trajector and landmark in different sub-parts of the circumstance. The circumstance can with 
high probability be identified as a relation in which something (metaphorically) moves thanks 
to some trajector’s activity to an object-landmark and/or this happens to the (dis)advantage of 
the latter. The range of conceptual differentiations with which a bare construction is 
functionally charged is thus quite variable. While a bare construction like NP-V can 
presumably code any type of monadic circumstance (and even circumstances with null 
adicity, e.g., weather verbs), which then may hardly have any conceptual commonalities, the 
NP-V-NP-NP construction is far more restricted in the number of circumstance types that it 
codes. In the case of a motivated mapping it is used to code circumstances in which 
something undergoes transfer from something (most probably someone) to something (most 
probably someone) (cf. Goldberg 1995, Primus 1999, Newman 2005, Barðdal 2007). 
By way of example, the types of monadic circumstances a bare NP-V construction can code is 
indicated by Figure 4.3. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: NP-V homonymy and polysemy 
 
The upper tree captures the semantic (i.e., conceptual + attributional) potential of the single 
NP in the construction: It may code a trajector, an object-landmark or a location-landmark. In 
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each case this element can be animate (“anim”) or inanimate (“inanim”). If animate, its 
circumstance can be caused (“+ csd”) by some other thing or it can be uncaused (“- csd”). If 
uncaused, the element can be attributed responsibility or not (“+/- resp”). If it is inanimate, its 
circumstance can also be caused or uncaused but attribution does not apply. Any terminal 
element is thus a possible semantic correlate of the NP. Conceiving of homonymy and 
polysemy as poles on a scale, one could say that the two topmost nodes in the tree (i.e., tr and 
default lm) constitute two possible but rather loosely related semantic correlates of the NP 
which therefore exhibits considerable homonymy. The binary branches of each the tr and lm 
nodes (animate vs. inanimate and object-landmark vs. location-landmark, respectively), can 
be seen as motion towards polysemy. The terminal nodes under a maximal node (e.g., the five 
terminal nodes under the tr node) can be conceived of as being more polysemous and less 
homonymous. 
The same considerations can be applied to the lower tree which depicts an aspect of the 
familiar circumstance taxonomy: The verb designates a state, process, or activity. The latter 
are either simple or complex. If complex, there is some change of (“c.o.”) some feature 
(“feat”) or (metaphorical) location (“loc”). If simple, all three sub-types of circumstances 
concern either some feature or some (metaphorical) “being located”. 
The range of different circumstances that can be coded by the bare NP-V construction can 
thus be conceived of as a matrix made of the multiplication of the terminal nodes in the NP 
tree and the terminal nodes in the V tree. Determinative of the high constructional homonymy 
are the binary and ternary branches in the top of both trees, respectively. 
Applying this rationale to the NP-V-NP-NP construction results in Figure 4.4. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: NP-V-NP-NP homonymy and polysemy 
 
If viewed in relation to V and independently of the other NPs, each NP in this construction 
can in principle code the same range of semantic differentiations as the single NP in the NP-V 
construction. But because the identification and conceptualization of circumstances depends 
on the identification and conceptualization of features and mutually dependent affordances of 
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the involved objects, the increasing number of involved objects decreases the range of 
circumstances that can exist between these objects and those that a language conventionally 
codes. This is the reason why the range of semantic differentiations an NP may designate in a 
triadic relation is reduced considerably, namely to the transfer concept mentioned above. This 
logic illustrates why the contribution of a construction to understanding utterances must be 
viewed differently from the contribution of each element making up the construction (see also 
Glenberg & Robertson 1999, Glenberg & Kaschak 2002; see Spivey et al. 2002, Chambers, 
Tanenhaus & Magnuson 2004 on how mutual affordances reduce ambiguities). 
 
 
4.1.2 The “bare” noun in the NP and PP (irrespective of inflectional morphology) 
I have argued that the bare syntactic construction potentially indicates a type of circumstance, 
albeit schematically, that the actual utterance designates. In the case of monadic constructions 
this potential is very weak, in the case of triadic constructions it is considerably higher. 
Presenting the contribution of the bare construction to the utterance-as-instruction already had 
to partially include information about the objects involved, namely trajector and landmark 
information. Now, in motivated mappings, nouns in NPs or PPs designate trajectors or 
landmarks. In cases of exploitation, decoding nominal expressions requires additional 
conceptualizations (see section 3.3.7). Motivated language use allows treating utterances as 
instructions for simulating (visual) perceptions. As trajectors and landmarks (the notions of 
which originate in figure and ground in perception), nouns within NPs and PPs make their 
own contributions to the sufficient sharing of conceptualizations and attributions.  
To recapitulate, features in sensation integrate to objects with the help of the gestalt laws. The 
pertinence of objects in identification/categorization and conceptualization co-determine to 
which features an actor/cognizer attends. It is on the basis of these features that objects afford 
circumstances. The range of circumstances an object affords is restricted by the identified or 
conceptualized features. What an object affords to an actor/cognizer is thus dependent on the 
features of the object itself and on the role it is playing in some ongoing discourse, especially 
in the plans and purposes of the actor/cognizer. The same is true for any nominal expression 
uttered in such a discourse: Independently of the syntactic context, i.e., of some circumstance 
expression and other nominal expressions, an NP is interpreted to designate either a trajector 
or an (object or location) landmark that is animate or inanimate, caused or uncaused, 
attributed to be responsible or not to be responsible, as Figure 4.5 indicates. Each terminal 
node constitutes a form of appearance of the semantic correlate of a nominal expression, and 
that independently of its features (i.e., those that are features in perception). 
 
Figure 4.5: NP 
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Importantly, the object concept to which the NP refers exhibits affordances independently of 
the syntactic context, too. Not only does the actor/cognizer simulate the corresponding 
perception when hearing some nominal expression but this simulated percept also affords 
some circumstance to the actor/cognizer on the basis of what is pertinent about the object to 
him/her.  
 
For instance, a ball does not only afford motion, i.e., some circumstance that is a process, but 
it affords, for instance, motion which inherently goes along a path, it affords some manner of 
motion on the basis of some pertinent feature, e.g., motion by bouncing or rolling, and it 
affords exertion of force in that it may hit some other object. This is the point where 
perceptual features come into play. (They are not depicted in Figure 4.5.) 
The object concept underlying some NP encountered in an utterance by an interpreter 
certainly has quite a number of affordances. The affordances of an object concept underlying 
some nominal expression can get further restricted, i.e., its range can become more limited, 
namely if other nominal expressions are involved, or encountered, too. This is the case when 
there are two or three nominals expressed before there is a relational expression realized, as is 
regularly the case in verb-final constructions (cf. Kamide & Mitchell 1999, Bornkessel, 
Schlesewsky & Friederici 2003, Kamide, Scheepers & Altmann 2003). On the basis of the 
mutual affordances of the objects some circumstance between them is construed as a kind of 
prediction. For instance, when hearing the nominal expression the boy, the interpreter already, 
or incrementally, construes the boy as standing in some circumstance, however schematic, 
even before the finite verb follows. The verb, e.g., runs, then, either confirms the prediction, 
specifies it or proves it wrong; the latter would require reanalysis in the form of 
conceptualizing a circumstance anew. When hearing the nominal expression der Junge (‘the 
boy’) and then the expression den Apfel (‘the apple’) the mutual affordances between both 
objects are considerably fewer than the affordances of the boy and the apple in isolation, 
respectively, and on the basis of frequent prior experiences with similar object constellations 
the interpreter might predict, for instance, a relation of eating or throwing between the two 
objects. The affordances of the boy in isolation include rather unrelated circumstances like 
running, sleeping, falling, reddening, being smart, and so on. 
In motivated mappings, NPs within PPs that are governed by verbs unambiguously constitute 
landmarks, i.e., mostly locations or objects at which something is located, towards or from 
which something moves. NPs governed by verbs and encountered first will be identified as 
trajectors (at least in languages with a predominant regular mapping outlined in the previous 
sections) that will be specified by a circumstance expression or by its relation to one or more 
other objects which then must function as landmarks, due to the logic of perception and 
spatio-temporal conceptualization.  
Summing up, the “bare” construction together with the nominal expressions does not 
constitute meaningless symbols and strings of symbols. The construction and the nominal 
elements occurring in it interplay with each other in a way that allows predictions as to the 
nature of the circumstance that an utterance designates, however schematic.  
The notions that make this possible are firstly trajector and landmark. They embody the 
asymmetry of objects in conceptualization. Utterances as instructions for conceptualizations 
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force an interpreter to treat each “incoming” nominal expression either as trajector or 
landmark.  
Secondly, affordances play a central role. Depending on the state of the interpreter 
(pertinence, purposes, attitudes) and the object concepts referred to by nominal expressions 
(their frequent and/or pertinent features) these objects afford certain circumstances to the 
interpreter which enter his/her incremental interpretation in the form of predictions as to what 
circumstance will be predicated about the nominal expression in question. Affordances, 
especially with respect to causation, i.e., exertion of force, already interplay with 
trajector/landmark information. Objects that occur in a position in the syntactic structure 
where mostly and in the motivated case trajectors are realized (PSC) are associated with the 
exertion of force rather than with undergoing force (as long as their features allow this). 
Landmarks rather afford the latter. There is a simple reason for that: The syntactic structures 
outlined in the previous sections are diagrammatically iconic with respect to 
conceptualizations, which simulate perceptions, which show retinotopic mappings, where the 
retina takes up light waves from the environment. Figures in sensation are what are singled 
out against a ground because they are smaller and move. Now, the physical involvement of a 
figure precedes the exertion of force on the ground. The ground’s undergoing exertion of 
force is therefore existentially dependent on and temporally later than the involvement of the 
figure. In motivated mappings which show diagrammatic iconicity, the first NP will therefore 
preferably be predicted to afford exertion of force and the other NP (in a syntactically 
transitive construction) will be predicted to undergo exertion of force.  
This preference to make the first (ambiguous) NP the trajector and, if there is a second 
(ambiguous) NP, also the causer of the circumstance (which – if there is an agent – will also 
be the agent) conforms to what has been said about cognitive efficiency (as a balance between 
accuracy and economy) and the large-scale law of closure in section 3.2.1.4: If there is only 
one NP, this allows the interpreter to conceptually predict a simple monadic circumstance 
with a responsible, non-caused, animate trajector (or, one could say, agent). With this the 
concept is economically “closed” in terms of the large-scale law of closure. If the first NP was 
interpreted as some causally affected landmark (or, one could say, patient), in contrast, the 
concept of the circumstance remains “open” until an initiator of the whole circumstance is 
identified. Therefore a second NP might be required. At least conceptually some initiator 
would be required in order to “close” the concept. Therefore, such a prediction means 
additional cognitive load. (This topic will be picked up again in section 4.2.)  
The third important notion is the number of objects involved. It influences the range of 
circumstances that an interpreter may predict to hold between objects. The crucial notion is 
mutual affordances here. The presence of two or three NPs in an utterance reduces the number 
of circumstances in which each NP in isolation could be predicted to stand.  
 
 
4.1.3 The “bare” verb (plus preposition) (irrespective of inflectional morphology) 
In an utterance the verb (plus preposition) actualizes one of the potentialities, i.e., affordances, 
of one or more objects because the speaker has conceptualized the respective object(s) to 
stand in this circumstance and wants his/her interlocutor to know this. Remember that in 
section 3.5 verbs have been characterized as hypostatizations, strictly speaking, because what 
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they designate manifests itself in nothing perceivable but the involved object(s). Now imagine 
an interpreter has made his/her conceptualizations including affordances on the basis of the 
string hat Alex die Frau Matthias… (lit. ‘has Alex the woman Matthias…’) and has not yet 
encountered a lexical verb. If the interpreter predicted on the basis of the object features and 
affordances, and maybe on the basis of his/her purposes that the circumstance between the 
three objects was that of showing and then actually encounters the verb gezeigt (‘shown’), the 
bare verb has added nothing to his/her conceptualization. Even if the showing activity is not 
anticipated by the interpreter, the verb may only slightly modify his/her conceptualization in 
that the one showing is conceptualized as executing his showing activity relative to the other 
two objects. But the verb does not stand for something independent of the objects of Alex, the 
woman, and Matthias. 
 
However, relative to the bare construction and the bare NPs, the bare verb may accomplish 
two things. Firstly, it picks out those (mutual) affordances that actually hold for some 
object(s). Where objects have been conceptualized beforehand by an interpreter on the basis 
of already encountered nominal expressions, this requires a re-conceptualization of these 
objects in most cases in terms of the circumstance that holds between them and which is 
expressed by the verb. Secondly, it might disambiguate, or concretize, the relationship 
between the involved objects with regard to the question what is trajector and what is 
landmark, where this is not definitively clear.  
 
For instance, when hearing dass die Frau das Mädchen… (lit. ‘that the woman the girl…’), a 
verb like sehen ‘see’ does not help determine which person is trajector and which is landmark 
because both relationships remain possible (both are similarly figure-apt, the NPs are 
ambiguous in case and identical in person information, and both NP orders are possible). The 
verb adoptieren ‘adopt’, however, would disambiguate this relationship in that the woman 
must be trajector and the girl must be landmark. With respect to incremental interpretation 
this potentially disambiguating aspect of the bare verb charges it functionally. The functional 
load of the verb is materialized in cognitively high interpretation “costs”, when it actually 
disambiguates a circumstance towards a non-predicted interpretation (e.g., Bornkessel-
Schlesewsky/Schlesewsky 2009a: 93). 
If the verb is encountered first by the interpreter, it potentially allows predictions as to the 
features (e.g., those depicted in Figure 4.5 above) of the objects that are yet to come in the 
form of nominal expressions (in the terms of traditional subcategorization and selectional 
restrictions; cf. Altmann & Kamide 1999). However, the asymmetry remains between object 
concepts and circumstance concepts: The latter are literally nothing without the former. In 
order to conceptualize the circumstance expressed by a verb in a verb-first utterance, it is 
necessary to conceptualize the involved object(s) first, even if only predictively. In order to 
follow the instruction for simulating the perception underlying the verb spielen ‘play’ in an 
utterance that begins with Spielt… (potentially a rare declarative V1 structure, but most 
probably interrogative mood in the sense of ‘does… play?’) it is necessary to conceptualize 
some object first, “at” which playing may then manifest itself. It does not play a role here, 
whether the interpreter anticipates the concrete person that the speaker has planned to utter. 
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In motivated mappings, verbs designate the circumstances that hold for one or between two or 
three objects. Where applicable, a central aspect of circumstances are specifications as to 
locations, directions etc. For instance, any movement/motion “has” a manner and “goes” 
along a path. Most verbs of movement/motion code either manner or path (see section 3.3.5). 
Although there are different linguistic
o
 strategies for coding such circumstances, e.g., 
incorporating paths into the verb stem (enter NP) or sourcing them out (go into NP), paths are 
always aspects of the circumstance. In contrast, the prepositional structure P+NP as a PP unit 
falsely suggests that paths conceptually make units with landmarks, insinuating a parallelism 
between syntax and conceptualization. This is misleading, as in the case of verbs and 
complements (cf. sec. 3.5). 
Based on the considerations of sections 3.3 and 3.4, my claim is that any construction 
expressing a relation including a path conceptually (eventually among other aspects of the 
relation), is motivated only if it either expresses the path in the stem or is accompanied (by 
affixation or freely) by a preposition it governs. Consider (4.1a) and (4.1b).  
 
(4.1a)  Peter              malt     Bäume           auf  die          Mauer. 
 Peter.3NOM paint.3 tree.ACC.PL on   the.ACC wall  
 ‘Peter paints trees on the wall.’ 
 
(4.1b)  Peter             bemalt           die          Mauer mit   Bäumen.  
 Peter.3NOM HOL-paint.3 the.ACC wall    with tree.DAT.PL 
 ‘Peter paints the wall with trees.’ 
 
According to this rationale, paint something on something is motivated, whereas paint 
something with something is not because conceptually, painting is directed towards something 
and with does not express a path. The idea that there are prepositions “underlying” verbs and 
that these prepositions do not always “surface” as in the second instance of paint is not new 
(e.g., Gruber 1970, Fillmore 1968, Jackendoff 1972). That only “surfacing” (in contrast to 
incorporated) prepositions make a construction a motivated one naturally follows from the 
utterance-as-instruction-for-simulating-perceptions view and from the assumption of 
diagrammatic iconicity between conceptualizations and constructions. There are several such 
alternations as in (4.1), e.g., the locative alternation (load sth. with sth. vs. load sth. on sth.), 
the conative alternation (hit sth. vs. hit at sth.), and the dative alternation (give s.o. sth. vs. 
give sth. to s.o.) (see section 4.4). The variants in which there is no path expression there are 
instances of compression: A syntactic unit compresses what is conceptually uncompressed. 
For instance, conceptualizing paint sth. requires conceptualizing the directedness of painting 
in terms of a path, which remains implicit. Modelled on Figure 3.40 from section 3.3.7, Figure 
4.6 illustrates this. 
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Figure 4.6: “Underlying” and “surfacing” prepositions 
 
The fact that specific syntactic minimal pairs like Peter malt Bäume auf die Mauer ‘Peter 
paints trees on(to) the wall’ and Peter bemalt die Mauer mit Bäumen ‘Peter paints the wall 
with trees’ need not be interpreted identically does not alter the motivation-compression 
analysis.
166
 In particular, many theoreticians argue that in the construction with the direct 
object the associated entity (concept) is “more strongly” or “holistically affected” by the 
circumstance described by the verb (for an overview cf. Levin & Rappaport Hovav 2005: 
208ff.). “More strongly” and “holistically” is mostly intended to mean something like 
‘undergoes greater change of state’ or ‘undergoes change of state with its whole physical 
body’, respectively. In the above example this would be constituted by the wall’s being 
covered with tree paintings to a greater extent or even completely in the NP-V-NP 
construction than in the NP-V-P-NP construction. These matters were already discussed in 
section 3.3.7. However, it is interesting to ask where the supposed holistic meaning of the NP-
V-NP construction comes from, i.e., whether it is a property of the direct object position. 
From the view taken here such an assumption must be rejected. As indicated in Figure 4.6 
above, the utterance Peter bemalt die Mauer mit Bäumen exploits the regular, i.e., motivated 
mapping in that there are aspects of the circumstance compressed in the verb which are 
conceptually uncompressed. It might be an interesting strategy to ask what the construction 
underlying the utterance in (4.1b) with the holistic interpretation and the exploiting structure 
would look like, if it were motivated and therefore distinct from (4.1a) which suggests the 
location landmark interpretation. One would take the motivated instance from (4.1a) with the 
structure NP-V-P-NP and provide it with an (in the first instance hypothetical) distinct 
preposition *bi meaning something like ‘directed at x, embracing it as a whole’, as in (4.1c). 
The asterisk marks a hypothetical or reconstructed form here. 
 
(4.1c)  Peter malt Bäume *bi die Mauer. 
 ‘Peter paints trees on the wall, embracing it as a whole.’ 
 
                                                 
166
 Only (4.1b) suggests a reading where the wall is entirely covered by tree paintings. Though, the wall can also 
be interpreted as the location to which tree paintings are applied, with no aspectual or degree-of-affectedness 
specification, which is the default interpretation for (4.1a). 
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In fact, *bi is supposed to be a West-Germanic preposition (Kluge 
24
2004) and is a 
documented Gothic preposition that has disappeared in German and English and can be 
paraphrased, among other things, with ‘directed at around x’.167 It is easy to see how a holistic 
interpretation can be traced to the meaning of *bi which is preserved in the New High 
German prefix particle be-. Grimm (1826: 798) states that what be- expresses is poly- or 
omnidirectional impact and full completion
168
 which is exactly what some modern 
theoreticians ascribe to the direct object position in general. Wilmanns (
2
1899: 134) 
emphasizes that “this use [of the particle] which makes it especially suitable for transitive use 
could easily develop from the meaning ‘around, over [über... hin; SK]’. Consequently, 
transitive verbs are formed with be- with particular frequency.”  
Similar things could be said about other particle verbs in German with prefixes like ver- 
(Goth. faur, fra-, fair- ‘before, for, away’, zer- (‘separation’)169), ent- (Goth. and- ‘against’), 
er- (Goth. us ‘away from sth.’, esp. ‘from inside to ouside, up from below’), and ge- (goth. 
ga-, ‘x-ing together’, i.e., collective meaning (cf. Wilmanns 21899, Kluge 242004)). 
Diachronically, we can detect a development from motivation towards exploitation by 
compression: Conceptual paths that once were expressed by means of prepositions are 
prefixed to verbs and gradually become ever less recognizable as expressions for paths. For 
instance, German be- has almost entirely lost its spatial meaning component (lost in bewahren 
‘conserve’, preserved in belügen ‘lie (at s.o.)’), similarly German comitative/collective ge- 
(lost in gewinnen ‘win’, preserved in gerinnen ‘curdle’) or English be- (begin, bewilder). This 
does not alter the fact, however, that conceptualizing utterances like (4.1b) requires 
conceptualizing paths. On the other hand, it means shifting quite a part of a grammar towards 
exploitation, if the grammaticalization of a preposition is carried through systematically (and 
at the same time leaving the potentially holistic conceptualization of the landmark untouched). 
Where this happens, it results in a whole new type of conceptualization associated with the 
NPnom-V-NPacc (Jmd. bemalt etwas, ‘s.o. paints sth.’) construction, making it more 
homonymous. Originally, this construction diagrammatically reflected dyadic relations the 
conceptualizations of which do not include paths, e.g. John learns 
(*at/*by/*from/*to/*with/*etc.) a poem. Because of this I deem it inappropriate to associate 
the direct object, or its syntactic position, with a holistic reading. This reading is possible 
where the construction compresses a conceptual path into the verb lexeme by exploitation 
because the nature of the path within the circumstance determines the holistic reading, and not 
a formal syntactic feature.
170
 It is therefore unreasonable to talk of per se holistic direct 
objects where there are no conceptual paths there for which the objects are means of coding. 
                                                 
167
 In particular, Wilmanns (
2
1899: 134) specifies that *bi governed the accusative in older times indicating 
direction. As primary meaning he mentions New High German um, herum. I have condensed these data into 
‘directed at around x’. 
168
 “[E]s liegt in dem be- die viel- oder allseitige einwirkung, die ganze und volle bewältigung.” 
169
 Presumably, NHG zer- is historically related to the numeral two, from which comparison and intensifying 
(e.g., Goth. dishaban ‘to catch + intens.’) as well as separation (e.g., Goth. disdailjan, NHG zerteilen ‘to part 
sth.’) are easily deducible.  
170
 Strictly speaking, talking about ”the nature of the path“ is imprecise. It would be more appropriate to call it 
the spatial distribution of the object which is the trajector of the circumstance in question. In particular, the 
“nature of the path” in ‘painting trees on the wall, embracing it as a whole’ is determined by the distribution of 
the paint in the form of trees on the wall. 
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In the light of verbs which code but do not compress paths in the verb stem, as in the case of 
enter, it is not reasonable to talk of a priori holistic objects, either.  
Apart from that, one would expect advantages in processing for the utterances with motivated 
mappings underlying them. With respect to the so-called locative alternation (as in 4.1a) and 
(b) utterances with the structure given in (4.1a) indeed seem to be assessed faster with regard 
to their acceptability than utterances with structures like (4.1b) (cf. Christensen & Wallentin 
2011). From the perspective taken here this can be explained by the necessity to “de-
compress” the conceptualizations conflated in the (b) structure (i.e., in the verb), whereas this 
is not necessary in the case of (a).  
 
 
4.1.4 Agreement morphology 
The formal correlates of the spatio-temporal layout of a circumstance, the objects involved in 
the circumstance including their (mutual) affordances, and the circumstance itself which 
actualizes one of the (mutual) affordances – in other words, the construction, the 
complement(s), and the verb might be all that is necessary to simulate some circumstance 
concept from an utterance. However, these formal constituents do not yet suffice to make all 
possible conceptualizations (plus attributions) efficiently sharable between interlocutors in a 
language. Without further formal restrictions too many ambiguous utterances remain, i.e., too 
many possible conceptualizations. The aforementioned notions in any case allow building up 
some conceptualization of a circumstance predictively, because they provide an interpreter 
with the respective concepts. They do not suffice in too many cases, however, to definitively 
fix the trajector/landmark distribution (which is PSC?) in a circumstance. When the referents 
of the two or three complements in a specific utterance have roughly similar affordances, 
there are two or six possible distributions of trajector and landmark, respectively. 
 
Therefore, most if not all languages employ further formal means to make sure that the 
conceptualizations of interlocutors are sufficiently similar to each other to warrant (the 
illusion of) mutual understanding. One of these means is morphological markers.  
 
This section deals with the agreement between verb and complement with respect to the 
specification of which object concept functions as trajector or landmark in the circumstance in 
question. From the utterance-as-instruction perspective of Instruction Grammar, 
morphological agreement information on the verb and some NP (as well as case markers on 
NPs) are helpful but strictly speaking hypostatizations: Agreement information on the verb 
and on an NP are from a conceptual perspective not independent of the object in the 
circumstance concept (which in turn is not independent of the objects involved).  
 
Conceptually, an object or several objects in a circumstance have as little number 
specifications as the circumstance itself has. In a circumstance concept a circumstance simply 
is what it is, and the roles of the objects are what they are. That does not mean that agreement 
markers are not motivated. They are concessions to the symbol system that forces into linear 
distribution what is actually synchronous and undistributed. 
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In section 3.3 I have illustrated that there are verbs that have trajectors (e.g., sell) and verbs 
that have landmarks (e.g., buy) as their PSCs. If the interpreter knows which lexicalization is 
conventionalized in which verb, agreement markers can determine which object concept 
functions as trajector or landmark of the circumstance expressed by the verb in the 
incremental interpretation of an actual utterance. Mainly two factors govern the functional 
charge of formal agreement information. This is firstly the question of whether agreement 
information is unambiguous at all. In (4.2a) agreement is not unambiguous and therefore 
cannot contribute to guaranteeing shared conceptualizations among interlocutors like an 
utterance with unambiguous agreement morphology. In (4.2b) it is unambiguous and it is 
therefore the only formal means to definitely fix the trajector/landmark distribution in this 
structure. It is therefore functionally charged. 
 
(4.2a)  … dass die Frau                                  das Mädchen                   sieht. 
        that  the woman.3SG.NOM/ACC the girl.3SG.NOM/ACC see.3SG 
 ‘… that the woman/the girl sees the girl/the woman.’ 
 
(4.2b)  … dass die Frauen                             das Mädchen                   sehen. 
        that  the women.3PL.NOM/ACC the girl.3SG.NOM/ACC see.3PL 
 ‘… that you see the girl/*that the girl sees you.’ 
 
Secondly, agreement information may be unambiguous as in (4.2b), but need nonetheless not 
be informative, namely when the trajector/landmark distribution has already been fixed by 
means of other information available to the interpreter (cf. Bates et al. 1982, MacWhinney et 
al. 1984, MacWhinney 1987). In (4.3a) it is the affordances of the cakes which exclude the 
possibility that they are the trajector in the baking circumstance, even before the auxiliary hat 
‘has’ is uttered which agrees with the pronoun sie ‘she’ in number, making it trajector and 
PSC in the construction. That means the interpreter already knows the appropriate 
trajector/landmark distribution when encountering gebacken ‘baked’. 
 
(4.3a)  … dass sie                              die Torten                          gebacken    hat. 
      that  she.3SG.NOM/ACC the cake.3PL.NOM/ACC bake.PTCP have.3SG 
 ‘… that she baked the cakes.’ 
 
(4.3b) … dass  sie                              die Torten                      im Gesicht getroffen  haben. 
      that  her.3SG/PL.NOM/ACC the cake.3PL.NOM/ACC in.the face  hit.PTCP  have.3SG  
 ‘… that the cakes hit her in the face.’ 
 
In (4.3b) the trajector/landmark and PSC distribution is (almost
171
) disambiguated by the 
information about the face which must be a feature specification of the referent of sie 
‘she/her’ and by the infinite verb getroffen ‘hit’. By the feature specification sie can be 
                                                 
171
 It remains possible that a verb like abgewaschen hat ‘washed off’ makes the referent of the pronoun the 
trajector and privileged syntactic complement, and the cakes that are in her face ([NP the cakes in her face]) the 
landmark.  
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identified as a person whose face is the landmark of flying cakes (flying being an affordance 
of cakes but less probably of the person). 
 
 
4.1.5 Phrase order 
Up to this point, phrase order has played a minimal role, and then even indirectly: In section 
3.3.2 it has been illustrated that there are verbs whose PSC is a trajector and verbs whose 
privileged syntactic complement is a landmark. Both strategies are motivated because they are 
diagrammatically iconic with respect to how the circumstance has unfolded conceptually or to 
how a circumstance concept is “scanned”, respectively. Privileged syntactic 
complement/landmark mappings are possible and PSC/landmark-oblique object/trajector 
structures are thus to a certain degree expected. However, when there is no unambiguous 
agreement information, the PSC eventually cannot be definitively fixed. We are then back at 
the point where an interpreter has all “participant” concepts for conceptualizing a 
circumstance at his/her disposal and agreement markers but nonetheless cannot fix the 
trajector/landmark and PSC distribution, as in (4.2a) which is repeated here.  
 
(4.2a)  … dass die Frau                                 das Mädchen                     sieht. 
 that  the woman.3SG.NOM/ACC the girl.3SG.NOM/ACC   see.3SG 
 ‘… that the woman/the girl sees the girl/the woman.’ 
 
This is where phrase order may come into play. The functions of arranging complement 
phrases in different possible orders are manifold. In languages where different orderings are 
possible the influence of information structure cannot be overestimated (cf. van Valin & 
LaPolla 1997). Here, we are interested only in the contribution of phrase order to sufficiently 
similar conceptualizations. By phrase order not only the actual order of formal constituents in 
particular utterances is meant (local order) but also the phrase order freedom or rigidity that a 
language generally exhibits in this respect (global order). In the previous sections some 
examples of grammatical object-before-PSC orders have been used. The global order of 
complements in German is often claimed to be free (e.g., Müller 1999). Accounting for 
certain restrictions in spoken language and varieties of German (e.g., New Low German 
dialects), this statement will be accommodated to “relatively free”. (In addition, there is some 
consensus that in general the first ambiguous NP in a German sentence is by default 
interpreted as the PSC of that sentence (“subject preference”; Schlesewsky et al. 2000). This 
will be more extensively discussed in section 4.2.1.)   
Now, the problem with (4.2a) – namely that it remains ambiguous despite the information 
supplied by the formal constituents discussed so far – lies exactly in the globally relatively 
free phrase order in German. When we take a look at English we see that phrase order 
accomplishes the disambiguation of the trajector/landmark and PSC distribution. In contrast 
to German, English phrase order is functionally highly charged in that it is a strong cue in 
determining the trajector/landmark and PSC distribution. Consequently, it can “afford” 
marginal agreement markers in its verbal paradigms. 
 
(4.2c) ... that the woman sees the girl. 
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  ‘woman = seer’; *’girl = seer’ 
 
Together with the knowledge about whether a verb has a trajector or landmark as PSC, phrase 
order in English almost definitively fixes the nature of the circumstance, thus providing an 
eminently efficient system for enabling simulated perceptions by taking utterances as 
instructions. On the other hand, it exhibits less information-structurally induced flexibility in 
phrase order than many other languages. 
In previous sections, formal units that have no counterparts in conceptualization stricto sensu 
have been characterized as hypostatizations, namely verbs and agreement markers. These 
notions are concessions to the linearity into which languages force signs for concepts. What is 
the status of phrase order in this respect? This question will be answered using the example of 
the following two sentence pairs, and anticipating aspects of the subsequent section. 
 
 (4.4a)  Ich                habe         die Mona Lisa. 
     I.1SG.NOM have.1SG the Mona Lisa.3SG.NOM/ACC 
    ‘I have the Mona Lisa.’ 
 
 (4.4b)  Die Mona Lisa                            habe          ich. 
   the Mona Lisa.3SG.NOM/ACC have.1SG I.1SG.NOM 
    ‘I have the Mona Lisa’/‘The Mona Lisa I have.’ 
 
 (4.4c)  Ich               bin                    in den Louvre          gegangen. 
    I.1SG.NOM be.1SG.PRES in the Louvre.ACC go.PTCP 
   ‘I went into the Louvre’ 
 
 (4.4d)  In den Louvre         bin                    ich               gegangen.  
   in the Louvre.ACC be.1SG.PRES I.1SG.NOM go.PTCP 
  ‘I went into the Louvre’/‘Into the Louvre I went.’ 
 
Have is a verb whose PSC is a landmark. A German PSC always bears nominative case. The 
landmark-to-PSC mapping is a regular and in a sense motivated mapping between 
conceptualization and syntax. However, it is presumably dispreferred as well as cognitively 
disadvantaged to and less frequent than the mapping of the trajector to the PSC, the landmark 
to an oblique object, and the circumstance to a verb (plus preposition) (see section 3.3.2). 
Although (4.4b) does not allow realizing the trajector as PSC of have, it does allow building 
up a conceptualization starting with the trajector – bearing accusative case – in almost the 
same manner as in a construction with the regular mapping. An oblique object-before-PSC 
order can thus be characterized as motivated in that it establishes a diagrammatically iconic 
conceptualization just like the regular mapping with a trajector PSC does, and it does so by 
phrase order. The reverse case is given in (4.4c) and (4.4d). The former allows for a 
diagrammatically iconic incremental conceptualization. This is not possible in the latter 
sentence.  
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Thus, phrase order stands in a contingent relationship with the motivation of diagrammatically 
iconic structures, at least in German. 
 
 
4.1.6 Case morphology 
The distribution of trajector and landmark and the PSC for (4.2a) is not yet definitively fixed, 
despite there being agreement morphology and a definitive phrase order. Unfortunately, both 
have insufficient interpretive value. Agreement morphology has insufficient interpretive value 
locally, i.e., in this sentence. Phrase order has insufficient interpretive value globally, i.e., in 
the Standard German variety. (Matters might be different in non-Standard varieties.) The last 
formal unit discussed here that could disambiguate (4.2a) and similar structures is case 
morphology. Combining Blake (
2
2001) and Dürscheid (1999) I distinguish case categories, 
case forms/markers and case bearers. Case categories (e.g., nominative, genitive, dative, 
accusative, ablative) can be abstracted from the distributional pattern of case forms (e.g., -us, -
i, -o, -um, -o) that attach to case bearers (e.g., domin- ‘master’) in a language (e.g., Latin). If 
there is no distribution of different case forms, there is no case category, or simply case, in 
that language, or alternatively, there is only a single case with a zero case marker. Thus 
defined, case is a formal unit in the first instance.  
 
 
4.1.6.1 Case in general 
Generally and trivially, the motivation for using distinct linguistic
o
 symbols in distinct 
circumstances is coding distinct conceptualizations (and, eventually, attributions). This 
includes uttering animal instead of dog (see section 3.2.1) and it can include using a dative 
instead of an accusative case form. The use of animal instead of dog may be motivated by the 
pertinence of the referent object in the situation of the utterance. The features that make the 
object a dog may simply not be pertinent. By what differentiations is the use of a case form 
motivated? Three subquestions will be discussed:  
 
(i) What is the domain of the differentiations case forms accomplish?  
 a) the local domain: the differentiation that a case form accomplishes concerns 
 the actual construction underlying an utterance;  
 b) the global, general domain: the differentiation that a case form 
 accomplishes concerns any possible construction underlying an utterance of the 
 language in which this form occurs; 
 c) the global, specific domain: the differentiation that a case form 
 accomplishes concerns only instances of some particular linguistic
o
 unit of 
 the language in which this form occurs; 
 
(ii) Are cases associated with particular differentiations? If yes, which 
differentiations? 
 a) particular differentiations or not? 
 b) differentiations of what kind? 
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(iii) Can other formal units accomplish the same differentiations? If yes, why is there 
case? 
 
(i) Imagine some case form -x in some actual utterance differentiates some semantic unit A 
from another semantic unit B such that -x signals A. Is this differentiation restricted to this 
utterance (= question (i (a)))? In one sense the answer is yes, in a more important sense it is 
no. The case form der, indicating nominative case, is attached to Poet ‘poet’ in (4.5) and to 
Chaot ‘careless person, slob’ in (4.6), respectively. The nominative is supposed to have some 
distinctive value. The question is whether the nominative differentiates Poet from Chaot in 
(4.5) and Chaot from Poet in (4.6), respectively, or whether it differentiates Poet from Chaot 
and Chaot from Poet between (4.5) and (4.6) and between (4.6) and (4.5), respectively. 
 
 (4.5)  Der Poet                schreibt    dem Chaoten. 
  the poet.3SGNOM write.3SG the slob.3SGDAT 
  ‘The poet writes (to) the slob.’ 
 
 (4.6)  Der Chaot             schreibt     dem Poeten. 
  the slob.3SGNOM write.3SG the poet.3SGDAT 
  ‘The Chaot writes (to) the poet.’ 
 
It is easy to see that the two instances of der are interchangeable without altering the 
conceptualization of one of the sentences. What differentiates the poet from the slob are their 
respective features, but not the nominative form of the determiner, and therefore not the 
nominative, and therefore not case. When substituting the nominative marking from (4.5) and 
the dative marking from (4.6) (consisting of dem and -en) and the other way around, the 
conceptualization of the new (4.5) sentence becomes that of the actual (4.6) sentence and the 
other way around. What these latter substitutions do not do is alter the identity of the poet and 
slob, respectively, but only their kind of involvement in the circumstance designated by the 
verb, namely their states as either trajector or landmark, respectively. In order to accomplish 
this, case must interplay with agreement in that it must be clear that a particular case form is 
associated with the verbal agreement marker such that the trajector/landmark distribution in 
the circumstance in question becomes clear. 
Thus, the case form der in (4.5) differentiates it from the other case form (dem… -en) in the 
same utterance in relation to the circumstance. And it does so similarly in (4.6).  
 
For the underlying construction NPnom-V-NPacc we can therefore generalize that the 
differentiation a case form accomplishes concerns the actual construction underlying an 
utterance. In this sense question (i (a)) can be affirmed.  
 
At the same time it simplifies matters. Consider (4.7a) to (c). 
 
 (4.7a)  Der Papst                  stellt                dem Kardinal      den Novizen             vor. 
  the pope.3SGNOM introduce.3SG the cardinal.DAT the neophyte.ACC  PART 
  ‘The pope introduces the neophyte to the cardinal.’ 
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 (4.7b)  Der Kardinal                 stellt                dem Novizen         den Papst          vor. 
  the cardinal.3SGNOM introduce.3SG the neophyte.DAT the pope.ACC  PART 
  ‘The cardinal introduces the pope to the neophyte.’ 
 
 (4.7c)  Der Novize                      stellt                dem Papst       den Kardinal          vor. 
  the neophyte.3SGNOM introduce.3SG the pope.DAT the cardinal.ACC  PART 
  ‘The neophyte introduces the cardinal to the pope.’ 
 
Obviously, what works for (4.5) and the NPnom-V-NPdat construction in general also works for 
the NPnom-V-NPdat-NPacc construction: The case form of der differentiates the kind of 
involvement of the case bearer from the case forms of the other case bearers in relation to the 
circumstance expressed by the verb. The same is true for dem and den, respectively. 
Generalizing this, we can state that this principle works for any construction in a language. In 
the present context this concerns those constructions listed in sections 3.3.9 (Table 3.8) and 
4.1.1 (Table 4.1).  
 
A consequence is that (i (a)) can be affirmed because (i (b)) can: The differentiation that a 
case form accomplishes applies to the construction that underlies an utterance, and this holds 
for each and every utterance in a language, i.e., for the global, general domain. 
 
It can be shown, however that the affirmation of (i (b)) is also a simplification, namely when 
we take the exact nature of the differentiation into account. Compare (4.8a) and (b). 
 
 (4.8a) Der                  Bär        verb-t.  
  the.3SG.NOM bear.SG verb-3SG 
  ‘The bear verbs.’ 
  
 (4.8b)  Der                   Bär        verb-t      die                  Fischgräten gegen     
  the.3SG.NOM bear.SG verb-3SG the.3PL.ACC fishbone.PL  against  
  den                   Baumstamm. 
   the.3SG.ACC treetrunk.SG 
  ‘The bear verbs the fishbones against the treetrunk.’ 
 
We are still dealing with the question of how interlocutors arrive at sufficiently similar 
conceptualizations (and attributions) based on an utterance. Having taken the perspective of 
the interpreter, the contributions of most formal means have been clarified. In particular, it has 
been shown that the “bare” construction and the “bare” (P plus) NPs play an especially 
important role. On the basis of the construction and the nature of the NPs (governed by V vs. 
governed by P) it is to a certain degree possible to predict, or anticipate, the nature of the 
circumstance that holds between the NP referents. Of central importance was – besides the 
identification of the trajector/landmark distribution in a circumstance – the fact that single 
objects afford circumstances but that the presence of multiple objects reduces what each 
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object affords because the objects in combination exhibit mutual affordances which are a 
subset of the affordances of an isolated object. 
 
Now, if a case form in an utterance and in its underlying construction differentiates the 
semantics of the respective case bearer from those of the bearers of the other case forms (if 
there are any) in exactly the aforementioned respects (single and mutual affordances 
depending on the construction and the nature and number of NPs), then it is clear that a case 
form in one construction cannot accomplish the differentiations that the same case form 
accomplishes in another construction. 
 
Accordingly, the nominative case form in (4.8a) differentiates the semantics of its case bearer 
from nothing whatsoever. As a consequence, its semantic range is close to maximal (cf. Frisch 
& Schlesewsky 2005 for a similar argument) – restricted not by case but by the features of the 
case bearer. This is schematically depicted in Figure 4.7, once more repeated from an earlier 
section, with only a slight modification. 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Semantic range of Der Bär ‘the bear’ in [NP bear]-V construction 
 
The location landmark branch is put in parentheses because corresponding utterances are 
almost but not completely excluded (
?
Der Bär läuft aus ‘The bear leaks’, e.g., after having 
been shot). In contrast, the nature of what the nominative (form) in (4.8b) differentiates is 
different in that the co-occurring NP referents of the construction reduce the number of the 
affordances of the nominative case bearer considerably, forcing it – as far as I can see – into 
the trajector function. This is depicted in Figure 4.8. 
 
    
Figure 4.8: Semantic range of Der Bär ‘the bear’ in  
[NP bear]-V-[NP fishbones] [P against] [NP treetrunk] construction 
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These sentences are instances of two of the most important constructions in German that are 
listed in section 4.1 above. However, as Der Bär läuft aus ‘The bear leaks’ (bear landmark) 
and Der Bär rennt ‘The bear runs’ (bear trajector) illustrate, constructions may exhibit 
homonymy. That means that while case forms in principle accomplish differentiations within 
their utterances and constructions, respectively, the nature of the differentiations cannot be 
characterized as similar or identical. 
Further above, (i (b)) has been affirmed in stating that the differentiation a case form 
accomplishes concerns any possible construction underlying an utterance of the  language in 
which this form occurs.  
 
We can now constrain this statement further by factoring in the nature of the differentiation 
the case form accomplishes, thereby affirming (i (c)): The nature of the differentiation that a 
case form accomplishes concerns only instances of the construction of the language in which 
this form occurs. This is the global, specific domain. Thus, case has value for each utterance, 
across all utterance types, and especially within each construction. 
 
Question (ii (a)) (Are cases associated with particular differentiations?) can be answered 
rather briefly. It follows from (i (c)) that within constructions, cases can code particular 
differentiations (e.g., those depicted in Figures 4.7 and 4.8 above, respectively). But following 
up on earlier statements on variation within single constructions (see section 3.3.9), 
constructions are not as homogenous as the above examples suggest. Independently of the 
questions concerning trajector/landmark distribution, affordances, mutual affordances, nature 
of NPs, agreement, case, and so on, constructions show internal variability with respect to the 
question of whether  
 
 they code a circumstance in a motivated or exploiting manner,  
 they code egocentric or allocentric space,  
  they code states or telic/atelic processes and activities. 
 
These first two factors add a considerable portion of variability and – in the case of the third 
factor – even homonymy to each construction. Nevertheless, I have tried to illustrate that 
constructions play a central role in how conceptualizations can be build up in incremental 
interpretation and how the information they provide can advance mutual understanding. It 
seems likely that the notion of construction also serves the learnability of languages for the 
reasons outlined here.  
 
That means, with certain important restrictions (ii (a)) can be affirmed. 
 
This leads directly to question (ii (b)) (Of what kind are the differentiations?). It will be 
shown, that my thesis regarding this question is of paramount importance for the 
syntax/semantics relationship as a whole. In particular, what I believe is that there is no basic 
construction in which a case form (or some other formal constituent) makes a differentiation 
with respect to attribution.  
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That means there is no basic construction in which case codes the attribution of responsibility 
for some circumstance. One could say, case is blind to the whole actional grounding of the 
linking competence (i.e., attribution). Where responsibility on the side of an object is coded 
unambiguously in an utterance and need not be attributed additionally (where this is possible 
at all), this is enforced either by a lexical form (e.g., a verb like murder in contrast to kill; cf. 
van Valin/Wilkins 1996) or it is indicated by a non-basic construction. Basic are those 
constructions that exhibit a motivated, i.e., diagrammatically iconic mapping of the type 
exemplified by Figure 4.9, counting as representative of all constructions listed in Table 4.1 
above. 
 
 
Figure 4.9: A basic construction 
 
Non-basic are therefore mainly constructions like the passive construction (diathesis) or the 
imperative construction.
172
 They are non-basic because they deviate from the abovementioned 
motivated mapping by ceding competing motivations: discourse/information structure in the 
passive and illocutionary force in the imperative construction. The deviation from the 
motivated, regular mapping is presumably correlative with the age of these constructions: 
They are historically younger, even across language families (cf. Wilmanns 1906: 134ff. for 
German; Givón 2009 for a more global perspective), and are instances of grammaticalization, 
i.e., conventionalization (e.g., Fleischer & Schallert 2011 for German). The younger age of 
the passive is also indicated either by its periphrastic character and the fewer number of 
distinct verb forms or by its morphological markedness in relation to the active. Data from the 
“World Atlas of Language Structures (WALS)” (Dryer & Haspelmath 2011) point to the 
existence of implicational hierarchies, or the secondary status of these constructions at least, 
such that when there is a passive or an imperative construction in the sense outlined in fn. 
172, then there is also an active construction and an indicative construction, respectively (cf. 
Siewierska 2011, van der Auwera et al. 2011; see also Keenan & Dryer 
2
2007, Givón 2009). 
                                                 
172
 The passive construction is qualified by the following features:  
“i. it contrasts with another constuction, the active; ii. the subject of the active corresponds to a 
non-obligatory oblique phrase of the passive or is not overtly expressed; iii. the subject of the 
passive, if there is one, corresponds to the direct object of the active; iv. the construction is 
pragmatically restricted relative to the active; v. the construction displays some special 
morphological marking of the verb.” (Siewierska 2011). 
The imperative is characterized by having “second person singular [or] plural imperatives as dedicated 
morphological categories.” (van der Auwera et al. 2011). Often, reduction of valency by one is another indicator 
of imperative mood, and hence the imperative construction. 
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The tendency “away from diagrammatically iconic motivation towards grammaticalization” 
works similar to what has been demonstrated about the malen-bemalen ‘paint-paint’ 
alternation in section 4.1.3.  
Interestingly, these constructions are not (yet?) as extensively exploitable as the basic 
constructions. Respective examples have been given in another context already (see section 
3.3.3.2); they are repeated here as (4.9a) and (b), and as (4.10a) and (b). 
 
 (4.9a) Der gestrige Tag hat wieder viele  Stürze       von Fahrern gesehen.  
  The   last      day  has  again  many accidents  of   cyclists   seen  
  ‘The last day has again seen accidents of many cyclists.’ 
 
 (4.9b) 
#
Viele  Unfälle  von Fahrern sind  vom     gestrigen Tag gesehen worden. 
  Many accidents of   cyclists  are    by-the last          day seen       were    
  ‘Many accidents of cyclists were seen by the last day.’ 
 
 (4.10a) Der Priester hat viele   Jungen gesehen.  
  The  priest     has many boys     seen 
  ‘The priest saw many boys.’  
 
 (4.10b) Viele Jungen sind vom     Priester gesehen worden. 
  Many boys    are   by-the  priest     seen      were 
  ‘Many boys were seen by the priest.’ 
 
The non-basic constructions, exemplified by the (b) variants can code fewer semantic 
differentiations than their basic constructional counterparts, respectively. They have a smaller 
semantic range. The restrictions on imperatives are even stronger. 
 
 (4.11a) Du erschießt den Bären. 
  ‘You shoot the bear.’ 
 
 (4.11b)  Erschieße den Bären nicht. 
  lit. ‘Shoot the bear not.’; ‘Don’t shoot the bear.’ 
 
 (4.12a) Du magst Alex nicht. 
   lit. ‘You like Alex not.’; ‘You don’t like Alex.’ 
 
 (4.13b) 
#
Möge Alex nicht. 
   lit. ‘Like Alex not.’; ‘Don’t like Alex.’ 
 
This leads to the situation that the imperative is – as a grammatical, not just a lexical means – 
reserved for coding responsibility. And the passive, to a lower (and decreasing?) degree, too:  
 
 (4.14a) Peter hat sein Schicksal beim Essen gefunden. Ein Donut hat ihn getötet, 
  indem er daran erstickt ist. 
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  ‘Peter found his fate in food. A donut killed him, as Peter choked on it.’ 
 
 (4.14b) Peter hat sein Schicksal beim Essen gefunden. [
?
Er ist von einem Donut 
  getötet worden], indem er daran erstickt ist. 
  ‘Peter found his fate in food. He was killed by a donut, as Peter choked on 
  it.’ 
 
The second matrix sentence in (4.14b) sounds odd, when the donut is not conceived of as 
anthropomorphic – having arms, moving like a human, getting himself stuck in Peter’s 
trachea. 
The tendency seems to be that the more basic a construction is the fewer the semantic 
restrictions on it. The (a) sentences are instances of basic constructions. Their PSCs are 
always semantically unmarked with respect to the responsibility status of their trajectors, 
respectively. The (b) sentences are non-basic. Their trajectors are preferably attributed 
responsibility. Sometimes, not making these attributions even results in non-acceptability of 
the respective utterances. 
If this is true, it is additional evidence for the “imposition” thesis defended in sections 3.2 and 
3.4: Basic, motivated constructions do not code actional, i.e., attributional, matters. They must 
be inferred by means of impositions onto spatio-temporal cores of conceptualizations. As 
formal means, attributional matters enter utterances only via lexical material and non-basic 
constructions.  
 
Question (ii (b)) can therefore be answered as follows: The nature of the differentiations 
determined by case is restricted by these differentiation having a perceptual basis. Cases 
differentiate spatio-temporal concepts from one another. In contrast, their differentiations are 
completely indifferent to actional matters.  
 
That does not mean that in particular utterances some case bearer is not preferably attributed 
responsibility. It means that a case bearer in basic constructions is never necessarily attributed 
responsibility, while a case bearer is always necessarily identified/categorized as trajector or 
landmark, as object or location, as being caused or uncaused, and so on. 
Question (iii) (Can other formal units accomplish the same differentiations? If yes, why is 
there case?) asks for the relationship of case morphology to the other formal constituents 
discussed above. It has been demonstrated that primarily, case morphology helps determine 
the trajector/landmark distribution in the conceptualization of an utterance. Ultimately, it shall 
help build up a more precise concept of a circumstance such that the interpreter has a glimpse 
of what stands in what spatio-temporal circumstance with what so that this sufficiently 
corresponds to the speaker’s conceptualization.173 However, it cannot accomplish this without 
a complex interplay with agreement and phrase order information, each of which accomplish 
                                                 
173
 This can of course never be clarified linguistically
o
, at least. It has been argued in the introduction to chapter 4 
that conceptualizations built up from utterances can never be identical between two interlocutors. If one (or 
better: two) wanted to be sure that their conceptualizations were sufficiently similar, and they negotiated it 
linguistically
o
, they would find themselves in an infinite semiosis: For their negotiating utterances the same is 
true as for their original utterance. They cannot be sure that they conceptualize them similarly/identically to each 
other and would have to negotiate that again and again ad infinitum.  
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similar differentiations. (The contributions of “bare” constructions, nouns, and/or verbs are 
invariably the same for all languages.) 
 
As to (ii (b)), the picture is thus that there are different means for accomplishing similar 
differentiations. Each of the formal constituents in isolation often does not suffice to 
accomplish them. In combination they do, potentially even redundantly.  
 
By way of example, if a language (e.g., Classic Latin) has unambiguous case morphology and 
unambiguous and unique agreement morphology, it may “afford” free phrase order. Case and 
agreement (together with the invariable constituents) accomplish anything necessary for 
conceptualization. If a language has neither unambiguous case morphology nor unambiguous 
and unique agreement morphology, only a strict phrase order can avoid a general, global 
ambiguity (English comes close to this pattern). In addition, it must be conventionalized that 
the trajector/landmark distribution of the verb is also determined by phrase order. Redundant 
patterns employ unambiguous morphology and (relatively) fixed phrase order (Icelandic 
comes close to this pattern). Underspecified patterns show poor morphology and (relatively) 
free phrase order (Bulgarian comes close to this pattern). 
Thus, one finds each of these patterns in the world’s languages. The redundant ones are not 
the problem (since we are not dealing here with economy matters primarily), but the 
underspecified ones: How do interlocutors arrive at sufficiently similar conceptualizations 
when confronted with such structures/languages? This will be the topic of section 4.2.  
I have discussed the contributions of phrase order, agreement morphology, and case 
morphology to shared conceptualizations of circumstances in a rather general way now. Since 
the present work is primarily concerned with German, and because its case system has often 
gained special attention, the next section deals with the German dative, by means of a case 
study. 
 
 
4.1.6.2 Case study: the German dative 
In the previous section I have demonstrated that the differentiation a case form accomplishes 
applies to the construction that underlies an utterance, and that this holds for each and every 
utterance in a language (see (i (a)) in the previous section). This observation is only half of the 
truth, because it does not take the nature of the differentiation into account: Case forms also 
accomplish specific differentiations, but only in dependence of their occurrence in particular 
constructions (see (i (b) and (c)) in the previous section). This is true, although particular 
constructions may exhibit considerable homonymy, especially monadic NPnom-V and dyadic 
NPnom-V-NPacc constructions. I think the first observation (relating to (i (a))) is one of the 
reasons for postulating “structural case” in Chomskyan Linguistics (cf. Chomsky 1981). The 
observation is that nominative and accusative cases obviously neutralize conceptual 
differentiations, i.e., they have quite a broad range of differentiations they code.  
However, this observation and the postulation of structural case comes along with the neglect 
of the other observations (relating to (i (b) and (c))), this neglect being a consequence of the 
autonomy-of-syntax principle and the rejection of the notion of construction. In an 
autonomous syntax it is not interesting what case does for conceptualization, but only its role 
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in purely syntactic machinery. More specifically, the broad range of conceptual 
differentiations neutralized by the nominative and accusative cases appears broad only in 
relation to the apparent range of the dative case. The dative has extensively been shown to be 
conceptually more restricted than the other two cases, and therefore often been assigned the 
status of a lexical or inherent case (for an overview cf. Hole, Meinunger & Abraham 2006; 
see also Behagel 1923, Wegener 1985, Willems & Van Pottelberge 1998, Blume 2000). 
Accepting that the differentiations cases accomplish also depend on the constructions in 
which they occur means accepting that the degree of neutralization of the nominative and 
accusative in relation to that of the dative can only be of a gradual nature. Reconsider the 
NPnom-V-NPdat-NPacc construction: I would purport that the range of the conceptual 
differentiations of the dative complement in this construction is not necessarily or 
considerably narrower than that of the accusative or even the nominative (see Figure 4.4 
above for my suggestions in this respect). Applied to CL that means the difference between 
structural and inherent case fails to capture the semantics of cases inherent to constructions. 
I will attempt here an Instruction Grammar characterization of the contributions that the 
dative makes to conceptualizations in the utterance-as-instruction perspective. I will do this 
using the actional, perceptual, and conceptual devices developed throughout this work, 
thereby differentiating it from the nominative and the accusative, and factoring in the insights 
from (i (a) to (c)) from the previous section. In particular, the following theses will be 
defended: 
 
(i) The German dative codes  
  (a) symmetrical and asymmetrical bi-directionality,  
  (b) symmetrical and asymmetrical coinciding directionality,  
  whereas the nominative and nominative-accusative code non-directionality 
  or uni-directionality in fictive or concrete motion/movement;  
  the dative also codes 
  (c) (non-default) internal actional involvement. 
 
Consider the first thesis (i (a)). It says that when a construction contains a dative form, this is 
an instruction to conceptualize its referent as moving concretely or fictively towards the 
referent of the nominative case bearer. At the same time the referent of the nominative case 
bearer shall be conceptualized as being concretely or fictively directed towards the referent of 
the dative case bearer. Thus conceived, the relation between both object concepts is 
bidirectional. Stricto sensu, both would have to be conceptualized as trajector and landmark at 
the same time, which is conceptually impossible but may be expressed with an exploited 
utterance (see Figure 3.33 in section 3.3.2). Factoring in the symmetry factor shows that this 
need not be the case. If a trajector is conceptualized as being directed to the landmark in the 
context of its circumstance and if it is then registered that the landmark is also moving, 
namely towards the trajector, this is very well possible. Exactly this situation is given in 
(4.15). 
 
(4.15) Der             Dozent  gratuliert/  begegnet/  dankt/öffnet    Matthias. 
  The.3NOM lecturer compliment/run-across/thank/open.3 Matthias.DAT 
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 ‘The tutor compliments/runs across/thanks/opens (the door to) Matthias.’ 
 
In (4.15) the tutor’s activity is directed towards Matthias. It is excluded, however, that the 
activity of the tutor succeeds, and that the verbalization of the circumstance with the 
respective verbs is appropriate if Matthias does not move, too, even though the tutor’s activity 
constitutes the major part of the whole circumstance. The contribution of both persons is thus 
asymmetrical. Nevertheless, the object towards which the tutor’s activities are directed also 
affords exertion of force and motion/movement. The latter is even necessarily actualized and 
works in a sense against the motion/movement of the trajector. This object is therefore not 
simply affected by the process/activity but contributes to the circumstance in that it has the 
potential to affect something by itself. This is in a very general manner depicted in Figure 
4.10. 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Asymmetrical bidirectionality in (fictive) motion/movement between trajector 
and landmark (dyadic relation) 
 
An interesting side-effect of these considerations is that it is possible to predict that the dative 
referent in these constructions need neither be animate nor a traditional (secondary or co-) 
agent. What is required is only that the dative referent affords (and actualizes) exertion of 
force and/or motion/movement – which often though not always coincides with animacy. 
Concerning traditional agents, I reiterate what was mentioned above: In basic constructions 
(of which the one underlying (4.15) is an instance) case cannot code attribution or non-
attribution of responsibility. Unless there is lexical material in the utterance that forces the 
interpreter into an interpretation with the attribution of responsibility, it is left to him/her 
whether he/she makes this attribution – presupposed the circumstance in question involves 
some activity on the side of the dative referent at all. 
 
(4.16) Matthias             hat    dem           Professor einen      Brief  geschickt. 
  Matthias.3NOM has.3 the.3DAT professor  a.3ACC letter  send.PTCP 
 ‘Matthias sent the professor a letter.’ 
 
What has been said about (4.15) holds also true for (4.16), except that the directedness of 
Matthias’ activity does not find its destination in the professor but that Matthias sets in 
motion/movement some other object which is directed towards the professor, such that the 
professor must show some activity towards this object in order to make this circumstance one 
of sending someone something. In a more general manner this is depicted in Figure 4.11.  
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Figure 4.11: Asymmetrical bidirectionality in (fictive) motion/movement between trajector 
and landmark (triadic relation); (mvt: movement, mtn: motion) 
 
In the conceptualizations underlying sentences (4.17), (4.18), and (4.19) below the 
aforementioned conditions are not met. This finds its expression in the absence of a dative 
form in these sentences (cf. (i (b))). The corresponding conceptual structures are also given, 
respectively. 
 
 (4.17) Der              Dozent sieht/mag/sucht/    prüft/     (unterstützt)  Matthias. 
  The.3NOM   tutor     see/  like/ look for/examine/(support).3   Matthias.3ACC 
 ‘The tutor sees/likes/looks for/examines/(supports) Matthias.’ 
 
 
Figure 4.12: Uni-directionality in (fictive) motion/movement between trajector and landmark 
(dyadic relation) 
 
(4.18) Matthias             hat    einen      Brief  an den           Professor geschickt. 
  Matthias.3NOM has.3 a.3ACC letter  to the.3OBL professor  send.PTCP 
 ‘Matthias sent a letter to the professor.’  
 
  
Figure 4.13: Uni-directionality in (fictive) motion/movement between trajector and landmark 
(triadic relation); (mvt: movement, mtn: motion) 
 
 
(4.19) Matthias              tanzt. 
  Matthias.3NOM dance.3 
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 ‘Matthias dances.’ 
 
 
Figure 4.14: Non-directionality in (fictive) motion/movement (monadic relation) 
 
Still dealing with (i (a)), let us turn to the case of symmetrical bi-directionality now. Consider 
(4.20): 
 
(4.20) Die             Villa gleicht/    ähnelt     einem    Schloss. 
   The.3NOM villa look-like/resemble a.3DAT palace 
  ‘The villa looks like/resembles a palace.’ 
 
The above sentence puzzles most case theories because there is a dative although there is no 
animate object and no movement/motion at all. However, taking a closer look at it, we find it 
similar to earlier examples from section 3.3.2 (involving Alex resembling Mario, the reverse 
and both resembling each other). It has been demonstrated that when A resembles 
(gleicht/ähnelt) B, B also resembles A, and that then B and A resemble each other 
(gleichen/ähneln sich). This is a symmetric relation, then. It has also been shown that it is 
impossible to conceptualize such a symmetric relation because the perspective dependence of 
perception/conceptualization allows only stating an asymmetric relation: The conceptualizer 
must fictively follow a trajectory from A to B in order to compare them. He/she cannot 
compare A to B and B to A simultaneously. In the course of conceptualization we have two 
uni-directional relations, then. This is depicted in Figures 4.15 and 4.16, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 4.15: Asymmetric unidirectional fictive movement 
 
 
Figure 4.16: Asymmetric unidirectional fictive movement reversed 
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One would expect unidirectional relations to be coded by means of an NPnom-NPacc 
construction, in accordance to what has been said about (4.17) and Figure 4.12 above. That 
(4.17) works this way is caused by the fact that for the circumstances in this utterance (‘see’, 
‘like’, ‘look for’, ‘examine’, (‘support’)) it is not true that if NP1 verbsi NP2, then NP2 also 
verbsi NP1. For ‘resemble’ and ‘look like’ in (4.20) this is true. Thus, two asymmetric 
unidirectional relations add together to yield a symmetric bidirectional relation. The 
difference between symmetric bidirectional relations and asymmetric bidirectional relations of 
the sort illustrated above lies in the conceptual partitioning of the former and the unity of the 
latter. Thus, where the conditions on symmetric and asymmetric bidirectional relations are not 
met, there will be no NPnom-NPdat construction.  
(i (b)) (symmetrical and asymmetrical coinciding directionality) is closely related to (i (a)), 
although bi-directionality and coinciding directionality sound quite antithetic in the first 
instance. Consider (4.21). 
 
(4.21) Der              Dozent hilft/folgt       Matthias. 
   The.3NOM tutor     help/follow.3 Matthias.3DAT 
 ‘The tutor helps/follows Matthias.’ 
 
The difference to the cases in (i (a)) lies in the fact that in (4.21) Matthias is involved in an 
own activity which may also be directed to something unspecified. That means Matthias, as a 
trajector, is involved in some activity that may concern some object or location landmark 
(e.g., help someone open bottles or follow someone into the mall). The active/moving/causing 
aspect of the dative referent is thus similar to most instances discussed in the context of (i (a)). 
However, the referent of the nominative does not work “against” the other’s directed activity 
but shares its directedness or path, but not necessarily its manner and its purpose, if there is 
any. Importantly, the success of the action schema actualized by the nominative referent 
existentially depends on the activity of the dative referent. Note that the involvement of 
responsibility on the side of the dative referent is again a lexical matter, not a constructional 
one: One can for some purpose follow a feather flying through the air, which cannot have a 
purpose. On the other hand, helping enforces the goal-directed activity of the one helped and 
of the helper. The purposes of both persons need not be shared, however, and both people 
need not know about the purposes of the other. That means coinciding directionality is 
indifferent with respect to we-intentionality. Although it is difficult to depict this, I have 
attempted it in Figure 4.17 below. 
 
 
Figure 4.17: Symmetrical and asymmetrical coinciding directionality  
(mvt: movement, mtn: motion) 
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Figure 4.17 shows the following: The nominative referent, being a trajector, moves relative to 
the dative referent, being an object landmark in this function, e.g., by following it (symbolized 
by the solid arrow from the circle to the hexagon). The dative referent in turn is involved in a 
process/activity which is directed toward some object or location landmark (symbolized by 
the dotted lines leaving the circle leading to a dotted object/location landmark). In this 
function it is a trajector. Because the referent of the nominative is oriented towards the dative 
referent, it is consequently oriented towards the dative referent’s destination. The same reason 
determines that the nominative referent need not have the same purposes for moving towards 
the unknown landmark as the dative referent. The motion/movement of the two trajectors and 
the landmark towards which they are directed are dotted because the verbalization (4.21) does 
not code them. This is also indicated by the grey shading of the prepositional phrase and the 
verb which may be added to the construction, yielding something like Der Dozent hilft 
Matthias tapezieren ‘The tutor helps Matthias wallpapering’ or Der Dozent folgt Matthias in 
das Institut ‘The tutor follows Matthias into the institute’. Again, where the attribution of 
responsibility to the dative referent is possible and not lexically enforced, it may apply. It is, 
however, not constructionally coded. 
Turning now to (i (c)), reconsider (4.16) above (Matthias hat dem Professor einen Brief 
geschickt ‘Matthias sent the professor a letter’). There is no doubt that the professor is 
physically involved in this circumstance, given that the event succeeds. Now consider (4.22).  
  
(4.22) Alex             hat       Christina            das            Auto gewaschen. 
  Alex.3NOM have.3 Christina.3DAT the.3ACC car    wash.PTCP 
  ‘Alex washed Christina the car.’ 
 
In the event underlying (4.22) Christina need not be there when Alex washes the car. It 
suffices that it is Christina’s goal or interest that her car gets washed or even that it does not 
get washed. The notions of goal and interest have been clarified in section 2.4 of this book. It 
is implicit in Figure 2.7 there that someone’s purposes need not be put into effect by that same 
person but can also be realized by others. Were Christina not mentioned in (4.22) above, one 
would be led to attribute the purpose of the car’s being clean to Alex. Were the professor left 
out in (4.16), this would not alter the motives of Matthias. Moreover, in contrast to (4.16) the 
dative complement in (4.22) can be left out in any information structural configuration, while 
this hardly possible in (4.16). What one finds in constructions like the one underlying (4.22) is 
one of the very special things that datives accomplish: The dative referent does not stand in a 
relation to the nominative referent and/or the accusative referent similar to the relation 
between the professor and Matthias, and between the professor and the letter in (4.16). Rather, 
the dative referent stands in a relation to the relation between the nominative and the 
accusative referent.  
This is not true for the complements in (4.16). The dative in (4.16) is of type (i (b)). A linking 
schema for this type is shown in Figure 3.31, repeated here from section 3.3.2. I will contrast 
it with the type (i (c)) dative in (4.22) shortly.  
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Figure 3.31: The role of the conceptualizer 
 
Now, what happens in sentences like (4.22), containing a dativus (in)commodi, is that the 
goals and interests concerning the circumstance verbalized are not those of the conceptualizer 
but of some conceptualized conceptualizer. Thus, the speaker-conceptualizer projects a 
conceptualizer into the circumstance as the person with respect to which this circumstance is 
pertinent.  
 
Strictly speaking, the speaker-conceptualizer stands in a relation to the relation in which the 
dative referent stands to the relation between the nominative and the accusative referents.  
 
This is depicted in Figure 4.18 below. The speaker-conceptualizer is characterized here as the 
first person, the projected conceptualizer as a third person.  
 
 
Figure 4.18: Dativus (in)commodi as projection of someone’s goals and interests towards a 
circumstance 
 
The classical dativus possessivus is often difficult to distinguish from the dativus 
(in)commodi. Consider (4.23) and (4.24).  
 
(4.23) Alex              hat      Christina            die            Haare gewaschen. 
   Alex.3NOM have.3 Christina.3DAT the.3ACC hair    wash.PTCP 
  ‘Alex washed Christina’s hair.’ 
 
(4.24) Alex             schmerzt  die             Nase. 
       Alex.3DAT hurt.3       the.3NOM nose 
  ‘Alex’ nose hurts.’ 
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The difference between (4.22) and (4.23) lies in the relation between the dative referent and 
the accusative referent. While in the former the relation may be one of possession, the latter 
must necessarily be one of possession, and it is often one of inalienable possession. Hair is 
one of the few things that are separable from a human body. In the usual case one deals with a 
part/whole relation relative to a human body. Strictly speaking, (4.23) is a dyadic relation 
between the object Alex and the object Christina such that Alex acts towards a part of 
Christina. The possessive relation between a possessor and a possessee has already been 
described in section 3.3.2. Conceptually, (4.23) instructs an interpreter to conceptualize a 
concrete movement of Alex (trajector) towards Christina (object landmark), whereas the 
relation between Christina (landmark) and her hair (trajector relative to Christina, landmark 
relative to the hair) is one of fictive motion. The part/whole relation including inalienability 
becomes especially clear in (4.24). Hurting is primarily a circumstance in which the nose is 
involved. But as a inalienable part of Alex the pain concerns Alex as a higher-order object. 
The difference between the possessive dative and the dativus (in)commodi can thus be 
characterized in the following way: The object affected by the circumstance (the car and the 
nose, respectively) stands in a part/whole relation in the former, while in the latter it does not 
necessarily. That means that in the case of the possessive dative the affected object is also the 
object (on a higher level of trajector-landmark configuration) which has some interest in or 
goal regarding the circumstance. In a sense they are coreferent. 
Closely related to the above dative types is the classical dativus ethicus. I am not quite sure 
about how to characterize the exact differences between the ethical dative and the dativus 
(in)commodi in conceptual and actional terms, but it seems to me that the former is restricted 
to interests, i.e., to circumstances that shall be maintained or avoided from the standpoint of 
the speaker-conceptualizer. Moreover, its occurrence seems to be restricted to circumstances 
in which a speech act participant is involved and that concern the interests of another 
participant, i.e., first and second persons. In (4.25) below it seems to be the integrity of the 
window that is pertinent. In (4.26), which is not negatively formulated, it is the benevolence 
of the teacher that the speaker wants to maintain. 
 
(4.25) Dass du               mir            nicht das            Fenster  triffst! 
   that   you.2NOM me.1DAT not   the.3ACC window hit.2 
  ‘Don’t even think about hitting the window.’ 
 
(4.26) Dass du                mir        ja       den            Lehrer grüßt! 
   that   you.2NOM me.1DAT PART the.3ACC teacher greet.2 
  ‘Don’t even think about forgetting to tell the teacher I said hello.’ 
   
The corresponding conceptual structure and its linking are given in Figure 4.19 below. This 
conceptual structure seems also to hold for the dativus iudicantis. In constructions containing 
it the circumstance expressed is judged by the dative referent to exhibit some feature to a 
degree that does not lie in his/her interest, e.g., Alex fährt mir zu langsam (lit. ‘Alex drives 
me[.DAT] too slowly’). There is always a degree particle indicating this. 
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Figure 4.19: Dativus ethicus and iudicantis as projections of someone’s interests towards a 
circumstance 
 
However, (4.27) constitutes the most intricate matter. Its explanation solves the linking puzzle 
outlined in chapter 1 and in sections 2.2.1 to 2.2.8. It expresses a circumstance which ranges 
between those of the other dative occurrences. Here, the dative shares with the dativus 
(in)commodi an alienable relation to the referent of the other case bearer, one of possession (at 
least one having sth. at one’s disposal temporarily) with the possessive dative, one of goal or 
interest with the ethical and/or bene-/maleficient dative, and one of activity with the datives in 
(4.15). This dative type can be deduced by combining (i (a)/(b)) and (i (c)) above: The dative 
referent is in any case involved in activity towards the other object – and makes contact with 
it. On the one hand Willi causes the glass to break, on the other hand, the breaking of the glass 
is, at least in a metaphorical sense, directed against Willi’s intended activity towards the glass. 
It blocks Willi’s movement by opposing it, blocking it, making it impossible.  
 
(4.27) Willi            ist   (
#
absichtlich)   ein           Glas zerbrochen. 
   Willi.3DAT be.3 (intentionally) a.3NOM glass break.PTCP 
  ‘(It happened to Willi that) a glass broke.’ 
 
Deleting Willi in (4.27) yields the anticausative construction in (4.28). However, as has 
extensively argued in section 3.2 (especially 3.2.4), exerting force is independent of the 
attribution of responsibility which is not contained in a (simulated) percept of an event. That 
is why (4.28) in which a causer is not expressed is ambiguous between an accidental and an 
intentional breaking event.  
 
(4.28) Ein         Glas  ist    zerbrochen. 
   a.3NOM glass be.3 break.PTCP 
  ‘A glass is broken.’ 
 
If someone verbalizing the event underlying both (4.27) and (4.28) wants to suggest that Willi 
intentionally knocked over the glass, he/she has to utter something like (4.29) 
 
 (4.29) Willi             hat      ein          Glas zerbrochen. 
    Willi.3NOM have.3 a.3ACC glass break.PTCP 
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  ‘Willi broke a glass.’ 
 
(4.29) still allows a reading in which Willi is not responsible for the breaking of the glass, but 
it suggests one in which he is. In order to make unambiguously clear that Willi is not 
responsible for breaking the glass, one has to do this lexically (by adding a disambiguating 
adverb) or utter (4.28) above which blocks attributing responsibility. I have attempted to 
depict this in Figure 4.20. 
 
 
Figure 4.20: Dative of non-responsible causer 
 
Interestingly, Figure 4.20 shows that there is an activity and a process compressed in this 
utterance: Willi’s activity towards the glass is only implicit but nevertheless relevant with 
respect to the fact that he pursues some purpose in holding the glass (unknown to us). The 
verbalized process is that of the glass changing from being intact to being broken, and it is 
this process that opposes Willi’s goals or interests. 
The discussion of (i (c): “(non-default) internal actional involvement”) has shown that this 
dative type is given where the internal actional involvement (in the sense of purposes, i.e., 
goals and interests) of someone is verbalized who is not by default the person having some 
goal or interest regarding the circumstance in question, or someone whose actually intentional 
activity is thwarted by his/her accidental causing a change in something. 
Before concluding the discussion about the dative, something shall be said about the 
constructions below which often contain datives. It shall broaden the survey of dative 
occurrences in German. 
 
(4.30) x              widerverbt      y. 
  x.3NOM against-verb.3 y.DAT 
 ‘x verbs against y.’ 
 
(4.31) x              entverbt                             y. 
  x.3NOM against/away-from-verb.3 y.DAT 
 ‘x verbs against/away from y.’ 
 
(4.32) x             verbt y             (z)          zu/auf/etc. 
  x.3NOM verb.3 y.DAT (z.ACC) to/on/etc. 
 ‘x verbs (z) to/on/etc. y.’ 
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(4.33) x              nähert        sich              y. 
  x.3NOM approach.3 REFL.ACC y.DAT 
 ‘x approaches y.’ 
 
 (4.34) x             gefällt   y. 
  x.3NOM please.3 y.DAT 
 ‘x pleases y.’/’y enjoys x.’ 
 
(4.30) and (4.31) contain a preposition/particle (wider- ‘against’) and a prefix (ent- ‘against, 
away from, apart’), respectively. That means the dative forms in these sentences are suspected 
to depend on the preposition, i.e., on the meaning of the preposition. As such, they could be 
argued to have another status than the datives discussed above, where no such 
prepositions/particles and prefixes are there. Instances of widerverb- that occur with dative 
forms are widersprechen ‘contradict, disagree’ or widerstehen ‘resist, withstand’. Instances of 
entverb- that occur with dative forms are entsprechen ‘correspond’, orig. ‘answer, respond’, 
entsagen ‘abdicate’, or  entkommen ‘escape’. Besides the fact that the English paraphrases are 
often literal translations of the German (and Germanic) verbs, but using Latin borrowings 
(with prepositions/particles/prefixes like contra-, re-, ex-, ab-), it can be seen that one deals 
here with asymmetrical bi-directionality (i (a)) or asymmetrical coinciding directionality (i 
(b)): Someone or something that contradicts, withstands, corresponds (responds) to, or 
abdicates, someone or something exhibits movement/motion “against” some opponent 
movement/motion. Someone or something that escapes someone or something can be 
conceived of as a mirror picture (i.e., mirrored conceptualization) of the conceptualization 
underlying the circumstance of following (see Figure 4.17).  
There are also instances of entverb- occurring in NPnom-NPacc constructions, e.g., entführen 
‘abduct’, entwickeln ‘develop, evolve’, or entdecken ‘discover’. They strongly suggest that 
only uni-directionality is given because their landmarks either need not even afford 
motion/movement or exertion of force, and if they do, they need not have them actualized.  
Possibly, similar things can be said about (4.32), although these cases seem more puzzling. 
Verbs of this sort are zurufen ‘call out to s.o.’ or auffallen ‘attract’ where there are spatial 
prepositions attached to the verb (as particles) that can be broken up syntactically (x ruft… 
zu). These types of prepositions/particles can be used locally and directionally. Here, the 
former seems to apply. On the one hand, this makes asymmetrical bi-directionality 
improbable, at least if we are talking about concrete motion/movement. Furthermore, it is 
well-known that the German dative aggregates functions of the Indo-European ablative, 
instrumental, and locative (cf. Behagel 1923). The datives in (4.32) can plausibly be argued to 
employ the locative function here, in that the one called out to and the one attracted are the 
loci of the call and the attractor, respectively. This is what Wegener (1985: 291) proposes for 
nähern and it seems applicable to zurufen, too. On the other hand, using auffallen 
appropriately requires a feature of the dative referent that many dative referents of bi-
directional relations also employ, namely animacy. For verbs like auffallen, an analysis in 
which there is asymmetric fictive bi-directionality is also conceivable, in that some fictive 
turning toward the attractor in the sense of becoming aware of it is necessary on the side of 
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the dative referent. Being or becoming aware of something has been correlated with eye 
fixation and eye gaze in earlier sections. This is what underlies fictive motion. 
The case of zurufen and nähern is more complicated in that it is possible to call out to and to 
approach whatever. The felicity conditions on the use of these verbs is nearly independent of 
the features and affordances of the landmark. (It has to be an object landmark in the case of 
calling out, however). This is why a locative analysis suggests itself. An alternative 
explanation for the case of zurufen could be a partial idiosyncrasy of transfers of information, 
which might (nearly universally) require the fictive turning towards the information emitter 
on the side of the landmark of the information, i.e., the dative referent in a zurufen 
circumstance, thus constituting an instance of (i (a)). 
A last explanation for the case pattern in zurufen could work by invoking the general function 
of case categories, namely to differentiate the role of a case bearer from the roles of the other 
case bearers in a construction. Zurufen expresses a triadic relation, coded by a NPnom-V-NPdat-
NPacc construction. If one subscribes to the analysis that the dative referent in a zurufen 
utterance need not fulfill one of the conditions under (i (a–c)) above, then one would expect it 
to bear accusative case, just like the referent of the second postverbal NP, the information 
transmitted. Two accusative case bearers are possible in German with the verbs lehren ‘teach 
s.o. sth.’, abfragen/abhören ‘ask s.o. for sth.’ and kosten ‘cost s.o. sth’ which clearly show 
aspects of asymmetrical bi-directionality but also the “wrong” case pattern, just like zurufen, 
but reversed. I am not sure whether this is coincidental but the transferred “object” in all these 
cases is either information or preferably abstract (in the case of kosten: Das kostet dich deine 
Stelle, lit. ‘That costs you your job’ vs. Das kostet dich zehn Euro, lit. ‘That costs you ten 
Euros’). It could be that this makes the case distribution with these verbs less stable than with 
concrete transferable objects. While one has little chances of success in finding non-dialectal 
instances of constructions like NPnom schickt ‘sends’ NPacc NPacc[+figure-apt], one can easily find 
instances of kosten and lehren constructions of the type NPnom-kostet/lehrt-NPdat-NPacc[-figure-
apt].
174
 To cut a long story short, two competing motivations seem to be at work here. Firstly, 
diagrammatic iconicity which shall maximize incremental interpretation in terms of the 
utterance-as-instruction view: The interpreter prefers distinct (case) forms for distinct 
conceptual differentiations (dative vs. accusative); and secondly economic considerations in 
the sense of associating more conceptual differentiations with fewer (case) forms (two 
accusatives) (cf. Hawkins’ 2004: 34, 51 “Minimize Forms” and “Maximize On-line 
Processing”; see also Primus 1999). Minimizing forms and incorporating multiple 
conceptualizations into single forms means a step away from diagrammatically iconic 
motivation towards exploitation by conventionalization. Following up on the discussion about 
acquisition in section 3.3.6 I would therefore predict that double accusative constructions in 
German are disadvantaged in language comprehension and are acquired later.  
Gefallen (4.34) is the last example that will be discussed here. It is closely related to auffallen 
but does not contain a productive preposition/particle like the latter. However, they behave 
similarly syntactically. The prefix ge- that is attached to the concrete meaning of fall- ‘fall’ 
can be traced back to older comitative and collective meanings (cf. Wilmanns 
2
1899). Thus, 
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 Searching www.google.com for the strings lehrt ihm and kostet ihm yields 33.500 and 34.900 hits, 
respectively [29/03/2012]. Searching schickt ihn this way is impossible due to the syncretisms that the second 
object allows and the phrase order flexibility. 
286 
 
something “comes together at” the dative referent of gefallen which again makes a locative 
interpretation of this dative complement possible. Analyzing it in accordance to (i (a): 
asymmetric bi-directionality) or (i (c): internal actional involvement) does not seem to be 
impossible: In the former case it is again the aspect of being aware of the nominative referent 
(unlike auffallen, where s.o. becomes aware of sth.) that is required in the dative referent. It 
must therefore be animate and shows some fictive movement towards the nominative referent; 
one could also interpret the dative referent of gefallen (and that of auffallen) as one who has 
some interest in the circumstance in which the nominative referent stands. It would thus 
constitute a variant of the dativus (in)commodi. An argument in favor of such an analysis are 
intransitive utterances like Er weiß wirklich zu gefallen ‘He really knows how to appeal (to 
s.o.)’ and Das fällt auf ‘That attracts (attention)’. In other words, “his” appeal and “its” 
attraction are actually intransitive circumstances that – when a dative complement is 
expressed, maybe grammaticalized – have some significance for the dative referent in terms 
of his/her goals or interests.
175
 
A last comment concerns evidence from behavioral and neurolinguistic studies for reanalyses 
of dyadic sentences where the two pre-verbal NPs are ambiguous with respect to the PSC and 
trajector/landmark distribution, e.g., … dass Peter (nom/dat/acc) Mädchen (nom/dat/acc)…. 
‘that Peter girls…’. Anticipating aspects of the next section, the first ambiguous NP is 
preferably interpreted as the PSC coding the source of movement/motion, a causer or 
responsible person (which make classical prototypical agents). Now, if agreement information 
allows the verb in such sentences to disambiguate the ambiguity of PSC/trajector-landmark 
towards an interpretation violating this preference (e.g., dass Peter (acc) Mädchen (nom) 
sehen ‘that girls see Peter’ or dass Peter (dat) Mädchen (nom) folgen ‘that girls follow 
Peter’), then the NPdat-NPnom order is accepted better than the NPacc-NPnom structure and the 
latter seems to require additional reanalysis procedures (e.g., Schlesewsky & Bornkessel 
2003, 2006).  
The present account of the dative taken together with the general preference for interpreting a 
first ambiguous NP as what is classically called a prototypical agent provides a plausible 
explanation for these findings: Many (nominative) PSCs of verbs taking dative complements 
allow semantically (i.e., with respect to conceptualization and attribution) diverse PSC 
referents: They may be inanimate objects, animate objects, even nouns designating 
circumstances, e.g. with gefallen ‘appeal to’. The referents of the NPs bearing dative case are 
semantically far more restricted (see criteria (i (a) to (c)) above). That means from the 
perspective of what they afford, the referents of the dative NPs of such verbs are far more 
likely to satisfy the conditions of a classical prototypical agent (source of movement/motion, 
causer, attributed responsibility) than the semantically unrestricted nominative NPs in such 
constructions. It is thus rather unsurprising that with verbs imposing few restrictions on their 
nominative NPs like gefallen the phrase order NPdat-NPnom may even be preferred over the 
NPnom-NPdat order. Such preferences may exhibit intra-categorial variation: Not all verbs 
occurring in the NPnom-V-NPdat construction are similar. For instance, folgen ‘follow’, unlike 
                                                 
175
 If this latter analysis is right, one must wonder how to explain verbs like wundern ‘amaze’ and interessieren 
‘arouse interest’ which occur in NPnom-V-NPacc constructions. Regarding this matter cf. Klein & Kutscher (2002) 
and the analyses proposed there. What can be said about so-called psychic verbs is that many of them can be 
traced back to spatio-temporal relations. These verbs often have preserved the constructional pattern of their 
original conceptualizations. 
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gefallen, requires two NPs that are quite similar in what they afford so that its PSC referent 
will – from the perspective of what it affords – be a similarly “good” PSC as the referent of 
the dative complement. So there is no reason to not interpret the first NP of folgen as PSC in 
incremental interpretation. 
In case-ambiguous NPnom-V-NPacc constructions, the referent of the accusative complement 
mostly does not exhibit the properties of a dative NP referent (as listed in (i (a) to (c))). Thus, 
it mostly does not compete with the other referent (that of the nominative NP) for the PSC 
status because it lacks the features of a classical prototypical agent. 
Thus, there are processing differences in the reanalysis of dyadic sentences with two 
ambiguous pre-verbal NPs towards either NPdat-NPnom or NPacc-NPnom orders because the 
semantic criteria licensing the dative are absent in the accusative referents of the latter 
construction. Processing differences of different verbs with the order NPdat-NPnom are due to 
the dative’s being licensed by either (i (a) or (b)) on the one hand or by (i (c)) on the other, the 
latter making the NPdat-NPnom order more acceptable. 
 
 
4.2 Reducing the remaining formal underspecification 
 
The discussion in section 4.1 has demonstrated that the interplay of the formal constituents 
and mechanisms in syntax may, but need not provide interlocutors with sufficiently similar 
conceptualizations of circumstances to organize their interaction. But because interaction 
apparently works irrespective of the formal underspecification of linguistic
o
 structures, 
speakers and interpreters must do more than simply instructing others to conceptualize 
circumstances by means of utterances and taking utterances as instructions for 
conceptualizations, respectively. They must rely on cues that are not part of the signal and 
cannot be detected by distributional analyses of this signal. This holds true for the grammars 
of many languages. They differ in the degree to which they functionally “charge” their formal 
and non-formal cues, such that cues relevant in one language may be redundant in another 
language. The non-formal cues are nevertheless available to any speaker of any language, 
since they are grounded in our physical make-up and in aspects of action, perception, and 
conceptualization – aspects that concern all human beings in equal measure. 
One of these non-formal cues has already been discussed, and this shall not be repeated here. 
When presenting the contributions of the “bare” construction, the “bare” noun, the “bare” 
verb, and that of case morphology, the notion of affordance has already played a prominent 
role. Now, affordances are not part of the signal, but play a huge role in (incremental) 
interpretation and conceptualization in that they belong to the referents of NPs which crucially 
make up constructions and are case bearers. What affordances do for incremental 
interpretation was presented in section 4.1. The other notions will be discussed in the present 
section. Throughout the discussion I will show that affordances and the other cues can be 
reduced to a common denominator that can be viewed as the rationale behind their utilization 
in linguistic
o
 interaction: the need for closure at the scale of circumstances. Closure is attained 
where the “front end” of a circumstance is determined, as it were. This will be clarified 
throughout the following sections.  
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In brief, in producing utterances speakers realize, and in interpreting utterances interpreters 
make use of exactly those cues that are instrumental in identifying the boundaries, especially 
the “front end”, of a circumstance. 
 
 
4.2.1 The PSC preference as epiphenomenon of a (responsible) causer preference 
Consider (4.2a) from section 4.1.4 again. 
 
(4.2a) … dass die Frau                                  das Mädchen                     sieht. 
      that  the woman.3SG.NOM/ACC the girl.3SG.NOM/ACC   see.3SG 
 ‘that the woman/the girl sees the girl/the woman.’ 
 
(4.2a) represents the fact that often in German neither phrase order nor the construction, the 
affordances, morphological agreement nor case suffice to definitively fix the 
trajector/landmark and PSC distribution in the interpretation of an utterance. This is a local 
but regular feature of Standard German that is among other things caused by several case 
syncretisms (in feminine and neuter genders, respectively) in which the nominative – as the 
case agreeing with the verb – is involved. When we take a look at English we see that phrase 
order accomplishes the disambiguation of the trajector/landmark and PSC distribution. 
 
(4.2c) ... that the woman sees the girl. 
 ‘woman = seer’; *’girl = seer’ 
 
Given this option is not ruled out by strong formal and non-formal competing cues (cf. 
MacWhinney, Bates & Kliegl 1984), one can state that in German it is the first ambiguous 
complement phrase encountered that is preferably interpreted as the PSC, even though both 
position and case are not necessarily associated with one another in that language (mostly 
called “subject preference”, cf. Hemforth, Konieczny & Strube 1993, Schriefers, Friederici & 
Kühn 1995). What is the explanation for such a preference? I would argue that the PSC, or 
subject, preference is an epiphenomenon of another preference. This latter preference is one 
for a concept that closes a circumstance concept causally, according to the large-scale law of 
closure (cf. section 3.2.1.4, paragraph (b)). That means actors/cognizers strive for delimiting 
circumstances they perceive – or simulate to perceive – mainly at the “front” and (only) 
secondarily at the “back”, i.e., where they begin and where they end, will end, or how they 
proceed. In the optimal case, this allows predictions as to the pertinence of some circumstance 
(i.e., the involved objects) in question for one’s own action planning: Will I have to 
interact/interplay with the objects in that circumstance? Do/will they threaten me? Do/will 
they aid my purposes? Predictability, in turn, is maximal if the beginning of a circumstance is 
identified/categorized or conceptualized as being responsible for the coming about of the 
whole circumstance, or as having caused the coming about of the circumstance. If the causer 
(or, by means of attribution, the causer attributed responsibility) of a circumstance is 
identified/categorized or conceptualized by an actor/cognizer, his/her action planning 
possibilities are maximal in that nothing imponderable about that circumstance remains. 
Knowing the causer means knowing what he/she/it is capable of – what he/she/it affords. This 
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makes possible integrating these objects, or circumstances of these objects, into one’s action 
plans in terms of purposes (cf. sections 2.4 and 3.2.1.1). In contrast, putting purposes into 
effect involving objects whose circumstances are hardly or not at all calculable is difficult if 
not impossible. Now, causers and/or responsible persons temporally precede their effects, in 
the environment, in perception, and in conceptualization. Causers/responsible persons 
(literally or metaphorically) move and exert force. They are therefore mostly trajectors (but 
also landmarks in the case of inverse mappings with obtain, buy etc.). In both – conceptually 
motivated – cases they are diagrammatically coded as PSCs in German.  
 
Therefore, the preference for the PSC interpretation of the first ambiguous complement in 
German is actually an epiphenomenon of the preference for a cognitively deeply grounded 
(responsible) causer (subsequently called RCP for “(responsible) causer preference”).  
 
This is depicted in Figure 4.21. 
 
 
Figure 4.21: PSC preference as “(responsible) causer preference” 
 
I am not quite sure about the status of causers that are causally affected themselves. They are 
put in parentheses in Figure 4.21. When encountering the ambiguous NPs in ... dass das Korn 
das Huhn (lit. ‘that the grain the chicken’) the grain presumably does not satisfy the 
conditions for a (responsible) causer, while the avalanche in ... dass die Lawine die Berghütte 
(lit. ‘that the avalanche the mountain shelter’) presumably does. One reason could be that an 
avalanche is not perceived, identified/categorized, or conceptualized as being caused, while a 
grain is when it is moving – at least in relation to a chicken, i.e., regarding their mutual 
affordances.  
Together with the considerations about cognitive efficiency in section 4.1.3 above, this means 
that the actor/cognizer in general, and the incrementally interpreting person in particular, 
strive for simple monadic circumstances that are causally closed by a (responsible) causer. 
The present theory makes the prediction that this should in principle be a universally valid 
preference in that striving for the closure of circumstance concepts is basically perceptually 
grounded (in interplay with the cognitive make-up of the actor/cognizer). Variation may 
appear in the culturally constrained role of attribution that operates on spatio-temporal 
conceptualizations. There is evidence for this prediction from neurolinguistic data from 
typologically diverse languages. It seems to confirm that the way in which the first ambiguous 
NP encountered in the comprehension of an utterance is interpreted is connected with the PSC 
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only because the PSC is often associated with the agent role, or “prototypical actor”, as 
Bornkessel-Schlesewsky & Schlesewsky 2009b put it, adopting RRG terminology. I have 
attempted to reconstruct agentivity, or prototypical actorhood, here by means of attribution of 
responsibility (the notion of which I deduced independently from neurolinguistic data, namely 
from philosophical and socio-pragmatic considerations, and from social psychological 
insights; see sections 3.2.2 to 3.2.4). A person attributed responsibility and additionally 
identified as a causer (the concept of which I – again independently – deduced from the 
workings of sensation and identification) is closely related to what Bornkessel-Schlesewsky & 
Schlesewsky call a “prototypical actor”.  
 
 
4.2.2 Animacy and the RCP 
What the RCP can provide in incremental interpretation is the following: It makes possible 
that an interpreter “assigns” the referents of “incoming” complements to their “roles” in a 
circumstance concept even before he/she knows whether the predicted circumstance is 
adequate at all. The “roles” in a circumstance concept concern mainly those of trajector and 
landmark and of (responsible) causation.  In addition, what the interpreter does in incremental 
interpretation – namely using any available cue at any moment during comprehension to 
predict these matters – is also what he/she does if he/she is confronted with a globally 
ambiguous utterance, i.e., if the utterance leaves open the exact nature of the circumstance 
even if it is already completed: Then, the interpreter utilizes those non-formal cues that are 
particularly functionally charged in his/her language (in the sense of Bates et al. 1982, 
MacWhinney, Bates & Kliegl 1984; note that these are not models of incremental 
interpretation), thus suggesting a specific unambiguous conceptualization (and attribution) for 
a formally underspecified utterance. A famous notion that is supposed to play a particularly 
important role as a non-formal cue to disambiguation is that of animacy. Technically 
speaking, the notion of animacy is supposed to be involved primarily in several other 
typological observations that have been made throughout the last decades, concerning, for 
instance, case marking (cf. Comrie 1981), word order (cf. Stolz et al. 2008), subject selection 
(cf. van Valin & LaPolla 1997), and many others.  
However, animacy has mostly served as a cover term in the literature for something that 
defies a clear characterization. The difficulty lies in the fact that the observations are based on 
typologically quite stable oppositions that can be systematized along a scale or hierarchy, i.e., 
an animacy hierarchy. A possible formulation of the hierarchy is the following (cf. Silverstein 
1976, Comrie 1981, DeLancey 1981, Bickel 2010):  
 
(4.35)  1
st
 person pronoun ≥ 2nd person pronoun > 3rd person pronoun > proper noun 
 > human noun > animate noun > inanimate noun > count noun > mass noun > 
 abstract noun 
 
A glimpse at the hierarchy in (4.35) suffices for us to realize that the heading “animacy” 
hierarchy is somehow arbitrary. What we find is discourse-pragmatic notions (person), 
categorial notions (pronoun vs. noun), specificity/individuation notions (count vs. mass vs. 
abstract), and the eponymous semantic notions (human vs. animate vs. inanimate). In what 
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follows I will treat these notions separately. The present section deals with animacy in the 
strict sense, the following sections deal with the individuation and person notions, including 
the pronoun-noun difference. One more remark is in order. The formulations of the hierarchy 
in (4.35) and of the particulate scales following below are quite general. However, there are 
language- and culture-specific moldings of these scales, where, for instance, gods, cats, or 
celestial bodies may range between pronouns and proper nouns in (4.35). 
Empirical evidence for the utilization of animacy information for the decoding of utterances 
comes from the “competition model” (cf. Bates et al. 1982, MacWhinney, Bates & Kliegl 
1984). In this model, animacy is treated as a cue to the decoding of an utterance just like the 
formal cues discussed above – with the difference that it (mostly) has no formal expression. 
Functionally, it works similarly. Before clarifying how animacy accomplishes this, we must 
clarify what animacy actually is in its function as cover term for (4.35). In section 3.2.2.2 this 
question has already been touched. It has been stated there that we “understand” the actions of 
others (or not) and attribute purposes to them (or not) to the degree that they are similar to us, 
i.e., that they are capable and competent of doing the same things to the same ends as we do 
(see also Langacker 
2
2002: 248, Dahl 2008 for related proposals
176
).  
 
From this perspective the notion of animacy can be reduced to the notion of (supposed) 
similarity to the self with respect to the capability for purposeful action and means-end 
rationality.  
 
This is also the rationale behind the fact that “human” and “animate” can both be found in the 
above hierarchy. The relevant animacy sub-scale of the “animacy” hierarchy is thus the one 
given in (4.36). 
 
(4.36) human > non-human animate > inanimate 
 
I think animacy can be characterized as an instantiation of the (responsible) causer preference 
in the following sense: In previous sections (see sec. 3.2.1.2) it has been noted that what 
stimuli top-down afford to actors/cognizers depends crucially on the salient features of the 
former and on what is pertinent to the latter. The salience of stimuli serves mainly to sustain 
our well-being in that it helps detect things moving in our environments and potentially 
threatening us, while pertinence is most closely related to planning action und realizing 
purposes. Through the frequent co-occurrence of particular features in particular things they 
may especially afford particular circumstances to us. It can now easily be shown how this 
relates to animacy and the present context: Human “things” are highly salient in that they 
nearly always move without an observable cause. They are thus hardly calculable for us. At 
the same time they are very often highly pertinent to us in that they are important in our 
putting purposes into effect which makes their calculability maximally desirable. It is also 
very likely if not certain that they pursue their own purposes that might conflict with our own. 
Something similar is true for non-human but animate beings. The difference between animals 
and humans lies in the fact that we inter“act” less often with the former, that domesticated 
animals are quite well controllable, that they seldom pursue purposes conflicting with our 
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 As mentioned ealier: In contrast to these proposals, I attempt an action-theoretic grounding of this hierarchy. 
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own, and so on. Finally, inanimate things hardly ever move, thus hardly ever threaten us, do 
not interfere with our purposes, and are quite well calculable. The particulate animacy scale 
leading from human animates over non-human animates to inanimates can thus be read from 
left to right as a decrease in the likeliness of an object to be a (responsible) causer. However, 
in incremental interpretation or in the interpretation of a (globally) formally underspecified 
utterance the interpreter strives for closing the circumstance at the “front end” in terms of the 
RCP. An NP referent unlikely to be a (responsible) causer of a circumstance forces the 
interpreter to further look out for the “real” (responsible) causer, causing an additional 
cognitive load. In other words, the degree of animacy of an object correlates with the 
probability that it closes a circumstance at the “front end”. 
Now, how does this psychological observation aid the interpretation of formally 
underspecified utterances? Animacy information is simply one aspect of what affordances 
accomplish in interpretation. Affordances may specify in interpretation what is formally 
underspecified. Animacy demonstrates this in that human “things” afford circumstances 
different from non-human animate and inanimate things.  
 
This results in an interpretation maxim that could be formulated as follows: If formal cues do 
not suffice for determining which complement referent is the (responsible) causer, trajector, 
or landmark, then act on the assumption that it is the most animate complement referent 
available. 
 
 
4.2.3 Individuation and the RCP 
Extracting individuation information from the “animacy” hierarchy in (4.35) yields a sub-
scale consisting of the following units: 
 
(4.37) individuated > non-individuated > abstract  
 
These units concern percepts and concepts. Individuated are those stimuli in perception that 
are figure-apt, e.g. an apple or five apples. In other words, objects are individuated. They 
correspond to count nouns on the animacy hierarchy. In constrast, locations are not 
individuated, e.g., the grass in which the apples are lying. But when they become spatially 
delimited, locations can also be treated as objects, since delimitation is accompanied by 
becoming figure-apt, e.g., as a cluster of blades of grass. Non-individuated, but nevertheless 
perceivable stimuli correspond to mass nouns on the animacy hierarchy. Abstract “things” 
concern perception and conception only in a negative sense. They are neither unique percepts 
nor unique concepts. Abstract expressions, as they occur in the “animacy” hierarchy, may 
they be words or phrases, are exploitations and as such instances of hypostatization or 
compression. In other words, it is not things that are abstract. Guilt, justice, evenings, or 
unemployment are not things but words for multiple conceptualizations plus attributions. 
Concerning the role of individuation for the decoding of utterances, it works analogously to 
animacy (in the strict sense). The particulate individuation scale leading from individuate over 
non-individuate contents of perception and conceptualization to abstract circumstances can be 
read from left to right as a decrease in the likeliness of an object to be a (responsible) causer.  
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And analogously, this results in an interpretation maxim that could be formulated as follows: 
If formal cues do not suffice for determining which complement referent is the (responsible) 
causer, trajector, or landmark, then act on the assumption that it is the most individuated 
complement referent available.
177
 
 
 
4.2.4 Person and the RCP 
In a face-to-face verbal interaction, saying I read books is an instruction for conceptualizing 
me reading books for my interlocutor, i.e., “the you” of my verbal contribution. Hearing I, my 
interlocutor refers this to me, the locutor, and not to himself, although he/she would also utter 
I, if he/she was uttering something with him/her as PSC. We both refer to others in the same 
manner, however, i.e., the referring expression does not change reference in dependence of 
whether I or you are using it. The otherness of the other is constituted by his/her/its non-
attendance to the (face-to-face) verbal interaction which requires joint (visual) attention. 
He/she/it is no a speech act participant (SAP; cf. DeLancey 1981). This is depicted in Figure 
4.22. The dotted lines symbolize the visual fields of the interlocutors and the other. The fact 
that the interlocutors find themselves in each others’ visual fields shall indicate that they 
exhibit joint attention. The fact that the other person who the interlocutors are conceptualizing 
also has something in its visual field but that he/she is absent indicates that he/she cannot 
participate in the verbal interaction in terms of joint attention.  
  
 
Figure 4.22: Asymmetry between SAP and non-SAP 
 
The asymmetry between SAPs and non-SAPs is captured in the “animacy” hierarchy in terms 
of first, second, and third person pronouns. The particulate scale is from the perspective of the 
referents is thus the one in (4.38). 
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 It shall not be concealed that it is one function of determiners – a formal unit – to mark individuation. 
Notwithstanding, individuation is treated here as a non-formal cue, since definiteness, as marked by determiners, 
has a very prominent second function, namely marking the parameters “mentioned earlier” or “not mentioned 
earlier” (cf. Dik 1997). Information structure is not the topic of this book, however. It seemed more appropriate 
to me to treat the semantic part of definiteness as a non-formal cue than as a formal cue which would have made 
it necessary to differentiate the formal contributions of individuation and information structure which seems 
illusory to me. 
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(4.38) referent of I ≥ referent of you > other referents 
 
Tying in with the ideas presented above, one can evaluate what the significance of these 
notions is for decoding underspecified utterances. I have argued that actors/cognizers strive 
for maximizing the predictability of circumstances, and that it is most effective to determine 
the (responsible) causer of a circumstance as fast as possible, or, in terms of incremental 
interpretation, as early as possible, given the incoming data. It seems obvious then that it is 
highly more pertinent for an interpreter when he/she hears his/her interlocutor utter Ich… ‘I’ 
than when he/she hears him/her utter er/sie/es… ‘he/she/it’. The referents of both Ich and 
er/sie/es are potential (responsible) causers the affordances/circumstances of whom need to be 
calculated, but the interpreter is immediately affected by this, when it is his/her vis-à-vis 
interlocutor in his/her close environment than when it is some detached other person or thing. 
The significance of the referent of you, uttered by the interlocutor, is hard to evaluate but it 
seems plausible to assume that the interpreter has a considerably greater interest in being a 
(responsible) causer than in being affected by a (responsible) causer. 
The particulate person scale leading from the referent of I over the referent of you to other 
referents can be read from left to right as a decrease in the pertinence for the interpreter of an 
object to be a (responsible) causer.  
 
And analogously, this results in an interpretation maxim that could be formulated as follows: 
If formal cues do not suffice for determining which complement referent is the (responsible) 
causer, trajector, or landmark, then act on the assumption that it is a speech act participant. 
 
 
4.2.5 Empathy and the RCP 
The only notion that has not yet been extracted from the “animacy” hierarchy into a 
particulate scale is that of proper noun. The particulate scale that comes to my mind is that of 
empathy (cf. Kuno & Kaburaki 1977). Adapted to the present context it states that the 
interpreter is empathic mostly with himself, then with kin, then with persons he/she calls by 
their name, and then with others.  
 
(4.39) self > kin ≥ person > others 
 
It is not possible to separate empathy properly from the particulate animacy scale, the person 
scale, and the individuation scale. This is also the reason why sometimes the “animacy” 
hierarchy as a whole is termed “empathy” hierarchy (e.g., Lehmann 1998). I am not sure 
whether empathy as it is formulated in (4.39) above serves as a cue to the disambiguation of 
underspecified structures similarly to animacy, individuation etc. This awaits empirical 
research. It is conceivable, however, that the scale can be read from left to right not as a 
decrease in the likeliness of an object to be a (responsible) causer but as a decrease in the 
calculability of the referents given that they are (responsible) causers. I am most certain about 
my own acts, I am quite certain about the acts of the persons nearest to me, less certain about 
the persons I know more or less well, and least certain about those I do not know.  
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The tentative interpretation maxim is the following: If formal cues do not suffice for 
determining which complement referent is the (responsible) causer, trajector, or landmark, 
then act on the assumption that it is the one you are most empathic with.  
 
 
 
4.3 Linking in performance  
 
All sub-competences listed in the introduction to part I have now been assembled. Broadly, 
these are actional, perceptual, and conceptual competences. It is time to demonstrate how the 
linking competence is applied to utterances in interpretation, how it shows up in the 
verbalization of concepts, and how the sub-competences get utilized. 
For the sake of clarity, the following subsection summarizes certain relevant aspects of the 
linking competence that are widespread through this work.  
 
 
4.3.1 Motivated construction-conceptualization mappings 
Relying on diagrammatic iconicity, according to which syntactic constructions reflect object 
concepts and the circumstances between them in a quite regular manner, the following 
schematics depict what actors/cognizers know about regular conceptualization-syntactic 
construction mappings. The constructions are the most important and most frequent ones 
taken from German. Motivated mapping has thus far been demonstrated using the example of 
the NPnom-V-P-NPobl construction (see sections 3.3.2 and subsequently). This is repeated here:  
 
 
Figure 4.23: Motivated mapping 
 
In what follows, the motivated mapping mechanism is demonstrated quite generally by 
applying it to the other constructions. Additionally, case information is also taken into 
account. Concerning agreement morphology, the nominative complement – as PSC in 
German – also agrees with the verb in person and number categories.  
Some comments are in order before demonstrating the linking schemas. In particular, there 
are several variables that cannot be depicted simultaneously but that are of crucial importance 
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for the linking competence: Firstly, the following linking schemas depict motivated linkings 
which I consider the cognitive anchor in producing and comprehending instances of 
exploiting utterances. Secondly, circumstances can be conceptualized egocentrically or 
allocentrically which is not depicted here. Thirdly, the whole temporal grounding is 
aggregated in these schematics. They are considered to apply to simple as well as to complex 
circumstances. Fourth, the whole theory put forward here treats verbs and their conceptual 
correlates (which are actually neglected because they manifest only in objects) obviously 
“like a red-headed stepchild”. The question of what is necessary to be able to link signals with 
conceptualizations was answered mainly by recourse to object concepts. Agreement 
morphology on the verb alone played a role as well as the sporadic mentioning of the 
lexicalization type of a verb. The importance of the latter shall be emphasized here. In fact, 
the verb loses something of its pivotal role in syntax, more precisely in incremental 
interpretation, to the power of affordances but it often remains pivotal in syntax in relation to 
the complements (see section 3.5) in definitely determining the nature of a circumstance. 
What actors/cognizers need to know in order to be able to link a verb to a conceptualization 
properly is the following: 
 
 the lexicalization type (Is the trajector or the landmark the PSC?), 
 whether it codes responsibility lexically, 
 (the spatial-conceptual structure it codes (which is already rather a feature of 
 the involved objects; see secton 3.5)). 
 
This can be exemplified using the verb herunterwerfen ‘knock over/throw down’. I am not 
quite sure whether this verb codes responsibility definitively or not. In Figure 4.24 below it is 
taken into consideration, at least. 
 
 
Figure 4.24: Instruction for conceptualization for herunterwerfen ‘knock over/throw down’ 
 
Computational and/or generative theories call this a lexical entry. I would rather treat it as a 
highly routinized action schema, employing the higher-order forms of learning: Under certain 
conditions a speaker actualizes this action schema, namely either by building up a particular 
conceptualization when hearing a form of the word, or by uttering it as a consequence of the 
same conceptualization. The shaded and dotted trajector and (object) landmark symbols 
indicate that they must be conceptualized first in order to instantiate, or constitute the 
circumstance designated by the verb.  
Sixth, the directions of motion/movement in the schematics are exemplary. They need not 
necessarily be shaped that way but may vary. 
Below, the first construction is depicted. 
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Figure 4.25: NPnom-V construction 
 
In the case of the regular motivated mapping a simple monadic circumstance is coded by the 
construction in Figure 4.25. As discussed in previous sections, this construction is highly 
homonymous because the single NP can code a high number of differentiations (see Figure 
4.2 in section 4.1.1). 
Figure 4.26 depicts one instance of a dyadic circumstance in which a dative complement 
codes symmetric bi-directionality (as in ähneln ‘resemble’). It is a placeholder here for the 
regular linkings of datives in dyadic circumstances in general (see section 4.1.6.2). The 
landmark referents in these constructions are mostly objects, not locations, because they often 
“oppose” the trajector which frequently correlates with animacy.  
 
 
Figure 4.26: The NPnom-V-NPdat construction 
 
Another rather homonymous construction is the one in Figure 4.27. It captures all cases of 
non- or uni-directionality in the relation between two objects. Here too the landmark is mostly 
an object, since it often holistically affected (see section 3.4.7 and 4.1.3 on holistic objects 
and their relation to NPs and PPs). 
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Figure 4.27: The NPnom-V-NPacc construction 
 
The same is not true for the construction in Figure 4.28, where the circumstance between 
trajector and landmark involves a path. The landmark may be an object (e.g., Alex jumps 
against the wall) or a location (e.g., Alex jumps into the water). The subscript under the 
landmark coding NP indicates that the case (i.e., oblique) is not motivated by the same 
rationale as in the cases where there are no paths in the conceptualization. The rules for case 
governed by verbs are included in sections 4.3.2, 4.3.3, and in section 4.1.6.2 on the dative. 
 
 
Figure 4.28: The NPnom-V-P-NPobl construction 
 
The construction in Figure 4.29 is the famous, so-called double object construction. It was 
discussed in some detail in the section on the dative (section 4.1.6.2). It serves as a 
placeholder here for all polysemous instances of this construction. The Figure below 
compresses the sub-parts of the triadic circumstance. Actually, the trajector first acts on the 
accusative referent with the consequence that it moves towards the dative referent who moves 
towards to accusative referent which qualifies it for bearing dative case. 
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Figure 4.29: The NPnom-V-NPdat-NPacc construction 
 
The so-called prepositional object construction in Figure 4.30 below is known to concur with 
the double object construction as the verbalization for supposedly similar conceptualizations. 
Its mapping conceptual onto syntactic units looks quite straightforward – which is due to the 
compression of its actual complexity into the schematic. The conceptual (and partially 
actional) differences to the above construction have been demonstrated in section 4.1.6.2. In 
brief, the physically and actionally contingent involvement of the oblique NP referent does 
not qualify it for bearing dative case. The alternation between this and the former construction 
will be addressed in section 4.4.4. 
 
 
Figure 4.30: The NPnom-V-NPacc-P-NPobl construction 
 
The variant of the “prepositional object construction” with a dative complement is given in 
Figure 4.31. The dative is motivated quite predictably. We have here conceptual object that 
acts purposefully towards some landmark and which is accompanied by a trajector who is at 
the same time directed towards the other actor and the landmark of the other actor (e.g., Alex 
follows the woman into the store). This schematic compresses an actually more complex 
circumstance into one.  
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Figure 4.31: The NPnom-V-NPdat-P-NPobl construction 
 
The last construction illustrates the linking in an alternative manner. It shall be representative 
of all verbs that lexicalize their landmark expression as PSC (verbs of the types of have, buy, 
receive, obtain etc.). This has been discussed in section 3.3.2 by means of the example I have 
a headache. 
 
 
Figure 4.32: Inverted mapping/alternative lexicalization 
(exemplified by means of NPnom-V-NPacc construction) 
 
 
4.3.2 The utterance as instruction – obeying the instruction 
In what follows I attempt to outline the conceptual and actional work of an actor/cognizer 
from hearing an utterance to having built up a conceptualization (plus attribution) of that 
utterance. I will use a single example by which the general mechanisms will nevertheless be 
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considered. The example chosen is that from sections 1.3 and 2.2.4 in Part I. It is repeated 
here as (4.40). 
 
 
(4.40) The three-year-old twins Jessica and Nicole are at dinner with their parents Sarah and 
Marc. Nicole reaches for the milk carton. She grips it only with her fingertips, causing it to 
fall down. It falls off the table and runs all over the floor. Jessica and her mother have kept 
track of what happened. 
 
(a)  Jessica: Nicole             hat                die          Milch runtergeworfen. 
  Nicole.3NOM have.3AUX the.ACC milk  down-throw.PTCP 
  ‘Nicole knocked over the milk.’ 
 
 Sarah: (hesitating, looking at the surprised causer) 
(b)  Nein, sie            ist            ihr           runtergefallen. 
  No    it.3NOM be.3AUX her.DAT down-fall.PTCP 
  ‘No, (it happened to her that) it fell down.’ 
 
 Jessica: … (not signalling misunderstanding) 
 
 
Jessica’s and Sarah’s utterances are verbalizations of what they have just perceived. My 
specific proposal is that they have arrived at similar conceptualizations of the sensed 
circumstance, where their attributions then diverge (see section 3.2). In what follows I will 
“vivisect” their cognitive activities using the theoretical notions developed throughout this 
work. The overall strategy is viewing an utterance as an instruction to simulate a perception, 
made possible by the regular mapping between conceptualization and syntactic structure 
outlined in sections 3.3 and 3.4. The interpretation activities described below can be viewed 
as happening from the perspective of one of the above interlocutors, or from your perspective 
as a reader. In the first case the utterance is an instruction for a re-evaluation of what has just 
been perceived, in the latter case it is an instruction for a conceptualization in the absence of a 
percept. Consequently, the instruction is formulated as an instruction to the interpreter.
178
 
 
Step (1): Establish the overall setting by making use of the grammatical information (word 
category, person and agreement information) in the uttered (in a step-by-step manner) 
material. 
(a) Build up a conceptual field (as a simulation of a visual field). 
(b) Determine your relation as conceptualizer and the relation of the speaker relative 
to the circumstance coded by the utterance (egocentric vs. allocentric space). 
 
Jessica’s utterance:  
                                                 
178
 In what follows interpreter, perceiver, and conceptualizer are used interchangeably. 
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Step (1) concerns the relationship between the interpreter and the circumstance coded 
by the utterance, as it is built up through the utterance. Any perceptual event, either 
real or simulated, involves a viewer whose visual field encloses a limited number or 
amount of stimuli (1a). Secondly, what happens in the environment in the visual field 
can either involve the interpreter or speaker in that it is spatially related to him/her or 
both (egocentric space) or it may be independent of him/her or both such that stimuli 
are spatially related only to one another (allocentric space). 
The overall setting of the circumstance coded is such that the interpreter decodes it as 
taking place allocentrically. In other words, because of their forms (3
rd
 person NPs) 
Nicole and the milk are specified relative to each other but not to the conceptualizer. 
This is depicted in Figure 4.33. 
 
Sarah’s utterance:  
– see  Jessica’s utterance –  
 
 
 
Figure 4.33: Establish the overall setting 
 
Step (2): Identify object (NP) and circumstance (V, P) expressions and conceptualize 
referents in dependence of the order in which expressions are uttered/heard. 
(a) Identify object expression(s) (NPs) and evaluate the features and affordances of 
the referent object(s). 
(b) Identify circumstance expression (V, P) and extract the features and affordances 
of the objects that constitute it. 
(c) Determine the construction underlying the utterance (see last section for the most 
important construction types in German). 
(d) Try to establish the regular conceptualization-syntactic structure mapping in 
accordance to diagrammatic iconicity (see section 3.3). 
 
Jessica’s utterance:  
Step (2) has to take place on basis of the same expressions as step (1), namely NP 
and V. Nevertheless, it cannot be completed until the establishment of the overall 
setting. In particular, the interpreter sequentially encounters the NP Nicole, the verb 
hat, the NP die Milch, and the participle heruntergeworfen. This is then an instance 
of a (bare) NP-V-NP construction (leaving case and agreement morphology open for 
now). Nicole refers to an animate human being that affords movement (i.e., self-
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initiated activity) and exertion of force in any human-like manner (going, rolling, 
diving, pushing, pulling, grasping, bumping etc.) and in any direction that the human 
body allows (either moving as a whole or being stationary, moving only limbs), and 
she is in principle competent of action. 
Hat is unambiguously a verb because of its form; it is ambiguous between a lexical 
possession verb and an auxiliary. Ignoring tense and aspect here,
179
 both possible 
functions of hat involve aspects of activity/process, the latter potentially even 
responsibility (cf. Keller & Sorace 2003 and section 4.4.2). Note that circumstances 
are constituted by nothing but objects. A circumstance expression is the instruction to 
conceptualize some object in the first instance at which the circumstance can 
constitute itself. So the conceptualization of hat is possible only on the basis of the 
conceptualization of at least one object. This object ideally affords movement 
(activity) or motion (process) and possibly exertion of force, if hat is identified as an 
auxiliary, or it necessarily affords possession (i.e., holding something, see section 
3.3.2), if it is identified as a lexical verb. Milch might refer to an individuated object 
or some non-individuated mass (i.e., location). The determiner points to the former, 
i.e., to a delimited mass, making it an object (which might nevertheless function here 
as a location landmark). Die Milch then metonymically refers to a glass or carton 
filled with milk and affords only externally caused motion in manners that its 
physical makeup allows (lie, stand, fall, drain off, drink etc.) and in directions in 
which it is caused to move. It also affords exertion of force if it is itself causally 
affected. The final complex verb form (indicated by the -ge-…-en form with attached 
prepositional adverb) instructs the interpreter to conceptualize a circumstance in 
which a movable object moves away from another movable object that must afford 
exertion of force and most probably lexically required responsibility. This verb 
lexicalizes the trajector of the circumstance as PSC (which corresponds to the regular 
mapping established in section 3.3). The affordances of the involved objects and the 
instructions that the circumstance expressions make are given in Figures 4.34a to 
4.34e below. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.34a: Affordances of Nicole 
 
 
 
Figure 4.34b: Affordances of the 
milk 
 
  
 
                                                 
179
 Tense is not the topic of this book. Aspect is discussed in connection with objects, specifically with 
landmarks (see sections 3.4.6, 3.4.7, and 3.4.8 for details). 
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Figure 4.34c: Instructions coded in hat 
(auxiliary) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.34d: Instructions coded in 
hat (lexical verb) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.34e: Instructions coded in heruntergeworfen 
 
The schematics for the circumstance expressions contain shaded and dotted trajector 
and landmark symbols. This indicates the primacy of objects in conceptualization. 
The respective circumstance cannot be conceptualized without conceptualizing 
objects first. However, it can already be seen in the above Figures that it is the 
objects that are candidates for exactly these roles, as those objects at which the 
circumstances constitute themselves. 
 
Sarah’s utterance: 
The interpreter does nearly the same things as in Jessica’s utterance. What is 
different is the order in which he/she encounters the phrases, the pronoun forms for 
the full NPs, and the lexicalization of the motion pattern by means of 
heruntergefallen and ist. The difference between heruntergeworfen and 
heruntergefallen is that of causativization. While the former verbalizes a 
circumstance with a (responsible) causer, the latter does not necessarily. The 
auxiliary ist is less likely to code a causative circumstance but more likely to code a 
complex circumstance (cf. Keller & Sorace 2003 and section 4.4.2). The copula 
instructs the interpreter to specify some feature or location of an object. The 
circumstance concepts are given in Figure 4.35a to 4.35c. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.35a: Instructions coded in 
ist (copula) 
 
 
Figure 4.35b: Instructions coded in ist 
(auxiliary) 
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Figure 4.35c: Instructions coded in heruntergefallen 
 
Step (3): Link parts of the conceptualization to parts of the construction. 
(a) Identify mutual affordances of involved objects. 
(b) Distribute trajector and landmark (predictively, incrementally) using any 
available clues: mutual affordances of the objects, lexicalization type of the verb 
(trajector or landmark as PSC), formal cues (construction, phrase order, agreement 
and case morphology), non-formal cues (animacy, individuation, person, empathy; 
in short: enact RCP). 
(c) Conceptualize spatio-temporal circumstance between trajector and landmark 
objects and link them to object and circumstance expressions in the construction.  
(i) Identify nominative case on the object being PSC, using information about 
the verb’s lexicalization type and the trajector/landmark distribution of the 
present circumstance. 
(ii) Identify accusative case on the other object, if it stands in a relation of 
non-directional or uni-directional fictive or concrete motion/movement to the 
PSC trajector/landmark. 
(iii) Identify dative case on the other object, if it stands in a relation of 
asymmetric or symmetric bi-directional or coincident directional fictive or 
concrete motion/movement to the PSC trajector/landmark and/or in a relation 
of internal actional involvement to the whole circumstance (see section 
4.1.6.2). 
(iv) If there are prepositional, incorporated, particle, or adverbial path or 
location expressions, they govern the case of the respective landmark 
expression; 
- the path expression governs dative case in simple relations (jmd. wohnt 
unter der Brücke ‘s.o. lives under the bridge.DAT’), 
- the path expression governs dative case in complex relations with 
verbs lexicalizing landmarks as PSCs, where the dative bearer is starting 
point of the path (jmd. bekommt etw. von jmd. ‘s.o. gets sth. from 
s.o.DAT’), 
- the path expression governs accusative case in complex relations with 
verbs lexicalizing trajectors as PSCs, where the accusative bearer is end 
point of the path (jmd. schickt etw. an jmd. ‘s.o. sends sth. to s.o.ACC’). 
 (d) Predict minimal constructions (Make your conceptualization as parsimonious as 
possible). 
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(e) Maximize prediction (Use any cue at any moment in order to be maximally 
accurate in your prediction).
180
 
 
Jessica’s utterance:  
Predicting minimal constructions and maximizing predictions, the interpreter will 
predict a simple monadic activity when encountering Nicole and continue to do so 
when encountering hat, interpreting this as an auxiliary, e.g., Nicole hat getanzt 
‘Nicole danced’. Interpreting hat as lexical verb would violate the minimal 
construction principle (since it requires another object). Encountering die Milch leads 
to a modification of the prediction of hat as auxiliary. The isolated affordances of 
Nicole and the milk are now reduced to the mutual affordances that hold exclusively 
between Nicole and the milk: The options for monadic activities and processes fall 
away. The simplest circumstance between both would then be that of the one having 
the other. hat would then be treated as a lexical verb meaning ‘have at one’s 
disposal’. This verb lexicalizes the landmark as PSC. Other, less simple options 
would be one object moving to or causally affecting the other one. Even less simple 
would be circumstances like those discussed in the dative sections (those of bi-
directonal motion/movement or internal actional interest). In both cases hat would be 
treated as auxiliary. The question is then which of the mutual affordances is 
actualized. Formal and non-formal cues could help maximize the prediction.  
 
 phrase 
order 
possible case 
category 
agreement 
(verb: hat 
have.3SG) 
first complement 
(PSC preference) 
Nicole 
Nicole.3SG 
free nom, dat, acc possible yes 
die Milch 
the milk.3SG 
free nom, acc possible no 
Table 4.2: Formal cues in Nicole hat die Milch… ‘Nicole has (…) the milk (…)’ 
 
Obviously, formal cues are not informative here (case syncretism, ambiguous 
agreement, free phrase order) as to which circumstance holds between both objects 
and which is the trajector/landmark distribution. (Note that the construction is 
already exploited as a formal cue at this point in that it has already caused the 
reduction of two isolated affordance evaluations to the evaluation of mutual 
affordances between the two objects. The phrase type in which the noun expression 
occurs – NP or PP – can only serve as a cue here in a restricted sense, since there is 
no PP. All nouns will thus be excluded as landmarks of motion/movement paths). 
Only the fact that Nicole is the first phrase may lead to the prediction of its being the 
PSC. Employing non-formal cues, then, it turns out that all scale information point to 
                                                 
180
 See Newmeyer’s (2002) commentary on Hawkins (2002). Newmeyer claims that there are two possible 
interpretations of Hawkins’s “Maximize On-line Processing”, only one of which involves prediction of what is 
yet to come. It is this interpretation which is crucial for my own proposal. The importance of prediction is also 
emphasized by Primus 2002 and is central part of neurolinguistic theories of sentence comprehension (cf. 
Bornkessel & Schlesewsky’s (2006 and subsequent “extended Argument Dependency Model (eADM)”). 
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the fact that Nicole is the object that ideally closes the circumstance at the front end. 
This is illustrated in Table 4.3: 
 
animacy human non-human 
animate 
inanimate  
Nicole  
the milk 
x   
x 
 
 
individuation individuated non-
individuated 
abstract  
Nicole 
the milk 
x 
x 
   
 
 
person referent of I referent of 
you 
other 
referents 
 
Nicole  
the milk 
  x 
x 
 
 
 
empathy self kin person others 
Nicole  
the milk 
  x  
 
 
Table 4.3: Non-formal cues in Nicole hat die Milch… ‘Nicole has (…) the milk (…)’ 
 
Respecting formal and non-formal cues, and predicting minimal constructions, 
Nicole will then be interpreted as possessor of the milk and thus the landmark and 
PSC (yielding Nicole hat die Milch. ‘Nicole has the milk.’), in accordance to the 
exceptional but motivated instructions of hat (PSC is landmark).
181
 Nicole is 
therefore identified to bear (morphologically null) nominative case. This fits also the 
affordances of the milk as a movable object that finds its place in space through 
movements of persons. The milk in this circumstance does not satisfy the conditions 
on bearing dative case but that for bearing accusative case. So die Milch is identified 
as bearing accusative case. Not predicting Nicole but the milk to be the PSC leads to 
the cognitive disadvantage that the interpreter must predict further lexical material, 
since the milk having Nicole is not a possible circumstance. The incremental 
conceptualization is thus the one in Figure 4.36. 
 
                                                 
181
 In principle, the intonational contour of Nicole hat die Milch may indicate whether this utterance is finished 
after Milch or not. A falling intonation contour on Milch would indicate the end of the utterance and thus the 
possessive meaning. But crucially, the possessive construction need not have a falling intonation because it could 
be complemented by an adverbial phrase like schon wieder ‘again’. This is the reason Nicole hat die Milch… can 
be (falsely) predicted to be a possessive construction in incremental interpretation, although it does not exhibit a 
falling intonation on Milch. 
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Figure 4.36: Nicole predicted to be landmark PSC and die Milch ‘the milk’ to be 
accusative trajector of hat ‘has’ as lexical verb, yielding Nicole hat die Milch 
‘Nicole has the milk’ 
 
When encountering runtergeworfen, the concept must be fundamentally modified. 
The verb instructs the interpreter to conceptualize a (responsible) causer/mover 
trajector as PSC. While formal cues remain uninformative, only Nicole affords 
movement and exertion of force against something in order to make it move 
downwards – which is the motion pattern the verb instructs the interpreter to 
conceptualize. Reanalysis of hat as auxiliary could also point to Nicole as the object 
exerting force, i.e., being the PSC of hat, due to her non-formally induced high 
prominence. The only trajector candidate in this circumstance is thus Nicole who 
perfectly satisfies the RCP. Reanalysis requires a new trajector/landmark distribution 
in relation to the possessive relation formerly predicted, then. The result is the 
conceptualization in Figure 4.37. The motivation of die Milch for bearing accusative 
case has now changed from a non-directional relation with hat as the lexical verb to a 
uni-directional relation with runtergeworfen as the lexical verb. 
 
 
Figure 4.37 Nicole conceptualized to be trajector PSC and die Milch ‘the milk’ to be 
accusative landmark of in ‘knocking over’ circumstance, yielding Nicole hat die 
Milch runtergeworfen ‘Nicole knocked over the milk’. Note that two sub-parts are 
compressed here in one schematic, namely that of Nicole exerting force against the 
milk and that of the milk falling down. 
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Sarah’s utterance:  
Encountering sie, which is ambiguous between being coreferent with Nicole or die 
Milch and between nominative and accusative case, the interpreter will strive at 
closing the circumstance as fast as possible, thereby enacting the RCP. He/she will 
thus interpret sie as nominative, PSC and referring to Nicole (topic continuity may 
also play a role here) and predict it to be involved in a simple monadic circumstance  
involving activity in which Nicole can in the optimal case be attributed responsibility 
(see Jessica’s utterance for an example). When encountering ist, this prediction can 
be maintained only partially. The interpreter can either switch to a circumstance 
which does not involve movement and responsibility (predicting a predicative 
construction coding some featural specification of Nicole, like Sie ist müde ‘She is 
tired’), in which Nicole remains nominative PSC and closes the circumstance less 
satisfyingly; or the interpreter predicts a more complex and/or dyadic circumstance 
and construction (like Sie ist aufgestanden ‘She got up’), allowing him/her to further 
treat Nicole as responsible mover. Whatever the interpreter chooses to do, he/she will 
have to modify his/her conceptualization when encountering ihr. Assuming the 
dative complement is not an ancient form (like in nähern ‘approach’, coding an Indo-
European locative) but a synchronically motivated one like those discussed in section 
4.1.6.2, it is very likely to have an animate referent in order to exhibit fictive or 
concrete motion/movement and/or being actionally involved in the circumstance. 
This featural requirement cannot be satisfied by the milk. The circumstance will thus 
be reanalysed towards one in which sie bears nominative case and refers to the milk, 
is PSC, and moves towards the dative referent, now identified as Nicole, which 
moves either against the motion of the milk carton or is internally actionally involved 
in the circumstance of the milk carton in terms of goals and interests. I would assume 
the prediction is one in which Nicole is physically involved, since this increases the 
chances of the interpreter to have the circumstance closed in accordance to the RCP. 
In any case the interpreter will now expect a simple dyadic relation – the most 
parsimonious prediction. This prediction must again be dismissed when encountering 
heruntergefallen which codes a complex monadic relation. However, the interpreter 
has encountered two complements already, and is now forced to identify the trajector 
of the falling circumstance as the milk – because of its nominative case marking 
which overrides non-formal cues. The dative referent can now be conceptualized – in 
accordance to the dative discussion above – as one who causes the falling of the milk 
by exerting force against it, but where this causation opposes her current goals or 
interests. Spatio-temporally, this conceptualization differs from the one underlying 
Jessica’s utterance only in terms of vantage point. It is given in Figure 4.38. (Note 
that the milk is the trajector in the falling event but the landmark in Nicole’s exerting 
force against it. Figure 4.38 compresses these two sub-parts of the circumstance, 
such that the milk is depicted here only as landmark.) 
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Figure 4.38: Conceptualization of Nicole as internally actionally involved trajector 
and of die Milch ‘the milk’ as accusative landmark of ‘knocking over’ circumstance, 
yielding Nicole hat die Milch runtergeworfen ‘Nicole knocked over the milk’. Note 
that two the two sub-parts of this whole circumstance are compressed here into one 
schematic, namely the sub-part of Nicole exerting force against the milk (where the 
milk is landmark) and that of the milk falling down (where it is trajector). 
 
Although the interpreter employed different strategies in incrementally 
conceptualizing circumstances from the two utterances, he/she has arrived at spatio-
temporally identical conceptualizations. If this was the whole story, the verbal 
interaction above would be quite strange, since both utterances were options of one 
another, making Sara’s objection to Jessica’s utterance inadequate. However, the 
central claim of the present proposal is that this is not the whole story. It has been 
argued extensively in section 3.2 that conceptualizations as simulated perceptions are 
underspecified with respect to certain parameters, especially actional ones 
concerning attribution. The above dialogue is thus the paradigmatic case of a single 
percept, spatio-temporally similar concepts but two verbalizations with nevertheless 
different semantics (i.e., conceptualization plus attribution) which are both 
potentially appropriate utterances, given some non-objective conditions are satisfied. 
 
 
Step (4): Make attributions in accordance to the attributional praxis you are participating in. 
(a) Check whether attributions are lexically enforced. If yes, re-enact the attribution.  
(b) If it is not lexically enforced, evaluate the attribution by yourself.  
(i) Identify the objects with respect to which attribution is available. 
(ii) Identify the parameter setting of the determining and determined 
parameters (see section 3.2 for details). 
(iii) Attribute responsibility or refrain from attributing responsibility by means 
of imposing it on the spatio-temporal conceptualization of the circumstance in 
question. 
((c) After having re-enacted the attribution, having obeyed (a), re-evaluate it by 
obeying (b (i) to (iii))). 
 
Jessica’s utterance:  
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In this circumstance, Nicole is the only object of conceptualization that can also be 
an object of attribution. In Jessica’s utterance attribution of responsibility indeed 
seems to be lexically enforced, i.e., the PSC of runterwerfen is most likely a 
responsible causer. The interpreter is thus forced to re-enact this attribution, since 
this is a precondition for understanding the utterance.  
The interpreter has only insight into the result of the Jessica’s attribution (the verb 
runtergeworfen), but not into the parameter setting by which she was led to make it. 
Knowing each other well might make this possible. Given that Jessica and Nicole are 
twins, the parameter setting in Jessica’s attribution could have been the following, 
i.e., Jessica could have closed the circumstance in question in the following way.  
 
parameter actor/observer 
difference 
 disposition/situation 
attribution 
setting Jessica = observer 
 
 disposition  
parameter  accomplishment/ 
misaccomplishment 
difference 
 cause/reason attribution 
setting circumstance = 
misaccomplishment 
 reason  
parameter  sympathy/antipathy 
(empathy) difference 
 credit/blame attribution 
setting antipathy (low 
empathy) 
 blame  
 
    
→ This parameter setting corresponds to scenario F from section 3.2.3.  
The person involved in this circumstance is attributed responsibility for 
what he/she has brought about. 
Figure 4.39: Attribution in the utterance Nicole hat die Milch runtergeworfen 
 
However, after having re-enacted Jessica’s attribution (perhaps even after being able 
to anticipate it, if the verb is encountered earlier), the interpreter can re-evaluate it, if 
he/she has witnessed the event that underlies it, too, or knows about it due to other 
sources. The former holds true for Sarah in the situation presented in (4.40)). Her 
utterance is the consequence of an attribution performance different from that of 
Jessica (thus the nein ‘no’ with which her contribution begins). 
 
Sarah’s utterance: 
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Trivially, Nicole is again the only object of conceptualization that can be attributed 
some actional matter. The parameter setting in attribution is the following, i.e., 
Jessica could have identified the circumstance in question in the following way: 
 
parameter actor/observer 
difference 
 disposition/situation 
attribution 
setting Sarah = observer 
 
 situation  
parameter  accomplishment/ 
misaccomplishment 
difference 
 cause/reason attribution 
setting circumstance = 
misaccomplishment 
 cause  
parameter  sympathy/antipathy 
(empathy) difference 
 credit/blame attribution 
setting sympathy (high 
empathy) 
 no blame  
 
    
→ This parameter setting corresponds to scenario D from section 3.2.3.  
The person involved in this circumstance cannot/is not attributed 
responsibility for what he/she has brought about. 
Figure 4.40: Attribution in the utterance Sie ist ihr runtergefallen 
 
Looking back to (4.40), the last turn in this verbal interaction is that of Jessica not signalling 
misunderstanding regarding Sarah’s correcting utterance. What Sarah has done with her 
utterance is confirming Jessica’s spatio-temporal conceptualization implicitly, while 
disagreeing with her attribution performance, namely by leaving the spatio-temporal structure 
of the conceptualization untouched but imposing a different attribution onto it. Jessica’s re-
action signals that she has understood this (though she need not necessarily have accepted it). 
Jessica and Sarah can now believe to have understood each other. 
 
 
4.3.3 The utterance as instruction – building up the instruction 
In this section I will describe the activities of an actor/cognizer from the perception of a 
circumstance to its verbalization. I will do this by means of a picture story. 
 
(4.41) You are sitting on a bench inside the train station of your home town waiting for a 
train. Across from you a woman is standing in front of the wall, reading a book. From 
overhearing her speaking with an employee of the railway company you know that her 
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name is Therese. A woman you do not know is standing beside her. You then observe the 
following (see picture story). Later you tell your friend what you have seen. 
 
1 2
43
 
Figure 4.41: Picture story 
 
Step (1): Build up a percept of the stimuli in the visual field. 
(a) Integrate visual features into objects. 
(b) Determine figure/ground structure. 
(c) Determine your relation as perceiver to what happens in your visual field 
(egocentric vs. allocentric space). 
 
There are several visual features already in the first picture that allow a perceiver to 
integrate them into three different objects. Listing three of them shall suffice here: 
first of all, there are color cues (the dominating dark colors of the object on the left 
side, the different bright colors of the object on the right side, the blue color of the 
third object of which it is not immediately clear whether it belongs to the object on 
the right or whether it is an object itself). Secondly, there are clear edges that even on 
the two-dimensional retinal image that allow separating at least two objects from one 
another and from the background. Thirdly, there are movement/motion cues. In 
contrast to the background the two different, larger shapes are not immobile but 
move slightly even when standing. The third, small object may even move faster than 
the more inert bodies of the other objects.  
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That means in sensing the circumstance that is statically depicted in the first picture a 
perceiver can detect several features that are still disintegrated. It is the gestalt laws 
that help integrate them. The integration of features into objects also includes the 
separation of a figure from a ground. It is especially the law of good continuation 
that suggests that the disintegrated features on the left make an object, although it 
exhibits different colors. The same can be said about the features on the right. 
Between the two there is no good continuation, so that they are not recognized as a 
single object. Both objects also exhibit closure (there are no gaps in them) and 
common fate, i.e., if some of their features are involved in motion/movement, all of 
them move more or less. It is perhaps the not-so-good continuation and the only 
“partially” common fate of the third, small object that already allows a perceiver to 
segregate it as a unique object from the large one to the right with which it is 
featurally intermingled. Information from motion parallax could also contribute to its 
singling out as an object. 
Depending on where the perceiver looks, there are different figure/ground 
configurations possible. He/she may single out each one of the objects from the 
background. Whether some specific figure/ground segregation is predominant for the 
perceiver does not turn out until “something happens”. This is the case in the three 
further pictures where, broadly speaking, the black object moves towards the bright 
and small objects at the same time such that the latter become the ground in relation 
to which the former moves. This is depicted in Figure 4.42 below. Furthermore, the 
perceiver is not physically involved in what he/she perceives. He/she perceives what 
is happening in his/her visual field as relations only between the objects he/she has 
recognized. As such, this happens in allocentric space. 
 
 
Figure 4.42: Build up a percept of the stimuli in the visual field 
(w: woman in black; b: book; T: Terese) 
 
 
Step (2): Identify stimuli in the visual field. 
(a) Evaluate features and affordances of the objects recognized (on-line). 
(b) Evaluate mutual affordances of the objects recognized (on-line). 
(c) Identify spatial structure of the circumstance in terms of trajector and landmark. 
(d) Identify temporal structure of the circumstance. 
(e) Determine causal structure of the circumstance. 
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After having built up a bottom-up structural description of the stimuli from the 
retinal image, the stimuli can be identified/categorized by means of top-down 
processes. The two larger objects can easily be identified as human beings, since 
their percepts, i.e., mainly their shapes and their movements, are similar to available 
concepts of human beings. The third object can probably without effort be identified 
as an instance of a book. 
Concerning their affordances, human beings are able to move by themselves in 
various manners, they may exert force on objects by pushing, pulling, grasping, 
throwing, they may hold things, let go of them, and so on. Books do not afford 
movement by themselves; if they move, it is externally caused. Being determined by 
its features, the book can be opened, rotated, thrown, held, torn, flipped open, and so 
on; they can fall, lie, and stand under certain conditions; they may exert force on 
other objects, if they are moved (see section 3.2.1.2 on affordances). 
All the objects in the visual field are restricted in their states, processes, and activities 
by their features. When the woman in black turns towards Terese, and commences to 
reach out her arms (picture 2), the perceiver calculates what will happen next. 
His/her object knowledge in terms of affordances aids him/her. Because the actual 
and possible circumstances in his/her visual field, and especially those of the person 
moving now stops being a monadic one, mutual affordances come into play. 
Although the woman in black is apparently reaching towards the superordinate object 
ground/landmark, the affordances of the book and Terese each get “mutualized” 
because they are two objects standing in an actually alienable part/whole relation. 
Depending on the progress of the movement, the mutual affordances between the 
woman in black and Terese with the book or between the woman in black and the 
book are perhaps of the following kind: taking the hand (for greeting or leading 
Terese somewhere), pushing, pulling, hitting, taking something, fondling and the 
like. It does not afford some giving activity, since the woman in black has no object 
that has been identified and that could be given to someone. At the same time Terese 
– although affording giving sth. to s.o. in principle – does not intend to give the book 
away. Thus, the progress of the movement of the woman in black actualizes the 
affordance of taking, as picture 3 shows, thereby inhibiting Terese’s activity of 
holding the book. Furthermore, this determines the book as the ground to the black 
woman’s activity. In its relation to Terese, the book is at the same time a figure, 
Terese being its ground. Finally, the woman in black has (holds) the book and goes 
away from Terese. It is – except the movement of the woman in black – the reverse 
figure/ground configuration from the beginning.  
The temporal structure of what has happened in the visual field of the perceiver 
cannot easily be determined. Earlier (section 3.4) it has been argued that the temporal 
structure of a circumstance can be characterized on a sensational, conceptual 
(concerning identification), and actional/attributional level. Although all sub-part 
boundaries on the highest level (attribution) correspond to sub-part boundaries on the 
lowest level (sensation), the reverse is not true. I will confine myself here to 
circumstance sub-parts on the conceptual and actional levels because it is them that 
are important for linguistic
o
 coding. That means fixing the temporal structure of the 
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circumstance on the attributional level anticipates crucial aspects of step 3 
concerning attribution. They are depicted in Figure 4.43. 
 
 
Figure 4.43: Aspects of the temporal structure underlying circumstance in picture story 
 
Even on the conceptual level one can identify several sub-parts of the circumstance. I 
have depicted four in Figure 4.43. The first and last illustrate the initial and final 
situations. The second panel illustrates the movement of the woman (w) towards the 
book (b) and the pulling activity. Strictly speaking, these can be identified as two 
action schemas. The third panel illustrates the movement of the book away from 
Terese (T) towards the woman in black by means of pulling. On the 
actional/attributional level it is the activities of the woman in black in the second and 
third panel that are identified as means to the purpose of having the book which is 
put into effect in the end. The reaching for the book, the pulling at the book and 
taking the book are the three ancillary action schemas that the woman is attributed as 
actualizing in order to have the book. (For reasons of space the two first action 
schemas have been compressed into the second panel. The language level, though 
anticipating what is yet to come, illustrates that each sub-part of the circumstance 
may be expressed by separate utterances; see section 3.4.6) 
Concerning the causal structure of the circumstance, it is certainly the case that the 
reaching for the book by the woman and the motion of the book towards her are 
spatially and temporally contiguous and that contact between the two is perceived. 
These are the primary cues that are involved in identifying a causal relation (see 
section 3.2.1.3). 
 
Step (3): Make attributions in accordance to the attributional praxis you are participating in. 
(a) Identify the objects with respect to which attribution is available. 
(b) Identify the parameter setting of the determining and determined parameters (see 
section 3.2 for details).  
(c) Attribute responsibility or refrain from attributing responsibility by means of 
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imposing it on the spatio-temporal conceptualization of the circumstance in 
question. 
 
There are certain circumstances in which humans are involved that are judged 
differently depending on particular parameters (see section 3.2), for instance those 
where something gets broken and where it is debatable whether someone can be 
attributed responsibility for the result or not. The circumstance depicted in Figure 
4.41 is not of that kind. In the sociocultural and attributional praxis where such 
circumstances take place, no one would exonerate the woman in black from the 
responsibility of having taken the book from Terese. It is obvious that she could have 
desisted from doing so and that there is a purpose in her deed, namely taking 
possession of the book. The determining and determined parameters in attribution are 
the cues that are taken into account where matters of responsibility are unclear in the 
first instance. It is thus clear that the woman in black is attributed responsibility. 
 
Step (4): Verbalize the circumstance 
(a) Choose construction in dependence of steps 2 and 3. 
(b) Choose mapping type (iconic to circumstance vs. iconic to scanning). 
(c) Decide on taxonomic level of object and circumstance expressions. 
(e) Decide on coding agentivity lexically in the verb. 
(e) Assign case and agreement. 
 (i) Determine PSC. 
(f) Choose phrase order. 
 (i) Respect RCP. 
(g) Minimize constructions (Make your verbal contribution as constructionally 
parsimonious as possible). 
 
Having discussed sensation, recognition, identification, and attribution, the 
circumstance must now be verbalized. There are several decisions to be made. There 
is firstly the construction. In dependence of the identification performances in step 2 
there is obviously an adicity of 3 in the circumstance in question, i.e., it is three 
objects that make up the circumstance. That means a construction involving three 
NPs will be chosen for verbalization (in a regular, i.e., diagrammatically iconic 
mapping).  
Although this is presumably mainly an information-theoretic matter, a mapping type 
must be chosen where available (see section 3.3 for details). The trajector-as-PSC 
variant has been discussed as exhibiting diagrammatic iconicity relative to the 
unfolding of the circumstance. The landmark-as-PSC has been discussed as being 
diagrammatically iconic with respect to the simulated eye gaze of the actor/cognizer. 
This will be chosen here. Because the PSC automatically agrees with the verb and 
bears nominative case, agreement need not be separately dealt with. The woman in 
black is the landmark in the pen-ultimate sub-part of the circumstance and will thus 
be realized as an NP bearing nominative case. It is her status which gives identity to 
the circumstance as a whole (see section 3.4.8). However, the nominative can be 
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motivated independently, namely by identifying uni-directional motion from the 
trajector to the landmark. At the same time this licenses accusative case for the NP 
designating the book (see section 4.1.6 on case).  
The choice of a construction is not yet finished. Because there is a triadic 
construction it is not yet clear how the third object (Terese) is realized. Taking into 
account the fact that there is a path there in the circumstance, namely that of the book 
away from Terese towards the woman in black, there are two possibilities: an NPnom-
V-NPacc-PP construction or a NPnom-V-NPdat-NPacc construction. If the former gets 
chosen, the path would be coded by the preposition von ‘from’ and the NP would 
bear dative case because it is the starting point of a path (see section 4.2, step (3)).  
The construction choice has been shown to depend on the presence or absence of the 
criteria licensing the dative case form on the NP referring to Terese. Is there an 
instance of symmetrical or asymmetrical bi-directionality, of symmetrical or 
asymmetrical coinciding directionality, and/or (non-default) internal actional 
involvement (see section 4.1.6.2)? I would argue that there is internal actional 
involvement on the side of Terese: Taking the book from her obviously conflicts 
with her action planning which includes continuing reading. This alone can license 
the dative case. Secondly – what is rather worth discussing – one could argue that 
this is an instance of asymmetrical bi-directionality. Both women act towards the 
book, but with asymmetrical force which results in the succeeding of the activity of 
the woman in black. This also licenses the dative. Thus, we have an NPnom-V-NPdat-
NPacc construction. 
A further question is which taxonomic level is chosen to code the objects and the 
circumstance. This is mainly an information-theoretic or discourse-related question. 
In brief, given both interlocutors know the information given in the text in (4.41), the 
woman in black is most likely to be referred to by something like die Frau ‘the 
woman’, Terese by Terese and the book by das Buch ‘the book’ (e.g., Ariel 1988, 
1991). The verb must be one whose PSC is a landmark (in the penultimate sub-part 
of the circumstance which gives identity to the circumstance as identified and 
designated by the verb), and which codes the actualization of the mutual affordances 
outlined above. It either codes responsibility lexically or it must be inferred by a 
separate attribution performance on the side of the interpreter (see section 4.3.2, step 
(4)). A verb that satisfies these criteria and codes responsibility lexically, at least in 
its literal, i.e., motivated uses, is wegnehmen ‘take from’. The resulting utterance and 
the complete linking schema are given in (4.42) and Figure 4.44, respectively. 
 
(4.42) Die Frau     hat               Terese          das          Buch weggenommen. 
  The.3NOM have.3AUX Terese.DAT the.ACC book away.RSLT-take.PTCP 
 ‘The woman took the book from Terese.’ 
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Figure 4.44: Linking schema for picture story in Figure 4.41 
 
Although there might be interfering phonological, syntactic, information-theoretic, 
and discourse-related constraints (which are not the topic of this book), the utterance 
in (4.42) is in line with the RCP (see section 4.2). The responsible causer is realized 
as PSC, the secondarily active object is realized as a second NP and the least active 
object is realized as the last NP. 
The maxim concerning the minimization of constructions can briefly be illustrated by 
means of Figure 4.43 again. The perceiver of the scene depicted in the picture story  
in Figure 4.41 could very well and in accordance with his/her sensation, 
identification, and attribution have verbalized this scene by means of multiple 
utterances, for instance by similar ones to those in the lowermost line in the language 
level in Figure 4.43. By not doing so he/she has obeyed the “minimize constructions” 
maxim. This maxim is motivated by cognitive efficiency (see section 3.2.1.4). By 
uttering (4.43) he/she allows the interpreter to simulate the perception of the scene in 
Figure 4.41. By uttering the several sentences from Figure 4.43 he/she would have 
accomplished the same thing but with far more effort.  
 
  
4.4 Some German linking phenomena  
 
 This section will demonstrate how the present framework deals with 
classical problems of the syntax-semantics relationship, in particular 
with what is called “argument structure” in other frameworks (see 
section 1.1). Some of these problems have already been dealt with in 
the context of particular actional, spatial- or temporal-conceptual 
matters, e.g., matters of aspect (section 3.4) and case (section 4.1.6) in 
a rather general manner. In this section, specific problems are 
discussed. This is given in Figure 4.45. 
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Figure 4.45: Coding concepts (+/- attributions) in a well-formed and appropriate manner as 
specific part of the linking competence that is developed in section 4.4 
 
Generally, the phenomena will be discussed from a semasiological perspective, looking at the 
sentences/utterances and asking why they have these forms and not others, why they cannot 
have these forms, and why they undergo some syntactic operation or not. Note that most of 
the phenomena are listed as they are known in the literature, even though the notions 
employed might not have a correlate in the present proposal. 
 
 
4.4.1 “Unergative” versus “unaccusative” constructions 
This distinction is based on the observation that the class of monadic constructions is not 
consistent but can be split into two subgroups, traditionally called “unergative” and 
“unaccusative” (cf. Perlmutter & Postal 1984 for the labelling and theoretical discussion; for 
discussion see also Fillmore 1968, Perlmutter 1978, Holisky 1987, Zaenen 1988, van Valin 
1990, Levin & Rappaport Hovav 1995). Consider (4.43) and (4.44). 
 
(4.43) Es ist           viel    getanzt/        
??
gestunken/
#(
hin)gefallen worden. 
  It  be.3AUX much dance.PTCP/stink.PTCP/fall.PTCP     was.AUX.PASS 
 ‘There was much dancing./There was much stinking./There was much falling.’ 
 
(4.44) Tanz!/         
??
Stink!/    
#
Fall (hin)! 
  Dance.IMP/Stink.IMP/Fall.IMP 
 ‘Dance!      /Stink!        Fall!’ 
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The verbs in (4.43) and (4.44) code monadic circumstances, respectively. (4.43) shows what 
happens under impersonal passivization. While this is perfectly possible for tanzen, the 
conditions under which it is possible for (hin)fallen are pragmatically more restricted, and 
those for stinken are very specific. The same holds true for imperativization in (4.44). 
Looking at the spatio-temporal conceptualizations underlying these circumstances, one finds 
that (hin)fallen codes a change of location in the trajector such that it takes a certain final 
position in space in the last sub-part of the circumstance. This is not the case for tanzen and 
stinken where the circumstances consist in only one (sub-)part, namely one of continuous 
movement, respectively. In the dancing and falling circumstances there is a trajector 
constituting the circumstance in that it actualizes one of its affordances. However, not 
everything affords movement/motion in a specific manner (tanzen), emission of bad odor 
(stinken) or free movement/motion downward ((hin)fallen). Movement/motion in a manner 
that is identified as dancing is an affordance mostly of humans, of few animals, and perhaps 
of leaves (in the wind). Stinking is unrestricted to a degree that few things attain. Virtually 
every object and even location can stink. Since odor in a sense moves away from the 
relatively stationary source, the origin of odor is a landmark. In contrast, locations cannot fall, 
however, but only things that can be detached from their present position. A summer house on 
a cliff affords falling but not a flatland summer house in a garden plot. These considerations 
are summarized in Table 4.4. 
 
 object feature object 
affordances 
spatial 
structure 
temporal 
structure 
tanzen 
‘dance’ 
making 
perceptual 
figure, animate 
rhythmic 
motion/movement 
along circular 
path 
monadic: 
trajector 
simple 
stinken 
‘stink’ 
making 
perceptual 
figure or  
location 
landmark 
emission of bad 
odor 
monadic: object 
or location 
landmark 
simple 
(hin)fallen 
‘fall’ 
making 
perceptual 
figure 
free 
movement/motion 
downwards 
monadic: 
trajector 
complex 
Table 4.4: Spatio-temporal requirements of objects involved in monadic circumstances listed 
 
The consequence of the above observations is that not everything that can stink can also 
necessarily dance or fall. And not everything that can fall can also necessarily dance.  
Looking at the attributional part of the semantics of the above utterances, one finds that 
attribution is possible only where animate beings are involved in the respective circumstances. 
So let us assume for now the dancers, stinkers, and fallers in the above contexts were animate. 
Animate dancers are almost necessarily attributed responsibility. Someone who cannot desist 
from dancing (as judged by others) can hardly be imagined. In contrast, leaves may be 
identified to dance but cannot be attributed responsibility. It has been argued in section 4.1.6.1 
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that the passive construction is in part restricted to responsible objects. While this statement 
applies less strictly to personal passives, it can generally be applied to impersonal passives. 
The former will be discussed in section 4.4.3 in more detail. Impersonal passivization of 
tanzen is possible only where the respective objects are animate, in the optimum human 
beings, that are necessarily attributed responsibility.  
 
In other words, attributed responsibility is the sufficient condition for impersonal 
passivization.  
 
The following example illustrates this. 
 
(4.45) Von den Leuten/
#
den Blättern ist             viel    getanzt        worden. 
   by   the  people/   the  leaves    be.3AUX much dance.PTCP was.AUX.PASS 
  ‘There was much dancing by the people/by the leaves’ 
 
By the same rationale it becomes evident why there are only very few contexts in which 
impersonal passivization with stinken is possible, i.e., well-formed and appropriate. It is 
possible where its landmark PSC is an animate if not human object, and uttered within a 
rather infrequent lifeworld context. If there were a bad taste party where the person with the 
worst odor won a price, it would be conceivable that someone reports on the party the day 
after in the following manner. 
 
(4.46) Es ist             unglaublich           viel     gestunken  worden. 
   It  be.3AUX unbelievable.ADV much stink.PTCP was.AUX.PASS 
  ‘There was an awful lot of stinking.’ 
 
If (4.46) was uttered not in the context of many intentionally stinking people but in the 
context of many stinking waste containers, it would certainly be impossible. Analogously, a 
context where impersonal passivization of (hin)fallen is possible could be one concerning 
Italian soccer pros who have the (bad) reputation of simulating being fouled. Being fouled is 
associated with falling. So if they collectively – and responsibly – simulate being fouled in a 
soccer match, (4.43) could be uttered appropriately. It certainly could not in the context of 
apples falling off a tree.  
Interestingly, the acceptability of impersonal passives interplays with non-formal features of 
the active PSC of the construction. In particular, it seems that with verbs/constructions lying 
at the threshold of passivizability (i.e., having questionable acceptabilities) low individuation 
of the PSC referent on the individuation scale and a value downstream the person scale 
increase the acceptability of impersonal passivization. That is the reason why (4.43) is 
certainly preferable to (4.45), and why (4.46) is certainly preferable to a similar construction 
including so-called passive by-phrase (see also Sansò 2006, Primus 2011).
182
 
There is an important implication of the proposed treatment of monadic circumstances and the 
operations they may undergo: These matters depend primarily on the features, affordances, 
                                                 
182
 Discourse-pragmatic causes of such preferences cannot be discussed in this work, since this lies outside its 
scope. But see Abraham & Leisiö (2006). 
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and attributions of the involved objects, respectively, and only secondly on the features that 
verbs necessarily determine about their complement referents. This means that it is not 
possible to determine the passivizability of a sentence on the basis of the verb: Wherever the 
object involved in a monadic circumstance is attributed responsibility for this circumstance, 
the monadic construction is passivizable. This statement simply does not refer to verbal 
semantics.
183
 (4.44) works similarly.  
 
Imperativization is dependent on the attribution of responsibility along the lines of what has 
been presented in section 3.2.  
 
So, one could utter Stink, wie du noch nie zuvor gestunken hast! ‘Stink as you never did 
before!’ when wishing a friend luck for the winning of the stinking contest at the bad taste 
party, or the coach of the Italian soccer team could utter Fall! in the context of his/her player 
being slightly touched in the penalty area by an opponent. This is not possible for objects that 
are not capable of activity and that cannot be attributed responsibility. The scale-related 
preferences regarding the impersonal passive do not hold for imperativization (presumably 
because the imperative construction is not information-structurally motivated). 
The above considerations show that the question of whether a construction is an unergative or 
an unaccusative one is not a binary one. It depends crucially on the question of what the 
involved object affords and whether it can be or is attributed responsibility. The semantic 
structure of “unaccusativity” and “unergativity” is given in Figures 4.46 and 4.47 below. They 
are modelled on Figures 3.14 and 3.16 from section 3.2.2.3, respectively.  
Assuming animate objects, the difference between unaccusatives and unergatives lies in the 
attribution of responsibility in the latter case (the movement is identified as an action schema 
which is a means to put some purpose into effect) and in attributing external causes to the 
object moving in the former case (which is why the object is landmark of the exertion of force 
and trajector of its movement at the same time). The semantics underlying unaccusativity 
prohibit impersonal passivization and imperativization. Those underlying unergativity license 
these operations. In the case of stinking it is possible that not perceiving (or conceptualizing) 
a possible cause of the odor (e.g., visible dirt) increases the likeliness to attribute 
responsibility, if the odor bearer is animate. 
 
                                                 
183
 Construction Grammar and neo-constructionist approaches also reject the “semantic load” of verbs and their 
projection to syntax (cf. Goldberg 1995, 2006, Borer 2003, Åfarli 2006), but pursue different research-
programmes than the one defended here, namely CFL and CL (see Part I). 
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Figure 4.46: Semantics of unaccusativity 
 
 
Figure 4.47: Semantics of unergativity 
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It is well known that languages differ as to how they code the single object in monadic 
circumstances. For instance, in Nepali the single complement of fall, roll, and the like is 
always marked like the object being affected in a dyadic construction (cf. Li 2007). In Tsova 
Tush (also called Batsbi, a Caucasian language), these verbs are usually marked like the 
object being affected in a dyadic construction, but in contrast to Nepali, they can also be 
marked like the (responsible) causer in a dyadic construction (“split intransitivity”, cf. 
Holisky 1987, van Valin 1990). As is demonstrated above, in German this latter strategy is the 
conventional means for expressing monadic circumstances (besides rather ancient forms like 
Mich friert (me.ACC freeze.3 ‘I am cold’)).  
The Batsbi and German patterns are not informative with respect to the semantic status of 
their single complements. (One cannot simply claim that someone x-ing is a responsible 
person in German, but a non-responsible person in Nepali because of its coding, since this 
coding may conflate many conceptual and/or actional differentiations). Evidence might come 
from the restrictions with these constructions on syntactic operations, and, of course, from 
how Nepali speakers make attributions (i.e., from social psychology). However, the Batsbi 
split intransitivity pattern has been claimed to be semantically informative (cf. Holisky 1987) 
in that it codes responsible causers and non-responsible causers or affected objects differently, 
giving a clue as to the underlying identification and/or attribution patterns.  
Where is the cross-linguistic diversity to be located, then? There is firstly, and trivially, the 
coding pattern, exemplified here by Batsbi, Nepali, and German. With respect to the linking 
competence, this diversity is semantically not informative because of its merely formal 
character. Secondly, one could look where – in conceptual terms – the split takes course 
through monadic circumstances. For instance, it would be interesting to examine whether the 
split in the intransitivity coding pattern in Batsbi is conceptually in line with the split in 
German with respect to those monadic circumstances that can undergo impersonal 
passivization and imperativization and those that cannot. However, in German 
conceptualization is not informative in this respect either, as has been shown (i.e., the split is 
not a conceptual one). Someone stinking intentionally and someone stinking unintentionally 
cannot be differentiated conceptually, since it is a matter of attribution alone. So one could 
thirdly investigate the coding patterns (split vs. non-split) and restrictions on syntactic 
operations in languages (passivization, imperativization) in relation to the attribution praxis of 
their speakers.  
That means where instances of stinking are sensed, conceptualized, and coded by similar 
constructions by the speakers of two different languages, these languages need not exhibit the 
same linking mechanisms with respect to such circumstances. The split may not be 
conceptually but actionally determined such that the attributional praxis in one speech 
community differs from that of another speech community in a way that leads to different 
restrictions on syntactic operations or on the use of monadic constructions. Particularly, 
taboos or prohibitions may play a role in such differentiations. Circumstances susceptbile to 
such splits are especially those close to being tabooed (in many though not all cultures), like 
those concerning bodily emissions, e.g., stinking, farting, belching etc. 
Diversity in linking synax and semantics due to attributional matters may be of two kinds. 
Firstly, speakers of different languages may enact different praxes of attribution, such that 
they allow or prohibit attribution of responsibility for similar, mostly precarious 
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circumstances. One need only survey where the split in monadic circumstances takes course 
across languages to see that they cannot be mapped onto one another, e.g., in the treatment of 
people belching. Secondly, and potentially criss-crossing the first factor, attributional praxes 
of speakers of different languages may differ as to who may be attributed responsibility for 
his/her deeds and who may not, for instance in dependence of his/her speech act participant 
(SAP) status in the discourse situation (e.g., deLancey 1981, 1990, Holisky 1987, van Valin 
1990, Li 2007, Hori 2008). 
 
 
4.4.2 Auxiliary choice 
In (4.47) the German verbs tanzen ‘dance’ and stinken ‘stink’ on the one hand, and (hin)fallen 
‘fall’ on the other hand are shown to be associated with different auxiliaries, respectively.  
 
(4.47) x            hat               getanzt/          hat               gestunken/  ist         (hin)gefallen. 
  x.NOM have.3AUX dance.PTCP/ have.3AUX stink.PTCP/is.3AUX fall.PTCP 
 ‘Alex danced./Alex stunk./Alex fell.’ 
 
Keller and Sorace (2003) have nicely modelled the auxiliary choice for the perfective verb 
form in German by making use of an “auxiliary selection hierarchy” (ASH).184 The units 
ranging on the hierarchy, though relatively independent of particular theories of grammar, are 
not separately motivated or deduced. For instance, Keller’s and Sorace’s “process” conflates 
what is differentiated here as process and activity, i.e., motion and movement, respectively. 
For a brief but thorough diachronic motivation of auxiliary choice be referred to Dal (
3
1966) 
(see also Fleischer & Schallert 2011). My claim is that these notion can quite well be 
reconstructed by means of the theory proposed here. The original ASH is given below in 
Table 4.5. 
 
change of location selects ‘be’ (least variation) 
change of state  
continuation of state 
existence of state 
uncontrolled process 
controlled process (motional) 
controlled process (non-motional) selects ‘have’ (least variation) 
Table 4.5: The general, i.e., typologically motivated ASH (Keller & Sorace 2003: 60) 
 
The ASH says that if a lexical intransitive verb designates a “change of location”, then it 
(nearly) invariably takes a form of ‘be’ as auxiliary. If it designates a “controlled process 
(non-motional)” it (nearly) invariably takes a form of ‘have’ as auxiliary. The more the 
designated circumstance of a lexical verb ranges in the middle of the hierarchy, the greater the 
variation of its auxiliary choice is across languages and non-Standard German varieties. What 
                                                 
184
 The ASH was introduced by Sorace (2000) in the context of auxiliary selection in several languages. 
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is especially interesting is that at the top of the hierarchy there are complex circumstances, 
i.e., processes or activities with more than one sub-part. Towards the middle there are simple 
states. And towards the bottom there are simple processes and simple activities. Furthermore, 
from “existence of state” downwards, “control” (i.e., responsibility) becomes important, and 
from “continuation of state” upwards, “change” (i.e., complexity) becomes important. In this 
section I will try to factor in transitive relations, too, and to reconstruct older insights – the 
ASH – in terms of the theoretical apparatus developed here.  
Looking at the upper half of the ASH first, one finds “existence”, “continuation”, and 
“change” as temporal matters, and “state” and “location” as featural and spatial matters, 
respectively. Change of location and change of state involve a perceptually salient process or 
activity in that something moves somewhere or some feature of something – or its whole 
integrity – changes, appears or disappears. Both maybe processes or activities. If they are 
processes, they are probably caused. If they are activities, they are potentially uncaused. If 
caused, the moving or feature-changing object is the landmark of causation and the trajector 
of change. The linking schema for change of location is given in Figure 4.48. 
 
 
Figure 4.48: Linking schema for auxiliary choice in ASH “change of location” circumstance  
 
This is also the structure underlying x ist (hin)gefallen in (4.47) above, where x bears 
nominative case, agrees with the verb, and is thus the PSC. If the circumstance is caused, the 
PSC referent is the landmark of the causation relation, but the trajector of the 
motion/movement relation. If it is not caused, the PSC referent is only a trajector. It is 
important to note that the motion/movement is one which comes to rest in the last sub-part of 
the circumstance which makes the circumstance complex. The complexity of the 
circumstance is compressed into one schematic in the above Figure. This whole setting finds 
its expression in the choice of a form of ‘be’ as auxiliary. Furthermore, manner of the 
motion/movement is coded in the verb participle. Path can generally be coded in the verb 
(leading to zero (“ø”) additional lexical material), in the P of an NP, or in the prefix, particle, 
or prepositional adverb attached to the verb. If it is a PP, then P mostly governs accusative 
case indicating motion/movmement towards some destination, and not stative being located. 
In the case of the (hin)fallen utterance above, the prepositional adverb strategy is realized, i.e., 
in hin ‘towards’.  
Consider next the linking schema for corresponding to the ASH “change of state”. 
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Figure 4.49: Linking schema for auxiliary choice in ASH “change of state” circumstance 
 
The difference to the former structure lies in the fact that here one is dealing with a featural 
change, not with a spatial one. Therefore, the verbalization option of a PP is absent here in 
favor of an adjective indicating the final stative sub-part of the circumstance. The featural 
change may concern the coming about or ceasing of something or the transition of some 
feature into another. Examples would be x ist verstorben/errötet/dick geworden ‘x has passed 
away/turned red/put on weight‘. Because the conceputal metaphor FEATURES/PROPERTIES ARE 
RELATIONS is prevalent across languages (cf. Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 1999, but see section 
3.3.3.1), and because featural changes thus describe something like a path, too (CHANGE OF 
FEATURES/PROPERTIES IS CHANGE OF LOCATIONS), path expressions are present in the prefixes 
of versterben and erröten, indicating the stative final sub-part of the circumstance. In x ist 
dick geworden, this is accomplished by an adjective dick.  
For reasons that will become clear further down this section, I will now discuss “controlled 
processes (motional)”. The linking schema for these circumstances is given in Figure 4.50. 
 
 
Figure 4.50: Linking schema for auxiliary choice in ASH “controlled process (motional)” 
circumstance 
 
The schematic shows that there is no external cause to the circumstance but that the single 
object involved in it is one that moves by itself (it is active), and is attributed responsibility 
for its movement, either by imposition by the actor/cognizer, or lexically enforced. The 
important feature that makes these circumstances similar to the others selecting ‘be’ as 
auxiliary, too, is that movement is involved. They can nevertheless under certain conditions 
be realized with ‘have’. Also important is that this movement is neither definitively directed 
somewhere nor leads to a stative final sub-part of the circumstance. Additional expressions 
coding paths or resultant states are therefore mostly absent. Examples are x ist 
gefahren/gewandert/geklettert/gekrochen/gerutscht ‘x has driven/wandered/climbed/crawled/ 
slid’. 
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The ASH units “existence” and “continuation of state” are conflated in Figure 4.51. This will 
be justified in turn.  
 
 
Figure 4.51: Linking schema for auxiliary choice in ASH “existence” and “continuation of 
state” circumstance 
 
In circumstances of the type depicted in Figure 4.51 nothing happens. There is no change of 
anything but only the spatial or featural state of something, and in particular at the time of the 
predicated tense (in the case of “existence of state”) or extending the time of the predicated 
tense towards the future (in the case of “continuation of state”). “Continuation” has 
undoubtedly a temporal connotation or even denotation today, and the “continuation of state” 
class actually includes many verbs coding primarily temporal matters, e.g., verharren 
‘persist’, bleiben ‘remain’, überleben ‘survive’. The underlying circumstances, though simple, 
are often verbalized using adjectives (in predicative constructions) and particles/prepositional 
adverbs/prefixes together with the verb. Where the verbs code a temporal meaning, they make 
use of the conceptual metaphor TIME IS SPACE (but see section 3.3.3.1). It is implicit in earlier 
discussions, however, that the conceptualization of a hat being red does not differ from the 
conceptualization of a hat remaining red. Verbs like remain are thus instances of exploitation: 
They pretend to code a simple conceptualization but they do not (see sections 3.3.2/3.3.3). 
Temporal continuation may only manifest itself in invariance across encounters, i.e., in 
invariance across circumstances conceptualized. Thus, if I sense and identify a red hat (1
st
 
identification) and I plan to wear that red hat at the wedding of my sister (2
nd
 
conceptualization in action planning), then it is my interest that the hat is still red when 
wedding day has come where I will ascertain this (3
rd
 identification). Only in relation to such 
temporally “distributed” conceptual activities it is appropriate to say that the hat remains red. 
And this is why such verbs only pretend to code simple conceptualizations.  
In contrast to the circumstances involving change, the stative ones are variable with respect to 
their auxiliary choice. While bleiben is used with a form of ‘be’, verharren and überleben are 
used with one of ‘have’. As is often the case with synchronically competing forms, there  
seems to be language change in progress with the most variable classes. For instance, loss of 
perfective meanings of verbs is associated with the expansion of ‘have’ as auxiliary (cf. Dal 
3
1966).   
Between these last two lexical classes (which is one, conceptually) and the next one in the 
lower half of the ASH there is a major split. While in the upper half change vs. no change and 
spatial vs. featural are supposed to be the factors governing auxiliary choice, it is – 
superficially – “control” vs. “no control” in the lower half. At this point, Keller and Sorace 
(2003) state that the hierarchy does not work for German as it does for other languages. While 
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“uncontrolled processes” are closer to selecting ‘be’ on the ASH than “controlled processes 
(motional)”, the former predominantly select forms of ‘have’ in German, while the latter 
predominantly select ‘be’ forms in German. In Keller’s and Sorace’s data, for “controlled 
processes (motional)” acceptability of ‘be’ was higher, and acceptability of ‘have’ was lower 
only in the two “change” classes at the top of the ASH. The ASH for German is thus the 
revised one below in Table 4.6. 
 
change of location selects ‘be’ (least variation) 
change of state  
controlled process (motional) 
continuation of state 
existence of state  
uncontrolled process 
controlled process (non-motional) selects ‘have’ (least variation) 
Table 4.6: The ASH for German non-causative constructions (adapted, based on Keller & 
Sorace 2003: 60) 
 
Verbs expressing uncontrolled processes are, for instance, zucken ‘convulse’, zittern ‘shiver’, 
stinken ‘stink’, schnarchen ‘snore’. That means these verbs designate simple monadic 
circumstances, in particular those that have been discussed in the previous section on 
“unaccusatives” and “unergatives” and which – under certain circumstances – may skip from 
one class to the other while this does not make a difference with respect to auxiliary choice. 
They are indeterminate with respect to causation. What is worth mentioning is, however, that 
these verbs often express pure manner concepts with path expressions only contingently 
attached to them or coded in them. If there is some aspect of motion/movement about these 
circumstances, it is not definitively directed anywhere (it often involves emission of sound or 
odor) and does not develop into a stative final sub-part of the circumstance. This is why the 
arrows indicating motion/movement are shaded. The underlying structure is given in Figure 
4.52. 
 
 
Figure 4.52: Linking schema for auxiliary choice in ASH “uncontrolled process” 
circumstance 
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The lowermost unit on the ASH, and that most closely connected with the auxiliary ‘have’, is 
“controlled process (non-motional)”. Verbs in this class designate activities of responsible 
persons that do not involve change of position in space as in x hat 
geschrieben/gearbeitet/telefoniert/geredet/gesungen ‘x has written/worked/phoned/talked/ 
sung’. The difference to the previous class thus lies in the absence of causation and in the 
absence of spatial extension of the activity. The corresponding linking schema is given in 
Figure 4.53. 
 
 
Figure 4.53: Linking schema for auxiliary choice in ASH “controlled process (non-
motional)” circumstance 
 
 
Now, when looking at the conceptual structures underlying the ASH for German, one finds  
 
(a) a decrease in circumstance complexity from top to bottom 
(actually, complexity is reduced to 1 at “controlled process (motional) ” 
already), 
(b)  a decrease in spatial extension of movement/motion from top to bottom,  
  accompanied by  
(c)  an increase in spatially non-extended movement/motion from top to bottom. 
 
Factors (b) and (c) determine the deviation of the German ASH from the rather cross-
linguistically motivated “general” ASH by Keller & Sorace (2003). The governing factor in 
the general ASH from the middle to the bottom seems to concern matters of responsibility. In 
German the factor “spatially non-extended movement/motion” seems to override that of 
responsibility, leading to the shift of “controlled process (motional)” towards the top of the 
ASH. However, the complex diachrony of auxiliary choice does not exclude the possibility 
that German intransitive and transitive (causative) constructions could work differently from 
one another in this respect (cf. Dal 
3
1966, Fleischer & Schallert 2011). In particular, matters 
of responsibility may play a part in the latter. 
Factoring in causative, i.e., transitive dyadic relations, shows that they entirely choose ‘have’ 
as auxiliary (cf. Dal 
3
1966: 122). Consider (4.48) and (4.49) first which are repeated from 
section (4.1.6.2). 
 
(4.48) Ein         Glas  ist    zerbrochen. 
   a.3NOM glass be.3 break.PTCP 
  ‘A glass is broken.’ 
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(4.49) Willi             hat      ein          Glas zerbrochen. 
   Willi.3NOM have.3 a.3ACC glass break.PTCP 
  ‘Willi broke a glass.’ 
 
In (4.48) we have an instance of a “change of state”. It is predicted by the ASH to take ‘be’ as 
auxiliary. This is the case. The ASH provides no treatment of cases like (4.49). My claim is 
that on the basis of the spatial and temporal grounding of conceptualization as outlined in 
previous sections it can be deduced. One must firstly look at the temporal organization of the 
circumstance. One finds that in its first sub-part Willi must exert force towards the glass. 
Underlying such an instance of causation are always two circumstances that are spatially and 
temporally contiguous on each other. Thus, in the second sub-part the glass loses its integrity 
by breaking, and in the final sub-part the former glass persists without integrity as pieces of 
glass. Strictly speaking, there are three circumstances then that could each be verbalized in 
perfect tense by a single construction such that for each one an auxiliary would have to be 
chosen. The second sub-part of the whole circumstance underlying (4.49) is identical with that 
underlying (4.48) – a change of state associated with ‘be’. The third sub-part – that of an 
existence/continuation of state – varies between ‘be’ and ‘have’. It is not important here. But 
crucially, the first sub-part is Willi’s activity towards the glass, where Willi is potentially 
though not necessarily attributed responsibility. It is thus either an “uncontrolled process” or a 
“controlled process (motional)” in terms of the ASH. Using the “general” ASH for the 
explanation of causative circumstances here and leaving the German ASH only for monadic 
circumstances would predict us the selection of ‘have’ for (4.49). Further evidence for the 
significance of responsibility matters with causative dyadic relations is indicated not only by 
the choice of a ‘have’ auxiliary but also in the lexicalization of the movement pattern in other 
cases than (4.49). For instance, the first subpart of das Glas fällt hin ‘The glass falls down’ 
and the the second sub-part of Willi wirft das Glas hin ‘Willi throws the glass down’ are 
conceptually identical. The difference between throw and fall lies in the presence of the 
responsible person. Thus, the choice of ‘have’ forms for causative dyadic relations can be 
deduced from the spatio-temporal grounding of the linking competence and the ASH. But 
what about cases like those in (4.50) and (4.51)? 
 
(4.50) Willi ist ins Haus gegangen. 
   Willi.3NOM be.3AUX in-the.ACC house go.PTCP 
  lit. ‘Willi has gone into the house.’ 
 
(4.51) Willi hat ins Haus gespuckt. 
   Willi.3NOM have.3AUX in-the.ACC house go.PTCP 
  lit. ‘Willi has spit into the house.’ 
 
In a nutshell, (4.50) is a complex relation with a stative final sub-part and therefore selects a 
form of ‘be’ as auxiliary. It is an instance of the ASH “change of location” with a PP path 
expression. What is different about (4.51)? The answer is that Willi’s movement is not 
identical with the motion of his spittle. In the first sub-part of the circumstance Willi acts in a 
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spatially non-extended manner. The result is the second sub-part in which spittle moves into 
the house. In the final stative sub-part, the spittle is located in the house. It is thus a variant of 
(4.49) above. The difference lies in the fact that (4.51) pretends to be a dyadic relation 
(between Willi and the house), while it is actually a triadic one (the spittle is also involved). 
A final remark concerns conceptual metaphor. As becomes evident through the importance of 
visual perception, spatial relations are the basis for temporal and other relations for which 
humans possess no perceptual modality. The ASH illustrates that spatial relations that are 
directed somewhere and find their destinations somewhere are stronlgy associated with ‘be’ 
auxiliaries. Now, it seems that where conceptual metaphors of the type X IS SPACE are 
grammaticalized (expressions originally spatial in kind have lost their spatial 
conceptualization), they tend to take over ‘have’ as auxiliary. Where there is a homonymous 
form with a preserved spatial conceptualization underlying it, it preserves a form of ‘be’ as 
auxiliary. This is given in x hat y gefallen ‘x appealed to y’ vs. x ist gefallen ‘x fell’, x ist y 
gefolgt ‘x followed y’ vs. x hat y gefolgt ‘x obeyed y’, x ist gegangen ‘x went away’ vs. Das 
hat gut gegangen ‘That worked well’. 
 
 
4.4.3 Conditions on passiviziation and imperativization 
In section 4.4.1 the condition on impersonal passivization has already been mentioned. It is 
the attribution of responsibility to the single object in a monadic circumstance with respect to 
that circumstance. This is only half of the truth with regard to the passivization of complex 
dyadic or triadic circumstances (henceforth “personal passive”). Consider (4.52). 
 
(4.52) Ihm           ist            das             Haar vom            Wind zerzaust        
  Him.DAT be.3AUX the.3NOM hair  by-the.DAT wind tossle.PTCP  
 worden. 
 was.AUX.PASS 
 ‘His hair was tossled by the wind.’ 
 
Obviously, responsibility is not the critical feature that governs the applicability of the 
personal passive because, if it were, (4.52) should not be well-formed. Now compare (4.52) to 
(4.53) below which is not well-formed. 
 
(4.53) 
#
Ihm           ist             vom             Wind durchs                  Haar geweht  
  Him.DAT be.3AUX by-the.DAT wind through-the.ACC hair   blow.PTCP 
 worden. 
 was.AUX.PASS 
 lit. ‘His hair was blown through by the wind.’ 
 
The difference between the two sentences can be characterized as follows: The state of the 
hair changes in (4.52) due to exertion of force, as it is coded in the verb zerzausen ‘tossle’. In 
contrast, durch etwas wehen ‘blow through sth.’ does  not code any exertion of force and 
change of state in that through which something blows. The reason is simple. In (4.52) the 
hair is an object landmark, in (4.53) it is a location landmark – nothing in the integrity, 
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features, or location of the hair is altered, it cannot undergo exertion of force. The hair 
accidentally lies in the  path of the wind, who passes it. In the case of (4.52) the hair also lies 
in the path of the wind, but partially blocks it, thereby becoming causally affected by it. The 
difference is captured in Figures 4.54a and b below: 
 
 
 
Figure 4.54a: Conceptualization licensing 
personal passive 
 
 
Figure 4.54b: Conceptualization not licensing 
personal passive 
 
There are active constructions that look as if they code exertion of force and/or a change of 
state, feature, or location in an object, while they do not. This is the case in (4.54) and (4.55). 
In (4.54) the two objects stand in a relation of inalienable possession or nearly identity. In 
(4.55) there is a simple, i.e., stative circumstance in which no change of state can be caused. If 
it were complex, (4.55) would be modifiable by an adverb like plötzlich ‘suddenly’ after the 
finite verb, but it is not.  
 
(4.54) 
#/*
Er/
#/
*Ihm          ist            vom             Kopf geschmerzt worden. 
  He.3NOM/DAT be.3AUX by-the.DAT head  ache.PTCP  was.AUX.PASS 
 lit. ‘He was ached by his head.’ 
 
 (4.55) 
#
Er             wird                  von dem       Vorfall   gewundert. 
  He.3NOM be.AUX.PASS by   the.DAT incident amaze.PTCP 
 ‘He gets amazed by the incident.’ 
 
(4.56) below is more difficult. It is not modifiable by an adverb indicating a complex 
circumstance, i.e., it is a simple relation not including a change of state. Nevertheless, it is 
passivizable, just like stative ängstigen ‘frighten’ or (ver)trauen ‘trust’ but unlike wundern ‘be 
amazed/surprised about sth.’, or gefallen ‘appeal to s.o.’.  
 
(4.56) Er              wird                  von den         Kindern gefürchtet. 
  He.3NOM be.AUX.PASS by   the.DAT children fear.PTCP 
 ‘He is feared by the children.’ 
 
Interestingly, all these verbs code a similar spatio-temporal conceptualization. The question is 
then why some of them allow passivization, while others do not. A change of state or location 
in the landmark is not the critical feature, since all these circumstances lack it. Returning to 
the impersonal passive, the attribution of responsibility to their PSCs might be the governing 
factor. If this is the case, it means that the fearers in fürchten ‘fear’, the trusters in (ver)trauen 
‘trust’, and the frighteners in ängstigen ‘frighten’ circumstances can be, and in fact are 
attributed responsibility, while the wonderers in wundern ‘wonder, be amazed about’ and the 
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appealers in gefallen ‘appeal to s.o.’ circumstances are not. This in turn should allow the 
imperative with these verbs under the same license used in the passivization of impersonals.  
 
(4.57) Fürchtet 
?
ihn/euch nicht!/Habt keine Angst! 
  Fear.IMP him.ACC you.ACC.REFL not/Have.IMP no.ACC fear 
 ‘Don’t be afraid (of him)!/Don’t be afraid!’ 
 
 (4.58) Ängstige ihn nicht!/Mach ihm keine Angst! 
  Frighten.IMP him.ACC not/Make.IMP him.DAT no.ACC fear 
 ‘Don’t frighten him!’ 
 
(4.59) Trau ihm nicht!  
  Trust.IMP him.DAT not 
 ‘Don’t trust him!’ 
 
(4.60) Wundere 
#
ihn/
#
dich nicht! 
  surprise.IMP it.ACC/you.ACC.REFL not 
 ‘Don’t be surprised!/amazed (about it)!’ 
  
(4.61) 
#
Gefalle ihm nicht! 
   Appeal.IMP him.DAT not 
 ‘Don’t appeal to him!’ 
 
(4.57) obviously deviates from (4.56), syntactically. Having ihn ‘him’ as accusative with 
fürchten is acceptable primarily in formal/literary and/or written language. The reflexive 
variant is closer to usage in spoken language, and Habt keine Angst ‘Don’t be frightened’ is 
certainly the most usual utterance. The latter shall demonstrate that imperatives in the 
semantic domain of fürchten are acceptable and appropriate in principle, even though jmd. 
fürchten ‘fear s.o.’ cannot be passivized in a syntactically faithful manner. The same is true 
for ängstigen ‘frighten’: It is preferably used in written texts, Mach ihm keine Angst ‘Don’t 
frighten him’ is more natural in spoken language. The imperative with trauen ‘trust’ is 
perfectly possible, i.e., appropriate, while that with wundern ‘wonder, be amazed/surprised 
about sth.’ is only when it is used reflexively, and only under a specific pragmatic 
circumstance, namely if uttered before and in anticipation of the addressee being surprised by 
some surprising circumstance (e.g., Don’t be surprised if Alex is not at home when you call 
him, because he works on Sundays.). It is in any case inappropriate with an accusative 
complement, as is (4.61) with gefallen.  
 
That means personal passivization is possible in diagrammatically iconic conceptualizations 
of complex dyadic or triadic circumstances where force is exerted on the landmark object, 
and/or in simple (stative) dyadic or triadic circumstances where the PSC referent of the verb is 
attributed responsibility for the coming about of the circumstance.  
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In other words, it is closely related to the RCP discussed above. By way of example, the 
conceptual structure of the latter condition (for fürchten ‘fear’ in the active variant of 4.56) is 
given in Figure 4.55. As another conceptualization licensing the personal passive, it 
complements the conceptual structure in Figure 4.54a . 
 
Figure 4.55: Second conceptualization licensing the personal passive 
 
Note that what has been said about non-formal scale information about the PSC referent of the 
active construction of an impersonal passive construction is also true for personal passives: 
Low values on the person and individuation scales increase the acceptability of personal 
passives. 
Concluding this section, the above linking criterion for passivization predicts that ängstigen 
‘frighten’ should be passivizable only if it codes a complex circumstance with a change of 
state and/or if its PSC referent is attributed responsibility. That means an utterance including 
ängstigen that does not satisfy both criteria should be impossible to passivize. This is 
illustrated by (4.62a) and (b). 
 
(4.62a) Peter              ist    ein        Junge, den             Gewitter                 
 Peter.3NOM be.3 a.3NOM boy    who.3ACC thunderstorm.3PL.NOM 
 ängstigen. 
 frighten.3PL 
 ‘Peter is a boy who is afraid of thunderstorms.’ 
 ‘Peter is a boy who gets scared by thunderstorms.’ 
 
(4.62b) Peter              ist   ein         Junge, der  von Gewittern 
  Peter.3NOM be.3 a.NOM boy     who by  thunderstorm.3PL.DAT 
  geängstigt        wird. 
  frighten.PTCP be.AUX.PASS 
  
#‘Peter is a boy who is afraid of thunderstorms.’ 
  ‘Peter is a boy who gets scared by thunderstorms (everytime there is one).’ 
 
(4.62b) is predicted to be possible only if Peter is interpreted as getting scared (i.e., change of 
state) everytime there is thunderstorm. A final prediction concerns typology. Because 
restrictions on passivization are closely related to the conditions governing split intransitivity, 
one would expect cross-linguistic differences in passivizability due to different praxes of 
attribution; firstly concerning the question of where the split between passivizability and non-
passivizability – as a symptom of attributing responsibility or not – semantically takes place, 
and secondly concerning which SAP status the (responsible) causer has. 
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4.4.4 The dative alternation 
A theory with a rather general scope like the one proposed here cannot do justice to all 
proposals with regard to the so-called dative alternation. Virtually every theory of the syntax-
semantics relationship has dealt with this phenomenon (e.g., Kaplan & Bresnan 1982, Larson 
1988, Jackendoff 1990, Goldberg 1995, Wunderlich 1997, Newman 2005, van Valin 2005, 
Bresnan et al. 2007, Rappaport Hovav & Levin 2008). The following rather brief discussion 
of the dative alternation follows from and is based on that of the dative in section 4.1.6.2. The 
examples used there and the underlying linking schemas are repeated below. Note that 
information-structural considerations will not be taken into account here. 
 
(4.63) Matthias             hat    dem           Professor einen      Brief  geschickt. 
  Matthias.3NOM has.3 the.3DAT professor  a.3ACC letter  send.PTCP 
 ‘Matthias sent the professor a letter.’ 
 
(4.63) is an instance of the so-called “double-object” construction (henceforth: DOC) 
containing a dative and an accusative complement. This type of dative has been identified 
above to be related to asymmetrical bi-directionality: In order to utter (4.63) in a situationally 
appropriate manner, the dative referent is required to move toward the object that is moving 
toward him/her and the dative referent may even be attributed responsibility in addition to the 
nominative referent. 
 
 
Figure 4.56: Linking schema underlying the “double-object” construction 
 
In contrast to the “double-object” construction, the “prepositional object” construction 
(henceforth: POC) lacks a dative. The addressee of the transfer relation is expressed by means 
of a prepositional phrase instead. 
 
(4.64) Matthias             hat    einen      Brief  an den           Professor geschickt. 
  Matthias.3NOM has.3 a.3ACC letter  to the.3OBL professor  send.PTCP 
 ‘Matthias sent a letter to the professor.’  
 
In the present proposal, the absence of a complement bearing dative case in a transfer relation 
is associated with the absence of symmetrical or asymmetrical bi-directionality in 
conceptualization:  
 
There is no object that moves against the motion/movement of the transferred object, as is 
indicated in the conceptual structure underlying such constructions, depicted in Figure 4.57. 
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Figure 4.57: Linking schema underlying the “prepositional object” construction 
 
At the same time, if there is a possible alternation between a DOC and a POC, the dative 
involved in the former is always one of type (i (a)) from section 4.1.6.2 exhibiting 
symmetrical or asymmetrical bi-directionality.  
 
That is why triadic circumstances with datives of type (i (b)) and (c) do not occur in the POC. 
(4.65) and (4.67) show the POC variants of (4.66) and (4.68) from section 4.1.6.2, 
respectively. They are repeated below. 
 
(4.65) *Alex            hat       das            Auto zu/nach/an Christina            
   Alex.3NOM have.3 the.3ACC car     to/to/    to   Christina.3DAT/DAT/ACC 
  gewaschen.  
  wash.PTCP  
  lit. ‘Alex washed the car to Christina.’ 
 
(4.66) Alex             hat       Christina            das            Auto gewaschen. 
   Alex.3NOM have.3 Christina.3DAT the.3ACC car    wash.PTCP 
  ‘Alex washed Christina the car.’ 
 
(4.67) *Dass du               das          Fenster   nicht zu/nach/an mir/mich            triffst! 
   that     you.2NOM the.3ACC window not    to/to/    to   me.1DAT/ACC hit.2 
  approx. ‘Don’t even think about hitting the window to me.’ 
 
(4.68) Dass du               mir            nicht das           Fenster  triffst! 
   that   you.2NOM me.1DAT not   the.3ACC window hit.2 
  ‘Don’t even think about hitting the window.’ 
 
From this simple treatment of the alternation in terms of bi-directionality, some predictions 
can be derived: 
 
(a) The presence of an immobile addressee (or one not affording movement/motion) 
is prohibited from being verbalized by means of a DOC. This includes especially 
location landmarks. 
(b) The non-requirement of movement/motion on the side of the addressee in the 
POC even allows addressees without object features in that role. In other words, the 
addressee in the POC may be an object landmark or a location landmark. 
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(c) The complex circumstance underlying the DOC has one sub-part more than that 
underlying the POC. This should cause differences in the appropriateness of their 
use. 
(d) The manner of transfer has an influence on the probability of the success of the 
respective transfer. This in turn correlates with the constructions that are associated 
with verbs designating different manners of transfer. 
 
Concerning (a) and (b), consider (4.69) and (4.70) which are variants of (1.3a) and (b) from 
part I. 
 
(4.69) Matthias             hat    einen      Brief  nach Marburg geschickt. 
  Matthias.3NOM has.3 a.3ACC letter  to     Marburg send.PTCP 
 ‘Matthias sent a letter to Marburg.’  
 
(4.70) 
#
Matthias           hat    Marburg             einen     Brief  geschickt. 
  Matthias.3NOM has.3 Marburg.3DAT  a.3ACC letter  send.PTCP 
  lit. ‘Matthias sent Marburg a letter.’ 
 
Marburg, unless interpreted metonymically as standing for some person, must be 
conceptualized as a location landmark. In this case the DOC is prohibited, i.e., it will not be 
used by a speaker and will be found unacceptable by an interpreter. At the same time, a 
location landmark is quite natural in the POC. 
Concerning (c), the POC actually leaves indeterminate the involvement of the adressee in 
terms of movement/motion instead of definitively coding his/her passivity. If the addressee in 
the POC affords movement/motion, he/she may – semantically – fulfil the requirements of a 
dative referent, i.e., actually move towards the transferred object. The reason for using a POC 
is then the uncertainty of the status of the addressee to the conceptualizer such that he/she 
does not make a statement as to his/her activity. That means uttering the POC is appropriate 
whenever the transferred object is conceptualized as being on its way towards the addressee, 
the latter’s exact nature being irrelevant. This movement/motion constitutes the last sub-part 
of the circumstance conceptualization underlying the POC. Now, in the conceptualization 
underlying the DOC the transferred object is also on its way to the addressee in some sub-part 
of the circumstance. But the DOC imposes additional restrictions on the addressee that are not 
there in the POC, namely the movement/motion of the addressee towards the transferred 
object and his/her receiving it which constitutes its final sub-part. That in turn means that 
when using the DOC is appropriate, using the POC is appropriate, too (but see further below). 
In other words, the complex circumstance underlying the DOC has one sub-part more than 
that underlying the POC. Considering Matthias, the letter, and the professor again, imagine 
Matthias has sent a letter and the professor did not get it. The above considerations would 
imply, then, that (4.72) is an appropriate utterance in this situation, while (4.71) is less 
appropriate. 
 
(4.71) 
#
Matthias           hat    dem           Professor einen      Brief  geschickt, aber  
 Matthias.3NOM has.3 the.3DAT professor  a.3ACC letter  send.PTCP but 
340 
 
 er            ist             nicht angekommen. 
 it.3NOM be.3AUX not   arrive.PTCP 
 ‘Matthias sent the professor a letter, but it did not arrive (at him).’ 
 
(4.72) Matthias             hat    einen      Brief  an den           Professor geschickt, aber 
  Matthias.3NOM has.3 a.3ACC letter  to the.3OBL professor  send.PTCP 
 er            ist             nicht angekommen. 
 it.3NOM be.3AUX not   arrive.PTCP 
 ‘Matthias sent a letter to the professor.’  
 
Imagine the letter is still on its way, with an uncertain outcome. Then both (4.63) and (4.64) 
are appropriate utterances. Now, the difference lies in the fact that the circumstances 
underlying the DOC and POC are instances of different circumstance schemas conceptualized 
by the respective speakers. While uttering (4.64) means that the speaker has conceptualized an 
action schema of sending up to the point where the letter is on its way, uttering (4.63) means 
that the speaker has conceptualized an action schema of sending up to the point where the 
professor receives the letter. Action planning for the person having uttered (4.64) is in a sense 
safer, since he/she can plan his/her actions on the certain ground of Matthias having sent the 
letter. There is nothing imponderable about his/her calculations. At the same time, his/her 
action planning does not take into account the potential or probable situation where the 
circumstance turns out to have been successful, i.e., the professor having the letter. This is the 
case with the action planning of the person having uttered (4.63). It proceeds on uncertain 
grounds – he/she predictively asserts the receiving of the letter by the professor – but his/her 
calculations already include the situation where the professor has the letter (and perhaps 
knows what is in it). Of course, this happens at the risk of being forced to re-conceptualize the 
entire action plans if the action schema of sending someone something turns out to have 
failed.
185
  
Turning to (d), it is obvious that schicken ‘send’ codes a circumstance in which the transferred 
object is “free-floating” in one of its sub-parts in the sense of not being located at either the 
source (e.g., Matthias in (4.63)) or at the addressee (e.g., the professor in (4.63)). This 
distinguishes it, for instance, from geben ‘give’. Giving events are nearly exclusively face-to-
face interactions and their outcomes are most probably successful. Something goes from one 
hand to another hand, the transferred object is at no point “free-floating”. If it were, it would 
already be a throwing event. Much more can interfere in a sending and throwing event. It 
seems as if a circumstance sub-part with a free-floating transferred object is the condition on 
the POC. This is the reason why geben ‘give’ does not occur in the POC. Further above it has 
been claimed that from the perspective of spatio-temporal conceptualization the POC is 
appropriate wherever the DOC is appropriate. This must now be restricted to transfer 
circumstances in which the transferred object is in some sub-part free-floating. Where it is 
not, the DOC is the strongly preferred construction for transfers. This can be illustrated by 
means of verbs of communication. Verbs of face-to-face communication tend to occur in the 
                                                 
185
 A variant of the jmd. etw. senden ‘send s.o. sth.’ vs. etw. an jmd. senden ‘send sth. to s.o.’ opposition is the 
jmd. etw. zuwerfen ‘throw s.o. sth.’ vs. etw. zu jmd. werfen ‘throw sth. to s.o.’ opposition. Although there are 
prepositions/particles/prefixes involved, they work similar semantically. 
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DOC, e.g., erzählen ‘tell’, sagen ‘say’, while verbs of remote communication work like the 
schicken ‘send’ type, i.e., they vary between DOC and POC, e.g., faxen ‘to fax’, mailen ‘e-
mail s.o. sth.’, SMSen ['zImzən] ‘send by writing a short message using mobile phone short 
message service (SMS)’. The same rationale can be applied to all novel, exceptional and 
creative cases of DOCs and POCs (see Goldberg 1995, 2006). For instance, in the Iliad one 
can find Zeus nodding Hera his consent (jmd. etw. zunicken).
186
 This is a face-to-face 
interaction where information is transferred and which can only succeed with Hera’s active 
engagement in the direction of Zeus. It will therefore not work with the POC (*etw. an jmd. 
(zu)nicken ‘nod sth. to s.o.’). 
 
 
4.4.5 The locative alternation 
The locative alternation was already mentioned in section 4.1.3. The relevant examples are 
repeated here as (4.73a) and (4.73b). 
 
(4.73a) Peter           malt     Bäume           auf  die          Mauer. 
 Peter.3NOM paint.3 tree.ACC.PL on   the.ACC wall  
 ‘Peter paints trees on the wall.’ 
 
(4.73b) Peter            bemalt           die          Mauer mit   Bäumen.  
 Peter.3NOM HOL-paint.3 the.ACC wall    with tree.DAT.PL 
 ‘Peter paints the wall with trees.’ 
 
To recapitulate, the (b) variant is often associated with an interpretation in which the painted 
object is holistically affected. Earlier I indicated that this meaning can be traced to a 
Germanic preposition *bi- which is today grammaticalized either as prefix to the verb stem, as 
in (4.73b), or is not any more overtly expressed as in English paint, while the respective 
landmark expression behaves as if it were still present. The meaning of *bi (approx. ‘directed 
at x, embracing it as a whole’) requires it to be perceivably spatially delimited, i.e., spatially 
delimited within the visual or simulated visual field. The underlying linking schemas are 
given below. (Note that these are more detailed now than those in section 4.1.3 and thus differ 
from them.) 
 
Figure 4.58: Linking schema underlying the NPnom-V-NPacc-Ppath-NP construction in the 
locative alternation 
 
                                                 
186
 This is based on Schadewaldt’s translation of Homer (51985). 
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Figure 4.59: Linking schema underlying the NPnom-V-NPacc-Pmit-NP construction in the 
locative alternation 
 
The first, contingent zero element in the syntactic structure in Figure 4.59 indicates the 
possible compression of the path expression into the verb. For instance, some verbs like 
gießen ‘pour’ without a path expression can also be inserted into this construction, as in die 
Blumen mit Wasser gießen ‘water the flowers’. Conceptually, there is clearly a path there. 
Variants to the compressed path expression are the prefix, particle, or prepositional adverb 
attached to the verb, exemplified in (4.73b) with the prefix be-. The second, also contingent 
zero element indicates the optionality of the final PP: Er bemalt die Wand. ‘He is painting the 
wall’ is a well-formed sentence. However, the Figure also shows that even if there is no PP 
realized, there is something in conceptualization with which the wall is painted.  
What is especially important is that in Figure 4.58 the object that is painted on is construed as 
a location landmark, while it is a location or object landmark in Figure 4.59. Why should this 
be the case? Remember that the status of circumstances is derivative of the status of 
perceptual and conceptual objects. A relation is constituted only by the states of the involved 
objects. Thus, conceptualizing a wall entirely painted with trees dictates that the 
conceptualizer verbalize this by means of the NPnom-V-NPacc-Pmit-NP construction, if this 
information is relevant for the message. Analogously, identifying this construction as 
underlying an utterance like (4.73b) indicates to the interpreter that the NPacc referent is most 
likely holistically affected. However, it is only in a very indirect sense the case that the 
expression for the painted object is dependent on the circumstance. Instead, the circumstance 
as well as the construction are dependent on how the objects in question, and the painted 
object in particular, are conceptualized in the first instance – as object or location landmark. 
Remember that even in incrementally interpreting a single verb in a verb-first utterance (like 
Bemalt… ‘paint)’ it is necessary to conceptualize one or more objects prior to being able to 
conceptualize the circumstance designated by this verb. Thus, it is essentially the nature of the 
landmark in the conceptualization of circumstances underlying the locative alternation that 
governs the choice of the particular construction. This is what aspectual approaches to the 
phenomenon must take into account (cf. Dowty 1991, Tenny 1992, among others, and Levin 
& Rappaport Hovav 2005 for an overview). 
If the above characterization is adequate, the two constructions must differ with respect to 
their acceptability when the nature of the landmark is systematically modulated. In particular, 
a landmark that is not conceptualizable as object (but only as location) and which can 
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therefore not be holistically affected should be prohibited in the NPnom-V-NPacc-Pmit-NP 
construction. I have tried to illustrate this by means of the difference between (4.74a) and 
(4.74b). 
 
(4.74a) Peter             spuckt Kirschkerne           in     die          Luft. 
 Peter.3NOM spit.3  cherry-pit.ACC.PL into the.ACC air  
 ‘Peter spits cherry-pits into the air.’ 
 
(4.74b) 
#
Peter           bespuckt     die          Luft mit   Kirschkernen.  
 Peter.3NOM HOL-spit.3 the.ACC air   with cherry-pit.DAT.PL 
  lit. ‘Peter spits the air with cherry-pits.’ 
 
The air cannot be conceptualized as being spatially delimited in a sense that would make 
(4.74b) acceptable. If some trajector (e.g., paint) goes “*bi” some landmark (e.g., a wall), and 
if *bi originally means something like ‘directed at around x’, then the distribution of the 
trajector (i.e., paint) may, when reaching the landmark (i.e., the wall), eventually extend the 
outer boundaries of the landmark (i.e., the wall’s edges). This requires the identifiability of 
these boundaries which is not the case with air. The other way around – the NPnom-V-NPacc-
Ppath-NP construction with an object landmark expression – is perfectly possible, while it is 
trivially also possible with a location landmark. 
  
Interestingly, we then have a similar implicational relationship between the two constructions 
as with the dative alternation.  
 
With respect to the latter it has been shown that the DOC imposes additional restrictions on 
triadic transfer circumstances in relation to the POC in that it has an additional final sub-part 
which constitutes (a)symmetrical bi-directionality licensing the dative. Similarly, we can state 
that the NPnom-V-NPacc-Pmit-NP construction imposes additional restrictions on the kind of 
circumstances underlying the locative alternation in relation to the NPnom-V-NPacc-Ppath-NP 
construction. This concerns the (presumably) definitive status of the landmark expression as 
object landmark that is fully affected by what the oblique NP designates. In contrast, the 
NPnom-V-NPacc-Ppath-NP construction leaves this status undetermined just like the POC leaves 
undetermined the motion/movement of the addressee and with this the arrival of the 
transferred object at the addresse. 
As a consequence, the difference between malen and bemalen, or between paint1 and paint2 
may be deeper than usually assumed. If this is true, then this difference can presumably not be 
captured by the notion of profiling in CFL which leaves the nature of the landmark untouched 
(cf. Langacker 2000, 
2
2002, 2008a, Croft 1991, 2001, Goldberg 1995 on the notion of 
profiling). 
Perhaps caused by the increasing grammaticalization, i.e., desemanticization, of be- which 
makes its effect on landmarks opaque, there may be a tendency in German to use malen and 
bemalen synonymously. (In section 4.1.3 it has been mentioned that in many cases be- has 
already lost its conceptual import). Three examples are given below: 
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(4.75) eine         frei stehende Holzlatte, die […] teilweise schwarz bemalt           
  a.3NOM free standing  lath           that       partially  black     HOL-paint.PTCP  
 ist
187
 
 be.AUX 
 ‘a freestanding lath that is partially painted black’ 
 
(4.76) Irgendjemand    hat               hier  an der         Straße meinen    Bulli  
 someone.3NOM have.3AUX here  at the.DAT street  my.ACC van     
 beschmiert
188
 
 HOL-smear.PTCP 
 ‘Someone smeared my bus here by the street’ 
 
(4.77) wo     man   zum beispiel wie  bei excel felder               hat,      die  
 where one.3 for   example like in   excel field.ACC.PL have.3 DEM.ACC.PL 
 befüllt                und sagt […]189 
 HOL-fill.PTCP and  say.3 
 ‘where one has fields like in Excel, for instance, (then) fills them and says…’ 
 
Concerning (4.75) and (4.77), if something is asserted to be bemalt ‘painted’ or befüllt ‘filled’ 
and if the interpreter takes the instruction – including be- – literally as a motivated mapping, 
then he/she would have to conceptualize this object as being painted all over and filled 
completely, not just teilweise ‘partially’. Likewise, the van of the person complaining in 
(4.76) can be seen (on the website) to have been beschmiert ‘smeared’ only at the mud wing, 
but by no means all over. 
 
 
4.4.6 The conative alternation 
Looking at its temporal organization, the conative alternation is closely related to the dative 
alternation. It is also related to the locative alternation in that the landmark plays again the 
crucial role with respect to the question of what governs the split between the two 
constructions exemplified below. It differs from the locative alternation (mostly)
190
 in the 
absence of something that changes its position ultimately (like the paint in paint the wall). 
                                                 
187
 Kölner Stadtanzeiger 14/04/2012; <http://www.stadtanzeiger.de/servlet/OriginalContentServer?pagename= 
ksta/ksArtikel/Druckfassung&aid=1334354037504> [Accessed on 17/04/2012] 
188
 <http://www.t5-board.de/board/threads/52096-Bulli-beschmiert-%28>  [Accessed on 17/04/2012] 
189
 <http://www.winfuture-forum.de/index.php?showtopic=195607> [Accessed on 17/04/2012] 
190
 (4.79) gives an example of a sentence pair which ranges somewhere between the locative and the conative 
alternation. One could say that the conative construction (see (4.79b) and main text) shows an interesting 
alternation with the NPnom-V-NPacc-Ppath-NP construction in the locative alternation (4.79a). 
 
(4.79a) Alex             wirft     den          Ball auf Christoph. 
    Alex.3NOM throw.3 the.ACC ball  on  Christoph.ACC 
 ‘Alex throws the ball to [lit. ‘on’] Christoph.’ 
 
(4.79b) Alex             wirft     den          Ball nach     Christoph. 
    Alex.3NOM throw.3 the.ACC ball  at/after Christoph.DAT 
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(4.78a) Der            Kardinal  schlägt den Jungen.  
 the.3NOM cardinal   hit.3      the.ACC boy 
  ‘The cardinal hits the boy.’ 
 
(4.78b) Der            Kardinal schlägt nach dem        Jungen.  
 the.3NOM cardinal   hit.3      at     the.DAT boy 
  ‘The cardinal hits at the boy.’ 
 
The (b) variant is called “conative” construction (deriving from Latin conor ‘try, make 
effort’) because the NPnom-V-P-NP construction in interplay with the verb codes “only” the 
attempt to actualize the circumstance that the verb in isolation designates. Thus, hit at sth. 
expresses the attempt to hit sth. (see Levin 1993, Goldberg 1995, 2006, Dowty 2001, Broccias 
2001).  
Remember that in the dative alternation the DOC has been differentiated from the POC 
among other things by stating that it has one sub-event more. By using the DOC the speaker 
conceptualizes the circumstance in a way that includes the addressee’s receiving the 
transferred object. The circumstance coded by the POC leaves this final sub-part 
undetermined. Only the transferred object being on its way to the addressee is coded by that 
construction. In this respect the concept of the circumstance underlying the POC is contained 
in that of the DOC. The same can now be stated about the conative alternation.  
If the cardinal hit the boy (and was attributed responsibility for that), then this entails that the 
cardinal also hit at the boy. The reverse case is not true. If the cardinal hit at the boy this does 
not mean that he actually hit him.  
 
 
Figure 4.60: Linking schema for NPnom-V-NPacc construction in conative alternation 
 
Figure 4.60 shows that the movement of the nominative referent is directed towards the 
accusative referent. If it succeeds, it is accompanied by exertion of force. It then constitutes 
the action schema of hitting someone. The result is a verbalization by means of the NPnom-V-
NPacc construction. If, in constrast, the movement does not reach the landmark, force cannot 
                                                                                                                                                        
 ‘Alex throws the ball to [lit. ‘at’/’after’] Christoph.’ 
 
Locally, i.e., with respect to these two utterances, I cannot detect a difference in the conceptualizations 
underlying them. However, globally the difference between the two constructions lies in the fact that the 
conative construction in (4.79b) is possible only when the landmark is an object, while location landmarks also 
license the NPnom-V-NPacc-Ppath-NP construction. 
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be exerted and no causation takes place. The landmark remains unaffected by the movement 
of the trajector. This is given in Figure 4.61. 
 
 
Figure 4.61: Linking schema for NPnom-V-P-NP construction in conative alternation 
 
The schematic in Figure 4.61 shall not suggest that this circumstance could not develop into 
one of hitting someone. In other words, hit at someone may code the midway to hitting 
someone, i.e., a middle sub-part of the action schema of hitting someone. But importantly, it 
can also code the failure of the action schema of hitting someone. In The cardinal hit at him 
but he dived away the hitting at the boy can only in a restricted sense be viewed as a midway 
to hitting him because the actualization of the latter action schema has actually failed. For 
another instance of the conative alternation compare (4.80) and (4.81), as well as their 
appendant schematics.  
 
(4.80) Alex             zieht   den         Hebel (zu       sich). 
 Alex.3NOM pull.3  the.ACC lever (toward self.REFL) 
 ‘Alex pulls the lever.’ 
 
 
Figure 4.62: Linking schema for NPnom-V-NPacc construction in conative alternation 
 
(4.81) Alex             zieht    an dem         Hebel (
*
zu           sich). 
  Alex.3NOM pull.3  at   the.DAT lever     (towards himself.DAT) 
  ‘Alex pulls at the lever.’ 
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Figure 4.63: Linking schema for NPnom-V-P-NP construction in conative alternation 
 
The difference between Figure 4.62 and Figure 4.63 lies in the arrow leading from the 
landmark symbol (lever) towards the trajector symbol (Alex). Whereas the NPnom-V-NPacc 
construction is used for the circumstance in which the motion of the lever takes place, the 
NPnom-V-P-NP construction is used for the circumstance in which its motion is planned but 
where the outcome is uncertain or irrelevant. Note that the presence of the PP zu sich in (4.81) 
would have the effect of actualizing the motion of the lever towards the puller – which is 
clearly contradictory to the conation coded by the NPnom-V-P-NP construction. 
There are several conditions on the appropriate use of the conative construction. Firstly, it is 
obviously the case that the object that will eventually exert force in such circumstances must 
be capable of conation, i.e., of trying and making effort. As such this object must be action 
competent in the sense that it must be able to conceptualize a circumstance that shall be 
brought about and for the bringing about of which some action schema(s) is/are the means. 
However, this action competence has in earlier sections been described to be a crucial 
ingredient to what is involved in the attribution of responsibility. In other words, the 
circumstance in (4.80) above, coded by the NPnom-V-NPacc construction, entails the 
circumstance in (4.81), coded by the NPnom-V-P-NP construction, only if the moving object is 
attributed responsibility. If this is not the case or not possible, the conative construction is not 
acceptable. 
Secondly, the verb in isolation (without P) must not designate a circumstance after which the 
landmark has some changed feature, location, or integrity than before. Furthermore, no 
element indicating a final result of the circumstance must be there. That means the 
circumstance must not be resultative. This can be shown by attaching elements to the verb 
coding resulting states. If they are present, the conative construction is unacceptable. 
 
(4.82a) Der            Jäger     erschlägt       den        Hasen. 
 the.3NOM hunter   RESLT-hit.3 the.ACC hare 
  ‘The hunter batters the hare to death.’ 
 
(4.82b) *Der            Jäger    erschlägt      nach dem        Hasen.  
 the.3NOM hunter   RESLT-hit.3 at     the.DAT hare 
  lit. ‘The hunter batters at the hare to death.’ 
 
(4.83a) Der           Jäger  schlägt den Hasen      tot.  
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 the.3NOM hunter hit.3    the.ACC hare dead.RESLT 
  ‘The hunter batters the hare to death.’ 
 
(4.83b) *Der            Jäger  schlägt nach dem         Hasen tot.  
 the.3NOM hunter hit.3     at      the.ACC hare   dead.RESLT 
  lit. ‘The hunter batters at the hare to death.’ 
 
The reason is that the circumstance coded by the conative construction is open at its “back 
end”, either because the information about how it works out is irrelevant or because it is 
unknown. Anyway, if there is a syntactic unit coding a resultant state with respect to the 
circumstance coded by the verb (stem), the final state that is actually unknown or irrelevant is 
asserted. 
Thirdly, the circumstance underlying the conative construction must exhibit exertion of force 
(which does not imply change of feature/location/integrity) between the moving thing and the 
landmark carried out in the pursued circumstance. For this to happen movement/motion must 
also apply. This may be fictive or concrete motion/movement. In (4.84a) below it is 
exemplified by fictive movement/motion. Contact is constituted here by the sub-part of the 
circumstance in which the fictive motion/movement of the trajector’s eye gaze “hits” the 
landmark in its conceptual field. As a consequence, it is undetermined whether the cardinal in 
the (b) variant will actually see the boy – he tries to see him.  
 
(4.84a) Der            Kardinal sieht den          Jungen.  
 the.3NOM cardinal  see.3 the.ACC boy 
  ‘The cardinal sees the boy.’ 
 
(4.84b) Der            Kardinal sieht nach dem        Jungen.  
 the.3NOM cardinal   see.3  at     the.DAT boy 
  ‘The cardinal looks where the boy is.’ 
 
It is not by coincidence that nach jmd. sehen (lit. ‘look after s.o.’) is also often 
interchangeable with jmd. suchen ‘look for s.o.’. 
Many proposals concerning English grammar and dealing with the conative alternation treat 
sentence pairs like Alex eats the cake and Alex eats at the cake as instances of the conative 
alternation. A pair like this resembles the conative construction with respect to the alternation 
between an adverbal accusative complement and a complement that is governed by at, the 
verb itself being equal across the constructions. Although there are similar conditions on the 
use of this alternation as on that of the conative alternation with respect to their temporal 
organizations, this treatment is problematic from a spatial-conceptual and especially from an 
actional standpoint (see also Broccias 2001). This is why examples like the above will be 
dedicated a separate section as partitives. 
 
 
4.4.7 The partitive alternation  
Consider the following sentence pairs and the appendant Figures, respectively. 
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(4.85a) Alex              liest    das          Buch (durch). 
 Alex.3NOM read.3 the.ACC book (through) 
 ‘Alex reads the book completely.’ 
 
 
Figure 4.64: Linking schema for NPnom-V-NPacc construction in partitive alternation 
 
(4.85b) Alex             liest    an/in dem         Buch (
*
durch). 
 Alex.3NOM read.3 at/in  the.DAT book   (through) 
 ‘Alex reads in the novel.’ 
 
 
Figure 4.65: Linking schema for NPnom-V-P-NP construction in partitive alternation 
 
(4.86a) Philipp             schreibt seine       Dissertation. 
 Philipp.3NOM write.3  his.ACC dissertation 
 ‘Philipp writes his dissertation.’ 
 
 
Figure 4.66: Linking schema for NPnom-V-NPacc construction in partitive alternation 
 
(4.86b) Philipp            schreibt an  seiner     Dissertation. 
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 Philipp.3NOM write.3  on  his.DAT dissertation 
 ‘Philipp writes on his dissertation.’ 
 
 
Figure 4.67: Linking schema for NPnom-V-P-NP construction in partitive alternation 
 
(4.87a) Hans             baut      ein       Baumhaus. 
 Hans.3NOM build.3  a.ACC tree-house 
 ‘Hans builds a tree house.’ 
 
 
Figure 4.68: Linking schema for NPnom-V-NPacc construction in partitive alternation 
 
(4.87b) Hans             baut      an einem  Baumhaus. 
 Hans.3NOM build.3  on a.DAT tree-house 
 ‘Hans builds a tree house.’ 
 
 
Figure 4.69: Linking schema for NPnom-V-P-NP construction in partitive alternation 
 
The circumstances underlying the (a) and (b) sentences above are long-term activities. If 
coded by means of the NPnom-V-NPacc construction as in the (a) variants, the final sub-parts of 
these circumstances are constituted by their respective landmark objects having gained or lost 
integrity and identity in terms of the noun referring to these objects. If coded by means of the 
NPnom-V-P-NP construction as in the (b) variants, the final sub-parts of these circumstances 
are constituted by their respective landmark objects gradually gaining or losing parts of a 
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whole (and ultimately integrity) and thus identity in terms of the noun referring to these 
objects.  
 
In the case of (4.85b) the activity takes place with respect to a part of the whole being 
metaphorically consumed. Like in the conative alternation, the trajector’s movement/motion 
must make contact with the landmark. 
The preposition an in the (b) variants does not really code a spatial relation, e.g., the location 
where the circumstance expressed by the verb takes place. I would suggest is that this is not a 
motivated construction. In particular I would suggest that it is no longer a motivated structure. 
One can imagine that it once was, when an in fact designated a spatial relation, namely that 
between the activity of a trajector (let us say Hans) and the location landmark where the 
activity took place (i.e., Hans building a tree house somewhere). It is conceivable that the 
location where Hans was building the tree house once ultimately became occupied by an 
object, namely the tree house itself. In this way, the location became identified with the object 
that gradually filled it by having been built. Grammatically, the continuous or iterative and 
temporally distributed activity of the trajector (i.e., Hans) at the location landmark may have 
been compressed in a way that resulted in the occupation of the product of the activity (i.e., 
the tree house) in the syntactic position of the location where the activity (i.e., building sth.) 
took place. The final result of these compression processes is a partitive conceptualization: 
The preposition phrases consisting of [an NP] in the (b) sentences above can always be 
paraphrased with [etwas von NP] ‘some part of NP’ which in many languages is expressed by 
partitive case forms. 
This is where the partitive alternation differs from the conative alternation in a crucial respect: 
Where the conative construction codes the effort to succeed in the circumstance that is coded 
by the NPnom-V-NPacc construction, the circumstance coded in the partitive construction 
actually succeeds, even though not completely, i.e., the circumstance to be realized is not yet 
brought about. However, the ancillary action schemas which constitute the trajector’s activity 
are not failed instances of actualizing the action schema designated by the verb, as may be the 
case in the conative alternation: nach jmd. schlagen ‘hit at s.o.’ may designate the failure in 
the attempt to actualize the action schema of hitting someone, whereas an etw. schreiben 
‘write on something’ does not designate the failure in the attempt to actualize the action 
schema of writing something. 
Although the following example differs from the previous ones with regard to 
definiteness/individuation and the fact that the landmark is the PSC, whereas the trajector 
occurs in the partitive phrase, it is clearly a partitive construction. I am not even sure whether 
the attribution of responsibility is necessary in the partitive construction, which would not be 
surprising given its “mere” conceptual characterization. 
 
(4.88a) Der             Reifen/Teich   verliert Luft/       Wasser. 
 The.3NOM tire/      lagoon lose.3   air.ACC/water.ACC 
  ‘The tire loses air/The lagoon loses water.’ 
 
(4.88b) Der            Reifen/Teich   verliert an Luft/       Wasser. 
 The.3NOM tire/     lagoon lose.3   on air.DAT/water.DAT 
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  ‘The tire loses (some of its) air/The lagoon loses (some of its) water.’ 
 
Interestingly, the German particle herum- ‘around’, if attached to a verb, takes (provisorily 
spoken) the presence of a final state away from the conceptualization of the underlying 
circumstance, i.e., there will not be a final state conceptualized if the utterance contains a verb 
prefixed with herum-. Attaching herum- to some German verbs thus results in the 
acceptability of the otherwise unacceptable partitive constructions.  
 
(4.89) Er              streichelt/küsst/rasiert  an der          Statue *(herum)
191
. 
 He.3NOM caress/    kiss/  shave.3  on  the.DAT statue   (around) 
 ‘He caresses/kisses/shaves around on the statue.’ 
 
The immediate cause of the acceptability of (4.89) does not seem to be the lack of a 
destination, but rather the conceptualization of the landmark as a location of which only a part 
is affected by the activity of the trajector. Only when something is spatially extended to a 
sufficient degree one can ‘verb around on/at a part of it’ and make this a long-term activity. If 
conceptualized as a holistically affected object landmark, there must be very special 
conditions met in order to make the partitive construction acceptable. This is illustrated in 
Figure 4.70 below which concludes this section. 
 
  
Figure 4.70: Linking schema for NPnom-V-P-NP-herum subtype of partitive construction  
 
 
4.4.8 Resultative constructions 
The resultative construction shall be discussed rather briefly. One can guess that the role of 
the landmark will be of some importance here again. For the dative, locative, conative, and 
partitive alternations it has been demonstrated that one of the respective constructions in the 
alternations lacks a definitive resulting stative circumstance as a final sub-part, and that this 
depends on how the landmarks are conceptualized, respectively.  
 
More precisely, there is a fundamental difference between object and location landmarks that 
has to do with their affordances: Only objects afford movement/motion in any conceivable 
manner, whether along particular paths or to particular destinations, or change of feature or 
                                                 
191
 The expression between a pair of parentheses is optional. An asterisk preceding the expression inside the 
parentheses [x (*y) z] indicates the unacceptability of the expression between parentheses in this utterance. An 
asterisk preceding the left parenthesis [x *(y) z] indicates the unacceptability of the utterance if the expression in 
the parentheses is absent. 
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location by means of undergoing exertion of force. This difference becomes important with 
respect to the resultative construction which is illustrated by (4.90a) to (4.90f).  
 
The resultative construction is exemplified by the first sentence. 
 
(4.90a) Der            Jäger  schießt den          Hasen tot.  
 the.3NOM hunter shoot.3 the.ACC hare    dead.RESLT 
  ‘The hunter shoots the hare dead.’ 
 
(4.90b) Der           Jäger  schießt  auf    den         Hasen (*tot).  
 the.3NOM hunter shoot.3 at/on the.ACC hare     (dead.RESLT) 
  lit. ‘The hunter shoots at the hare (dead).’ 
 
(4.90c) Der           Jäger     erschießt            den        Hasen (*tot).  
 the.3NOM hunter   RESLT-shoot.3 the.ACC hare    (dead.RESLT) 
  lit. ‘The hunter shoots-dead the hare (dead).’ 
 
(4.90d) Der            Jäger    erschießt           (*auf)  den         Hasen.  
 the.3NOM hunter   RESLT-shoot.3 (at/on) the.DAT hare 
  lit. ‘The hunter shoots-dead (at) the hare.’ 
 
(4.90e) Der            Jäger  beschießt       den         Hasen (*tot).  
 the.3NOM hunter HOL-shoot.3 the.DAT hare     (dead.RESLT) 
  lit. ‘The hunter shoots toward the hare (dead).’ 
 
(4.90f) Der            Jäger  beschießt      (*auf)   den         Hasen.  
 the.3NOM hunter HOL-shoot.3 (at/on) the.DAT hare 
  lit. ‘The hunter shoots toward (at) the hare.’ 
 
In (4.90a) there are two circumstances (i.e. two conceptualizations) compressed into one 
sentence. First of all there is the activity of shooting by the hunter and secondly the dying or 
being dead of the hare. The same can be said about the well-formed variant (4.90c)/(d). In the 
well-formed variants of the other sentences (4.90b) and (e)/(f) there is only the activity of 
shooting with an uncertain or irrelevant outcome. One can ask now (i) what the difference 
between the sentences with a resultant state is, (ii) what the difference between those without 
a resultant state is, and (iii) why adding the expressions in parentheses make all of them 
unacceptable. 
(i) The difference between (4.90a) and (c)/(d) lies in the fact that the death of the hare is not 
the only possible result of the shooting activity in (a) but that this is the necessary result of 
erschießen ‘RESLT-shoot’ in (c)/(d). The prefix er- goes back to Germanic *uz- (Goth. us 
‘away from sth.’, esp. ‘from inside to ouside, up from below’), lost its spatial meaning 
relatively early in favor of a temporal one, so that the position in space of some 
movement/motion got replaced by the “position in time” where the motion/movement ends. 
This is the resultant, i.e., final sub-part of a circumstance that is largely determined by the 
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concept underlying the verb stem. Where er- today still contributes to the conceptualization 
underlying some verb stem it can thus be paraphrased as ‘indicating the result of the 
circumstance designated by the verb stem’. Because “result” is theoretically vague, it can be 
reconstructed here by means of the action theoretical notions introduced in section 2.4: Result 
in this context means the outcome of the actualization of a circumstance schema, given that 
the actualization is successful.  
In the case of schießen death is the outcome the actualization of the action schema. 
Linguistically
o
, this finds its expression in the conservative hunter’s jargon: etw. geschossen 
haben ‘having shot sth.’ means that the once animate object is dead now. (In the German 
Standard variety this construction with schießen is rather rare.) As a consequence, the 
landmark in the circumstance verbalized by means of erschießen is dead if the action 
succeeds. The landmark in the NPnom-V-NPacc-ADJ construction (4.91c)/(d) may also be dead 
(as in (4.90a)), but the result may also be another one. Because the respective adjectives for 
animate objects are difficult to find, (4.91) uses an inanimate object landmark: 
 
(4.91) Der           Jäger  schießt  die          Statue kaputt/entzwei.  
 the.3NOM hunter shoot.3 the.ACC statue broken.RESLT 
  ‘The hunter shoots the statue to pieces.’ (lit. ‘broken’) 
 
If erschießen enforces the death of the shot object, then it should be unacceptable to use it 
with an inanimate object landmark. What happens to such an object depends rather on its 
affordances than on the action schema designated by the verb. 
 
(4.92) 
#
Der           Jäger  erschießt            die          Statue.  
 the.3NOM hunter RESLT-shoot.3 the.ACC statue  
  ‘The hunter shoots the statue.’ 
 
(ii) The difference between (4.90b) and (e)/(f) is obviously that of a locative alternation. 
However, it differs from the examples with malen/bemalen ‘paint’ in section 4.4.5, namely in 
the way the prefix be- interplays with the conceptualization underlying the verb stem schieß-. 
To be precise, the hare in (4.90e)/(f) need not at all be hit by the shot. What does that mean 
with respect to the holistic affection of the object landmark in constructions with be-? I would 
suggest that the hare, as object landmark in the shooting event is still holistically affected, but 
in the sense be- originally indicates, namely ‘directed at around x’. This is – in a slightly 
stylized manner – depicted in Figure 4.71. That beschießen can indicate that multiple shots 
are fired (shooting is iterated) could originate in the ‘around x’ conceptualization underlying 
be-, because a single shot can hardly accomplish this holistic affection. Thus, (4.90e)/(f) 
compress multiple actions into a single construction. 
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Figure 4.71: Conceptualization underlying beschießen ‘HOL-shoot’ event 
 
In contrast, with the construction underlying (4.90b) the hare may remain unharmed too, but 
only because this construction does not code a situation in which the shooting results, but a 
conation. This is indicated  by Figure 4.70 which is modelled similarly to Figure 4.69. 
 
  
Figure 4.72: Conceptualization underlying schießen auf ‘shoot at’ event 
 
(iii) Sentences (4.90b) to (f) become unacceptable if the expressions in parentheses occur in 
them, respectively. (4.90b) without the addendum is a conative construction and renders the 
result of the activity irrelevant or uncertain. It is thus conceptually/actionally incompatible 
with a resultative phrase. In (4.90c) the verbal prefix er- already instructs the interpreter to 
conceptualize the landmark as dead, as has been argued. Its change of state cannot be 
conceptualized twice, as the final adjective would require. In (4.90d) the PP headed by auf 
‘at/on’ renders the outcome of the activity of shooting at the hare uncertain. It is open at the 
end and can even be continued. The prefix er- on the verb is incompatible with this 
conceptualization because it instructs one to close the circumstance by means of a final sub-
part in which the hare is dead. Concerning (4.90e), the conceptualization in Figure 4.71 shows 
that be- does not enforce the conceptualization of a resulting state in the landmark but even 
renders the activity imperfective by compression which makes it incompatible with a 
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resultative phrase. And in (4.90f) the be- prefix already instructs the interpreter to 
conceptualize the path of shooting as being directed towards (around) the landmark. The PP 
headed by auf is thus incompatible with it.  
 
 
4.4.9 Weather verbs 
Most grammar or syntax textbooks on German dedicate special attention to weather verbs, 
since they show some special syntactic behavior (e.g., Eisenberg 1999, Hentschel & Weydt 
3
2003, Eroms 2005, Fleischer & Schallert 2011). In fact, this is a cross-linguistically 
observable phenomenon (e.g., Jones 1996: 66f., Hualde & Ortiz de Urbina 2003: 377f.). In 
particular, many languages to which German belongs express weather circumstances by 
means of verbs. Within the tradition of Chomskyan Linguistics the co-occurring PSCs of 
these verbs are often assumed to be “thematically” empty and to be syntactically required 
(
#
wer/was regnet ‘who/what is raining’). Cognitive linguists are rather skeptical about these 
assumptions and consider the so-called expletive pronoun PSC “meaningful” (e.g., Smith 
2002). If Chomskyan linguists are right, the syntactic behavior of weather verbs is 
independent of actional, perceptual, and conceptual foundations of verb-complement 
structures, belongs to the idling cycle of the symbol system (see section 3.3.8), and thus lies 
outside the scope of this work. If Cognitive linguists are right, one should find some 
motivation in the mapping between conceptualization and syntactic structures with respect to 
weather circumstances. Let us first assemble some linguistic
o
 evidence. The following 
examples suggest that the expletive pronoun es ‘it’ is not a mere syntactic dummy. 
 
(4.93) […] ich war froh,    daß es danach   in Strömen     geregnet und mir     den  
         I    was  happy that it  after-that cats-and-dogs rained    and  to-me the  
 Radlauf      und Unterboden abgespült hat.
192
  
 wheel-arch and undercarriage rinse-out has 
 lit. ‘I was happy that it had rained after that and rinsed out the wheel-arch 
 and undercarriage of my car.’ 
 
(4.94) […] es hat gestürmt und den Regen gegen  das Fenster  gepeitscht.193 
    it has stormed  and  the rain      against the window slashed 
  ‘It was storming and slashed the rain against the window.’ 
 
(4.95) Es hat geregnet und den ganzen Schnee weggespült.
194
 
  it   has rained    and  the entire    snow    washed-away 
 ‘It rained and washed all the snow away.’ 
 
                                                 
192
 <http://www.golfcabrio.de/forum/archive/index.php/t-78968.html> [Accessed on 20/04/2012] 
193
 <http://remstalhoehenweg.blogspot.de/2012/01/regen-und-schnee.html> [Accessed on 20/04/2012] 
194
  <http://www.weightwatchers.de/community/mbd/post.aspx?threadpage_no=1&page_size=25&rownum= 
11&board_name=Unter+Freunden&thread_id=126685931&board_id=8&forum_name=forum&forum_id=1&thr
ead_name=***Star+Trek+meets+WW+am+18.01.10***&mod_no=&sincedate=05.01.2010+00%3A00%3A00
&viewchange=DATECREATEDDESC> [Accessed on 20/04/2012] 
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(4.96) […] es hat geregnet und den losen dreck in    den teich geschmissen […]195 
          it  has rained    and  the loose  dirt    into the  pond thrown 
  ‘It rained and washed the loose dirt into the pond’ 
 
 
(4.93) to (4.96) each contain coordinated clauses. In the first clause of each sentence a 
weather verb occurs with a PSC considered an expletive es ‘it’. In the respective coordinated 
clauses the PSCs are quite regularly left out. The verbs in the coordinated sentences are not 
weather verbs but verbs whose conceptualization includes motion and/or exertion of force by 
a trajector, and thus should require “thematic” or “meaningful” PSCs – but which they 
obviously do not have. 
On the basis of these data is difficult to decide whether es is – somehow – referential in both 
clauses of each sentence or whether the verbs in the second clauses of the sentences can be 
expressed without their referential PSCs and take an expletive es instead, just like the weather 
verbs. One can state, however, that in sentences like Mir hat es den Radlauf und Unterboden 
abgespült
196
 ‘It has rinsed out the wheel-arch and undercarriage of my car’ one can ask the 
question of what (was) has done this. 
In the face of the insights in auxiliary choice (see section 4.4.2) one can ask what motivates 
the auxiliary choice in weather verb constructions. Consider (4.97) to (4.99). Note that I have 
added conceptual subscriptions to parts of the construction. 
 
(4.97) Esexpl       regnetmotion+manner Fröschetr. 
 it.3EXPL rain.3                    frogs 
 ‘It is raining frogs.’ 
 
(4.98) Esexpl      hat             Fröschetr geregnetmotion+manner. 
 it.3EXPL has.3AUX frogs        rained 
 ‘It has rained frogs.’ 
 
(4.99) *EsVf-es           sind/              *Esexpl       ist           Fröschetr geregnetmotion+manner. 
 it.3SGVFES are.3AUX/it.3SGEXPL is.3AUXfrogs.PL   rained 
  
The sentences illustrate that if it rains or if it rains something, a form of ‘have’ is chosen as 
auxiliary. According to the regularities of auxiliary selection, this predicts a causative 
circumstance, an “existence of state”, an “uncontrolled” or a “controlled process”. I think we 
can exclude on relatively safe grounds that there is a controlled process underlying (4.97) and 
(4.98). An argument against the existence of a state is that something is actually happening 
when it is raining. Thus, we presumably deal with an uncontrolled process or a causative 
circumstance. Uncontrolled processes are expressible by monadic constructions, where the 
involved objects are realized by the PSC. This does not work, as (4.100) illustrates. 
                                                 
195
 <http://www.spielerboard.de/allgemeine-diskussionen/247495-teich-im-garten-2.html> [Accessed on 
20/04/2012] 
196
 I wanted to avoid beginning this sentence with Es hat ‘It has’ because this would have shifted the expletive es 
to a so-called “Vorfeld-es” (‘prefield’, according to the theory of topological fields). 
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(4.100) 
#
Frösche regnenmotion+manner. 
 frogs.3    rain.3 
 ‘Frogs are raining.’ 
 
Treating (4.98) as a causative construction, we can make the underlying circumstance 
complex and conceptualize it as including a change of state in the added landmark. This 
should allow us to passivize the sentence. If it works, it is a causative construction. 
 
(4.101) Esexpl      hat              Fröschetr  aufdirection michlm herabpath geregnetmotion+manner. 
 it.3EXPL has.3AUX frogs         on           me        down-rained 
 lit. ‘It rained frogs down on me.’ 
 
(4.102) 
#
Fröschetr sind            aufdirection michlm herabpathgeregnetmotion+manner worden. 
 frogs.3     are.3AUX  on            me      down-rained                        were.AUX.PTCP 
  lit. ‘Frogs were rained down on me.’ 
 
Thus, it seems it is not a causative construction. However, it behaves like one in other 
respects. Remember that in triadic causative constructions the selected auxiliary is that which 
would be chosen if only the first sub-part of the causative circumstance would be verbalized. 
This is always an “(un)controlled process” in which the trajector is involved. Now, if we take 
the object exerting force away from the causative circumstance and if the second and third 
sub-parts of the causative circumstance include a change of location or state, then this would 
be expressible by a form of ‘be’ as auxiliary. This is indeed already implicit in (4.102) and 
now explicated in (4.103). 
 
(4.103) Fröschetr sind            aufdirection michlm herabpathgeregnetmotion+manner. 
  frogs.3    are.3AUX  on           me       down       rained                     
   ‘Frogs were raining down on me.’ 
 
Adding es to the construction in (4.103) does not result in an expletive construction but rather 
in one with a Vorfeld-es (given in (4.104)). And because it still involves a change of location, 
it is perfectly okay – in opposition to (4.99) above. For the same reasons (4.105) is also okay 
– in opposition to (4.100) above. 
 
(4.104) EsVf-es            sind                 Fröschetr aufdirection michlm herabpathgeregnetmotion+manner. 
 it.3SGVFES are.3PL.AUX frogs.3PL on            me      down-rained 
 ‘There were frogs raining down on me.’ 
 
(4.105) Fröschetr regnenmotion+manner aufdirection michlm herabpath. 
 frogs         rain                        on           me        down 
 ‘Frogs are raining down on me.’ 
 
Thus, weather verb constructions resemble causative constructions in certain respects, but 
differ from them in others. The factors that make them different make (4.100) and (4.102) 
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unacceptable. (4.99) is unacceptable by independent reasons. In what follows the former 
factors shall be isolated. When examining possible actional, perceptual, and conceptual causes 
for the special behavior of weather verbs, one cannot avoid taking the entities involved in 
weather circumstances into account. 
From a perceptual and conceptual point of view, objects in weather circumstances are mostly 
not figure-apt. As such, they cannot serve as trajectors in conceptualization. In section 3.1 I 
outlined how gestalt laws help perceivers “build” a figure as a whole from basic visual 
features, and how they help determine the spatial relationship of a figure in reference to a 
ground, i.e., to determine in which relation the figure stands to what else is in the visual field. 
A “good” figure was characterized as an integration of visual features which are proximate to 
each other, similar to each other, constituting well continuing lines, exhibiting closure, and 
which are moving together. The segregation of a figure from a ground is facilitated by the 
smallness of a figure and the movement/motion of a figure relative to a ground. The 
importance of foveal seeing in the identification/categorization of stimuli has also been 
outlined. Most of these properties do not apply to what we call rain in raining, snow in 
snowing, storm in storming, drizzle in drizzling, or hail in hailing circumstances. That means 
there is something in the visual/conceptual field that cannot be singled out as figures, i.e., as 
trajectors and object landmarks. There can thus be no affordances – e.g., no exertion of force 
– as long as the stimuli in our visual/conceptual do not become more individuated and thus 
somehow more figure-apt.  
I ascribe the unacceptability of (4.100) to the lack of figure-aptness of the designata of rain in 
raining, snow in snowing, and so on. That makes these nouns suspicious of being 
hypostatizations – pretending to designate objects by being a noun while actually coding 
whole circumstances –, but that need not be the case: Rain, snow, etc. can actually assume 
object features, namely rain (or water) and snow as results of raining and snowing, 
respectively. In opposition to being amorphous, non-individuated masses, amounts of rain, 
snow etc. may at least partially get spatial delimitations, i.e., perceivable edges, in particular 
there where the products of raining, snowing and so on aggregate or pile up somewhere. The 
fact that rain may refer to the fairly individuated result of raining may also contribute to the 
unacceptability of (4.100): The sentence would have to be interpreted such that the process 
was identical with its result. Another consequence is that snow and water aggregations (e.g., 
snow heaps, puddles of water) may afford circumstances to actors/cognizers, among them 
exertion of force. If interpreted as results of the respective processes of raining, snowing and 
so on, and as having a certain amount and spatial delimitations, the PSC NPs in (4.106) need 
not be hypostatizations but may refer to fairly regular trajectors. An exception is Niesel 
‘drizzle’, since it is unusual if not impossible to designate the result of nieseln ‘drizzle’, 
perhaps because it describes a manner of raining. 
 
(4.106) Der         Regen/Schnee/Hagel/
?
Niesel hat                mir          die                 
 the.3NOM rain/    snow/   hail/    drizzle   have.3AUX me.DAT the.ACC.PL 
  Pflanzen kaputt gemacht.  
  plant.PL broken make.PTCP 
  ‘The rain/snow/hail/drizzle destroyed my plants.’ 
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The regular status of the trajectors (except Niesel) should in turn license the passivization of 
these sentences: The trajectors exert force on the landmark so that it undergoes a change of 
features (here: losing integrity/identity). 
 
(4.107) Die                  Pflanzen sind         mir         vom              Regen/Schnee/Hagel/ 
 the.3NOM.PL plant.PL  be.3AUX me.DAT by-the.DAT rain/  snow/   hail/     
 
?
Niesel  zerstört/bedeckt       worden 
    drizzle destroy/cover.PTCP was.AUX.PTCP 
 ‘The plants were destroyed/covered by the rain/wind/hail/drizzle.’ 
 
(4.106) demonstrates that the result of a weather circumstance may exert force on something. 
However, this still does not answer the question as to whether this result itself is caused by 
something which is expressed by es ‘it’, e.g., in (4.101).  
The comparisons of sentences (4.93) and (4.96) on the one hand, and (4.101) and (4.102) on 
the other, yield no clear-cut picture, suggesting that with weather verbs the relationship 
between semantics and syntax is not as regular as with respect to other phenomena. A 
tentative explanation could be a mismatch between the diachronic motivation of the expletive 
es in weather verb constructions and the way in which it is actually interpreted and used by 
speakers of German today. 
Concerning diachrony, there are some clues that point to rather formal causes in the 
development of the expletive es (cf. Dal 
3
1966: 166ff., Fleischer & Schallert 2011: 213ff.). 
Around the time of Old High German it seems to have appeared at first in the syntactic 
prefield of sentences with weather verbs. Such uses existed alongside subjectless uses of 
weather verbs at that time. Other old languages of the Germanic branch used complements in 
instrumental case together with weather verbs. From the prefield the expletive then found its 
way into other constructions and syntactic positions. 
Concerning interpretation and conceptualization, evidence like that in (4.93) to (4.96) and the 
perceptual considerations above point to the fact that cognizers conceptualize weather 
circumstances as being somehow caused, but without conceptualizing any causer. This may 
sound rather metaphysical, but it simply concerns a causer that cannot be detected. In other 
words, weather circumstances cannot be closed at the front end, but at the same time 
cognizers refuse to believe them to be uncaused. Forgetting about the expletive for a moment, 
what would be a motivated manner of coding the single complement of a weather verb? 
Emphasizing the fact that weather circumstances have some causal power while at the same 
time being caused suggests a causally intermediate status. Such objects are coded by 
instrumental case in many languages. This strategy was used in Germanic (see above). 
Emphasizing the “undetectable causer”, gods come to mind. And indeed, in ancient Greek, for 
instance, Zeus may rain (Ζɛῦς ὕɛι ‘Zeus rains’; e.g., Iliad, 12, 25f.). For syntactic and 
historical reasons, neither coding strategy is available in New High German.  
 
To cut a long story short, I think the expletive es in weather constructions is originally, i.e., 
historically, a syntactic (or information-structural) dummy but due to the cognizer’s 
universally valid attempt to close circumstances at the front – which is not possible in weather 
circumstances for perceptual reasons – the expletive pronoun may be exceptionally used, or as 
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one could say, conceptually occupied in order to satisfy the responsible causer preference 
(RCP) which results in utterances like (4.93) to (4.96) and explains the partial pseudo-
causative behavior of weather verbs and the expletive es.  
 
I think one must especially appreciate the power of the RCP here. Remember the discussion 
of how causes are identified by self-serving pragmatics (section 3.2.1.4): Sometimes any 
explanation (i.e., cause) will suffice, irrespective of its scientific plausibility. 
 
 
4.4.10 A note on coercion 
A last phenomenon that shall only briefly be mentioned is often called “coercion” or “type 
coercion” (cf. Pustejovsky 1995). It refers to the phenomenon that words of specific 
categories may be coerced into other categories, as is exemplified in (4.108) and (4.109) 
(examples adapted from Goldberg 1995 and Kaplan 1975) 
 
(4.108) Alex             niest        die          Serviette vom              Tisch. 
  Alex.3NOM sneeze.3 the.ACC napkin     off-the.DAT table 
  ‘Alex sneezes the napkin off the table.’ 
 
(4.109) Kaplan             russellt    einen   Frege-Church. 
   Kaplan.3NOM russell.3  a.ACC Frege-Church. 
   ‘Kaplan russells a Frege-Church.’ 
 
In both sentences, the verbs are used as belonging to categories which they “actually” do not 
belong to. Niesen ‘sneeze’ is traditionally supposed to be a monadic verb, and russelln 
‘russell’ is not traditionally a verb at all. 
The case of niesen is easy. For Alex to be identified as being in a circumstance of sneezing, 
he must engage in a stationary activity (probably behavior, but responsibility may be 
attributed) but must also emit sound or at least cringe. He may also emit a burst containing air 
and maybe fluids. The emission is spatially and temporally contiguous to the motion of the 
napkin (which affords motion due to its features), and, if fluid plays a role, contact may also 
be recognizable. The relationship between the activity of Alex and the motion of the napkin is 
thus identified as a causal one. The construction underlying (4.108) with a causative reading 
is thus perfectly derivable from the features and affordances of the involved objects. What is 
not derivable, however, is that both the monadic and the causative sneezing activities are 
coded by a single form, namely niesen ‘sneeze’. As examples like fallen ‘fall’ and fällen ‘fell’ 
as ‘cause to fall’ illustrate, this need not be the case. 
Russelling a Frege-Church means – as I take it – applying ideas of one philosopher – Russell 
– to the ideas of another philosopher – Frege – whose ideas have already been applied to (or 
adopted by) a third philosopher – Church. The first “application” is done by a fourth 
philosopher – Kaplan. However, not knowing that these persons are philosophers with 
competing ideas leads to a situation where (4.109) can be interpreted in various ways. For 
instance, meyering Smith does not necessarily mean that the ideas of Meyer are applied to 
Smith. But what causes exactly this conceptualization when using Russell as a verb is that we 
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know that Russell’s main activity was thinking about philosophical problems and generating 
ideas. If the main activity of Meyer was that of hating meat eaters, meyering Smith would 
presumably mean applying the attitude of hating meat eaters to Smith, so that Smith changes 
his/her attitude towards hating meat eaters.  
 
In other words, the most prominent or pertinent affordance of the “coerced” object is 
conceptualized as affecting another object by means of the exertion of force of a part or 
feature of the first object, mostly by means of emitting it forcefully.
197
 This is the same 
principle as in making a verb hammer out of the noun hammer or a verb color out of the noun 
color. And if the landmark is conceptualized to change some feature, position, or its integrity, 
the utterance is interpreted to code a causative relation. 
 
It is thus once more the features and affordances of the involved objects and the spatio-
temporal constitution of their activities and processes that restrict the range of coercions that 
they may undergo (see also Kaschak & Glenberg 2000). Russelling someone, coloring 
something, hammering something, and sneezing something off something is possible only 
because Russell, color, hammer, and sneezer afford affecting something physically or 
psychically by means of a literal or metaphorical forceful emission: in the case of the hammer 
some kind of inalienable emission, in the other cases alienable emission, but in any case 
involving their most prominent affordances, respectively. 
 
 
4.5 Future prospects: predictions and consequences  
 
In this section, I will present a selection of possible predictions and consequences that can be 
derived from Instruction Grammar as presented in this book. They are considered to be 
falsifiable by means of empirical research. In this way the theory from which these 
predictions are derived can in principle be evaluated against other theories making falsifiable 
predictions about a similar subject-matter. I suggest that it is possible to make especially 
strong and (potentially) easily falsifiable predictions on the basis of the present theory because 
the theoretical, especially the semantic notions employed in it are – that is what I attempted – 
thoroughly derived from perception, action, and symbol use. They are not modeled on 
linguistic
o
 evidence but deduced independently of it. The advantage that the present theory 
may have over other theories of the linking competence may lie in the fact that statements and 
predictions involving theoretical, especially semantic notions can – for the sake of 
falsification – be “traced back” even to basic mechanisms of perception, conceptualization, 
action/attribution, and symbol use. In brief, they can be falsified even by data outside 
linguistics, but for the sake of linguistics. Note that the same does not hold true for the 
research programme in which the theory is embedded, since this is by definition not a 
hypothesis or a theory, but a normative – though generally acceptable in its metaphysical 
assumptions – background in front of which theories become possible.  
                                                 
197
 Thanks to Hanni Schnell for the idea that it is the most prominent feature that is crucial here. 
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Please note that there is also a reconstruction of traditional semantic notions in Appendix A 
which can very well be considered “consequences” of the present research programme and 
theory. Further possibilities for reconstructing such notions can be found in the text (e.g., 
section 3.4.8 on the temporal structure of circumstances). In what follows 1.–18. give some 
predictions, 19.–24. some consequences I deem especially worth mentioning.      
 
1. Typology: Languages with basic syntactic constructions in which expressions coding 
trajectors precede expressions coding landmarks should be preferred from the 
perspective of “ease of conceptualization” and the utterance-as-instruction-for-
conceptualization perspective (see sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2). Cross-linguistically, this 
phrase order tends to be associated with S>O structures (i.e., SVO, SOV, VSO). 
Furthermore, the number of conceptual functions (trajector and landmark) in non-
complex circumstances corresponds to the number of syntactic functions (S and O) 
in simple transitive sentences. Typologically, languages differ as to the basic order 
between S and O, where S>O is by far the predominant order. This can be explained 
by recourse to diagrammatic iconicity and the regular mapping between 
conceptualizations and constructions (see section 3.3.2), and it is directly applicable 
to Greenbergs (1963: 77) early observation, according to which “[i]n declarative 
sentences with nominal subject and object, the dominant order is almost always one 
in which the subject precedes the object.” (More recent data from a more 
comprehensive set of languages show that of 1377 languages surveyed in the World 
Atlas of Language Structures, 1148 have a basic order in which S precedes O; cf. 
Dryer 2011). 
 
2. Typology: When there is a third syntactic function besides that expressing a trajector 
and that expressing a landmark, it is predicted that the referent of that function is 
either part of a complex circumstance (with at least two sub-parts), such that the third 
function refers to an object that is the landmark in one but the trajector in another 
sub-part of that circumstance (see, for instance, Figure 3.26 and comments there). An 
example for such an object is what yi-hu jiu ‘a jug of wine’ in (4.110) refers to 
(Chinese; example taken from Huang, Li & Li 2009: 82). In the conceptualization 
underlying that sentence the jug of wine is initially the landmark of the action of the 
referent of ta and then functions as the trajector that moves toward the landmark 
expressed by gege in another sub-part of the circumstance. 
 
(4.110) ta di-gei        gege     yi-hu     jiu. 
  he pass-give brother one-CL wine 
  ‘He passed his brother a jug of wine.’ 
 
Or the referent of the third syntactic function exhibits internal actional involvement 
along the lines outlined exemplarily in section 4.1.6.2. Or both conditions apply. The 
former case is exemplified by henna ‘her’ in (4.111) (Icelandic; example taken from 
Thráinsson 2007: 218) and anyaní ‘baboons’ (4.112) (Chichewa; example taken from 
Mchombo 2004: 80). In (4.111) the referent of henna need not be present while the 
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referents of Þeir are finding her a new job. It is very likely, however, that this 
concerns her goals and interests, constituting internal actional involvement on her 
side. The same can be said about the baboons in (4.112). 
 
(4.111) Þeir            fundu henna      nýtt           starf. 
  they.NOM found her.DAT new.ACC job.ACC 
 ‘They found her a new job.’ 
 
(4.112) Alenje       a-ku-phík-íl-á                anyaní        zítúmbûwa. 
  2-hunters 2SM-pres-cook-appl-fv 2-babboons 8-pancakes 
  ‘The hunters are cooking (for) the baboons some pancakes.’ 
 
3. Typology/language comprehension: When there is a complex circumstance (with at 
least two sub-parts) where a particular conceptual object functions as the landmark in 
one and as the trajector in another sub-part (such as the transferred object in transfer 
events), languages that exhibit alternative verbalizations for such events allow two 
orders between the expression of the transferred object and the expression of the 
recipient (see examples (4.16) and (4.18) in section 4.1.6.2 for German). This is also 
exemplified in (4.113) and (4.114) (Mandarin Chinese; examples taken from Huang 
& Ahrens 1999: 2). 
 
(4.113) Wo song ta     yi   ben shu. 
           I     gave s/he one CL book 
 ‘I gave him/her a book.’ 
 
(4.114) Wo song yi    ben shu    gei   ta. 
            I    gave  one CL  book GEI s/he 
  ‘I gave a book to him/her.’ 
 
Irrespective of whether the referent of ta ‘s/he’ in (4.113) exhibits internal actional 
involvement, it is predicted that (4.114) is preferred in language comprehension as 
regards “ease of conceptualization”: The utterance can be used as a diagrammatically 
iconic instruction for simulating the perceptual experience of that giving event.  This 
is not possible for (4.113) to the same degree. The additional cognitive effort 
associated with the comprehension of (4.113) and its analogues in other languages 
should be measurable in terms of reaction times, accuracy, neuronal activity etc. in 
relation to (4.114) such that higher cognitive effort should be measurable in terms of 
higher reaction times and lower accuracies in psycholinguistic experiments or in 
terms of increased neuronal activity in the context of neurolinguistic experiments, 
e.g., electroencephalography (EEG). 
 
4. Typology/language comprehension: In languages with a basic O>S phrase order (i.e., 
OVS, OSV, VOS), it is predicted that “anti-iconic” mappings are preferred as regards 
“ease of conceptualization”. Anti-iconic are those mappings that inverse the regular 
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mapping in languages with a basic S>O order (see sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2). That 
means when there is a complex circumstance (with three conceptual objects and at 
least two sub-parts) where one of the conceptual objects functions as the landmark in 
one and as the trajector in another sub-part (such as the transferred object in transfer 
events), the order recipient expression > transferred object expression > agent 
expression should be associated with less cognitive effort in language comprehension 
than an alternative order conforming to a basic O>S order, i.e., transferred object 
expression > recipient expression > agent expression. Higher cognitive effort should 
again be measurable in terms of higher reaction times and lower accuracies in 
psycholinguistic experiments or in terms of increased neuronal activity in the context 
of neurolinguistic experiments, e.g., electroencephalography (EEG). An example for 
an anti-iconic mapping is given in (4.115) for Tiriyó, an O>S language (example and 
classification adopted from Meira 1999: 514, 582). 
 
(4.115) ji-pawana-rï_ja pakoro w-ekarama-e 
 1-friend-Pos_Dat house 1A-give.Prs.Ipf-Cty 
 ‘I am giving a house to my friend.’ 
 
5. Typology: Since it takes motivation to be primary to exploitation, the present 
proposal predicts/explains that if a language hypostatizes states, relations, 
quantifications etc. by using nominal expressions for them, it also has nominal 
expressions for “true” objects in sensation/conceptualization. 
 
6. Typology: Because restrictions on passivization are closely related to the conditions 
governing split intransitivity, namely attribution of responsibility, one would expect 
cross-linguistic
o
 differences in both phenomena due to different praxes of attribution. 
If attribution of responsibility is the critical factor, variation is expected regarding the 
question of where the split between unaccusatives and unergatives on the one hand 
and between passivizability and non-passivizability on the other hand semantically 
takes place. 
 
7. Language comprehension: Exploiting instances of utterances are either instances of 
compressing multiple conceptualizations into a single utterance (All men fall off their 
bikes in Marburg) or of hypostatization (Unemployment is threatening the Spanish 
youth) (see Figure 3.40 in section 3.3.7). Understanding exploiting utterances 
requires greater cognitive effort than understanding motivated utterances (Peter is 
kissing the blond woman) because they require “decompressing” an utterance 
conceptually: Where a motivated utterance is an instruction for simulating some 
unique conceptualization, an exploiting utterance forces an actor/cognizer to make 
numerous conceptualizations in order to approximately understand that utterance. 
For instance, understanding utterances coding high level temporal structures (e.g., at 
the attribution level: Russia privatizes the Soviet industry) not only superficially 
requires decompressing that utterance into numerous more fine-grained 
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conceptualizations. This should be measurable in terms of reaction times, accuracy, 
neuronal activity etc. (see predictions 3 and 4). 
 
8. Language comprehension: Regular mapping means expressing the trajector 
expression before the landmark expression since this reflects how a circumstance 
unfolds. (This cannot be equated with an S<O order but tends to be one, cross-
linguistically.) Any order deviating from this order requires a re-analysis that is 
iconic with respect to the circumstance itself, so that the interpreter is able to 
simulate the corresponding perception. This should be measurable in terms of 
reaction times, accuracy, neuronal activity etc. 
 
9. Language comprehension: Consider a locally ambiguous utterance in incremental 
interpretation where the last element in the utterance disambiguates it for the 
interpreter with respect to the order of trajector and landmark expressions, e.g., 
…dass die Lampe die Männer trifft/treffen ‘that the lamp hits the men’/that the men 
hit the lamp’. In this (partial) utterance the last element, the verb, determines who 
does what to whom and with it the trajector/landmark structure. If it turns out for the 
interpreter when integrating the verb into his/her interpretation that the overall 
structure exhibits a landmark>trajector order (corresponding to the ‘men hit lamp’ 
interpretation when encountering treffen), the interpretation of that utterance should 
cause more cognitive effort (to be measured in terms of reaction times, accuracy, 
neuronal activity etc.; see predictions 3 and 4) than when it turns out to exhibit a 
trajector>landmark order (corresponding to the ‘lamp hits men’ interpretation when 
encountering trifft). This is because the utterance with the landmark>trajector order 
needs re-analysis by the interpreter for him/her to be able to simulate the 
corresponding experience.
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a) This should hold true language-internally, e.g., between active sentences and their  
passives. 
b) This should hold true cross-linguistically, i.e., where a language regularly maps 
landmarks to first positions. 
 
10. Language comprehension: The approximate understanding of an utterance is a 
variable concept in that it is a matter of degree.
199
 Although this might be a trivial 
point, it is non-trivial that the present proposal offers a possibility to quantify 
understanding to some extent. Locating the interpretation of an utterance on different 
levels of organization (sensation, identification, attribution; see sections 3.4.3 to 
3.4.5) allows a classification of the degree to which someone understands an 
                                                 
198
 With regard to the example chosen here one should be aware of the fact that the disambiguation towards the 
‘lamp hits men’ interpretation may also be associated with some additional cognitive effort because it violates 
the RCP: The men are more probably the (responsible) causer in that event. 
199
 Note that this usage of „understanding“ concerns the question of what conceptualizations and/or attributions 
an interpreter is able to associate with a given utterance. It is not to be mistaken for the question of what the 
conceptualization and/or attribution of the producer of that utterance could look like and whether it is similar to 
that of the interpreter. The latter concerns mutual understanding and is dealt with in the introduction to chapter 4. 
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utterance in the following sense: Is the interpreter of some utterance able to 
understand it on the attribution level? If yes, is he/she also able to understand it on 
the identification level? If yes, is he/she able to trace it back even to particular 
figure/ground configurations in sensation? Applying this rationale to an example like 
Russia privatizes the Soviet industry yields something like this: Understanding this 
on the attribution level means knowing that some person(s) in the Russian 
government can be made responsible to have employed certain measures in order to 
put the purpose into effect that the Soviet industry is no longer in the hands of the 
government but at the disposal of private persons. Understanding the utterance even 
“better” would mean to be able to give the certain or probable ancillary action 
schemas by means of which this purpose is put into effect. At the level of 
identification one could even be able to name the necessary circumstance schemas 
that are associated with that far-reaching event. And a rather complete (but 
improbable) understanding would be given, if someone could break down this event 
into the figure-ground configurations that actually constitute schemas on the 
identification and attribution levels. What is crucial, however, is that “deeper” 
understanding (in the sense of “going down” the levels) is associated with more 
cognitive effort, and that the term “understanding” can be operationalized in this 
way. 
 
11. Language comprehension: The (responsible) causer preference (RCP; see section 
4.2) and its underlying mechanisms (concerning affordances, causation, the 
difference between reasons and causes; see sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2) predict that 
(4.116) and (4.117) below will differ as to the cognitive effort that is required in 
language comprehension. (Examples are taken from Röhm et al. 2004; see also 
Schlesewsky & Bornkessel 2004: 1223.) 
 
(4.116) … welchen      Mönch der           Zweig streifte. 
              which.ACC monk  the.NOM twig    brush.PAST 
  ‘… which twig brushed the monk.’ 
 
(4.117) … welchen       Mönch der           Bischof begleitete. 
              which.ACC monk    the.NOM bishop  accompany.PAST 
  ‘… which bishop accompanied the monk.’ 
 
Case-marking in both sentences indicates that the first NP encountered in 
incremental interpretation is the grammatical object and the second one the PSC. In 
(4.116) the second NP encountered is inanimate and thus does not afford self-
induced movement but may only move if it is causally affected itself. The second NP 
in (4.117) is human. It therefore affords self-induced movement and may be 
attributed responsibility. However, according to the RCP and the large-scale law of 
closure human actors/cognizers strive to identify the responsible causer, i.e., the 
uncaused causer, of any event. The need for closure of the event at the “front end” 
cannot be satisfied by (4.116): The motion of the twig must be externally caused by 
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an unknown causer. It is satisfied in (4.117). For the actor/cognizer, the bishop 
certainly closes the event at the front end. Thus, the attempt to close the event coded 
by (4.116) at the front end causes the additional neuronal activity detected by 
Schlesewsky and Bornkessel (2004). Because of the presumably universal character 
of the RCP, similar results are predicted for analogue examples in other languages. 
 
12. Identification/categorization and conceptualization: The speakers of different 
languages should be equally competent in the differentiations they are able to sense, 
identify/categorize, and conceptualize. But they have conventionalized different 
means of coding differentiations in terms of grammatical and lexical material. This in 
turn may lead to different identification/conceptualization routines when feeding 
back to language use. However, people’s routininized action schemas are not 
identical with the action schemas they are in principle able to actualize. Given the 
respective purposes, non-routinized differentiations can be made. (I have argued for 
this and against Whorfian accounts in section 3.3.4.) Other sources of differential 
identification/conceptualization routines that are not linguistically
o
 induced are 
different pertinence patterns of perceptual units in practical contexts.  
 
13. Attribution: Members of different speech communities/cultures may make use of 
different parameters in attribution, in particular regarding the determining factors. 
This may lead to different attributions and attribution habits. Since the notion of 
agentivity is derived from the attribution of responsibility, there is cross-cultural 
variation expected regarding what agentivity is. 
 
14. (Responsible) causer preference: There is no cross-cultural variation in the RCP, 
since it is “naturally” grounded by means of the large-scale law of closure. (One 
could even go further and argue that this is an adaptational advantage, since being 
able to identify responsible causers in one’s environment makes events in one’s 
environment more predictable, thus avoiding potential threat.) This does not 
contradict prediction 13, because it leaves open only the precise criteria by which 
some attributional praxis declares a causer responsible, while it leaves unquestioned 
that responsibility is actually attributed. 
 
15. Language acquisition: As a prediction, it would be rather surprising if children up to 
school age (and often beyond) frequently produced hypostatizations, i.e., instances of 
exploited language use. They can presumably hardly understand utterances like 
Unemployment is threatening Spanish youth, i.e., they might not even know what to 
conceptualize at all. Apart from mastering morphological operations like derivation, 
children must have available a rich common ground with their interlocutors and 
encyclopedic knowledge which are required for an approximate understanding of 
hypostatized utterances (see section 3.3.7). 
 
16. Genesis of grammar: The invention of verbs can be argued to have been a crucial 
step in the early development of language. The ideas on semantics proposed in this 
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book assert that verbs are hypostatizations in that they refer to nothing except the 
object(s) “at” which a circumstance manifests itself (see section 3.5). Evolutionary, 
figure-apt entities (moving, small relative to background) are easily referred to in 
pointing to them and uttering a (then) object expression. In contrast, circumstances 
are a different kind of ontological category in that they are embodied by objects but 
are “nothing” for themselves. But a “language” without circumstance expressions, 
exhibiting only object expressions is too underspecified to serve communicative 
purposes. Therefore, “sourcing out” the circumstance aspect from (the) object(s) by 
externalizing these aspects as a special category in the symbol system (i.e., the verb) 
is a major step towards a symbolic communication system in general and syntax in 
particular. 
 
17. Genesis of grammar: Introducing elements into the symbol system that are 
externalizations of aspects of objects (features and circumstances are aspects of 
objects; adjectives and verbs are externalizations of such aspects; see section 3.5) 
means introducing different categories into the symbol system: The ontological 
relationship between objects and their aspects is an asymmetrical one. This in turn 
means introducing a crucial mechanism into the symbol system: dependency. From 
this perspective, dependency can be argued to be one of the beginnings of a 
grammar. 
 
18. Grammaticalization: Cross-linguistically, passive auxiliaries are mostly former 
lexical verbs. It is cross-linguistically common that the verbs that grammaticalize 
towards passive auxiliaries are verbs of having and getting (cf. Heine & Kuteva 
2007: 80). Why should this be the case? Most lexical verbs that are passivizable map 
trajectors to PSCs, therefore most grammatical objects in active sentences of this sort 
are landmarks. That means some fictive or concrete motion/movement is directed 
from the trajector to the landmark. What passives do is make active objects passive 
PSCs without altering the conceptualization of the circumstance. A language 
developing a passive should choose itself a passive auxiliary from those lexical verbs 
which map landmarks to PSCs. Therefore, the present theory predicts that new 
passive auxiliaries should develop from former lexical verbs that map landmarks to 
PSCs. 
This is well documented for German regional varieties (as exemplified in (4.118); cf. 
Lenz (2012)). It is also documented for Seychellois, a French-based creole (as 
exemplified in (4.119); example taken from Corne 1977: 161, cited in Heine & 
Kuteva 2007: 81). In this case, the auxiliary gaŷ ‘get’ developed out of French 
gagner ‘gain’, a verb that maps its landmark to the PSC. 
 
(4.118) Julia           kriegt/bekommt/erhält das          Auto gewaschen. 
  Julia.NOM get.AUX                      the.ACC car   wash.PTCP 
  ‘Julia is getting the car washed.’ 
 
(4.119) zot     pa     ti        gaŷ           êvite   dâ sa    festê. 
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        They NEG PAST get.AUX invited in that party 
 ‘They did not get invited to that party.’ 
 
 
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the following points constitute consequences 
rather than predictions. 
 
19. Theory of meaning: In the history of linguistics and philosophy of language there 
are two theories of meaning that seem to exclude each other. In fact, linking theories 
neglect one of them systematically, namely the “meaning as use” perspective, and 
they do so in favour of the “meaning is reference/designation” perspective (cf. Lyons 
1991). What I attempt is to reconcile both: The “meaning is reference/designation” 
view is represented by diagrammatically iconic mappings where the utterance has 
something in common with the circumstance it codes and is acquired in contexts of 
joint attention and triangulation. The “meaning as use” view is represented by the 
arbitrary pairing of conceptual contents with utterances in dependence of 
interactional variables and common ground, without triangulation. Both views are 
condensed in the two acquisition modes in section 3.3.7. This also represents an 
attempt to reconcile the young “Tractatus” Wittgenstein with the old “Philosophical 
investigations” Wittgenstein. 
 
20. Autonomy of syntax: If utterances can be systematically iconic with respect to 
conceptualizations, then syntactic structures can be motivated. Arbitrariness and 
motivation of syntax are two poles on a scale. Highest motivation is given where an 
utterance is an instruction for simulating a perceptual experience. Highest 
arbitrariness is given where no coherent conceptualization can be build up from an 
utterance, i.e., where communication does not succeed (see section 3.3.8). 
Chomskyan Linguistics makes the latter case its paradigmatic observation. The 
present research programme makes the former case its paradigmatic observation. 
While it is difficult if not impossible for CL to accommodate motivation in syntax 
(employed strategies are declaring it epiphenomal or part of use or the broad faculty 
of language (FLB)), the present programme and Instruction Grammar can 
accommodate arbitrariness, if necessary. 
 
21. Case theory: The special behavior of German “free” datives (or other cases in other 
languages) can be predicted on the basis of the considerations in section 4.1.6.2: It is 
possible that the referents of these expressions do not immediately stand in a relation 
to (an)other object(s) in a circumstance but in a relation to a relation between other 
objects or the circumstance of another object. More specifically, it is possible that it 
exhibits internal actional involvement. 
 
22. Case theory: The considerations in section 4.1.6.2 on the German dative may serve 
as an explanation for instances of well-formed and acceptable double datives (or 
other cases in other languages. This may be possible where one dative referent 
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exhibits asymmetric bi-directionality and the other exhibits internal actional 
involvement, as exemplified in (4.120) and (4.121). 
 
(4.120) 
?
Er           hat           mir          dem         Kind zu  viel    Süßes        gegeben. 
 he.NOM has.AUX me.DAT the.DAT child too much candy.PL give.PTCP 
 ‘In my opinion, he gave the child too much candy.’/lit. ‘To me, he gave…’ 
 
(4.121) 
?
Dass du               mir            dem         Kind nicht zu  viel    Süßes  
 that   you.2NOM me.1DAT the.DAT child NEG too much candy.3ACC  
 gibst! 
 give.2 
 ‘Don’t even think about giving the child too much candy!’ 
 
23. Case theory: The considerations about the function of constructions and cases in 
general (see sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.6, respectively) offer a possibility to make the 
structurality vs. lexicality of cases a matter of degree. It depends on the role of a case 
category in a particular construction. Because the differentiations a case category 
accomplishes depend on the construction in which it occurs, the conceptual “load” of 
a case category may differ. This has been demonstrated using the example of an 
NPnom-V construction and an NPnom-V-NPdat-NPacc construction. The range of 
conceptual differentiations of the nominative is considerably smaller for the 
ditransitive construction than it is for the intransitive construction. In other words, 
the nominative is more structural in the latter and more lexical in the former. 
 
24. Agentivity: The underspecification of percepts and concepts, their specification by 
means of actional knowledge and attribution, and the (responsible) causer preference 
(RCP) constitute a psychologically and actionally plausible basis for the well-known 
effector-to-agent pragmatic implicature, according to which human/animate causers 
are interpreted as “intentional agents” (cf. Holisky 1987, van Valin & Wilkins 1996).  
 
 
4.6 Summary of part III 
 
Part III has turned away from the species/community level in the model underlying the 
research programme, i.e., away from the sub-competences to the individual level and the 
linking competence in the strict sense. The results from the sections on perception, 
conceptualization, action (attribution) are brought together here in order to outline how 
German verb-complement structures are organized, how they are motivated by the workings 
of the sub-competences, and why verb-complement structures behave as they behave under 
certain circumstances. 
First, the notion of “meaning” has briefly been reconstructed as that which sustains the 
illusion of understanding between two actors/cognizers in the face of necessarily dissimilar 
concepts of even a single circumstance. Bearing this in mind, the contribution of formal 
constituents of syntax to the well-formed and appropriate coding of semantic contents 
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(conceptualization +/- attribution) has been explicated (4.1). The constituents discussed were 
the “bare” construction, noun, verb, as well as phrase order, agreement and case morphology. 
It could be shown that especially the number (adicity) and nature (trajector, object landmark, 
location landmark) as well as the affordances of the objects involved, the conceptual 
components conflated in verb morphology, and the distribution of trajector and landmark to 
the complements of the verb are important for making an utterance an instruction for 
simulating the perception of a circumstance in a way that does not let the verbal interaction 
between a speaker and an interpreter fail. Complementing the discussion of the contribution 
of case morphology, a theory of the German dative has also been developed. 
Because the formal properties of utterances often do not suffice to assure the illusion of 
understanding and thus do not make successful linking possible, the contribution of non-
formal properties to linking had to be discussed, too (4.2). In accordance with the primacy of 
objects over circumstances in conceptualization, the non-formal properties concern objects, in 
particular the notions of animacy, individuation, person, and empathy, each of which exhibits 
a scalar organization. The well-known “subject preference” in (incremental) interpretation 
could then be reconstructed as a (responsible) causer preference (RCP), stating that high 
prominence of an NP referent on the abovementioned scales increases its capability of closing 
a circumstance at the front end, thus satisfying the large-scale law of closure. 
The next step was to list examples of motivated conceptualization-syntactic structure 
mappings, using the most important constructions in German (4.3). How such mappings are 
actually enacted in the context of verbal interactions was then demonstrated by means of two 
exemplary scenarios: a comprehension scenario and a production scenario. They illustrate 
how the sub-competences and the formal and non-formal information are utilized by 
actors/cognizers to obey a linguistic
o
 instruction in order to simulate a perception and to build 
up such an instruction, respectively.  
The next section (4.4) is concerned with classical problems of the syntax-semantics linking. In 
order to solve these problems, i.e., to explain why these linguistic
o
 phenomena show the 
behavior they show, all notions developed throughout parts II and III had to be employed 
together. How the landmark in circumstances is conceptualized in detail has turned out to be 
of special importance in linking conceptualizations and syntactic constructions. 
The final section of part III, section 4.5, presents a selection of predictions and consequences 
that can be drawn from the theory of the linking competence. They concern, among others, 
typology, language comprehension, language acquisition, case theory, and the genesis of 
grammar. 
 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
Throughout this work, a research programme has been developed that is supposed to satisfy 
one crucial condition: The human linking competence should be grounded in both nature and 
culture, i.e., in cognitive competences that develop independently of cultural influences and in 
competences that do not develop independently of the participation in a sociocultural praxis. 
The linking competence has been characterized as the competence to code conceptual and 
actional matters by means of utterances containing verb-complement structures 
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(constructions) in a well-formed and situationally appropriate manner. The naturally and 
culturally grounded sub-competences were identified as perception, conceptualization, action 
(attribution), and relating conceptual structures to arrangements of linguistic
o
 symbols. 
Uncovering the systematic relationship between syntax – in terms of constructions – and 
semantics – in terms of circumstance concepts as trajector-landmark configurations +/- 
attributions – made a multidisciplinary account necessary. Traditional semantic descriptions 
using predicate-argument structures have been disregarded in favor of a conceptual structure 
based on evidence from cognitive psychology and cognitive neurosciences. This conceptual 
structure had to be complemented by actional, i.e., attributional information because 
otherwise it is underspecified with respect to these matters. Only in combination 
conceptualization and attribution may account for the abilities of a language user.  
A semantic theory grounded in perception and action has some properties that distinguish it 
from traditional semantic theories. First, a correspondence theory of truth is not available. If 
utterances code conceptualizations and attributions, a completely different problem than truth 
arises, namely that of the validity of one’s claims. On what basis may one claim validity for 
his/her statements if they have great social significance, i.e., if they are judgments as to the 
responsibility, guilt, praise or reprimand of oneself or others? Not only a notion of truth is 
negligible in this context but many notions supposed to be indispensible for a linking theory 
become questionable, among them thematic roles like that of “agent”. If objective criteria for 
assigning thematic roles to objects fall away, one needs other criteria to take their place. I 
have attempted to provide these criteria by outlining the perceptual and conceptual 
mechanisms that actors/cognizers share. On their basis they come to have similar though not 
identical concepts of circumstances which they can make intersubjectively accessible by 
talking about them (the indefinite semiosis notwithstanding) or by enacting what they claim, 
following the motto that truth is success in action (cf. Janich 2006: 186–209). What is more, 
socially significant matters with respect to which percepts and concepts are largely 
underspecified are negotiated by the utilization of an attribution theory that is internalized by 
the native speakers of a language, or alternatively, by the participants in a sociocultural praxis. 
As such they are imposed on percepts and concepts. 
With respect to the grammatical part of the linking competence – syntactic structures and 
operations – it is inherent in the symbol system that basic constructions underlying utterances 
can be described independently from conceptual considerations, but I have attempted to show 
that this necessarily results in a huge loss of generalizability and explanatory power. The 
notion of diagrammatic iconicity cannot be reconciled with a completely autonomous syntax. 
The consequence would be that one has to neglect the regular correspondences between 
circumstance types in terms of trajector-landmark configurations and constructions including 
case assignment and the determination of PSCs. Furthermore, the conditions on syntactic 
operations and alternations as discussed in the latest sections demonstrate that not looking at 
conceptualization and attribution also leads to a huge loss of explanatory power. One cannot 
explain the conditions on passivizability, imperativization, the dative alternation, and so on 
without taking attribution of responsibility into account. One cannot explain most of the other 
so-called “argument alternations” when ignoring the conceptual constitution of the landmarks 
involved in the underlying circumstances. Neglecting the close correspondence between 
sociocultural praxes and perception on the one hand and linguistic
o
 structures and conditions 
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on syntactic operations on the other means giving up the most basic insights about the linking 
competence. 
In the first part of this book I promised to develop a theory of the linking competence in 
accordance to the research programme proposed in the corresponding sections (see Figure 
2.3). The model underlying that research programme and the filling of its “panels” has been 
discussed in a rather general manner. I have stated that on the data level there are syntactic 
structures and interactional variables that describe verbal interaction. On the individual level 
the theory of the syntax-semantics relationship is meant to describe the linking competence, 
and on the species/community level theories of non-linguistic
o
 competences and interaction 
are supposed to describe the respective competences and interaction. Parts II and III should 
serve to breathe life into these general notions. Accordingly, the model underlying the 
research programme proposed here can finally be filled in by the key theoretical notions and 
mechanisms whose explication was the main purpose of this work. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Model underlying the research programme, specified for linking competence as 
developed throughout this work 
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Some more general conclusions may be appropriate here. In part I I justified the deviation 
from the Cognitive-Functional Linguistics framework by stating that CFL sticks to individual 
cognition when dealing with the linguistic
o
 competence. I dedicated large parts of the present 
work to the demonstration that the linking competence cannot be characterized adequately 
without taking into account the embedment of linguistic
o
 activities in sociocultural praxes. It 
is mechanisms of our living together – supra-individual matters – that shape how we use and 
understand language in crucial respects. In fact, meaning has been argued to be a social 
activity, not an individual one. It is what does not let fail verbal interaction; meaning shows 
itself in success in (inter)action. This is the crucial difference between conceptualization and 
meaning. CFL claims that meanings are embodied because meaning is conceptualization. I 
have tried to show that conceptualization is in important respects and to a large degree 
embodied in the senses in which people in the neurocognitive community understand it: Its 
workings can be described as the result of evolutionary processes, of the interplay between the 
physis of a living being with the environment in which it lives, as being subjected to natural 
laws, as being constrained in its potentialities by the anatomical and physical limits of the 
body and so on. But all this does not hold for understanding and with respect to the notion of 
meaning. Where we subject these activities to natural laws and to embodiment, we surrender 
our most highly developed praxes to relativism and contingency, among them our scientific 
claims. Understanding and establishing meaning in interaction are cultural activities. Where 
they are reduced to natural objects they cease to exist. 
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Glossary 
 
 
action type of →movement that can be desisted from in accordance with 
→attribution, and that cannot be described (predicted) scientifically by 
means of natural laws. Attributing a. corresponds to attributing 
someone →responsibility for some activity (→circumstance). To be 
differentiated from →behavior. 
 
actor/cognizer human being involved in internal (cognitive) and/or external (physical) 
activities (→movement), either →perceptual, →conceptual 
(→identification), actional (→attribution), (and/) or verbal. The a./c. 
can be shown to be a pragmatic who always strives for maintaining 
his/her self-concept and for realizing his/her →purposes. Practical 
consequences are that his/her attributions do not conform to lay 
scientific methods but are pragmatic in kind. 
 
adicity aspect of →circumstances and →constructions that concerns the 
number of objects/NPs that are (co-)determinative of the identity of the 
circumstance and the construction, respectively. Subtypes dealt with 
are monadic, dyadic, and triadic circumstances and constructions. 
 
affordance a state/process/activity (→circumstance) that an →object indicates to a 
perceiver/conceptualizer neuronally and conceptually on the basis of its 
recognized (bottom-up a.; →perception) or →identified →features, the 
frequency with which it occurs in certain circumstances, and the 
present →purposes (→pertinence) of the perceiver/conceptualizer. 
 
attribution cognitive activity (→circumstance) of →actors/cognizers concerning 
the ascription of →action and →behavior (→responsibility) to the 
animate →objects involved in activities with respect to these activities. 
A. is part of sociocultural →praxis. Actor/cognizers’ attribution 
performances can be shown to depend on certain socio-cognitive 
parameters that cannot be reconciled with the view of the 
actor/cognizer as a lay scientist. A. applies to, or operates on, percepts 
(→perception) or concepts of (→conceptualization) →circumstances 
that are inherently →underspecified with respect to the factors 
governing a. 
 
behavior type of →movement that cannot be desisted from in accordance with 
→attribution and that can be described scientifically by natural laws. 
Attributing b. corresponds to exonerating someone from 
→responsibility for some activity (→circumstance). To be 
differentiated from →action. 
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capacity the (condition of the) possibility to develop a →competence. While 
human beings are capable of developing the →linking competence, 
other species are not. Being capable of something is a necessary though 
not sufficient condition for the development of a competence. 
 
categorization → identification 
 
causation aspect of the relation between two →circumstances with respect to 
which →percepts are →underspecified. An instance of c. is 
→identified where the →objects involved in two circumstances exhibit 
mutually dependent →affordances, where the circumstances are 
identified to stand in a relation of spatial and temporal contiguity, and 
where exertion of force is either haptically sensed or →neuronally re-
enacted, having the status of a simulated perception 
(→conceptualization). 
 
circumstance form of appearance of an →object. C.s of objects or between objects 
are in a →perceptual and →conceptual sense inherent to the objects, 
namely as actualizations of →affordances which in turn depend on the 
→features of the object(s). C.s express themselves only “through” 
objects and are in this sense secondary to objects: It is impossible to 
conceptualize some polyadic (→adicity) and/or complex 
(→complexity (temporal)) c. without conceptualizing some object(s) 
first by which the c. is constituted. 
 
closure in the domain of →perception supposedly one of the →gestalt laws that 
contribute to integrating →features into →objects. The law of c. states 
that elements are more likely to belong together which yield a closed 
shape when “filled in”. In →conceptualizing (+/-attribution) 
→circumstances c. represents the need of an →actor/cognizer for 
identifying (either by →identification or by →attribution) the 
(responsible) cause(r) (→responsible causer preference (RCP)) of that 
circumstance in order to be able to evaluate the consequences of that 
circumstance for him-/herself and his/her action plans (→purpose). The 
latter can be considered a “large-scale” law of c. 
 
competence ability to actualize particular →movement →schemas. 
 
complexity 
(temporal) 
concerns the number of sub-parts of a →circumstance. Circumstances 
can be segmented at the levels of sensation (→perception) in terms of 
→figure/ground configurations, →conceptualization in terms of 
→schematizations, and action (→purpose), yielding different 
segmentations. Segmentations on higher levels respect segmentations 
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on lower levels. 
 
concept simulated percept (→perception) or activity (→circumstance, 
→movement) retrievable from memory, including →object 
→affordances. On the neural level a partial →re-enaction of the 
neuronal activity which is also observable in the actual perception of 
something or the enaction of some movement →schema. 
 
conceptualization activity of simulated →perception (→concept). Contents of 
conceptualization are restricted to what is in principle perceivable. 
Matters like →purposes, dispositions, causes (→causation), or 
affections are not conceptual in kind but belong to the domain of 
→attribution. C. provides the structures to which utterances 
(→construction) are →diagrammatically iconic. Central to these 
structures are the notions of →trajector and landmark. 
 
construction syntactic structure underlying utterances in terms of →adicity, parts of 
speech, morphological case, and morphological agreement. C.s are 
supposed to regularly code →circumstance types in terms of 
→trajector & landmark configurations by means of →diagrammatic 
iconicity. C.s exhibit different degrees of polysemy and homonymy in 
dependence of their formal properties. C.s also vary with respect to 
whether they are →motivated or exploiting instances, whether they 
code allocentric or egocentric reference frames, and they vary with 
respect to →complexity, and with respect to whether they exhibit 
regular or inversed →mappings. 
 
culture complex of →actions, interdependent actions, concerted actions, their 
→schematizations, and →attributional norms within a community. 
 
diagrammatic 
iconicity 
perceivable similarity between the organizational principle underlying 
a symbol system like language and something outside the system. Here, 
the organization of utterances in terms of →constructions are 
conceived of as d. i. to the order in which →conceptualizations unfold 
or as d. i. to the order in which an actor/cognizer’s eye gaze is 
simulated. 
 
differentiation d.s are what categories are constituted by (→identification). Categories 
are not the result of the partitioning of the environment in accordance 
to objective criteria but are brought about by how living beings act 
(→action) or behave (→behavior) towards →objects in the 
environment, depending on their biotic make-ups (→embodiment) and 
present →purposes. In general, indifferent activities towards various 
objects in similar contexts by different human beings make these 
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objects belong to a category.   
 
embodiment cover term for the diverse ways in which neuronal, cognitive, and 
bodily activities (→movement), accomplishments, potentials as well as 
their epistemological validity can be shown to be dependent on the 
biotic/physical makeup of their bearers. 
 
exploitation kind of relation that a linguistic
o
 form bears to some 
→conceptualization. E. is opposed to →motivation (see also 
→diagrammatic iconicity). In the case of e., a linguistico form exploits 
the organizational principle of motivated conceptualization-linguistic
o
 
structure →mappings, either by pretending to code a unique 
→conceptualization (→trajector & landmark) while it actually 
compresses multiple conceptualizations into a single construction, or 
by →hypostatization, i.e., by pretending to code an →object while it 
actually codes a →circumstance. 
 
feature perceptual f.s are what is integrated by means of →gestalt laws into 
→objects. What can be a feature is restricted by what a living being 
can →differentiate in its environment in terms of the feature detectors 
in its perceptual apparatus (→embodiment). F.s play a crucial role in 
what →objects →afford to →actors/cognizers, since the →identified 
f.s of an object restrict the range of →circumstances in which this 
object can stand. 
 
fictivity  
(motion/ 
movement) 
there may be →motion/→movement →conceptually while there is 
actually none in the environment. This “fictive” motion/movement thus 
relates to the simulated eye gaze that conceptualizers employ when 
they “scan” a concept, for instance by gradually moving their 
(simulated) visual focus from one object of conceptualization to 
another object of conceptualization in a stative relation. 
 
figure & ground the notions giving structure to →percepts. By integrating formerly 
disintegrated →features into wholes by means of the →gestalt laws, the 
resulting →object is segregated, or isolated, from a background. Across 
all instances of singling out objects from backgrounds, the isolated 
object is called f., and the background from which it is singled out is 
called g. The g. may eventually exhibit →object →features similarly to 
the f. Then it is the g. relative to which the f. is singled out, i.e., in 
relation to which the →circumstance of the f. is specified. A g. that has 
no object features is called “location g.”, a g. with object features is 
called “object g.” 
 
gestalt laws notion from perceptual psychology with somewhat unclear status but 
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undeniable significance. G. l.s are instrumental in grouping stimuli of 
→perception into (parts and) wholes, i.e., in making possible 
recognition of discriminable →objects by integrating formerly 
disintegrated →features (→figure & ground). There are five g. l.s: 
proximity, similarity, common fate, →closure, and good continuation. 
 
goal  
(action theory) 
→ purpose 
 
 
ground 
(perception) 
→ figure & ground 
 
 
grounding 
problem 
originally the question of how meaningless symbols in a computational 
mind can “have →meanings” although they are not connected to the 
environment they are supposed to be “about”. Here, the problem of 
how the →linking competence can be traced back to sub-competences 
that relate to →perception, →conceptualization, and action 
(→attribution). 
 
iconicity → diagrammatic iconicity 
 
identification cognitive activity (→movement) of matching a percept (→perception) 
with a retrievable →concept on the basis of the →salience (as stimulus-
driven i.) or →pertinence (as purpose-driven i.) of the stimulus. 
 
incremental 
interpretation 
a feature of on-line interpretation, according to which interpreters 
immediately integrate each “incoming” part of an utterance into their 
→conceptualization of that utterance. At any point they strive for 
maximizing their prediction of how the uttered sentence and thus the 
coded →circumstance →concept will work out. 
 
interest  → purpose 
 
hypostatization kind of →exploitation besides compression.  H. is given where a 
linguistic
o
 form, mostly a noun, pretends by its category to designate a 
conceptual →object, while it actually codes a whole →circumstance 
→conceptually. It is thus a linguistico strategy to exploit 
→diagrammatic iconicity (→motivation). 
 
landmark → trajector & landmark 
 
linking 
competence 
the ability to encode and decode →concepts of →circumstances 
successfully, i.e., either by being able to produce appropriate and well-
formed utterances or by being able to →identify appropriate and well-
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formed utterances. This requires several sub-competences, in particular 
→perception, →conceptualization, and action (→attribution, 
→purpose) competences, as well as being able to apply regular 
→mappings to →constructions underlying utterances in the context of 
interpretation, and to apply regular →mappings to conceptualizations 
that shall be verbalized in the context of production. 
 
mapping, inversed alternative to regular mapping (→mapping, regular). In i. m., the 
→construction is not →diagrammatically iconic with respect to the 
order in which the →conceptualization (and the →circumstance) 
unfolds but to the order in which a →concept is examined, or scanned. 
Corresponds to a PSC-landmark (→trajector & landmark) mapping in 
German. 
 
mapping, regular conventionalized pattern of how parts of →constructions (phrases) in a 
language are related to parts of →conceptualizations across types of 
constructions. For instance, in a regular mapping exhibiting 
→diagrammatic iconicity (order in which conceptualization unfolds), 
the →trajector is coded as PSC, the object landmark by means of an 
NP with oblique (dative or accusative) case, the location landmark 
within a PP, the circumstance including manner specification as verb, 
path specification as P. Can be →exploited. 
 
meaning the m. of an utterance is not identifiable, since it is not identified here 
with →conceptualization. It can only be specified negatively: The m. 
of an utterance is what did not let fail the verbal interaction, or 
alternatively, the m. of an utterance is what sustains the illusion of 
→understanding each other. Trying to clarify the m. of some successful 
verbal interaction verbally leads to an infinite semiosis: The m. of the 
m. negotiating utterances would have to be discussed again by m. 
negotiating utterances and so on ad infinitum. 
 
motion change of position over time and/or change of →feature over time of 
(an) inanimate →object(s). →Circumstances constituted by m. are 
processes. To be differentiated from →movement/activity. M. can be 
recognized on the basis of bottom-up sensation (→perception). 
 
motivation here mainly a property of the arrangement of signs. If signs can be 
shown to be arranged in accordance with →diagrammatic iconicity or 
in accordance with other cognitive requirements (e.g., economy or 
efficiency considerations), then this arrangement is motivated. 
Processes (→circumstance) leading away from m. due to diagrammatic 
iconicity are accompanied by →exploitation. 
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movement change of position over time and/or change of →feature over time of 
(an) animate object(s). →Circumstances constituted by m. are 
activities. To be differentiated from →motion/process. Requires top-
down identification. 
 
neuronal re-
enaction 
Analogous to →conceptualization which simulates the →perception of 
something in the absence of stimuli, neuronal re-enaction consists in 
neuronal activity in the absence of the perceptual experience or the 
motor activity with which it is originally associated, respectively. 
 
object  
(perception, 
conceptualization) 
result of the integration of disintegrated →features in sensation thanks 
to the working of the →gestalt laws. What can be an o. of →perception 
or →conceptualization is thus conditioned by there being o. →features, 
i.e., by being figure-apt (→figure & ground). Figure-aptness is of 
crucial importance for certain linking phenomena. 
 
perception the processes/activities (→circumstance) leading from light waves 
hitting the retina over the building up of a percept (bottom-up) to the 
→identification of the percept (top-down) as an instance of some 
category. The percept as the result of sensation is a structural 
description of the stimuli in the visual field due to retinotopic 
mappings. Being able to describe the percept means to have recognized 
it. The percept can be shown be →underspecified with respect to 
action-theoretic, →causal, physical, and socio-cognitive considerations 
(→attribution). 
 
pertinence the significance of a perceived (→perception) or conceptualized 
(→conceptualization) →feature or →object for the action planning 
(→purpose) of an →actor/cognizer. P. are those features or objects that 
are part of the circumstances that instantiate a subordinate or superior 
purpose of the actor/cognizer. The p. of a feature or object co-
determines not only whether something is identified/conceptualized but 
also the taxonomical level at which it is identified/conceptualized. 
 
praxis interdependences of acts (→action) that are regular, rule-governed, and 
that are actualized independently of particular persons. Praxes can be 
sub-classified with respect to practical domains. Sociocultural praxis 
concerns the interdependences of acts that constitute and let succeed 
our living together in everyday life. Of special importance in 
sociocultural praxis are the factors underlying →attribution. 
 
purpose results or outcomes of acts (→action) that shall be brought about (as 
goals) or avoided/maintained (as interests) in order to fulfill the needs 
of →actors/cognizers. Actors/cognizers know which action →schemas 
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are appropriate means to put their p.s into effect. P.s can be sub-
classified into subordinate and superior p.s. Realizing p.s requires the 
actualization of action schemas. Since p.s involve bringing about 
→circumstances, →objects and →features in these circumstances are 
→pertinent. →Attributing →responsibility involves attributing a p. to 
the person in question.  
 
recognition → perception 
 
reference relationship between signs and →concepts, the latter being connected 
to →objects in the environment via joint attentional (simulated) 
→perception. Fixing r. in verbal interaction in acquisition works (in the 
case of →motivation) by the triangulation between speaker, hearer, and 
→object, or (in the case of →exploitation) with the help of joint 
→pertinences, common ground, and the evaluation of practical 
consequences of the utterance in question. 
 
research 
programme 
a codified complex of assumptions supplementing a model that makes 
the empirical cycle work. The model contains the data, observations, 
descriptions, explanations, and tests that constitute the empirical cycle. 
In accordance to research →purposes certain heuristics, criteria, and 
absolute assumptions are supposed to circumvent the inherent problems 
of the empirical cycle. 
 
responsibility binary distinction, →attributed or not attributed to animate →objects in 
activities (→circumstance). Whether someone is attributed r. or not 
depends on the precariousness of activities and on the factors 
underlying →attribution performance. In childhood, some activities are 
invariantly associated with credit or blame, others are precarious in that 
it depends on certain socio-cognitive criteria, whether the animate 
object deserves credit or blame and is attributed r. The crucial 
implication of the attribution of responsibility is the ascription of 
reason to the animate →object and that he/she/it could have desisted 
from the activity. 
  
responsible causer 
preference (RCP) 
psycho- and neurolinguistic generalization saying that 
→actors/cognizers treat the first “incoming” ambiguous NP referent as 
the (responsible (→responsibility) causer (→causation) of the 
→circumstance in →incremental interpretation. This overwhelming 
cognitive tendency is enforced by certain formal and non-formal 
properties of the NPs and their referents. The RCP is an expression of 
the large-scale law of →closure. 
 
salience the →features of →objects in the visual field which are rendered more 
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prominent in relation to a perceiver (→perception) than other features 
and which therefore are more likely to be attended to by the perceiver. 
Prominent are those features that grab the perceiver’s attention, 
measurable in terms of eye fixation/foveal seeing. Salient stimuli may 
interfere with present →purposes and thus with the →identification of 
→pertinent stimuli. They force the perceiver to identify these stimuli. 
 
schema as a theoretical term the result of abstracting (Lat. abstrahere ‘draw 
off’) differences between →features, →objects, or →circumstances 
encountered in various occurrences. In other words: treating as 
invariant what actually differs in featural, positional, temporal, or other 
aspects. Schematization expresses itself in activities: Something gets 
schematized if an animate object actualizes similar movement schemas 
towards (slightly) differing features, objects, or circumstances.  
 
sensation → perception 
 
trajector & 
landmark 
the notions giving structure to →conceptualization and →concepts, 
analogously to →figure & ground. Since conceptualization is simulated 
→perception, the conceptual counterpart of a perceptual figure is a t. 
The conceptual counterpart of a perceptual ground is a l. Due to its 
independence of the presence of stimuli, conceptualization and with it 
t/l segregation are more flexible than figure/ground segregation in that 
a vantage point can freely be chosen by the conceptualizer. T. & l. are 
regularly mapped (→mapping, regular) to NPs. Especially the 
landmark has some importance for the temporal organization of 
→circumstances and the temporal semantics of utterances. 
 
underspecification property of →percepts, →concepts, and the semantics of utterances in 
relation to their specificity as required in successful verbal interaction. 
→Perception and →conceptualization are u. in the sense that percepts 
and concepts concern only sensible matters. Dispositions, 
accomplishments and misaccomplishments, attitudes etc., and often 
causes (→causation) and physical properties of →objects which are all 
important for the syntax-semantics relationship are not sensible and 
thus absent from percepts and concepts. These matters must be 
imposed on percepts and concepts by means of →attribution. 
Utterances are u. firstly because they (and the words they are made of) 
code mainly differentiations from conceptualization which in turn are 
u. with respect to actional matters (→attribution), and secondly because 
of the privacy of conceptualization, causing that two conceptualizations 
by two persons underlying a single utterance are never identical. 
 
understanding u. an act (→action) requires the ability to specify to which →purpose 
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the →movement (chain) in question was considered a means to put into 
effect. U. action in general requires the ability to tell apart those 
movements which are acts and those which are instances of →behavior 
on the basis of the →attribution →praxis enacted within the respective 
lifeworld. In verbal interaction, complete u. is an idealization, since the 
entire overlap of →conceptualizations of two conceptualizers on the 
basis of a single utterance is virtually impossible 
(→underspecification). Successful verbal interaction thus relies on “the 
illusion of u.” which gets destroyed if the verbal interaction fails. 
 
utterance-as-
instruction 
basic assumption according to which an utterance serves as an 
instruction for simulating a perceptual experience 
(→conceptualization). What makes the instruction possible is a 
→motivated relationship between →constructions and 
conceptualizations (and eventually →attributions) in terms of 
→diagrammatic iconicity. 
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Appendix A: The status of traditional semantic notions in the present 
theory 
 
 
agent 
 
Traditionally, agents are (prototypical) volitional causers. Lacking 
volition, they are “only” causers or effectors. Lacking causation, they 
remain (non-prototypical) agents. Here, volition can be reconstructed 
by means of attributing responsibility. Attribution of responsibility 
involves the attribution of reason or intentional activity to the person in 
question. This is associated with the ascription of a purpose to this 
person. The activity of the person is then considered to be a means to 
put this purpose into effect. The advantage of the present 
characterization lies in the fact that volition need not objectively be 
postulated or stipulated by the linguist or by the actor/cognizer but 
follows from the attributional praxis enacted in a community and 
allows for cross-culturally variable notions of “agentivity”, as far as the 
attribution part of the notion is concerned. That means agentivity is 
given where responsibility is attributed. This is an all-or-nothing 
matter. The attributional part of agentivity is independent of causation 
which is independently characterized. Causation, in opposition to 
responsibility, may exhibit prototype effects and has a cross-culturally 
constant characterization because it is grounded in perception. That 
means traditional “agentivity” is a notion that cannot be uniquely 
characterized. 
 
argument 
structure  
 
(also: predicate-argument structure). Argument structure is a 
descriptive device that originates in a philosophical research 
programme whose research purposes are completely different from the 
purpose of describing in a psychologically plausible manner the human 
competence of relating linguistic
o
 signs and concepts (+/- attributions). 
It thus lacks research programmatic legitimation as a descriptive means 
at least in the present framework. It is replaced here by a dynamic 
conceptualization activity in which a circumstance (i.e., the traditional 
predicate) is identified as an aspect of the perceivable/conceptualizable 
object(s) that constitute the circumstance. A circumstance cannot be 
conceptualized without conceptualizing (an) object(s) first. A verb, by 
sourcing out an aspect of an object concept in verbalizing a 
conceptualiztion, pretends that the circumstance was something 
different from the object. In this sense is language misleading and in a 
sense hypostatizes the unity of object and circumstance. A predicate is 
the back projection from language (verb) to truth-oriented semantics 
(predicate), from where it has found its way into modern, cognitively 
oriented linguistics, where it was and is mistakenly considered 
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psychically real. 
 
beneficiary 
 
The thematic role of beneficiary (not identical with recipient) is 
reconstructed here as the referent of the (dative) NP who has an interest 
in the circumstance described by the rest of the utterance, or who has it 
as a goal. This explains why a beneficiary does not stand in a relation 
to the other complement referents in the circumstance but to the 
circumstance as a whole, and why he/she is always animate. 
 
CAUSE CAUSE is often used as a so-called base predicate in the 
decomposition of circumstances. By far the most of these proposals 
rely on a rather intuitive concept of causality, i.e., of what can cause 
what, and regarding the perceptual and conceptual conditions on there 
being a causal relationship. In the present proposal, what we call causes 
and effects is derived from the features and properties of perception 
and identification/categorization, for instance affordances, features, 
motion/movement, the contingency model, haptic perception and 
neural re-enaction. 
 
experiencer So-called psychic verbs have not separately been dealt with here, 
because they are considered to work like – and to have developed from 
– verbs which code circumstances originating in visual, haptic or other 
experiences. Experiencers are traditionally those animate beings in 
circumstances that are in some psychic state that is described by the 
verb. They often range high on the thematic hierarchy, close behind 
agents and causers. From the perspective taken here, this is due to their 
features which make these referents potential responsible causers. That 
means “experiencers” are potentially satisfying the RCP and are thus 
ranked high thematically. In this respect they are related to 
beneficiaries who are also always animate and potential RCPs. It is not 
by accident then that experiencers are often marked with dative case in 
German and other Indo-European languages. 
 
goal  
 
The traditional goal role is assigned to NPs to which movement/motion 
is directed. It is often differentiated from recipients by means of the 
animacy feature. Here, goals are also characterized as the NP referent 
towards which some movement/motion proceeds. However, it is 
unspecified with respect to figure-aptness, i.e., it may be an object or 
location but is always a landmark. This is its defining feature which 
partially differentiates it from recipients.  
 
instrument 
 
The instrument can be characterized here partially similarly to how it is 
characterized in Cognitive-Functional Linguistics, namely by recourse 
to a causal chain. The instrument is an inanimate object which 
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undergoes force by another object (ideally animate due to the RCP), 
and exerts force on another object (landmark). However, the present 
framework provides the perceptual psychological and neuro-scientific 
background that the CFL accounts lack. 
 
location 
 
Most thematic role theories except the Cognitive-Functional linguistic 
theories lack a perceptual psychological account of what locations 
actually are. They rather presuppose an intuitive understanding of the 
notion and thus of the corresponding thematic role. Here, the location 
role can be reconstructed as the location landmark in a simple spatial 
circumstance. 
 
meaning A survey of what is traditionally meant by “meaning” cannot be 
accomplished here. In the present framework, the meaning of an 
utterance is what did not let fail the verbal interaction. It is thus 
negatively characterized, and alternatively as that what maintains the 
“illusion of understanding”. Due to the perspective-dependence and 
underspecification of perception – and thus conceptualization –, due to 
the underspecification of utterances, and due to the eventual 
inexplicitness of utterances regarding attributional matters, the identity 
of the conceptualizations (+/- attributions) of both speaker and hearer 
with respect to some utterance is precluded. What sustains the praxis-
coordinating functioning of language notwithstanding these 
shortcomings is called “meaning” here. 
 
patient 
 
Patients are mostly those referents that undergo some change of state 
by the circumstance described by the verb, or that are causally affected 
by that circumstance. Such a characterization can to some degree be 
accepted here as a reconstruction of the patient role, but it can be 
grounded in perception and conceptualization more accurately. Object 
landmarks that undergo exertion of force by some trajector, thereby 
either changing some feature, location, or their integrity (and thus 
identity), can be called patients. 
 
qualia structure Traditionally, qualia structure is supposed to capture the relational 
force of a lexical item in terms of what it is made of, its formal 
characteristics, its function, and its involvement in agentive 
circumstances. It can be viewed here as a placeholder for all theoretical 
proposals attempting to describe actor/cognizers’ encyclopedic 
knowledge about objects and circumstances. However, most of these 
proposals simply stipulate these “quales”, i.e., the constitution of this 
knowledge. In the present work, I have attempted to reconstruct what 
actors/cognizers know about the things and circumstances in their 
environments by means of a theory of perception, causation, 
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conceptualization, and action (attribution). Of crucial importance are 
the notions of salience, pertinence, frequency and especially that of 
affordance. My account of affordances is based on psychological and 
neuroscientific evidence and their significance need not be stipulated. 
The telic quale can be reconstructed on the basis of action competence 
and attribution. In combination, the above notions accomplish what 
qualia accomplish and even more, since frequency and pertinence are 
factors that are not taken into account in other proposals. 
 
recipient  
 
The traditional recipient is often treated as an animate goal. The 
recipient can here be reconstructed by the notions of asymmetric bi-
directionality, a feature licensing dative case, and by its restriction to 
object landmarks. Thus, where there is no (or where this is not clear) 
asymmetric bi-directionality and/or an object landmark in 
conceptualization, there will not be a recipient. 
 
semantics In the present work, “semantics” is the cover term for those 
conceptualizations (+/- attributions) that can be shown to be coded by 
means of the verb-complement structures that can be extracted from 
utterances. As a linguistic discipline dealing with conceptualization and 
attribution, a thus characterized semantics grounded in perception and 
action (attribution) is non-objectivistic and must refer to perceptual 
psychology, neurosciences, philosophy, social psychology, and 
sociology, at least. In order to account for the linking competence, the 
semantics of utterances must also rely on conceptual and attributional 
matters that reduce the inherent underspecification of linguistic
o
 signs. 
A “lexical” semantics dealing only with “core meanings” cannot 
accomplish this. 
 
source The object or location landmark from where some movement/motion 
proceeds. If it is an animate object landmark, traditional thematic role 
theories have to deal with the problem that this object could also be 
characterized as a causer/effector or an agent – yielding different 
predictions as to its syntactic behavior. In the present framework, 
where utterances code conceptualizations and conceptualizations are 
simulated perceptions and may be supplemented by attributions, this 
problem does not arise, since source, causer, and agent may simply 
describe different, but synchronous aspects of that object. What is 
determinative of its syntactic behavior, however, is its embeddedness in 
a whole circumstance concept. 
 
thematic role 
 
Traditionally, thematic roles are generalizations over the features of the 
argument(s) of a semantic predicate in order to capture regularities in 
the mapping between semantic and syntactic structures serving to 
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characterize the relationship between syntax and semantics as non-
accidental. The set of roles proposed mostly contain roles (or feature 
sets) that comprise spatially (e.g., theme, goal), temporally (e.g., 
extent), causally (e.g., causer), and actionally (e.g., agent) grounded 
aspects. Beyond noticing these different domains these domains are 
mostly not separately explored and explicated. In the present 
framework, all roles from all domains can be accurately reconstructed: 
spatial and temporal roles from the detailed spatio-temporal conceptual 
structure developed, causal roles from the proposal on causation 
developed, and actional roles on the basis of the action/attribution 
theory developed. The generalizations that traditional thematic roles 
allow can be reconstructed by taking into account the notion of regular 
(and inversed) conceptualization-construction mapping by means of 
diagrammatic iconicity. 
 
theme The theme is traditionally that object in a circumstance that moves. It is 
therefore often difficult to distinguish from the agent and patient roles. 
In the present framework, themes can also be reconstructed by means 
of moving objects. Though, this feature alone is not informative. In 
order to be able to make some statement as to its linguistic
o
 realization 
one must know how it is embedded in a circumstance, whether it is 
trajector or landmark, whether it undergoes some change, whether it is 
animate, whether it can be attributed responsibility or not, and so on. 
Only a sub-set of these parameters qualifies an object as a theme, 
others as an agent or a patient etc. Again, theme, patient, and agent may 
simply describe different, but synchronous aspects of the object in 
question. What is determinative of its syntactic behavior, however, is 
its embeddedness in a whole circumstance. 
 
transitivity 
 
Transitivity is mostly characterized with reference to the interplay 
between the semantics of the subject, the (grammatical) object, and the 
verb. High transitivity is mostly associated with an agentive, volitional, 
highly individuated subject, a causative verb, and a (grammatical) 
object being affected by the force exerted by the subject referent. 
Theories differ as to the precise features of the (grammatical) object. 
However, the present theory may reconstruct the notion of transitivity 
anyway: the semantics of the subject by means of mapping a 
responsible causer to the PSC, and by means of mapping a however 
conceptualized landmark on the second, oblique case-marked 
complement. The latter may undergo change of feature, position, 
integrity, and may undergo exertion of force, thus modulating the 
distinctiveness between the two objects and thus the degree of 
transitivity. From the perspective of the RCP, optimal transitivity 
would be that including a responsible causer exerting force on a 
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landmark that does not compete for the responsible causer role. It 
would thus not exhibit features licensing a dative, would certainly be 
inanimate but presumably individuated (i.e., figure-apt), and would 
lose its integrity through the force exerted by the responsible causer. 
Thus conceived, this circumstance would perfectly satisfy the 
actor/cognizer’s need for large-scale closure in that the front end and 
back end of the circumstance are definitively fixed, leaving nothing 
imponderable and uncalculable about the circumstance. 
 
truth Bearing in mind the embodied character of our cognitive activities and 
their results, as well as the fact that claims of validity for assessments 
must rely on the intersubjective traceability of how these assessments 
have come about, an objective notion of truth is not available, 
according to which those assessments are true which correspond to 
reality. Such a theory is not available, since reality is not available. The 
traditional notion of truth as correspondence must therefore be replaced 
by a notion of truth that must be produced: Truth for which one may 
claim validity is success in joint action. 
 
universality Universality with respect to the linking competence applies to cognitive 
psychological, neuroscientific, socio-cognitive, sociological, actional 
(attributional), and/or syntactic/grammatical statements that are 
claimed to be valid for all human beings supposed to possess the 
linking competence. Of all the sub-competences that have been 
discussed in this work, which of these competences or mechanisms can 
be asserted to be universally applicable? I would argue that universals 
apply only on very schematic levels: The bottom-up mechanisms of 
sensation seem to be applicable to all speakers of all languages. The 
overall conceptual operations seem to be applicable to all speakers of 
all languages. There being some attributional praxis seems to be 
applicable to the speakers of all languages. Regular conceptualization-
syntactic construction mappings seem to be applicable to all languages. 
On the other hand, languages and the speakers of these languages may 
differ with respect to how they have routinized their 
identification/categorization (is something identified as ‘plant’, ‘tree’, 
or ‘Cinnamomum loureiroi’), conceptualization, and attribution 
performances (which are the determining and determined factors 
underlying attribution), and how they have conventionalized the 
mappings between certain conceptual contents and constructions/parts 
of speech (how do they map manner and motion in circumstances to 
parts of speech? Which of the possible conceptual and actional 
differentiations are conventionalized to license passivization? To which 
degree are constructions homonymous due to the conflation of many 
conceptual differentiations in few constructions?) 
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Appendix B: SyHD materials 
 
 
1 List of the dialect regions within the borders of Hesse: 
 
dialect regions transition zones 
Northern Hessian A Northern Hessian/Central Hessian 
Northern Hessian B [Northern Hessian/Thuringian] 
Central Hessian A Northern Hessian/Eastern Hessian 
Central Hessian B Central Hessian/Moselle-Franconian A 
Eastern Hessian Central Hessian/Moselle-Franconian B 
Rhine-Franconian A Central Hessian/Moselle-
Franconian/Rhine-Franconian 
Rhine-Franconian B Central Hessian/Eastern Hessian/Eastern 
Franconian 
[Westfalian] Central Hessian/Rhine-Franconian 
[Eastfalian]  
Table AB.1:  Dialect regions within Hessian borders  
(on the basis of Wiesinger 1983) 
(Regions in angled brackets partially exhibit dative/accusative syncretisms and have been 
partialled out from the results.) 
 
 
 
 
Figure AB.1: Map of Hesse, crossfaded with dialect classification 
(on the basis of Wiesinger 1983) 
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2 Dialectal SyHD tasks (selection of dialectal variants for each scenario) 
 
Scenario D: 
 
7. Sie haben sich von einer Freundin für eine Familienfeier mehrere Gläser geliehen. Durch Willi, 
Ihren von der Grippe geschwächten Vater, ist bei der Feier eines davon zu Bruch gegangen. Als 
Sie die Gläser Ihrer Freundin zurückgeben wollen, sagen Sie zu ihr: 
 
 Bitte kreuzen Sie die Sätze an, die Sie in Ihrem Platt/Dialekt sagen können (auch 
Mehrfachnennungen sind möglich). 
  
a)          De Willi hot eens von deine Gleser rengergeschmisse. 
b)       Dem Willi es eens von deine Gleser rengergefalle. 
 
 Würden Sie den Satz normalerweise in einer Form sagen, die gar nicht aufgeführt ist? 
Wenn „ja“: Bitte notieren Sie hier den Satz so, wie Sie ihn normalerweise sagen würden: 
 
c)................................................................................................... ................................................. 
 
 Welcher Satz ist für Sie der natürlichste? 
a)  , b)   oder c)   
Northern Hessian A 
 
 
  
a)          De Willi hot aans von deine Gläser erunnergeschmisse. 
b)       Dem Willi es aans von deine Gläser erunnergefalle. 
Central Hessian A 
 
 
  
a)          Däer Willi hot eins von dinne Gläser rengergeworfe. 
b)       Dem Willi es eins von dinne Gläser rengergefalle. 
Eastern Hessian 
 
 
  
a)       Der Willi hot ans vo deine Gläser runnergeworfe. 
b)    Dem Willi es ans vo deine Gläser runnergefalle. 
Central Hessian/Moselle-Franconian A 
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Scenario B: 
 
25. Während Ihre Tochter und Ihr Schwiegersohn im Urlaub sind, kümmern Sie sich um deren 
Pflanzen. Beim Durchgehen durch die Wohnung stoßen Sie gegen den größten Pokal Ihres 
Schwiegersohnes. Er fällt herunter und ist kaputt. Als die Urlauber wiederkommen, sagen Sie zu 
Ihrem Schwiegersohn: 
 
 Bitte kreuzen Sie die Sätze an, die Sie in Ihrem Platt/Dialekt sagen können (auch 
Mehrfachnennungen sind möglich). 
  
a)    Ich ho dein Pokal ronnergewoarfe. 
b)     Mer is dein Pokal ronnergefalle. 
 
 Würden Sie den Satz normalerweise in einer Form sagen, die gar nicht aufgeführt ist? 
Wenn „ja“: Bitte notieren Sie hier den Satz so, wie Sie ihn normalerweise sagen würden: 
 
c)................................................................................................................................................... 
 
 Welcher Satz ist für Sie der natürlichste? 
a)  , b)   oder c)   
Central Hessian/Eastern Hessian/Eastern Franconian 
 
 
  
a)    Ech hon dinnen Pokal rongergeschmissen. 
b)     Me is dinn Pokal rongergefallen. 
Northern Hessian B 
 
 
  
a)    Eich hu dein Pokal ronnergeworfe. 
b)    Mir es dein Pokal ronnergefann. 
Central Hessian B 
 
 
  
a)    Ich hon dinn Pokal rengergeworfe. 
b)    Mer es dinn Pokal rengergefalle. 
North Hessian/East Hessian  
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Scenario F: 
 
13. Sie hatten zwei Wochen lang die Handwerker im Haus, die Ihnen das Bad neu kacheln sollten. 
Als die Handwerker endlich weg sind und es wieder leise im Haus ist, bemerken Sie, dass aus 
Ihrem Waschbecken eine Ecke herausgebrochen ist. Sie berichten daraufhin Ihrem Mann: 
 
 Bitte kreuzen Sie die Sätze an, die Sie in Ihrem Platt/Dialekt sagen können (auch 
Mehrfachnennungen sind möglich). 
  
a)          Die Hondwerker hawwe des Waschbegge kabudd gemoacht. 
b)       De Hondwerker is des Waschbegge kabudd gange. 
 
 Würden Sie den Satz normalerweise in einer Form sagen, die gar nicht aufgeführt ist? 
Wenn „ja“: Bitte notieren Sie hier den Satz so, wie Sie ihn normalerweise sagen würden: 
 
c)............................................................................................................... ..................................... 
 
 Welcher Satz ist für Sie der natürlichste? 
a)  , b)   oder c)   
Rhine-Franconian A 
 
 
  
a)          Die Hondwärjer häwwe des Waschbegge kabudd gemoacht. 
b)       De Hondwärjer is des Waschbegge kabudd gange. 
Rhine-Franconian B 
 
 
  
a)          De Handwerker ho de Spülsteeh kabütt gemocht. 
b)       Denn Handwerkern es de Spülsteeh kabütt gegange. 
Central Hessian/Northern Hessian 
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